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ABSTRACT
Through a study of the history and performance of successive military 
regimes, this thesis examines the role of military governments in economic 
development, particularly the creation of a market-enabling environment in Nigeria. 
The key question underlying this research is: did the policies formulated and 
implemented by the different military governments accelerate or decelerate economic, 
and concomitantly markets developments in Nigeria? . Essentially, an evaluation of 
the military governments (1966-1999), is undertaken to determine the nature of the 
linkage, if any, between regimes and economic and market development policies.
Also evaluated are two civilian governments within the relevant period, and only as a 
reference point to more effectively identify the military’s role in economic 
development.
Regime profile outlines the scope and economic effects of policies; case 
studies of the individual regimes illustrate the underlying reasons for economic 
underperformance. Measured in real terms and relative to its contribution to the 
welfare of the average citizen, the study shows that successive military governments’ 
relative economic development achievements are not commensurate with the 
magnitude of resources expended. Indeed that the decades of military regimes have 
not seen, in real terms, any significant improvements in the distribution of national 
income and wealth. Indications also are that the military structure and its paternalistic 
policy accommodation account for much of the pervasive corruption found all through 
the regimes. Also identified is the role of the institutional civil service in policy 
formulation and implementation.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
RESEARCH PROBLEMS
Due to the near non-existent political involvement of the military in governments 
of the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) prior to the mid-1960s intervention deluge, there was 
relatively little scholarly research on the role of the military either in politics or in 
economic management. That was then. However, the situation changed rather 
dramatically in the decades of 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.With the dominant presence of the 
military in governments in much of the region, it became apparent that the military is a 
critical institution in the formulation and implementation of national political and 
economic policies. Its new position and relevance have thus earned the military a new 
status, entailing a political and economic role that would be different both in scope and 
emphasis from that which it had traditionally performed.
It would appear that earlier inquiries into the role of the military in civil society 
were limited in their scope, in that the research was more concerned with coups d’etat, 
counter-coups d’etat and the reasons for the collapse of civilian regimes, than they were 
with the actual functioning of the military in the implementation of political and 
economic policies. This was attributable to the general assumption that military 
intervention was an aberration, some sort of interregnum, thus few scholars have 
attempted a detailed examination of the policy (political and economic) implications of 
military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and especially as it relates to outputs 
and outcomes. However as time progressed, a few more scholars went beyond the now 
traditional exercise of determining reasons for coups d’etat. They sought not only to
12
explain military intervention (Nordlinger, 1970; Feit, 1973; and Welch, 1974), but also to 
evaluate the performance of the military as a ruling group (McKinlay and Cohan 1975; 
Jackman 1976; Bienen 1987; and Joseph, 1987). Some scholars have attempted to 
determine the impact of party alternation on policy output and outcomes in countries of 
Western and emerging Europe (Winters, 1976; Jennings, 1979; Rose, 1980; Bunce, 1981 
and Garand, 1985). However, no detailed study has attempted to examine the policy 
implication of military alternation in power in SSA, not the least Nigeria. This thesis, 
with emphasis on economic and market development in Nigeria, is both an attempt to 
remedy these lacunae, as well as compare, and where applicable, contrast policy 
initiatives and performance levels under different military regimes.
The key issue underlying this research therefore, is to determine the extent to 
which particular military regimes impacted on overall economic development in Nigeria. 
Since military intervention in SSA is apparently the result of an inevitable need for 
change, and the introduction of something other than the status quo, does the regime 
change carry with it a harbinger: policy change? In other words, has military intervention 
brought with it positive or negative changes in the overall structure of the system, 
culminating in economic growth. Or are the political and economic structures, institutions 
and environment the precursors of such changes; and are they insensitive to regime type? 
Some analysts insist that regime type does have peculiar policy implications (Huntington 
1968), while others think not (McKinlay and Cohen, 1975). It is the goal of this study to 
explore these issues, as they relate to Nigeria, in order to determine their effects, and if 
none are found, to explain their absence.
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The other aim of this study is to evaluate if and why some regimes, and similar 
regimes at different time periods, seem to fare better than others at coping with similar 
problems, such as productivity, unemployment associated with surplus population, 
inflation, migration and the threat of economic decline, among others. It is hoped that by 
evaluatively juxtaposing regime response to similar problems or policy issues, 
important lessons may be learned. Some of these lessons may guide policy makers in 
recommending economic policy initiatives and/or alternatives that peculiarly suit the 
country’s development needs and requirements. Perhaps very importantly, they may 
highlight critical lessons for the whole of SSA countries as they seek a path to steer their 
economies out of their prevailing crisis.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Through a study of the history and performance of successive military regimes, 
this thesis examines the role of military governments in economic development, 
particularly the creation of a market-enabling environment in Nigeria. The key question 
underlying this research is: did the policies formulated and implemented by the different 
military governments accelerate or decelerate economic and concomitantly markets 
developments in Nigeria? In this regard, an evaluation of the military governments 
(1966-1999) is undertaken in order to determine their levels of performance. This study 
also attempts an evaluation of the only two civilian governments (1960-1966 and 1979- 
1983) within the period, but only as a relevant reference point to more effectively 
juxtapose any identifiable military regime performance in economic development. 
Essentially therefore, this study attempts to determine the nature of the linkage, if any, 
between regimes and economic and market development policies by specifically
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examining the following:
*The nature and impetus for military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, with 
particular emphasis on Nigeria;
*The nature and concept of economic and market development in the relativity of 
“leadership” definition, interpretation and usage, and its impact and relevance on the 
overall well being of the citizenry;
*The role, if any, of military governments in the development of economic and 
other critical sub-sectors of the market;
*The changes in regimes that are associated with shifts and emphasis on the 
patterns and structure of policy formulation and implementation;
*Based on outputs and outcomes, relative to overall revenue generation, and 
assuming equal revenue predisposition, whether socio-economic development in Nigeria 
has been less or more effective under any particular military government; and
*The extent to which changes in regimes in Nigeria have any positive or negative 
correlationships on international investment and market receptivity.
These objectives examined in the light of the effects of oil revenue (which 
accounts for over 90 per cent of national foreign exchange earnings) on the national 
economy and how oil production effectively provided either the incentive or disincentive 
towards national policies on Agriculture, Health, Education, Industries, Public Enterprise 
Sector and Foreign Investment.
The picture that emerges from this study shows that, assuming equal or relatively 
equal revenue generation capacity, none of the various military regimes in Nigeria is 
distinguishable in terms of economic policy outputs and outcomes, vis-a-vis the well­
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being of the citizenry. The difference, if any, occurred during the regimes of Generals 
Gowon and Babangida, as a result of seemingly inevitable societal developments during 
their tenure: civil war and Structural Adjustment Programme.
A broad regime profile outlines the scope and economic effects of policies; case 
studies of the individual regimes illustrate the underlying reasons for economic 
underperformance. Measured in real terms and relative to its contribution to the welfare 
of the average citizen, therefore the study shows that successive military governments’ 
relative economic development achievements are not commensurate with the magnitude 
of resources expended. Indeed, that the decades of military regimes have not seen, in real 
terms, any significant improvements in the distribution of national income and wealth. 
Indications also are that the military structure and paternalistic policy accommodation 
account for much of the pervasive corruption found all through the regimes.
This study also highlights the roles and influences, and indeed the impact, of 
multilateral institutions and international investment community sensitivities, especially 
their criticality toward military regimes. Also identified is the extremely critical, but 
barely noted, and hardly evaluated role of the institutional civil service in military 
governments’ policy formulation and implementation. Their relevance and apparent 
indispensability, on policy matters, seemingly secured by their continuity of tenure, 
during each successive regime, warrants the contention that military governments’ failure 
to engender significant economic development may not be unconnected with the pivotal 
role of the institutional civil service, as both formulator and implementor, and should 
therefore be evaluated in conjunction.
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METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE
In order to effectively evaluate the performance of the different military regimes 
in Nigeria, it is necessary that their levels of performance be compared. Two 
methodological approaches will be used to evaluate the performances of the regimes: 
qualitative and case studies.
Both methodologies will be employed because each makes a unique and valuable 
contribution in the effort to determine the impact of the military in economic 
development. The case study approach often does not, for example, allow for 
generalizations but tends “to be very sensitive to human agency and social processes in 
general” (Ragin, 1987, 35-51, 70). On the other hand, by allowing researchers to study 
more than a handful of successive regimes, who are peculiarly secretive at both limiting 
public access to information and severe at punishing breaches, the qualitative approach 
allows for deeper analysis of the underlying and particular factors that make for specific 
policy outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, the usefulness of the quantitative method is 
heavily dependent on the reliability of available data, hence the choice of the qualitative 
approach. As is the case with most countries in Africa, not the least a military regime, as 
in Nigeria, data collected are often unreliable. For this reason, the validity of some of the 
quantitative analyses on regime performance has been questioned. For example, the 
methodology used in large cross-national studies, including those by McKinlay and 
Cohan (1975) and Jackman (1976) has been criticized for their failure to consider other 
important variables, such as a nation’s natural resources, infrastructure, size, or 
geographical location. Instead these studies often depend, almost exclusively, on the 
overall economic and statistical indicators of the country under investigation (Janowitz,
17
1977).
Commenting on the limitations of quantitative analysis on military regime 
performance in Africa, Bienen (1978, 15) notes:
“There may be military characteristics, responses, orientations, 
and patterns of decision making that do not show up in cross-national 
analyses. That is, we may be able to capture some elements of military 
rule in Africa that are consequential, but we may not be able to see these 
elements in every case of African military rule, and we may not be able 
to see them via aggregate data such as growth rates, GNP, rate of urbanization, 
and literacy.”
In order to overcome such shortcomings, the qualitative and case study 
approaches would be employed. It is expected that one approach should check the biases 
of the other. “... By combining these two approaches, we can speak about processes, 
correlations, and causes, and be more confident in drawing concrete conclusions about 
the role of succession in generating policy innovation” (Bunce, 1981,39). And yet using 
both methodologies raises the possibility that the results of the two dissimilar approaches 
may be irreconcilable (Ragin, 1987, 70).
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study, like studies of this genre has its limitations. Although extensive interviews 
were conducted with senior military and civil servants during the periods 1998 and 1999, 
there were several difficulties that had to do with the insecurity of the miltary era. Apart 
from the unreliability of data, which might thus subject the cumulative finding to 
question, there was also the military security environment ( research was conducted 
during the notoriously abusive military dictatorships of Generals Babangida and Abacha) 
which made subject respondants extremely reluctant to be interviewed, apart from the 
strong insistence of anonymity. Indeed it will take some time and intensive 
methodological experimentation and reassessment to evolve a reliable process that
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adequately address the kinds of research problems associated with some regions. In the 
circumstance, the present work may not “prove” that specific policy outputs and 
outcomes are a direct consequence of a particular regime’s economic policy initiative, but 
it goes to identify policy initiatives or carry-overs that produce reasonably predictable, 
but nonetheless below projected, results. Too many other variables may intervene 
between regime decision-making and socio-economic outcomes in the country for this to 
be possible. For example, the oil boom of the 1970s, glut of the 1980s and partial 
windfall of the 1990s, all influenced and affected public policy-making in Nigeria. 
Particular regime’s performance cannot therefore be explained away without these 
variables impacting.
Notwithstanding, by combining these two methodologies, this study will provide 
evidence that there is some causal relationship between the military regime and level of 
economic development in Nigeria. The shortcomings identified above notwithstanding, 
this study should also make a meaningful contribution to the literature of comparative 
military regimes’ performance in Nigeria. It would also function as a guide for policy 
makers within (especially the emerging civilian administrations) and international 
organizations and investors who play significant roles in development and market 
activities in the country and sub-region. It is also hoped that this study would yield some 
significant insight in its contribution to economic and development policy articulation 
and implementation.
It is believed that the experience in developing countries, including Nigeria, is the 
inability of the state to fund every conceivable project, due to resource limitations. There 
must necessarily be budgetary “trade-offs” and stiff competition for scarce
19
resources.Understandable therefore is the tendency for leaders to respond first to the 
needs of their primary constituency before allocating funds to other sectors. The attempt 
in this exercise is to determine whether there is any correlation or commonality between 
regimes on the one hand and regime policy focus on the other, when it comes to priority 
over resource allocation for projects. The expectation is that by evaluating individual 
regimes and their policy preoccupation, relative to their implementation of the various 
development plans, particularly the structural adjustment programme, it is possible to 
discern and evaluate realizable and actual performance levels, based on opportunity cost.
THESIS OUTLINE 
In the first chapter is the introduction which details the general thrust of this 
research. Also introduced are the goals and underlying objectives. Also included in this 
chapter are the data sources, methodology and working hypothesis.
In chapter two is the general literature on military intervention in Africa; all in an 
attempt to explain why military intervention has become the most popular choice 
instrument in bringing about government change in the sub-region; and especially the 
circumstances leading to its occurrence in Nigeria. Also reviewed in this chapter two are 
the works of some of the more prominent scholars who have studied regime performance 
in Third World settings. Indeed, a preliminary review of the literature indicates that 
considerable disagreement exists among scholars regarding policy consequences between 
civilians and military regimes.
In chapter three, is examined the theories and concepts of development. An 
evaluations of the different schools of thought reveal how they equally enhance and 
contradict practical relevant applications of the different concepts of development. Their
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relevance and practicability to the Nigerian environment is also explored.
Chapter four is a background of Nigeria’s geography, followed by the state of the 
economy and development processes from early colonial administration, the first 
republic, and up till the first military intervention in 1966. The focus is on how policy 
initiatives, and prioritization, including at the regional levels, impacted on a rapidly 
growing population in terms of income distribution, employment and migration patterns.
Following a description of capacity building and the state of the business 
environment in Nigeria, chapter five deals with the structural patterns of the changing 
environment of business including the legal, social, and economic impact on national 
economic development.
In chapter six is examined the introduction, structure and nature of the first 
military administration, its policy initiatives and implementation outcomes. Along the 
same vein is articulated the implications of disproportionate budgetary allocations in 
favour of military priorities, as against improvements in social and economic sub-sectors 
Areas specially addressed, because of their significance and the fact that theorists 
consider them intrinsically critical and indispensable, are Enterprise Development, 
Agriculture, Education and Manufacturing (Meier and Stiglitz, 2001).
In chapter seven, an attempt is made to evaluate the policy initiatives and process 
implementation of the second military administration, flowing directly from the inherited 
policies of the first; with a view to determining whether there are any correlations or 
commonalities between the two regimes. The expectation is that by evaluating regime’s 
performance, relative to policy articulation and implementation, preferences if any, 
would be identifiable.
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Following a brief description of the emergence of the second republic, which was 
relatively brief and un-cohesive in policy articulation, formulation and implementation, 
chapter eight introduces the economic development thrust of the civilian administration, 
especially the patrimonial orientation of its structure and institutions. This chapter also 
explores the states’ (regional) party framework, which was very susceptible to a corrupt 
political process and economic mismanagement, culminating in the fall of the second 
republic.
Chapter nine introduces the third military administration; and focuses on the 
economic and political circumstances that led to its emergence, which subsequently 
informed the regime’s policies, especially its economic emergency relief initiatives. Also 
discussed in this chapter are the peculiarities of the regime’s tenure and the levels of its 
institutional and structural initiatives, which characterized its relatively short tenure. Also 
evaluated are the regime’s policy impact, outputs and outcomes, and the managerial 
inflexibilities that precipitated its demise.
Chapter ten examines the fourth military administration and the very huge 
implications of its policy (economic and political) initiatives. Especially significant are 
two critical components of its policy initiatives: the structural adjustment programme and 
the political transition programme. Performance evaluations reveals a poorly articulated, 
yet most ambitious, radical, but extremely corrupt, and grossly mismanaged 
implementation process that failed to produce even a modicum of projected results.
Policy impact, outputs and outcomes, are also evaluated.
In chapter eleven is introduced what may be characterized as a default military 
intervention, following the collapse of the Babangida-contrived Interim National
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Government; effectively heralding the fifth military administration. Apart from reviewing 
the administration’s signature economic development initiative, Vision 2010, this chapter 
also evaluates the political and economic policy focus of the administration, especially 
those initiatives that were deliberately structured, less for economic and market 
development and more for the political self-succession of the military leadership. Also 
evaluated are the policy impact, outputs and outcomes, of performance. Also discussed in 
this chapter is the brief, but eventful life span of the sixth and last military regime. Its 
policy initiatives and emphasis, especially the economic impact of the political transition 
programme that culminated in the introduction of the popularly elected civilian 
administration of president Olusegun Obasanjo.
In the final chapter, an attempt is made to draw together and analyze the findings 
of the preceding chapters as they relate to regime performance and their impact on 
economic development policy. More importantly, an attempt is made to provide some 
explanations for the sensitivity or insensitivity of policy outputs and outcome to regime 
type. In the process the impact of environmental constraints (domestic institutions and 
social ethics) on the formulation and implementation of public policies are evaluated.
The other important constraint evaluated is the impact of the international environment 
(economic and political) on policies. Thus the role of developed countries, the 
international market place, and multilateral Institutions and donor organizations as they 
impact national policy is examined. Also evaluated in this final chapter is the role of the 
institutional civil service in policy articulation, formulation and implementation.
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DATA COLLECTION/SOURCES
The collection and analysis of data (including case studies) was a significant 
phase of this study. It did not only provide the evaluative source material, enabling the 
tracking of ‘‘cause and effects”, it also made possible a framework for retrospective 
analysis of interconnected, even if distinct, features of the various military governments, 
allowing for a more critical evaluation of their concepts and notions of development. It 
also enabled some evaluative generalizability for individual military regime’s concepts 
and levels of performance. Most importantly, it made possible the carrying out of this 
study to completion.
The bulk of the information (included in the qualitative analysis)used in this study 
was derived from case studies and other related public documents, but most notably: 
GOVERNMENT ANNUAL BUDGETS FROM 1960-1999; NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS/NATIONAL ROLLING PLANS 1962-1999 (NDP/NRP); 
DIGESTS OF STATISTICS PUBLISHED BY FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS; 
NIGERIA ENTERPRISES PROMOTION DECREE; WHITE PAPER NATIONAL 
POLICY ON EDUCATION 1963-1993; LAND USE DECREE; NIGERIA 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND STRATEGY: GUIDELINES TO INVESTORS 
(FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRESS, LAGOS).
Government Annual Budgets from 1960-1999, National Development Plans 
(covering 1st, 3rd and 4,h from 1962-1968,1970-74,1975-80 and 1981-1985 
respectively) and the National Rolling Plans (1st 1990 -  1992), all provided a functional 
framework for retrospective analysis of each of the military governments, and their 
individual objectivity (or subjectivity) in national decision making process as it relates to
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specific development policies and goals embodied in their annual budgets and National 
Development Plans or National Rolling Plan, as applicable to each military 
administration).
The NDP, and to a limited extent the NRP, functioned as the primary source, from 
which government annual budgets and all other significant policy initiatives and/or 
directives (for example, the Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Decree, National Policy on 
Education, Industrial Policy and Strategy etc) emerge. The evaluation and assessment of 
both the NDP and NRP therefore provides both a quantitative and qualitative “mirror of 
understanding” in the process application. The Digest of Statistics published by the 
Federal Office of Statistics functions both as the “tracker” and provider of the statistical 
figures, numbers on which government heavily depend in making positive or negative 
evaluations on its economic performance. And because this source is one of the main 
sources (the others being the Economic and Financial Review, and Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts, complied by the Central Bank of Nigeria) the World Bank and 
the IMF depend on for statistical data on Nigeria, its only prudent to rely on its 
authenticity for this study. To do otherwise would essentially create inconsistencies and 
discrepancies in the overall premise of this exercise.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MILITARY, COUPS D’ETAT AND REGIME CHANGE IN 
SUB-SAHARAH AFRICA 
INTRODUCTION
The general belief is that the military institution is one whose only role is that of 
protecting the nation-state, particularly its security needs (Huntington, 1972). It therefore 
has no place in the civil administration of the country. When the military became a 
dominant presence in the governance of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, their 
involvement promptly raised issues that included appropriateness, legitimacy and 
relevance. But perhaps more important is whether any cultural, social, political and 
economic necessities or peculiarities justify such role reversal; especially, when such 
seemingly temporary engagements or interferences assume a permanent feature. It is the 
aim of this chapter to explore some of the questions raised, and to determine their 
possible significance.
MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THEORETICAL ROLE IN A NATION 
STATE
There is this persistently recurring question as to the proper role and place of the 
military in a nation-state. The prevailing suggestion is that an appropriate role is one 
dictated by the military’s “natural” responsibilities to the state. That is one premised on 
three interrelated and complementary responsibilities, anchored as it were, on mandatory 
and unwavering obedience to the legally constituted democratic government, whatever its 
type or system. For the military that entails proper and appropriate representation, 
practical advisory functions, and effective executory responsibilities. According to
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Samuel P. Huntington:
“The military has first, a representative function, to represent the claims of 
military security within the state machinery. He must keep the authorities of 
the state informed as to what he considers necessary for the minimum military 
security of the state in the light of capabilities of other powers.. .second the 
military has an advisory function, to analyze and to report on the implications 
of alternative courses ofstate action from the military point of view.. .finally the 
military has an executive function, to implement state decisions with respect to 
military security, even if it is a decision which runs violently counter to his military 
judgement...”(1972, 72).
This patently docile and “conventionally” ascribed role for the military vis-a-vis 
the politician in a nation state may also be explained away from the traditional French 
Civil Law on the matter, as reflected upon by M. Duguit. He claims, “The military must 
be a passive tool in the hands of government. The latter can only fulfill its mission if it 
has the military completely at its disposal, so that the government may use it as an 
unconscious material force. This excludes all possibility of military leaders in any way 
refusing to comply with governmental orders... The state would no longer exist if 
military leaders were allowed to question its orders. The ideal armed force would be one 
that government could activate simply by pressing a button” (Raoul Girardet, 1962, 121). 
This contention essentially presupposes a fundamental exclusion of the military from 
politics and other civil participation and its potentially discipline-eroding consequences. 
In effect, a de facto, prohibition on partisan political involvement or interference by the 
military.
This apparent presumptuous subordination of military power to the authority of a 
legally constituted civil government lacks substantive basis both in reason and reality, for 
as Samuel E. Finer points out, even though “there is a common assumption, an 
unreflecting belief, that it is somehow ‘natural’ for the armed forces to obey civil 
power.. .no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, in
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fact, ‘natural’ ” (1975, 4). Indeed the political advantages of the military in relation to the 
civil structures and institutions are of overwhelming superiority and relatively efficient 
manageability. Its superior peculiar features include central command, hierarchy, 
discipline, intercommunication and espirit de corps and a corresponding isolation and 
self-sufficiency (Finer, 1975, 6)
From Finer’s point of view therefore, the surprise really is that the military, 
inspite of its superior institutional and organizational attributes, has somehow acquiesced 
to this subordinate role (1975, 5). This acquiescence may be better understood from the 
professional orientation of the military’s officer corps -  its core and indispensable 
competent component. According to some opinion, the officer, as opposed to the enlisted 
man, is a specialist who is peculiarly expert at directing the application of violence under 
certain prescribed conditions (Huntington, 1972, 17). His professional expertise in the 
“management of violence” imposes upon him a special social responsibility to use his 
professionalism solely for the benefit of the state, his client. The military profession is 
therefore monopolized by the state, and the military overriding responsibility is the 
military security of his client, the state (society). And because society has a continuing, 
direct and general interest in the employment of this skill for the enhancement of its own 
military security, the promiscuous employment of this expertise for military’s own 
advantage must be prohibited, so as not to wreck the fabric of the society.
It would appear that the military functions purely from professional 
motivation, unadulterated and uncorrupted by other considerations, including economic. 
Clearly he does not act primarily from economic incentives. It is believed that in Western 
society, the vocation of officership is not well rewarded monetarily nor is his behaviour
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within his profession governed by economic rewards and punishments. . .The 
motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social 
obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society.. .since not regulated by economic 
means, however the officer requires positive guides, spelling out his responsibilities to his 
fellow officers, his subordinates, his superiors, and the state he serves. His behaviour 
within the military structure is governed by a complex mass of regulations, customs, and 
traditions. His behaviour in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can 
only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state” 
(Huntington 1972, 15-16). Given the experience of countries in much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA)— Nigeria, Ghana, Somalia, Liberia, Republic of Congo, etc —  it is 
doubtful whether the same is true of their military.
It is also this level of professional expertness embodied in social responsibilities 
and corporate loyalty that persuades the officer to immerse himself^herself in his/her own 
technical tasks -  management and organization of violence -  and less involved in any 
policy issues that do not affect him militarily. Huntington maintains that the logical 
consequence is for the officer corps to leave politics (and mechanisms of state 
governance) to politicians. The officers’ own responsibility becomes increasingly 
confined to representing the requirements of the military to the civilian authorities, giving 
advice to them, and, finally, when so charged, executing their decisions (Huntington, 
1972).
On the other hand, the existence of Nation-States and their proper functioning 
within a stable civil order is the preoccupation, or raison d'etre of any civil government. 
And the existence of the military profession depends upon the presence and viability of a
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nation-state, capable of maintaining a military establishment and desiring to maintain 
such an institution because of possible threats to state security. It would seem that herein 
lies the mutual-dependency argument: that for their individual, independent and viable 
survival, they both must rely on the support system and structure of each another. In a 
manner of speaking therefore, some kind of need complementarities is to be found in the 
civilian-military relationship in a modern society.
It is along the lines of this contextual inevitability or unavoidability that a 
civilian-military relationship can best be appreciated, which essentially is national and 
institutional security. For the military therefore, its role must be to maintain and save the 
state against various external threats and internal subversion and insane strife, thus 
enabling the civil government to secure and maintain stable social, economic and 
political institutions that enhance societal well-being and national prosperity, manifesting 
in growth and (economic) development.
LEGAL FORM AND POLITICAL REALITY: THE COLLAPSE OF 
SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY 
IN THE BODY POLITY.
The concept of military professionalism and its presumed attendant unwavering 
obligation and obedience of non-political involvement or participation to its client, the 
state, ought to as well presuppose a corresponding professionalism and unwavering 
obligation and responsible accountability on the part of the politician to his client, the 
. state.
There is this prevailing notion, misconstrued and misrepresented, albeit 
popularized by the professional politician, to the effect that the political representatives of
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state (civil government) are an indistinguishable and inseparable component of the state. 
In other words, that the politician in civil government does not just function in a 
representative capacity for his client, the state, and should therefore hold office during 
“good behaviour” and at “the pleasure” of the state, but that the politician is himself the 
state. And that his conducts and actions, inseparable from the state, must not be queried 
when executed in the name of the state, since like the abstraction “state”, he can do no 
wrong and must not therefore be subjected to possible reprimand and/or any levels of 
public accountability. The military profession, on the other hand, the argument goes, 
must hold “natural” obedience and responsibility to the state and, by implication, to the 
politician. This seemingly unwarranted presumptuousness on the part of the civil 
government is thought to be as unpersuasive as it is disingenuous.
It would appear however that between the politicians and the military, there exists 
what ought rightly be professional participants in the conduct of state’s affairs; and to 
whom they both owe absolute, equal and corresponding responsibilities by taking the 
oath of allegiance to the Constitution. These professional participants who institutionally 
wear the distinguishable structure of the political party in government, on the one hand, 
and the national military establishment, on the other, must function from the primacy of 
national (state) interest. They are “... to support the laws of the country. This means to 
sustain, protect, and defend the institutions in force and the current form of the state” 
(Finer, 1975, 26). Indeed it would appear that the military’s “natural” obedience and 
loyalty is one that inures to the sovereign (state) and not the politician/party per se. This 
contention also suggests that the soldier/military stands in “natural” obedience to any 
civilian administration (representative of state), which secures legitimate sovereign
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authority expressed in the will of the people, through free and secret elections held at 
regular intervals. For the military however, it is a duty to protect the sovereign’s (state’s) 
interest, and not that of the politician or party per se. To imply otherwise, would not only 
be tantamount to an unwarranted and illegal subordination of the state’s interest, even as 
a farfetched proposition, its consequences are too dangerous to contemplate. General 
MacArthur denounced what he believed to be in existence, “a new and heretofore 
unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary 
allegiance to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of 
Government, rather than to the country and its constitution which they are sworn to 
defend”(Huntington, 1972, 353).
To imply an equally valid and relevant separation of functions between 
institutions of state (namely the politician and the military) presupposes a corresponding 
obligation of responsible accountability in their separate roles, which must be held 
sacrosanct to the preservation of the nation-state, in whose name and on whose behalf the 
different contending institutions claim to act. Simply put, it obligates that in all matters of 
national relevance, to act in the best interest of the nation-state (the sovereign) and the 
preservation of its corporate existence from acts or conducts which may threaten or 
imminently appear to threaten its continued existence.
It is not particularly surprising therefore that almost in all cases and in all 
countries where the military has intervened, it has claimed to act in the national 
(sovereign) interest. The military, “see it as a duty to arbitrate or veto. They feel 
authorized to exercise it when some convulsion or decision of the civil authorities seems 
to them to threaten what they think are permanent interests of the state. In this conception
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the armed forces are not to merge into the public authorities but to remain distinct and 
outside them but with the power to intervene against them” (Finer, 1975, 31). It is this 
perception that persuades the military’s seemingly self-assigned “manifest destiny” role 
in countries with military intervention experiences. It is in this “assigned”, “moderator 
role”, that the military in Pakistan headed by General Pervez Musharraf and in Cote 
d’Ivoire headed by General Robert Guei recently, (1999) sacked the elected governments 
of Presidents Nawa Sheriff and Henri Konan Bede respectively.
Although “national interest” is a usage phenomenally susceptible to all kinds of 
subjective interpretation, and therefore open to gross abuse, it is the case that in the 
majority of the countries with what Finer described as “low political culture” (1975, 4-6), 
the military has always intervened to secure or redeem tottering social, political or 
economic institutions on the verge of complete disintegration. And almost always, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), they have been warmly received, on intervening, 
as “rescuing patriots”. For indeed, there seems to be something inexplicably uninspiring 
about the political class in much of SSA, that in its unbridled public corruption and 
reckless mismanagement of state (national) affairs, it seems to hold out a perpetual and 
continuing invitation to the military to intervene (B.N. Ayittey, 1992, 136-139; The 
Economist, May 22, 1999, 52).
It would appear however that what happens to the military after its initial 
“corrective” intervention is the blatant “corruptiveness” of its tenure, as they, in the 
words of Finer, “fall in love with the power that has come so easily, and to convert their 
‘interim’ regimes into full-blooded rule by the army,” (1975, 32), thus unabashly 
manifesting another vested consideration for intervention, perhaps more apparent than
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national interest preservation, which appears to be corporate self-interest and preservation 
of the military and its officer corps. Few countries’ military so perfectly fit these replete 
circumstances as those of the Nigerian military. With its debatable first invitation to 
intervene, (Aguiyi-Ironsi, 1966; Richard Akinjide, 2000; Prince Nwafor Orizu 1997) in 
the face of what seemed an imminent national disintegration in 1966. Nigeria has known 
ten attempted and successful coups d’etat and counter-coups d’etat in its forty years of 
independence. Twice has the military organized coups d’etat against civil 
administrations, which it blamed for gross ineptitude, political intolerance, corruption and 
economic mismanagement. If its stated reasons for initial intervention are anything to go 
by, the number of coups d’etat and counter-coups d’etat the Nigerian military either 
attempted or successfully executed against itself seems patently unreasonable and 
unjustifiable. They can only be explained in purely selfish terms, and very insignificantly 
on national security interest reasons. Indeed some seem rather too obvious. Some were 
either due to an assumed “right” of succession (General Sani Abacha) coup in November, 
1993 or to protect interests perceived to be threatened (General Ibrahim Babangida) coup 
in August, 1985.
JUSTIFYING MILITARY INTERVENTION
The very debatable issue is whether, given the prescribed constitutional role of the 
military as guardian of nation-state security, it has any role to play in the displacement of 
erring or mindlessly corrupt elected civilian government; even a civilian government 
whose actions or conducts bring the nation-state to the brink of possible disintegration. In 
dealing with the reasons or rationale for military intervention anywhere in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and especially Nigeria, a number of issues need be determined. One, evaluate the
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reasons(s) commonly canvassed by the various military interventionists for their 
involvement. Two, rationalize whether the prevailing social, political and economic 
situation in the country at the material time, justify such intervention. And three 
determine whether there exists at the crucial time (of intervention) an alternative more 
viable and constitutionally appropriate than direct military intervention.
Firstly, there are a few instances where the military took over power, or attempted 
to take over power, purely for selfish reasons (Ghana, 1966; Sudan, 1957; Nigeria, 1985 
and 1993; Cote d’Ivoire, 1999).
Pathetically, the political class in much of the developing world is anything but a 
representative, and accountable stewards of the people. According to some 
commentators, it has collectively shown a level of corruption and prodigality that calls 
into serious question the meaning and social relevance of political leadership and socio­
economic responsibility (Ayittey, 1992; Economist, May 22, 1999) In government, it 
seems to have functioned from a level of mindless corruption and lawlessness that what 
passes for democratic civilian government may as well be, and indeed seems, organized 
social and economic mismanagement, designed solely for the vandalization and 
scandalization of national economy and institutions. This sense and atmosphere of social 
disorganization and imminent economic doom is usually so absolute and infectious that 
the system completely breaks down. It is against this background that most countries’ 
failure at democratic experiment in the sub-region, and indeed Nigeria’s failure at first 
and second democratic experiment, should be viewed. However, the predominant 
contention has always been that extremely few exceptional circumstances justify military 
intervention, if it can be justified at all.
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The prevalent argument against intervention is that a democratically elected 
civilian government traditionally has limited duration of tenure. And that a non­
performing one, and especially a very corrupt one, will face the electorate in new 
elections, at the end of their term and the real possibility of being voted out of office 
makes military intervention unnecessary. This argument presupposes regularity and 
fairness in universal suffrage in the process implementation, in which eligible electorates 
express their will in a free and fair election. It is believed, and indeed The Economist 
notes, that “rests upon the simple and now more or less universally accepted principle 
that the government should stay in office only with the continuing consent of the people 
it governs” (February 24, 2001, ppl7-18). Where this process works, without interference 
and manipulation, there would be absolutely no justification for intervention. But the 
states of affairs in much of the countries with military intervention experience tend to 
suggest that political corruption and wanton electoral rigging hinder the regularity of this 
process. That was the case in Nigeria under President Shehu Shagari in 1983 and in Cote 
d’Ivoire under President Henry Konan Bede in 2000.
In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the countries of Africa, especially 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), have seen more military intervention than they have normal 
transitory electoral process. When normal democratic changes in the process become 
impossible, because of corrupt and insensitive civilian governments or monarchs, military 
intervention aimed at change becomes the only readily available alternative. The 
frequency and rapidity of the occurrence between 1952 and 1966 gave the phenomenon 
the semblance of “normal” change, akin to process transition in a regular democracy 
anywhere else in the democratic world.
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(SUB) REGIONAL OVERVIEW AND FACTORS IN MILITARY 
INTERVENTION
In Africa, direct military intervention first occurred in Egypt in 1952 when 
General Muhammad Naguib and his loyal officers toppled King Farouk. This was 
followed by what seemed a replication exercise in Sudan in 1958 when General Ahmad 
Abdal Wahab overthrew the government of Abd Allah Khalil. The general political 
situation in the sub-region shortly thereafter was relatively stable and uneventful in what, 
now in retrospect, seems like the uneasy calm that comes before a storm. For, in quick 
succession, between 1965 and 1966, military governments became the norm rather than 
the exception in much of the sub-region. The military took over in Zaire (Republic of 
Congo) (November, 1965), Dahomey (Republic of Benin) (December, 1965), Upper 
Volta (Burkina Faso), Central African Republic and Nigeria (January, 1966), and Ghana 
(February, 1966). Crawford Young (1982), commenting on the prevalence of military 
intervention in the sub-region had this to say:
“When it became apparent that political monopolies guaranteeing 
incumbents indefinite prolongation of their mandates were becoming 
the rule, disaffection flowed into new channels, particularly the military.
Although initially not perceived as such, the fiend of military coup as a 
vehicle for ruler replacement began in Egypt in 1952, moved to Sudan (1956), 
occurred half-heartedly in Zaire (1960), Benin (1963) and Togo (1963), and 
then became an institutionalized pattern with rapid fire sequence of putsches 
in 1965-66 (Algeria, Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, Central African Republic, Benin)...”
By the time Nigeria gained independence in October 1960, over eighteen (18) 
countries in the sub-region had also gained independence from their colonial authorities. 
Table 2.1 shows the list of countries in the region and the dates they attained 
independence.
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(Table 2.1)
Dates of Independence of Sub-Saharan African States in Chronological Order of
Independence
Sudan 1 January 1956
Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) 6 March 1956
Guinea 2 October 1958
Cameroon 1 January 1960
Togo 27 April 1960
Mali 20 June 1960
Senegal 20 June 1960
Madagascar 26 June 1960
Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo) 30 June 1960
Somalia 1 July 1960
Benin (formerly Dahomey) 1 August 1960
Niger 3 August 1960
Burkina Faso (Formerly Upper Volta) 5 August 1960
Cote d’Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) 7 August 1960
Chad 11 August 1960
Central African Republic 13 August 1960
The Congo (People’s Republic) 15 August 1960
Gabon 17 August 1960
Nigeria 1 October 1960
Mauritania 28 November 1960
Sierra Leone 27 April 1961
Tanzania (as Tanganyika) 9 December 1961
Rwanda 1 July 1962
Burundi 1 July 1962
Uganda 9 October 1962
Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania) 10 December 1963
Kenya 12 December 1963
Malawi 6 July 1964
Zambia 24 October 1964
The Gambia 18 February 1965
Botswana 30 September 1966
Lesotho 4 October 1966
Mauritius 12 March 1968
Swaziland 6 September 1974
Equatorial Guinea 12 October 1968
Guinea-Bissau 10 September 1974
Mozambique 25 June 1975
Cape Verde 5 July 1975
The Comoros *6 July 1975
S ao Tome and Principe 12 July 1975
Angola 11 November 1975
Djibouti 25 June 1977
Seychelles 27 June 1977
Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia)
Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1988, p. 79.
*Date of unilateral declaration of independence.
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For the newly independent states, expectations were high and optimism was rather 
contagious, as the rest of the international community envisioned a bright and stable 
future for the rest of the sub-region. Unfortunately, the majority of these emergent 
democracies would subsequently perpetrate a coup culture shortly after independence. It 
was especially so for Nigeria. For as Yusufu (1996, 42) would comment, “...Nigeria was, 
within the international community, a much beloved nation on which hopes were pinned 
for the rise of a giant African economy and civilization...But alas! Nigeria does stand 
today as a ‘Giant in the Tropics’. But it appears to be more of a very sick giant, being 
devoured hollow from within, by the cancerous disease of uneconomic cultures, 
individual and social insecurity, carefree and corrupt pseudo-elitism, unfulfilled 
educational and technological hopes.”
The structure and composition of the military at independence for virtually all of
these newly emergent independent countries was such that the military was seen purely in
the light of its “colonial holdover” status, and was not even regarded with political
curiosity or significance. Apart from Sudan, (where there had been a coup d’etat in 1958
and where the British had indeed provided indigenous soldier military training since
1918) “... none of the sub-Saharan African states has an army capable of exerting a
political role...” (Coleman, 1960, 313-314). Ghana had only 10 per cent of its officer
corps indigenized at the time of independence in 1957. And for the Republic of Congo, at
the time of independence in 1960, there did not exist one single African officer in the
Force Publique of more than 24,000 men (Gutteridge, 1975, 6-7).
In this prevailing state of affairs therefore, the military was neither thought of nor 
regarded as a threat. The thinking and general belief was that no patriotic citizen or group 
could be audaciously disruptive of a prospective future, as to stop or slow the progress 
and dividend which democracy and free participation was supposed to engender. It was 
inconceivable therefore for any body or group to slow or prevent the acceleration of the
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development of needed infrastructure and services like roads, railways, schools, 
communication, electricity, pipe-borne water, etc.
In Nigeria, for example, the military was regarded with such a level of irrelevance 
and inconsequentiality that nationalists like Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe contemplated a new democratic dispensation without any serious regard to the 
military in what was then conceived of as the “non-militarization” of Nigeria.
It has been suggested that the military’s participatory role, even though seemingly 
imposed by duty under the colonial administration, in the suppression of nationalist 
independence movements, may have informed such general negative sentiment. For as 
Gutteridge would observe:
“There had been a legacy of fear and distrust of soldiers in many African countries. 
Nationalist politicians saw them (soldiers) as agents of imperial rule suppressing 
political demonstrations and protecting European property. Though they had won 
glory by serving overseas in the two world wars, their imperial activities caused 
them to be regarded in some quarters as armies of occupation or at best as 
mercenaries in the service of foreign powers” (1975, 6).
However the circumstances and conditions for military intervention have varied widely in
the sub-region. Even then, there appears to be a recurring commonality that has been
consistent for virtually all of the countries. Examinations of these common traits are
profoundly revealing (Welch and Smith, 1974). They include: civilian leadership failure,
lacunae and structural weakness of existing political institutions, failure of existing
regimes to gain legitimacy, economic factors, military factors, cultural pluralism,
personal and foreign factors.
CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP FAILURE 
A number of coups d’etat have resulted from a desire to remedy the failure of 
civilian leadership, like in Nigeria (Buhari, Federal Ministry of Information, 1984).
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Where civilian government’s activities and performance are adjudged by the military to 
be inconsistent with national goals and aspirations, it may intervene to remedy what it 
deems inappropriate. In 1969 for example, Somalia soldiers under the leadership of 
Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre, following the murder of the civilian President Dr. 
Rashid Ali Shermarke by a police officer, seized control of government. And after they 
seized power, to a far greater extent than the previous civilian government, they pursued 
a policy of mass mobilization (Wiking 1983, 30).
It has been suggested that a regime’s performance failures are an important factor 
in explaining the timing of an intervention (Karl Maier, 2000). “Opportunities to 
intervene occurred in many forms-widespread strikes or demonstration against the 
government, severe economic difficulties, the undesired dependence of the government 
upon the armed forces to maintain control over a rapidly deteriorating situation” (Welch, 
1970, VIII). In Sierra Leone for example, President Siaka Stevens ruled the country from 
1968 to 1985, heading a regime so larcenous that Sierra Leoneans called it the “17-year 
plague of locusts” (Washington Post, May 14, 2000, Bi -B2). To all intents and purposes, 
the government had stopped functioning, due to uncontrollable corruption, when young 
officers led by 26 years-old Captain Valentine Strasser, overthrew the administration he 
bequeathed to his handpicked successor, General Joseph Momoh. “Eventually, his 
government was unable to pay civil servants, police and schoolteachers” (Washington 
Post, 2000).
It has also been suggested that the civilian leadership’s use of the military to cope 
with political situations (like riots, strikes and communal clashes), only serve to intensify 
the political role of the military at the expense of civilian authority. Extensive
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dependence on the military to maintain control not only reveal the weakness of civilian 
authority but also encourages the military to believe that its intervention is indispensable 
to political stability (Liebenow 1986, 247-248). Coups d’etat in Zaire (1965) and Nigeria 
(1965) appear to meet these general criteria.
LACUNAE AND STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS OF 
EXISTING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
According to Huntington (1968, 4) military intervention results from the inability 
of existing political institutions to keep pace with the rapid mobilization of new groups 
into politics. When existing political institutions become strained due to the demands 
placed upon them by newly mobilized members of the society, the outcomes often are 
increased political violence. Where normal political channels and processes can no longer 
attend and accommodate citizens’ demand, they find expression through other means, 
such as demonstrations, strikes, and as far as the military is concerned, coups d’etat.
The military intervention in Ethiopia in 1974 presents a classical case of how an 
inadequate political institution can encourage a coup d’etat. There was the failure of the 
attempted land reform in 1967-69, which in part was due to the obstructionist influence 
of wealthy and conservative landlords, who to all intents and purposes, were the ruling 
class. There was also the drought of 1972 which gave impetus to the civilians and 
military alike that change can only come from without existing institutional structures 
(Schwab 1979, 125 - 135). The refusal and/or failure of government to address these 
existing pressing issues looked like an open invitation to the military.
That invitation was further extended when soldiers in a small garrison in remote 
southeast Ethiopia, reacting to poor food, shortage of drinking water, amidst rising prices 
and unemployment, demanded higher salaries. Neither the government nor the Emperor
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reprimanded the limited military rebellion they executed. The Emperor would appease 
the military by hastily replacing the Prime Minister, and promising his new responsibility 
and accountability to parliament. The military which, by now had, formed a secret 
coordinating committee (to be known subsequently as the Dergue) announced that the 
armed forces would no longer automatically take instructions from the Prime Minister, 
even as they affirmed their obedience to the monarch. By the time the coup leaders 
finally strangled Emperor Haile Selassie to death on September 12, 1974, and formally 
proclaimed the end of the monarchy and the resumption of a full blown military 
government, over 50 members of the royal family, ministers, generals and dignitaries of 
the imperial government had been summarily executed (Cutter, 1998, 168-169; 
Cartwright 1983, 271-272; Ottaway and Ottaway, 1978).
Due to tribal/ethnic structures and the ideological learning of the political parties 
that emerged in post-colonial sub-Sahara Africa, lacking as it were, a truely national 
representation, a climate of disagreement and squabbling along tribal or ethic lines was 
festering and indeed an invitation for the military to intervene. For Liebenow (1986), the 
inherent weakness of African political parties also fosters a climate in which military 
intervention can occur. With a few exceptions, political parties in post-colonial Africa 
have lacked organizational strength, even as the politicians themselves are not regarded 
as being particularly inspiring {The Economist, May 22, 1999, 52). Liebenow, (1986, 
240-241) believes also that this weakness is due, in part, to the obstructionist policies and 
practices of colonial administrators, which made it difficult for African civilian 
politicians to acquire the organizational skills needed to create and manage viable 
political parties.
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Even where strong and potentially viable parties did exist, like in Nigeria, they 
tended to be oriented toward a specific regional or ethnic cluster. In Nigeria, the National 
Council of Nigeria, and Cameroon, later to be renamed National Council of Nigerian 
Citizen (N.C.N.C) was a predominantly eastern, (tribally Igbo) party; the Action Group 
(AG) was a predominantly western (tribally Yoruba) party; while the Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) was a predominantly northern (tribally Hausa/Fulani) party. Indeed with 
the possible exception of a few countries, there are no truely national (in the sense of 
representation) parties in Africa. And as Liebenow (1986, 241) points out, civilian 
leadership has endured only in a handful of countries (Cameroon, Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zambia) where broad, cross-cultural political parties have been successfully created. 
Apart from these countries however, there are a few others, which although they lack 
broad-based political parties, have nonetheless been able to maintain durable civilian 
regimes. These include Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Senegal and Gabon.
While in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, relative civilian regime durability has in 
part to do with the antecedental circumstances of the struggle for independence, in 
Senegal and Gabon, it has to do with a combination of external military support and 
sensitive temperamental disposition of the political leadership. In Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, the parties that ultimately became the ruling party had assumed a military 
posture, since their campaigns were largely of a military nature during their struggle for 
independence. They were therefore able to, on attainment of independence, and with 
better appreciation of military sensibilities, take steps to isolate the military wings of their 
organizations from political affairs and active participation. It would appear that the 
militaries in these countries (Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambiq, etc) have not had both the
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reason and occasion to step into the political sphere to settle social or political issues of 
competing vested interests.
In Gabon and Senegal on the other hand, civilian rule has prevailed because of the 
presence of French intervention forces stationed in the area, as well as the temperamental 
disposition of both Leopold Sedar Senghor and Abdou Diouf of Senegal towards political 
accommodation. In perhaps one of the most orderly transfers of power in post-colonial 
Africa, President Senghor would, for reasons of old age, resign his office on 31 
December 1980. Just as President Diouf, would uneventfully concede defeat to 
Abdoulaye Nade in a run-off to presidential election held March 2000; another rare 
occurrence in the sub-region. The government of President Omar Bongo in Gabon has 
prevailed only by the grace of French troops stationed in the region (The Economist, 
March 25, 2000, 6; Cutter, 1998, 57 - 59 or 98 - 99; Liebenow 1986; 241 - 242).
FAILURE OF EXISTING REGIMES TO GAIN LEGITIMACY
It has been argued that “the ease with which the armed forces assume political 
power varies inversely with the legitimacy enjoyed by the existing civilian government” 
(Welch and Smith, 1974, 26-30) And since authentic government functions from 
legitimacy, loss of (legitimacy) operates as an open invitation to the military elite to 
intervene.
By the time the military sacked the government of President Shehu Shagari in the 
early hours of December 31, 1983, the administration had completely lost its legitimacy. 
The four years of Shagari’s administration witnessed a rapid deterioration of economic, 
social and political conditions in Nigeria. These deteriorating conditions were neither 
addressed nor regarded. Besides, the presidential elections in August 1983 were allegedly
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“rigged”, and the public perception of the government was one of irrelevance and 
illegitimacy. The leader of one of the opposition parties the United Party of Nigeria 
(UPN), Chief Obafemi Awolowo, would later comment that the Shagari-led National 
Party of Nigeria’s (NPN) electoral fraud was “vote-rigging of a scale unprecedented in 
African history”. 1 The Nigerian experience would lend credence to the proposition that 
the military is more likely to intervene in politics where the existing regime lacks 
legitimacy.
ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY INTERVENTION
No single factor is as important as economic condition, in the encouragement of 
m ilitary intervention in sub-Saharan African. With the possible exception of South 
Africa, the continent remains “the world’s most difficult and seemingly intractable 
development challenge” (Sewell, 1994). Indeed many countries in the sub-region are 
rapidly losing the institutional capacity to help themselves. According to the US State 
Department, “Africa is the only area in the world where national growth rates are often 
negative and where per capita food production is declining” (Bureau of Public Affairs, 
1983, 1). And because the economic crises confronting the continent continues to show 
signs of outpacing efforts to resolve them, it is not surprising that in virtually all of the 
countries where the military has intervened in the sub-region, the interventionists have 
used the economic condition as primary justification for their actions.
Some scholars believe that the state of a nation’s economy has a direct effect on 
the possibilities of a coup d’etat within that country. In her study of military interventions 
in Africa, Nelkin (1967, 231) concluded, “the issues which best account for the ease of 
military access to power, relate to economic circumstances and their social consequence.”
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It is also the opinion of Welch, (1970, 18) and Nordlinger (1977, 89) that economic 
decline is a factor that encourages military intervention.
Indeed economic decline has been a primary factor in a number of coups d’etat in 
the region. Or so have the coup plotters alleged. In Republic of Benin, which has 
experienced six military interventions since attaining independence in 1960, every 
successive military regime, has asserted deteriorating economic condition as a reason for 
its intervention. Economic decline would also be said to be responsible for at least two of 
five military interventions in Ghana, in 1966 against President Kwame Nkrumah and in 
1981 against Dr. Hilla Limann. Economic deterioration was also responsible for military 
interventions in Congo-Brazzaville (August, 1968), Mali (1968) and Nigeria (December 
1983) (Nordlinger, 1977).
In his empirical evaluation of the relationship between economic performance and 
military intervention, Staffan Wiking (1983, 74-77) showed that income, in terms of per 
capital GNP in African countries varied significantly with the incidence of coups in these 
countries. And that of the “poorest” fifteen countries on the continent, all but two had had 
military coups. Also that only six of the “richest” fifteen has experienced m ilitary  
intervention (Wiking, 1983, 37).
MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY 
INTERVENTION
It has also been suggested that the role of the military in a nation-state is one 
dictated by its natural responsibilities to the state. It must not therefore act contrary to 
those expectations, even when the actions or conducts of the democratic civilian 
administration run violently counter to its (military) judgement (Huntington, 1972, 72).
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In the light of these obviously debatable conflicting constructive strictures and 
seemingly inherent contradictions in institutional (military and civilian) roles in a nation­
state, it is not surprising that some scholars have argued that some factors peculiar to the 
military establishment in Africa can either encourage or discourage military 
interventions. The African soldier is particularly sensitive, if not downright disdainful, of 
the civilian government, some of whom they consider institutionally and organizationally 
inferior (Finer, 1975, 4). And when civilian governments’ actions are perceived as 
threatening to state security or inconsistent to their collective corporate interests, the 
military feel duty bound to intervene. In this regard, military manpower rationalization 
and reductions in budgetary allocations have always been contentious areas.
The consensus among scholars is that the likelihood of military intervention 
increases when the existing government fails to provide adequate funding for the military 
or interferes excessively in its affairs (Nordlinger 1977, 66- 76; Liebenow 1986, 240-250; 
Welch and Smith 1974). Military interventions in Uganda (1971), Ghana (1972) and 
Liberia (1980) were all partly attributable to existing governments’ failure and/or neglect 
to provide for the well being of the military (Wiking 1983, 786 - 798).
Another area of frequent friction is the perceived excessive involvement of the 
civilian governments in purely military matters and processes. The military interventions 
of 1966 and 1972 in Ghana were believed to have been precipitated, in part, by Presidents 
Nkrumah and Busia respectively, in their attempts to interject extraneous political 
considerations into matters that were purely military. For example, the military gravely 
resented President Kwame Nkrumah’s removal of General Ankrah as commander of the 
army (Price, 1971, 399-430). When Busia’s government was removed in 1972, he was
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also accused of not only lowering the living standards of the military personnel, but also 
of politically manipulating the promotion process (Wiking 1983, 86-87). It is also the 
view of Decalo (1976, 173-230) that the military intervention in Uganda in 1971, when 
General Idi Amin toppled the government of Milton Obote, is another example of civilian 
government interference in military affairs, resulting in military intervention.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that nothing is perhaps more challenging and 
threatening to the military’s corporate interest and existence than the creation of 
independent military or paramilitary organizations. According to Liebenow (1986, 249), 
by the creation of a president’s own guard regiment, which was recruited, trained and 
equipped independently of the regular army, Nkrumah was well on his way to being 
toppled by the military. This was apart from his sacking General Ankrah.
MILITARY COUPS AND CULTURAL PLURALISM
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are not a collection of ethnically and regionally 
homogeneous components. Rather they are the result of the amalgamation of different 
tribal and ethnic groups, following the European scramble and partition of Africa (Cutter, 
1998). The result is a mixture of sometimes incompatible and ethnically divergent groups 
lumped together for what was originally conceived only as administrative convenience 
structures by the colonial authorities. As many of these countries attained independence, 
nothing significant was done to change the ethnic and tribal incompatibilities prevalent in 
the mix. It is against this background that ethnic and regional differences, and with it 
conflict and the disruptive struggle for leadership dominance came to constitute an 
important reason for military intervention in African politics.
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According to Welch and Smith (1974, 26-30), “the likelihood of military 
intervention rises as the intensification of conflicts arising from ethnic or class cleavages 
threatens the status and power of the dominant group or class”. And although it may be 
difficult to categorically identify a military intervention resulting solely for reasons of 
ethnic or regional consideration, it has nonetheless played a part. Indeed it has been 
suggested that the first short-lived military intervention in Sierra Leone in March 1967, 
was due to the reluctance of the Mende tribe to relinquish to another tribe, the control and 
power it had exercised over the country since independence on April 19, 1961 (de 
Villiers 1976, 60).
Much as intervention may never be justified on ethnic and tribal grounds by the 
military, it appears to be one of the most, if not the most, important considerations. 
Although the interventionists often accuse the preceding governments of tribalism: 
Somalia (1969), Uganda (1971) and Chad (1975), it has only been in Uganda that this 
accusation was specifically used to topple the government of the Milton Obote (Wiking 
1983, 119). The alleged poor civilian leadership handling of regional problems in Sudan 
was also partly responsible for intervention in that country. The leaders of the coup in 
1969 blamed Prime Minister Muhammed Mahgoub and his fellow politicians for their 
inability to resolve the traditional problem with the southern part of the country. Ethnic 
and regional problems were also responsible for interventions in Nigeria (1966), Togo
(1967), Dahomey (1972), Rwanda (1973) and Mauritania (1978) (Wiking 1983, 93-119).
PERSONAL FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY INTERVENTION
There is the suggestion that military intervention is as much influenced by 
personal reasons. The prevailing evidence suggests that the striving for status and the
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desire to hold and exercise power may not be ruled out in assessing the motives behind 
some coups in Africa (Decalo, 1976, 15-22, 173-230; de Villiers 1976, 54-66; Maier, 
2000).
It has been suggested that the most important reason for the 1965 intervention in 
Central African Republic was the personal ambitions of the army chief of staff, Colonel 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Bokassa had manifested his desire to exercise power on countless 
other occasions, including once, when he unilaterally assumed the position of minister of 
war (Decalo 1976,17).
Idi Amin’s coup in Uganda in 1971 was perhaps one of those clear manifestations 
of personal ambitions in the execution of a coup d’etat. According to Decalo (1976), Idi 
Amin’s intervention pre-empted President Milton Obote’s attempt to remove him from 
his position as commander of the army. According to one report, a few hours before the 
coup, Obote had called from Singapore, where he was attending the Commonwealth 
meeting, to have Amin arrested (Decalo 1976, 18). Furthermore, in October of 1970, 
Amin’s power has already been reduced by the creation of two command positions equal 
to his own. Besides, he was also at the time, the target of at least two inquires (one into 
the death of a top army officer and the other into the misuse of defense funds). Finally, 
there was the personal conflict between Amin and Obote (Decalo 1976, 18-19). All of 
these served to provide a strong motive for Idi Amin to intervene.
The personal element persuading intervention was perhaps as obvious in the 
General Babangida-led coup d’etat in Nigeria. For there was no obvious, justifiable 
reason for the intervention, which furthering the apparent bewilderment for cause, was 
dubbed a palace coup d’etat.2 Within eighteen months of being the number three (Chief
51
of Army Staff) of the original coup leaders that toppled the government of President 
Shehu Shagari, General Ibrahim Babangida would seize power from General 
Mohammadu Buhari on August 27, 1985 (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 97). It has 
been suggested that there was some personal conflicts between the military head of State 
(General Buhari) and General Babangida on the one hand, and between the military Chief 
of Staff (late General Tunde Idiagbon) and General Babangida on the other. According to 
some unconfirmed reports, General Babangida was to be retired as soon as the military 
Chief of Staff returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca. It was while he was still on 
Pilgrimage that General Babangida intervened (Newswatch, August 28, 1985; The 
Guardian, August 30, 1985).
FOREIGN FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY INTERVENTION
Most of the literature on coups d’etat in Africa has failed to highlight the 
significance of foreign influence when it comes to military intervention in Africa. Even 
though there are difficulties involved in proving direct foreign influence, it is hard to 
justify this level of omission. Since there appear to be instances where foreign influences 
were obviously at work, directly or indirectly.
The Bretton Wood Institutions (especially, the International Monetary Fund- 
IMF) provide excellent examples of how foreign organizations can influence or 
precipitate economic and political outcomes in Africa. When in 1985 President Nimeri of 
Sudan was persuaded by IMF to remove subsidies on food and fuel, as well as devalue 
the Sudanese pound, the reaction was one of general strike, with students, doctors, 
lawyers and other professionals participating. Public discontent with the regime
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culminated in the ouster of Nimeri on April 6, 1985 (Clark 1985; Africa, South of the 
Sahara 1988, 949).
The so-called “contagion” or “demonstration” effects, of coups are another 
significant foreign factor. It has been suggested that the threshold of tolerance by the 
military for an existing regime is drastically lowered when there is an increase in the 
frequency of successful military intervention elsewhere in the continent. One successful 
coup, it is believed, begets another. When the continent is viewed in its seemingly 
unavoidable interacting and interdependent relationships, it becomes evident that a 
process of feedback would be at work within these countries. Indeed the wave of 
intervention in 1965 and 1966 are too coincidental to be unaffected. It is perhaps difficult 
to demonstrate that there were direct connections between events in Algeria (June 1965) 
and seven other countries in which coups occurred between October 1965 and February 
1966. It was obvious, however, that by 1960s, African politicians as well as military 
officers were much in touch with one another, and with political life on the continent as a 
whole, through frequent meetings within the frame-work of regional and international 
organizations, and cooperation.
When it comes to links between coup plotters, the experience in West Africa is 
very instructive. Colonel Lamizana of Burkina Faso, Colonel Bokassa of Central African 
Republic and General Soglo of Republic of Benin were acquaintances from their service 
days in Indochina (Aristide Zolberg, 1968, 86). And it is conceivable that a successful 
coup by one would tempt the others. According to Helen Kitchen (1964), the 
Commanding Officer of Liberia’s National Guard, who was arrested on suspicion of 
plotting a coup, was alleged to have said, three weeks after the assassination of President
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Olympio of Togo: “If only 250 Togolese soldiers could overthrow their government a 
Liberian army of five thousand could seize power easily” (1964, 9). Another extremely 
suggestive contagion phenomenon may be found in the comments of General Soglo, 
shortly after his takeover in Benin. He said that his takeover was prompted by the 
concern that the elections scheduled for early 1966 might crystallize the north-south 
cleavage and result in the kind of disorder which prevailed among the Yorubas of 
neighboring Western Nigeria during and after the electoral campaign of October 1965, 
and about which Benin, many of whom are also Yoruba, were well informed (Zolberg, 
1968, 86).
It is also highly probable that Soglo’s successful takeover emboldened the 
Nigerian officers who attempted to topple the government of Prime Minister Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa. Their limited but determinative success, in turn, may have persuaded 
their Ghanaian counterparts, with whom they shared not only British colonial heritage 
and professional traditions, but also a common exposure to the disastrous consequences 
of political disorder while serving in Congo. Furthermore, Zolberg argues that “the 
phenomenon of contagion contributed to the normalization of military rule as well: its 
establishment in one country enhanced both the opportunities available to other groups 
and the legitimacy of stepping in to save the situation. In the light of their shared 
experience, military leaders became even less hesitant to establish military rule from the 
outset”. (1969,179)
It would appear that the most important aspect of contagion is related to the 
relative strength of the regime in power. For as Welch and Smith (1974) and Feit (1973) 
would observe, coups seem to have occurred mainly in countries whose regimes are
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obviously weak. This apparent weakness would subsequently have “domino” 
consequences and effects. According to Zolberg (1968, 87), “the revelation of this 
prevalent weakness made even the more firmly established regimes much less 
formidable. It is as if a spell had been broken.” and “...the army has now seen that the 
Emperor stands naked”. Ordinarily, the expectation would be “that firmly established 
regimes” are able to more successfully resist military intervention. Unfortunately, this has 
not been the case for Africa. As examples in Ethiopia and Liberia, one of the oldest 
imperial governments in Africa and one of the most enduring one-party civilian 
government respectively will show, Ethiopia fell victim to military intervention in 1974 
and Liberia in 1980.
Generally speaking, it would appear that the military’s ability to topple the 
government of a country is, to a large degree, dependent on the support and or tolerance 
of the larger civilian population who must initially manifest their displeasure and 
disenchantment with the existing regime (civilian or military).
NIGERIA: MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PERSPECTIVE
Direct military intervention in Nigeria is attributable to virtually all of the factors 
already outlined above. However, some of these and their enabling circumstances are 
more directly relevant than others. The history of Nigeria from January 15, 1966 to May 
29, 1999 (and except for a civilian interregnum between October, 1979 and December 
1983) can be described as the history of Nigeria under military rule; for the country was 
effectively and completely under military rule during that period. Table 2.2 shows both 
the sequence and frequency of occurrence and mode of change in Nigeria.
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After independence in 1960, the country operated a Westminster kind of 
parliamentary democracy until January 15, 1966, when the first military coup d’etat led 
by late Major Kaduna Chukwuemeka Nzeogwu sacked the government of the first Prime 
Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa, in a bloody and traumatic display that was hitherto 
unknown to the country.
CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA FROM 1960 -1999
TABLE 2 .2
PERIOD OF RULE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT TYPE OF 
GOVERNMENT
TYPE OF CHANGE
1959 -1 9 6 6 Sir Tafawa Balewa Civilian Rule Elected
1966 Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi Military Rule Coup
1966 -1975 Gen. Yakubu Go won Military Rule Coup
1975 -1976 Brig. Murtala Mohammed Military Rule Coup
1976 -1979 Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo Military Rule Coup
1979 -1983 Alhaji Shehu Shagari Civilian Rule Elected
1983 -1985 Gen. Mohammadu Buhari Military Rule Coup
1985 -1993 Gen. Ibrahim Babangida Military Rule Coup
1993 -1998 Gen. Sani Abacha Military Rule Coup
1998 -1999 Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar Military Rule Succession
1999 - Present Gen. (Rtd) Olusegun 
Obasanjo
Civilian Rule Elected
SOURCE: AUTHOR 2000
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The Federal Minister of Finance, Okotie Eboh; the Premier of Western Nigeria, 
Chief Ladoke Akintola; and Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Leader of the ruling party, Northern 
People’s Congress (NPC) were among the prominent politicians killed across the North, 
West and Mid-west. Also killed were the Prime Minister and, at the time, the most senior 
northern military officer, Brigadier Mai Malari. Also killed were Brigadier Ademuyegun, 
Colonels Shodeinde and Kur Mohammed and Lt. Col. Pam Unegbe, among others.
By some still explicable, but extremely contentious circumstances, no prominent 
politician or very senior soldier who hailed from the eastern part of the country was killed 
in that murderous exercise. According to Claude Ake (1984, 14), this military 
intervention was not only unfortunately indecisive, it also had a touch of tribal bias, in 
that the original coup leaders were of eastern origin and “managed” not to kill any one of 
their own in the putsch. Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi, 
himself an Igbo and coincidentally the same tribe that suffered no significant casualty in 
the first military intervention, would head the military government that emerged after the 
killings. General Ironsi was killed in a counter-coup led by a band of Northern soldiers in 
July 1966. This was in apparent retaliation of what they considered “unbalanced” 
elimination of their leaders by Igbo military officers. The northern officers believed that 
the discriminatory killings were intended to marginalize the north in the country’s 
political arrangement since the Igbos were already the dominant professional class in the 
military.
Lt. Col. Yakubu Go won (as he then was) succeeded General Ironsi in what was 
regarded by Lt. Col.Odumegwu Ojukwu (military administrator of defunct Eastern 
Nigeria) an irregular succession process, since according to him Gowon was not, at the
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material time, the most senior military officer hierarchically entitled to succeed the 
assasinated General Ironsi. In the counter-coup that brought on Lt. Col. Yakubu Go won 
as the Head of State, and Commander-in-Chief of Nigerian army, can be glimpsed “...the 
intensification of conflicts arising from ethnic or class cleavages” which “threatens the 
status and power of the dominant group or class” (Welch and Smith, 1974, 26-30).
Lt. Col. Ojukwu, did not only object to this irregular succession process, he also 
failed to reach consensus and resolution with the new government of Gowon in the matter 
of the mass killings in northern Nigeria, persons of eastern Nigeria origin. Following 
which he proceeded to excise the eastern region from the rest of the federation, by 
declaring the independent republic of Biafra on May 27, 1967. The civil war that ensued 
lasted until January 1970, when Biafra surrendered after Ojukwu left the country into 
exile in Cote d’Ivoire.
What remains unresolved to this day is whether the first successful military 
intervention in Nigeria was a coup d’etat or an invitation? In other words, did a situation 
arise which persuaded the inevitability of military involvement and was this involvement 
a voluntary invitation by the civilian administration? There has been no consensus as to 
the mode of entry (invitation or intervention), as there are conflicting accounts of the 
sequences of events leading up to this climax. However, it would appear, on the face of it, 
that the military was ’’invited” by the acting President of the country, Prince Nwafor 
Orizu, after consultations with the Council of Ministers, to take over the government.
This was following a total breakdown of law and order in the aftermath of the 
unsuccessful coup attempt of Major Nzeogwu and his fellow officers. According to the 
acting President, the country was at a precipice and the only prudent thing to do was to
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invite the military to take over the government, even if temporarily (Orizu, 1988). The 
inability or lack of capacity of the civilian government to contain a rapidly deteriorating 
political and social situation showed an inherent weakness, consistent with Huntington
(1968) and Liebenow (1968) contention as a possible factor in military intervention.
That the political dynamics in the system was degenerating was apparent for a 
long time. According to Ake (1985, 11-15), within one year of independence, it became 
abundantly clear that the political structure was heading inevitably towards disintegration 
under pressure from the collective “politics of anxiety”. The three political parties that 
emerged following independence were a little less than tribal or regional associations. 
Indeed, with the possible exception of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) 
(originally called National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon, when southern Cameroon 
was part of Nigeria), these were ethnic parties, without national orientation or focus.
To all intents and purposes, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was a 
Hausa/Fulani party, which held sway in the North. It was also the party in government 
and in alliance with the NCNC. The NCNC was a predominantly Igbo party. But unlike 
the others, was more liberal and accommodating of other ethnic groups, a rare occurrence 
in the political landscape of Nigeria in the days immediately following independence. 
And because of its national orientation, it attracted rank and file (membership and 
leadership) across tribal and ethnic lines, particularly in the west and the middle belt 
region. This nondiscriminatory membership composition did not only make it possible 
for the NCNC to have the political temperament to go into alliance with the NPC, it also 
allowed for a comfortably accommodating non-ethnic party participation across tribal 
lines, leading to the formation of the Nigeria National Democratic Congress (NNDC), a
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coalition of Western and Eastern elements. The Action Group (AG), on the other hand, 
was a predominantly Yoruba party. According to Orizu (1977, 9), “the 1959 election 
preceding independence signified that there were three self-contained leaders rooted in 
tribal, religious or geographical anchors”.
In the 1959 election, the NPC had 148 seats in the House of Representatives, the 
NCNC 89 and the AG 75. Each party captured the bulk of its seats from its ethnic base. 
The NCNC went into alliance with NPC, while the AG went into opposition. The NPC, 
the dominant partner in the federal government immediately mobilized the resources of 
the federal government to consolidate its political ascendancy. The fruits of this exercise 
at consolidation were beginning to manifest at the time of the Regional elections in 1961, 
when there were defections from the minority parties to NPC. The AG for its part and in 
obvious disregard of overall appropriate political conduct carried out its opposition in an 
uninhibited and confrontational manner.
The NPC-led government responded in kind, following a quarrel in AG between 
AG national leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was in the Federal House of 
Assembly and the Premier of the AG-controlled government in Western Region, Chief 
Ladoke Akintola. The Federal parliament promptly, and arguably unjustifiably so, 
declared a state of emergency in the Western Region. The AG government was 
proscribed and an administrator, Dr. Moses Majokodunmi, was appointed with extensive 
powers, which included the maintenance of law and order, the power to search anyone 
and to imprison or detain them, to permit or prohibit meetings and processions. A 
rigorous investigation was promptly instituted into the financial dealings of the Western 
Regional government. Prominent AG leaders were arrested and detained. The leader,
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Chief Awolowo and some of his prominent followers, an elite group of the party called 
the “Tactical Committee”, were tried for treason. Chief Awolowo was sentenced to ten 
years’ imprisonment. About the same time, machinery was also set in motion for the 
creation of a state out of Western Region. Against this onslaught, the AG effectively 
collapsed: defections from the ranks ensued, to the point in which the party’s strength in 
the Federal House of Representatives fell from 75 to 13 (Ake 1986, 12).
Following the apparent vanquishing of the AG, the confidence of the NPC 
continued to grow. This confidence was at its height when the NPC gained an absolute 
majority in House of Representatives by gaining 7 seats in the newly amalgamated 
Northern Cameroon and also from by-elections. This level of confidence had the effect 
of exacerbating declining relationship between the NPC and NCNC, who were coalition 
partners in the Federal House of Representatives. Although the partners bickered on 
various insignificant issues, such as tribal discrimination and construction of road leading 
to Kainji Dam, serious issues came to a head during the census controversy.
The census figures became a matter of bitter contention because of their larger 
implications for revenue allocation and distribution of power. The figures of the 1952-53 
censuses had been the basis for the allocation of seats for the election of 1959, and it was 
by virtue of these allocations that the NPC gained dominance in the House of 
Representatives. The AG and NCNC and the other minority participating parties had 
hoped that the new census of 1962-1963 would reduce the share of seats going to 
Northern Region, thereby reducing the influence of the NPC. It was not to be. On the 
contrary the numbers exponentially increased. The North had increased by 30 percent 
from 17.3 million to 22.5 million. Between the East and the West the figures have grown
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to 71 percent and 70 percent respectively. While the increase in the North was adjudged 
realistic, those of the West and East were thought less so by the NPC. A remedial census, 
which was conducted in 1963-1964, gave the North and East percentage increases (over 
the 1952-53 census results) of 67 percent each and the West 100 per cent. The new 
census figures effectively put the population of the North, East and West at 29 777 986,
12 388 646, and 12 811 837 respectively. Needless to say, because these figures 
essentially revalidated the North’s dominance, they were rejected by the leaders of other 
political parties who resorted to fanning the embers of ethnic suspicion and hatred.
As the country was preparing for general elections on January 11, 1965 these 
lingering controversies were unresolved. The election campaigns degenerated into 
warfare with all parties using their power and resources in a blatantly unconstitutional 
manner to promote their prospects (Ake 1985). The situation in all the Regions was one 
of utter lawlessness, intimidation, corruption and violence. According to Ake, (1985, 13) 
“To illustrate, in the constituency of the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi 
Southwest, the lack of an opposition candidate was attributed to the harassment and 
violence perpetrated on the opposition party... the first time the opposition tried to 
nominate a candidate, the nominators were arrested. On the second attempt, they were 
simply carted off, and on the third attempt they were held until the time for nomination 
lapsed. The candidate for Binji - Tangza - Silame was simply killed. So was the candidate 
for Gwadabawa...There is independent evidence to corroborate the general picture of 
lawlessness and violence which the document depicts”.
The election took place in this general atmosphere of lawlessness, and the 
employment of a boycott by some of the political parties who could not see any chance of
62
winning. The election results, which predictably favoured the NPC, would only deepen 
the crisis as other political parties rejected the result. The President Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
a founder of the NCNC (which was in coalition with NPC) refused, as tradition demands, 
to call on Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, the incumbent Prime Minister to form a government 
since his party, the NPC was the dominant partner in the winning coalition. Although the 
President subsequently reversed his position and invited the Prime Minister to form a 
new government, the ethnic and tribal sentiments generated by these controversies, 
especially between the Igbos and the Hausa/Fulani, were already apparent and festering.
The volatility of the situation was still tense by the time of the elections to the 
Western House of Assembly on October 11, 1965. Indeed that election was more violent 
than the federal elections of the same year, as many politicians and their supporters, 
including electoral officers and policemen lost their lives. According to Ake (1985, 14) 
“after the election the two main political coalitions which fought the election, the NNDP 
and the AG/NCNC alliance claimed victory. The leader of the AG announced the 
formation of a government to displace the incumbent NNDP government, which was 
effectively a satellite of the federal government. Alhaji Adegbenro, the AG leader in the 
Western Region, who announced the formation of the new government and several 
leading people in his party were promptly incarcerated. This sparked off a rash of riots, 
looting and mass killings”.
As would be expected, the feeling and sense of insecurity in the country was as 
palpable as it was unpredictable. The Balewa government seemed obviously incapable of 
containing the endless violence or was so partisanly involved in its containment that it 
lacked both the moral authority and the peoples’ confidence to succeed. Ending the crisis
63
looked far-fetched. By the time the coup leaders of Major Nzeogwu and company struck 
on January 15, 1966, it gave as some of its reasons national insecurity, political and 
economic corruption and debilitating intolerance.3 Hardly anyone, including the 
exasperated citizenry, watching the general state of lawlessness and social chaos, could 
agree with the military more that national security was threatened. The prevailing social, 
political and economic situation in the country was severe and obviously threatening to 
its continued corporate existence. When the coup leaders struck, it was indecisive and, far 
from arresting the situation, it merely heralded a myriad of other problems. Since the 
coup attempt was not quite successful in supplanting the civilian government, even 
though the Prime Minister and some of the political leadership had been killed, the 
uncertainty and atmosphere of utter confusion and unmanageability compelled the acting 
President, Prince Nwafor Orizu’s invitation to the military, under the leadership of 
Major-General Ironsi to take over the government. Orizu rationalized his decision thus: 
“election malpractices of 1964 federal elections and the 1965 western regional elections 
had reached alarming dimensions, resulting in violence that was almost impossible for 
civilians to control. The military was called in to participate in policing the Western 
Region...” (1997, 12)
On January 15, 1966, the Acting President effected the suspension of the 
government in his broadcast to the nation: “ I have tonight been advised by the Council of 
Ministers that they had come to the unanimous decision voluntarily to hand over the 
administration of the country to the armed forces of the Republic of Nigeria with 
immediate effect. All Ministers are assured of their personal safety by the new 
administration. I will now call on the GOC, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, to make a
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statement on the policy of the new administration. It is my fervent hope that the new 
administration will ensure the peace and stability of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and 
that all citizens will give them their full cooperation” (Orizu 1997, 15). This clearly 
illustrates a case of extensive dependence on the military to maintain control, which not 
only revealed the weakness of civilian authority but also encouraged the military to 
believe that its intervention was indispensable to political stability (Liebenow 1986, 247- 
248).
General Gowon (as he would become) was overthrown by another band of 
military officers led by Major-General Murtala Mohammed in a bloodless coup in July . 
1975. General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded General Mohammed, who was assasinated 
in a failed coup attempt led by Colonel Buka Suka Dimka in 1976. General Obasanjo 
would conduct a transition process culminating in the handing over in October 1979 to 
the short-lived civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. The Shagari 
administration lasted from October 1979 to December 1983. The Shagari administration 
was said to lack both the vision and managerial capacity to evolve any consistent or 
viable social and economic development initiatives. His government’s pathetic inability 
to create or encourage an enabling environment for market and economic development, 
amidst corruption and mismanagement, was said to have created a prevalent sense of 
hopelessness and helplessness, not to mention the perceived rigging of the presidential 
election of August 1983. By the time the Shagari administration was inaugurated in 
October 1983, for a second four-year term, the economic indicators were ominous 
Anunobi (1992, 220), had this to say:
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"The military coup d’etat which removed President Shagari’s 
administration on New Year’s Eve, 1983, took place against 
a background of corruption, enormous debts, high rate of inflation 
and unemployment, deteriorating terms of trade, and low rate of 
economic growth. Nigeria’s global debt at the time of military 
take- over had reached an estimated $17 billion. Trade deficits 
account for nearly $4.8 billion of this debt. Imports had increased 
from an average of about $300 million a month in the mid-1970s 
to about $1.8 billion a month in 1983".
It was perhaps against this background that the military, under the leadership of 
General Mohammadu Buhari, on December 31, 1983, intervened to topple the civilian 
administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, with the “primary objective of saving the country 
from total collapse” (Kirk-Green, 1971). General Tunde Idiagbon would become the 
administration’s number two (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters). Generals Buhari 
and Idiagbon were everything that was dreaded and uncertain about military governments 
in Nigeria; in a socio-political sense, that is. They were as unorthodox in the management 
of the economy as they were strict and brutal in enforcing public discipline. In economic 
sense, that was perhaps the closest at the time, the country had come to sanity, stability 
and accountability after the disastrous Shagari years. Their time in government was brief 
and accountable. For the first time in the country’s recent history, there was a sense of 
purpose and direction, even if enforced by a faceless and ruthless display of brute force.
It is believed that the administration’s human rights records were reprehensible.
Nigerians were petrified to observe the application of brute, raw and unrestrained force in 
the regulation of economic, political and social life of the citizenry (Newswatch, 
November 20,1985). The administration was criticized for high-handedness. It was
66
criticized that an administration that relied, almost exclusively, on the enforcement of 
discipline, transparency and accountability to pull the economy out of near-decade of 
recession was not only naive in terms of economic policy articulation, but was also 
unrealistic in terms of its own expectations (Business Times, August, 1985).
The impact of the two “crusading”, no-nonsense Generals was not lost upon the 
military, their core constituency. Because of a widespread national corruption culture that 
had not only besmirched the military, but had made it its primary harbinger, some very 
senior military officers who were themselves absolutely corrupt and criminal felt ruffled 
and imminently threatened by this “rising tide”. They would consider the removal of 
these crusading Generals a matter of both personal and group political and economic 
survival. It happened on August 27, 1985 when General Babangida and his band of loyal 
officers toppled the military government of General Buhari. Since he (Gen. Babangida) 
was one of the leaders of the original coup plotters that toppled the government of 
President Shagari in December 1983, it appears evident that personal ambition, as 
suggested by some commentators, was a motive for this intervention and indeed the 
perpetuation of coups d’etat in the sub-region (Decalo 1976, 15-22, 173-220; de Villkers 
1976, 54-66).
General Babangida administration’s was said to be absolutely and thoroughly 
corrupt (Ibrahim Shehu Usman, 1999; Abdul Raufu Mustapha, 1999). According to 
Usman (The News, October 4, 1999) “...IBB’s (as he was fondly called by supporters) 
government was the worst. Worst in the sense that, it was a government without purpose. 
It was a government without direction...But during Babangida’s era corruption and 
looting was legalized and even given credence. There was more looting during his time
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than Abacha’s tenure, because Abacha actually deprived people from looting and he was 
just looting alone with some few elements. But during IBB’s tenure, it was like 
corruption was legalized. If there was anything that the government was acknowledged 
for, it was the issue of legalization of looting...” Indeed Nigeria is yet to witness an 
absolutely corrupt, political and economic dispensation of such dislocating magnitude. 
Babangida’s administration’s display of political hooliganism and economic “hara-kiri” 
would embolden his regime to abort the conclusion of a NG (Naira) 300 billion dubious 
experimentation in democratic transition. The social and political instability the 
cancellation of the June 12, 1993 presidential election exercises engendered only further 
heightened an already precarious economic environment, further discouraging investment 
(foreign or domestic)
General Babangida would “step aside” in the ensuring social and political milieu, 
after setting up what he called the Interim National Government (ING), headed by his 
handpicked chairman, Chief Ernest Shonekan. That the ING was so short-lived and lasted 
for only six months was both predictable and inevitable. The Decree 4 setting up the 
interim government had an in-built disenabler clause. It provided, inter alia, for the 
succession by the most senior Minister in the event of the Head of State (chairman of 
ING) dying, resigning or being otherwise incapacitated. General Sani Abacha had 
participated in military governments since New Year’s Eve 1983 when he announced the 
overthrow of the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Indeed he had been an active 
participant and beneficiary of two successive successful coups. And perhaps not too 
coincidentally, he was also the most senior military officer of the original group 5 of coup 
plotters to survive retirement. General Abacha was indeed the most senior Minister both
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by virtue of his superior ministering (cabinet) experience and the fact that he was, at the 
time, the most powerful chief of army, Defence Minister, as well as Vice Chairman of 
ING. That he remained in government and the army after General Babangida “stepped 
aside” and indeed occupied such obvious critical and strategic position strongly suggests 
that the structure of the interim government was tailor-designed for him to, at some point 
in the near future, oust the Head of Government and Chairman of ING, Chief Shonekan.
Chief Shonekan was forced to resign on November 17, 1993, by Generals Abacha 
and Oladipo Diya. It has been suggested that General Abacha’s succession was irregular 
and not as contemplated by the Decree (61 of 1993), and therefore meets the definition 
of a coup. This viewpoint is supported by the subsequent irregularities and illegalities 
that followed the “resignation” of Chief Shonekan shortly thereafter (Nwabueze, 1995). 
He summarily sacked all the cabinet Ministers who served with him in the interim 
government, as he also disbanded the two political parties, the National Republican 
Convention and the Social Democratic Party. Also sacked in the process was the Federal 
and States’ popularly elected legislators as well the states’ popularly elected Governors.
General Abacha ruled Nigeria from November 1993 to June 8, 1998, the date he 
reportedly died of an apparent heart attack. He supervised and participated chiefly in 
destroying the political and economic structure by his unabashed and unrestrained 
pillage of the national treasury. It would appear that he was as incurably kleptocratic and 
pathologically criminal as he was heartlessly brutal and evil. Nigeria effectively became 
a pariah nation under his administration. His unprecedented level of human rights’ 
abuses not only compelled significant segments of the developed world to impose 
various forms of sanctions on Nigeria, including expulsion from the Commonwealth,
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they also completely consigned the country into the oblivion of persona non grata 
nations when it came to foreign investment and international participation. Needless to 
say, during his tenure foreign investment into Nigeria was said to be virtually non­
existent (C.B.N., 1998).
General Abdulsalam Abubakar, who succeeded General Abacha on June 9, 1998, 
following his death, had this to say to the cabinet ministers who would serve under him 
in the implementation of his hurriedly-structured democratic transition process “...every 
human welfare and development index measuring the well-being of our people is on the 
decline ...Currently, we are the world’s 13th poorest nation. Given our resource 
endowments, this sorry state is a serious indictment” (The Economist, August 29, 1998, 
45-46). The administration of General Abubakar promised a return to civil rule, which it 
effected on May 29, 1999. General Abukakar’s administration may not have been as 
absolutely brazen and creatively corrupt as General Babangida’s nor as pathologically 
kleptocratic and brutally evil as General Abacha’s, he nonetheless exhibited all the 
trademarks of economic recklessness and financial mismanagement and 
unaccountability notoriously associated with Nigeria military rulers. For example to 
appease his service chiefs who felt absolutely disinclined to leave office at the end of his 
tenure (as has been the tradition in this coup recurring country) following the emergent 
civilian dispensation, for them and sundry others, he would allow what appeared a last 
quick slurp at the trough. By the time the elected civilian government of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo took over on May 29, 1999, less than mid-way into fiscal year 1999, 
the federal deficit was a dizzying NG 254 billion (Obasanjo, 1999).
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REGIME TYPE AND PUBLIC POLICY: STATE OF THE 
LITERATURE
It could be determined from the foregoing, that a general body of knowledge 
exists explaining military intervention. However, there appears to be lacunae on the issue 
of performance of soldiers after they have taking over government. The question is 
whether a military administration enhances or diminishes economic, and by implication 
market development capacity? In other words, is there something about the military 
regime that makes it better equipped and better prepared to handle government and policy 
issues more effectively and/or efficiently? Or in the words of Claude Welch (1971, 213), 
“Can a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian 
regimes encountered?”
The dearth of statistics and the variability of peculiar national circumstances make 
a thorough investigation difficult. However, some studies have evaluated and attempted 
to explain the performance of regime types in the Third World countries, within the 
context of their political and economic ambiance. Some scholars have argued that 
military regimes are more “progressive” and essentially more conservative; others have 
contended that civilian governments are more legitimately “progressive”; and yet a third 
group has maintained that there is little or no difference between military and civilian 
regimes. Whether or not there is any supporting evidence(s) to these various contentions 
shall be determined by looking at the state of the literature.
THE MILITARY AS A PROGRESSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE FORCE 
Furthering the contention of military regimes as a progressive force, some 
scholars have suggested that the likely consequences of military rule are: economic 
growth, the modernization of economic and social structures, and more equitable
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distribution of scare economic values and opportunities (Pye, 1962; Johnson, 1962; 
Huntington, 1968; Olson, 1982; Malloy, 1987). According to Lucian Pye, a leading 
proponent of this school of thought, the continuing modernization of the military’s 
organization and weaponry has instilled in the officer corps, the military’s core and 
indispensable competent component, the belief that their society ought also to be 
modernized:
Above all else the revolution in military technology has caused 
the army leadersof the newly emergent countries to be extremely 
sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically 
and technology underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic 
to advance societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly 
avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies 
(Pye 1962, 280).
The officer corps’ constant overseas training and experience, coupled with 
intermingling resulting therefrom highlights the inadequacy or “primitivity” of own home 
settings, which compels them (military) to “focus more on the standards common to the 
more industrialized world” (Pye 1962, 281). It has also been argued that the progressive 
consequence of military regimes stem from their civil structures and institutions which 
are of overwhelming superiority, with peculiar features that include central command, 
hierarchy, discipline, inter-communication and espirit de corp and a corresponding 
isolation and self-sufficiency (Finer, 1975, 4).
Cohen (1985), Sloan and Tedin (1987) and Biglaiser (1999) in their different 
studies of regime performance in Latin America, have argued that bureaucratic- 
authoritarian regimes show a higher level of efficiency than other regimes at promoting 
economic development, even if for varying underlying motives. Bureaucratic- 
authoritarian regimes are essentially military regimes governing with the tacit approval 
and collaboration of technocrats and domestic bourgeoisie (O’Donnell, 1973; Cardoso
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and Faletto 1979; Frieden 1991 and Silva 1993). Although a Latin America phenomenon, 
the bureaucratic-authoritarian model can be extrapolated to Africa in the determination of 
regime performance. This is especially so because two consecutive military regimes in 
Nigeria (General Gowon 1966-1975; and Generals Mohammed/Obasanjo 1975-1979); 
and Ghana (General Ankrah 1966-1969) exhibited some characteristics of bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism: the rule of the military in conjunction with technocrats (Cammack, Pool 
and Tordoff, 1988, 123).
Cohen, using interrupted time-series analysis, compared the performance of 
democratic and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. He 
observed that such regimes have an advantage over democratic ones in effectively 
implementing the type of policies necessary to facilitate growth. And according to Olson 
(1982) and Malloy (1987), the regimes more generally provide the ideal circumstances 
for the attainment of high rates of economic growth in the medium and long run. Not 
only because they do not seek re-election or popularity, which enables them to ignore 
societal interests usually hurt in the short term by stabilization or adjustment policies 
(Biglaiser, 1999), but because the economic gains were often realized at enormous 
political cost (for example, suspension of constitutional rights, declaring state of 
emergency, press censorship, arrest, exiles and executions) (Cohen, 1985).
In their study, Sloan and Tedin (1987) employed a multi-variate model and year- 
by-year data from 1960 to 1980 in twenty Latin American countries to analyze the 
relationship between regime type, regime age, and public policy. They employed two 
independent variables (regime type and number of years a specific regime has been in 
government) in an attempt to explain variations in policy outputs. They identified five
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regime types. These were democratic, bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA), communist, 
“traditional authoritarian” (TA) and “transitional”. According to Sloan and Tedin (1987, 
104), TA regimes were either personal dictatorships or “oligarchic democracies”. The 
label transitional regime was used to account for any year in which a country experienced 
a change in regime control of government.
Having identified the various regime types, Sloan and Tedin went on to evaluate 
regime effect on five separate policy areas. They were: domestic economic performance, 
agricultural production, military spending, external debt and domestic social 
performance. Like Cohen (1985), they found that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were 
the most effective in achieving economic growth; albeit a less than impressive record 
controlling inflation and taking on heavy external debts. The democratic regimes, on the 
other hand, performed adequately and had the second-best record in all five-policy areas.
As a conservative force, some scholars have argued that the military structure is 
governed by a complex mass of regulations, customs and traditions, with the result that it 
is primarily preoccupied with the maintenance of order and the status quo (Huntington 
1972, 14-16). For even where social and economic factors persuade intervention, military 
government seldom possesses the organizational and political skills to effect significant 
changes. According to Bienen (1971), military governors are prone to directing their 
attention and resources at preserving order the moment it becomes evident that their goal 
of effecting economic growth and social change (often times a primary justification for 
most military interventions) are difficult to attain. Indeed some scholars have argued that 
on attainment of power, the military rulers get concerned also about the protection of 
their own interest and those of the military. “They fall in love with the power that has
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come so easily, and to convert their ‘interim’ regimes into full-blooded rule by the 
military” (Finer 1975, 32).
Nordlinger (1970) employed statistical analysis of economic change under 
military regimes to advance the hypothesis that military governments do not really act as 
agents of modernization. In what seems a modification of his original contention, he 
stated that “within a particular social and political context (where there is hardly a middle 
class to speak of, and when workers and peasants have not been effectively mobilized, 
politically) soldiers in mufti sometimes allow or even encourage economic 
modernization” (1970, 1134). Indeed, Ayittey (1991, 152-157), Nordlinger (1970), 
Skocpol, (1979), and Bates (1981), like most analysts, are of the opinion that under 
military regimes, the interests of military are accorded the highest priority, even when 
they directly conflict with the interests and aspiration of the larger segments of the 
society.
In his review of the World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators, 
Nordlinger came to the conclusion that in those countries in which there was direct 
military rule during at least part of the period from 1957 to 1962 (n=18), the average 
percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) spent on defense was 3.6; but the 
corresponding figure among those countries in which the military did not serve as 
governors, but did exert a good deal of political influence (n=20) was 3.4; and those 
countries in which the military ‘s activities remained circumscribed within their 
instrumental role (n=36) it was 1.9 (1970, 1135). It would appear that the proportion of 
GNP devoted to defense is almost twice as large in countries overtly ruled by the military 
as it is in countries with non-politicized military.
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In his study, Nordlinger included 74 countries which he grouped into four 
regions: Latin America (n=21); Middle East and North Africa (n=15); Asia (n=15); and 
Tropical Africa (n=23). As Sudan was the only tropical African country with a military 
regime during the period covered by his study (1957-1962), there are questions raised as 
to the relevance of his study in terms of general applicability to the current situation in 
Africa. Recent studies have shown that when the military take over power in Africa 
today, its preoccupation at protecting itsown interest is no less intense and 
disproportionate, thus confirming the findings in Nordlinger’s study. The World Bank 
(November 1989, 23) expressed concern at the level of military expenditure in Africa: 
“Military spending has diverted enormous resources from Southern Africa’s 
development, and has consumed nearly 50 percent of government expenditures in the 
countries experiencing the worst destabilization”. According to Whitaker (1988, 43),
“The proportion of African funds going to equip and pay the military has been steadily 
rising, reaching for example, over 40 percent in Ethiopia, and 25 and 20 percent 
respectively in drought-ravaged Mauritania and Mali”. This disproportion GNP allocation 
is a prevalent pattern in Africa:
“Military spending by African countries, according to the US Center for 
Defense Information, reached $16.9 billion in 1983, up 400 percent from 
$3.8 billion in 1973. Sixteen African countries spent more on arms than 
they received in aid. Libya topped the list with $1.9 billion in arms purchases 
against $52 million in aid. Nigeria spent $430 million in arms. Many other 
African countries also spent more on military than on health. Gabon ($88 versus $49)
The Congo ($45 versus $25); Mauritania ($31 versus $6)” (Ayittey, 1991, 153).
Indeed, under military regimes, general societal well-being is perfunctorily a 
secondary, not a primary consideration. “Developing countries have 8 times more 
soldiers than physicians and the ratio of soldiers to teachers in some cases is as high as 5 
to 1” (UN Report on Human Development, 1990). And according to the UN Center for
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Peace and Disarmament, “Africa spends about $12 billion a year on the purchase of arms, 
an amount which is equal to what Africa was requesting in financial aid over the next 5 
years” (West Africa, May 1, 1987, 912).
Nordlinger (1970) and Biglaiser (1999, 4-7), attempted to show how officers are 
wont to identify and sympathize with middle class interests in the formulation and 
implementation of public policy under military regimes. While agreeing with the general 
hypothesis that the military acts to protect middle-class interests, Nordlinger advanced 
what appears to be a supplementary hypothesis noting that “soldiers in mufti will protect 
the status quo only where the middle-class interests are seen to be threatened” (1970, 
1142-43). From his analysis, which were based on data collected by Irma Adelman and 
Cynthia Morris (1967), Nordlinger inferred that military governments failed to sponsor 
economic modernization in countries where more than ten percent of the active male 
population was employed in middle-class occupations: commerce, banking insurance, 
technical, professional, managerial, administrative and clerical positions (1970, 1143).
Some scholars have subsequently propounded some hypothesis with a view to 
further elucidation on the rather complicated and intricate conservative military policy­
making (Edward Feit, 1973; Claude E. Welch and Arthur K Smith, 1974; and Glen 
Biglaiser, 1999). Feit (1973) argued that most military governments evolve through three 
stages. The first stage is characterized by direct control of the polity by military officers. 
In this stage, military officials hold all principal offices in the country, usually of a short 
duration. This stage is followed by the second stage, in which civilian technocrats are 
absorbed into the regime, which claims to be apolitical. This functional arrangement, 
some sort of cohesion without consensus, which is bourne out of political convenience
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and expediency of mutually suspicious and hostile social forces, permits the military to 
claim significant civilian participation while still maintaining power. This was especially 
the case in Nigeria under General Abacha, following the overthrow of the Interim 
National Government. This apparent uneasy coalition hold together only as long as each 
component part believes that its interests will be best served by remaining within it, and 
that none will profit more than the other. This coalition of mutual unease and suspicion 
from the outset inhibits any serious attempt at social regeneration or significant change 
for fear of coalition disintegration. According to Feit, the hostility of the opposing 
interest comes to a boil, thereby breaking the coalition, and with it the military regime.
In other to avoid this scenario, and indeed to be able to initiate the promised 
regeneration of society (often times the original basis or justification for intervention), the 
regime shifts to a third phase: presumptuously apolitical to avowedly political. In this 
phase, the leaders seek a mass base as a means of legitimizing the regime and 
precipitating progress. To this end, the regime creates sets of symbols by which it 
attempts to rally the support and loyalty of the masses. In addition, it creates mass parties 
in which the masses can be trained to a given political ritual. These mass parties are 
incapable of holding the allegiance of the masses since the enabling condition for such 
coalition, which is meaningful representation, cannot be attained. Eventually the 
hollowness of the ritual becomes evident, leading to the destruction of any mass 
following the regime may have acquired. According to Feit (1973, 6-19), the military 
regime fails because it can neither hold together the disparate and hostile social forces it 
has had to harness, nor maintain the mass support that it needs to maintain some 
semblance of legitimacy. Feit’s model reveals therefore that because of the constraints
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imposed by political and organizational factors, which essentially limits their ability to 
initiate or maintain socio-economic development, military governors do not make good 
governors.
Welch and Smith (1974) in their consideration of military regimes, on the other 
hand, identified four principal types: predatory, reformist, radical and guardian. In their 
opinion, the great majority of recent military regimes have reflected the propensity of 
military officers in emerging societies to establish themselves as the unique custodians of 
the “national interest”.
Guardian military regimes place an overwhelming value on political stability and 
order or on their corporate interest. Unlike radical and reformist regimes, military 
guardians consider change to be of secondary importance, and they prefer that change 
take place through a gradual and orderly process. In manner of speaking, they are 
primarily “law and order” men. The authors went on to identify four major categories of 
military guardianship: direct, arbiter, factional and post-colonial. The post-colonial 
variety is the most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa; whilst for Latin America the other 
forms of military guardianship apply.
In direct guardianship, the military regime assumes direct responsibility for 
government by ruling for indefinite periods. In arbiter guardianship, the military tend to 
act indirectly as custodians of national interests, supporting civilian elites they deem 
acceptable and setting limits on the policy choices open to government leaders. Factional 
guardianship is similar to arbiter guardianship. However, in the arbiter guardianship, the 
armed forces are relatively weak and organizationally fragmented. They are, as a 
consequence, unable to effect fundamental changes.
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The preoccupation of post-colonial guardians is to restore orderly processes to a 
social order distorted by mismanagement and misgovernment. The post-colonial 
guardianship is more geared towards restoring institutional stability and international 
investor confidence. However, it would appear that the military rulers are more interested 
in economic development and the overall growth of the middle class. A conception, 
which perhaps explains the seemingly abiding inclination of successive military 
government’s pledge to honour and observe virtually all and any multi-national and 
related international obligations entered into by a preceding government.
Welch and Smith proceeded to look at case studies of civilian-military 
relationships in some countries: Nigeria, Peru, Thailand, Egypt and France. France’s 
situation is peculiar, in that, although the military was instrumental in bringing down the 
Fourth Republic, it was not part of its intent to supplant the civilian government (Welch 
and Smith, 1974, 205-233). The case study also reveal that the scope and character of the 
political role of the military are conditioned by a large number of intervening and 
interacting institutional and environmental variables. Notwithstanding, Welch and Smith 
still believe that the outcomes of military intervention and its implications for socio­
economic modernization and political development conform to a pattern, which they 
called the “Garrison- Managerial State”. The underlying conception is that as military 
institutions throughout the Third World have become more differentiated and specialized, 
and as officer corps becomes more professionalized, the performance in office of military 
politicians tended to be more bureaucratic than political in both motivation and effect. 
Military rule focuses primarily on policies that serve the narrow interest of the armed 
forces. Secondarily, they seek the preservation of public order. Thirdly, they seek the
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promotion of stable industrial growth; and lastly (if ever), they advocate policies 
designed to bring about social and economic reform (1974, 260).
In his study dealing with regime performance in Africa, Berg-Schlosser (1984) 
identifies four African regime types and proceeded to evaluate their performance on three 
main levels: polyarchic, socialist, civil authoritarian and military. His first level of 
evaluation includes the achievement of socio-economic development; the second level is 
the degree of dependence on external economic and political forces; and the third level is 
the achievement of a good political order (1984, 134).
The result of his analysis is consistent with World Bank findings (World Bank 
1989, 6, 15, 60-61 and 192) and contradicts the generally held view that democracy 
adversely affects economic growth in developing countries. According to Berg-Schlosser, 
polyarchic systems fare quite well both in terms of GNP growth and the improvement of 
basic quality of life. They appear to also have the best record when it comes to normative 
standards, such as the achievement of good political order (like protecting civil liberties 
and guaranteeing freedom from political oppression). Military regimes, on the other hand, 
did not fare very well; nor as well as their civilian counterpart. As “military regimes 
clearly show themselves to be no remedy whatsoever for the problems of Africa, either in 
terms of their economic performance or of their observation of normative standards” 
(Berg-Schlosser, 1984, 121-151).
However Huntington (1968), who appears much more interested in the 
comparative correlationship between the two contending views, believes that the 
difference between the two (progressive and conservative) is a function of both relative 
levels of development and societal dynamism:
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“As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, 
the soldier is a radical, in the middle-class world, he is a participant and 
arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative 
guardian of the existing order. Thus paradoxically but understandably, the more 
backward a society is the more progressive the role of the military; the more 
advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes 
the role of its military” (1968, 221).
Huntington’s argument seems to authenticate the contending views of the military 
as both conservative and progressive, even as it makes no attempt at distinguishing 
between “backward” and “advanced” societies. However, it would appear that those 
usages relate to social and economic development; which by that very definition would 
suggest that almost all the countries in Africa fall into the “backward” category. In this 
context therefore, Huntington’s hypothesis seems consistent with that of Pye, in that they 
both emphasize the dynamism and changing role of the military, depending on the 
societal settings. It follows also that in regions where economic and social development 
are at a relatively more advanced stage, military regimes tend to act as conservative 
forces, which would imply that they act as a progressive force in Africa.
The social and economic situation in Africa, with dominant military 
administrations, is not one of “progressivity” as postulated. With the possible exception 
of Gabon and Sychelles, with average annual per capital GDPs of approximately $700 
and $500 respectively, the annual average per capita GDP of virtually all the other 
nations in the sub-region is on the decline. On average per capita income fell from $600 
in 1981 to $360 in 1992.
REGIME TYPE AND DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCE(S)
When it comes to regime performance, some studies have concluded that few, if 
any, significant differences exist between military and civilian regimes; and even less so 
for alternating or consecutive military regimes. In a cross-national, aggregate study of all
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independent, non-communist countries with a population greater than one million, R.D. 
McKinlay and A.S. Cohan (1975) found that military rule in the Third World has no 
discernible economic policy consequences. They concluded “the occurrence of military 
regime does not have a pronounced effect on economic performance when military 
regime (MR) are compared to period of civilian rule in countries that have experienced 
military regimes” (CRM) (1975, 20). It was also their finding that military regimes have 
no significant effect on economic performance when both MR and CRM are compared 
with CR 900 (low income countries which have experienced only civilian rule). In 
relation to overall regime performance, McKinlay and Cohan concluded that military 
regimes in the Third World are not a homogenous group that can be clearly differentiated 
from civilian regimes (1975, 1-30)
Along the line of this field of research was the attempt by Robert Jackman (1976) 
to evaluate the efficacy of the foregoing postulations. Jackman used the Adleman and 
Morris (1967) data, in addition to a new set of data covering the periods from 1960 to 
1970 for 77 Third World countries to assess the validity of the different hypotheses about 
the impact of military rule. Indeed his general model, which indulged a comparative 
evaluation of the arguments of Pye (1962), Huntington (1968) and Nordlinger (1970), 
failed to confirm any of the competing hypotheses. He opines:
“In short, military intervention in the politics of the Third World has no unique effects 
on social change regardless of either level of economic development or geographic 
region. We can conclude that blanket statement portraying military governments in the 
Third World as either progressive or reactionary are without empirical foundation. This 
implies that many observers may have been mistaken in attributing unique political skills 
to the military, whether directed towards progressive or conservative ends. We can also 
conclude that military regimes do not assume different mantles as countries of the Third 
World become wealthier. In short, the simple civilian-military government distinction 
appears to be of little use in the explanation of social change” (1976,1096-1097).
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CONCLUSION
The above review clearly shows that there are different performance levels for 
both military and civilian administrations on assumption of office. It also shows that this 
(performance level) is both a function of relative state of national development and 
societal dynamism. Indeed, the review is rather inconclusive as to whether the military 
administration are better equipped as against civilian ones in coping with the problems of 
a developing country. Wilh the possible exception of three studies (Pye 1962; Cohen 
1985; Sloan and Tedin 1987), the proponents of these studies seem to arrive at the same 
conclusion, albeit through different routes, namely that military rule has a negative, or at 
best, no impact upon social and economic changes in the Third World countries. 
Nordlinger (1970) McKinlay and Cohan (1975), Jackman (1976), Berg-Schlosser (1984), 
Cohen (1985) and Sloan and Tedin (1987) arrive at their conclusion by employing 
statistical analysis, while the other proponents do so by case studies.
It would appear that the proposition advanced by some scholars (Olson, 1982) and 
Malloy, 1987), that military regimes are positive agents for economic and social 
modernization is based on a number of unwarranted and tenuous assumptions. The first 
assumption is that the education and training which soldiers receive “in the context of 
their environment socialize” them into professional men, with attributes that make for 
good governors. The second is that such acquired values and attributes are transferable 
into situations or occupational roles, which are not primarily military. The third and final 
assumption is that, in the process of governing a civilian society, these military values are 
transmitted to the rest of society in a way that regulates societal behavior and that 
consequently changes such societies for the better.
84
Although a number of studies appear to support the first assumption, particularly 
within the officer corps, their general applicability to the African military elites would not 
only be out of place but misleading. According to Moore (1970, 6), the kind of training, 
which produces a top military professional, in general is usually of exceptional duration. 
That can hardly be said to be the case for any of the African nations since, following 
independence in many of these countries, there was the rapid “Africanization” of the 
officer corps, which called for the replacement of the colonial officer corps with an 
indigenous one with the inevitable shortening of training periods to achieve these goals. 
For example, even though the officer corps of the Nigerian army was a mere 18 percent 
indigenized by January 1960, it was completely Nigerianized by the end of 1965 (Welch 
1987, 103). This state of transitionary frame was too short to produce the kind of high 
caliber of officers to positively impact on the quality of officer corps. For as Ogbebor 
(1976, 12) would observe, himself a retired major in the Nigerian army, the degree of 
professional proficiency in the Nigerian Army of today was significantly inferior to that 
of the Nigerian pre-civil war soldier.
Apart from the deliberate exercise of indigenization of the military in Africa, 
there are also the recurrent incidences of civil wars and political appointments for the 
military. There has been incidences of civil wars (Liberia, Ethiopia, Chad, Nigeria and 
Sudan), which create the necessity for rapid and crash training, as well as quick 
promotions to officer cadre, to fill manpower needs. In addition, in military-led 
governments, the movement of senior officers to staff civilian administrative positions 
brings about the premature promotions of junior officers to senior positions. Indeed there 
is also the high attrition rate in a gravely politicized military (as in Nigeria) where within
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a decade (1985-1995), the military witnessed the inexplicable, but recurring “retirement” 
of its most senior and experienced officers, and the need to promote poorly trained and 
low quality junior officers to take their place (Goodluck Ebelo, 1999). The cumulative 
result of all of these is the presence of considerable mediocrity among the professional 
officer corps within these nations.
Available evidence suggests that members of the military in most African 
countries do not all live in isolated barracks; neither do they have the kind of facility and 
capacity to enhance their education and training. The lack of adequate barracks facilities 
and the unwieldy size of the army ensure that the education and training of military 
personnel are conducted in facilities, which are not insulated from interference by 
civilians. As a practical matter, civilian and soldiers mix freely within the society and in 
public, so that it would be safe to say that in most of these countries the military has been 
adulterated to the point of indistinguishable “civilianization”. Needless to say that it 
would be futile to argue that the absorption of military values or attitudes, directly or 
indirectly, would have any significant educational or training impact on the larger 
society, which if anything, may be dangerously “civilianizing” the military. As a matter 
of fact, a number of factors, including manpower shortage and resource constraints in 
much of developing Africa, make it difficult to agree with those scholars (Pye 1962; 
Daadler 1962; Johnson 1962) who argue that military officers possess special qualities 
and attributes which make for good governors.
The argument by Pye that overseas training or duty would persuade the officer 
corps to modernize its own national military is bourne out of the assumption that their 
training and its practical application would positively translate into reforms at the local
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levels. Indeed the prevalent evidence in the region will tend to suggest that the more 
western education and training, and this cuts across military and civilian strata, the less 
disposed they are to modernization and more to corruption, mismanagement and 
repression. Virtually all of Africa’s political elites which where part of the struggle for 
independence and ended up becoming part of its early leadership after independence 
were, like the officer corps, trained overseas. They included Hastings Kamuzu Banda of 
Malawi, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo of 
Nigeria, and Leopold Senghor of Senegal. It is also the case that overseas training may 
compel the kind of negative exposure and impact that persuades premature emulation of 
western living and values in a rural and impoverished African setting, thereby triggering 
the kind of wholesale looting of national treasuries that have characterized military 
regimes in much of Africa (Nigeria, Zaire, Liberia and The Gambia) to sustain such 
acquired habits and tastes.
Besides, the link between education and training, and by extension economic 
policy, is one that is difficult to establish. Indeed to the extent that the officer corps is 
susceptible to group and societal pressures and influences, their military training and 
experience as the predictor of political or economic thrusts loses its efficacy. In most 
Third World countries, including Africa, pressures from powerful economic interests lead 
to a particular set of economic policies (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Frieden 1991, 
O’Donnell 1973; Silva 1993). The prevalent pattern in military administration is also one 
that relies heavily on the expertise of the technocrat “civil servants” for the 
implementations of policies. And studies have shown that state officials sometimes have
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policy preferences that are reflective neither of military leadership thinking nor important 
economic interest in society (Skocpol 1979; Bates 1981; Ayida, 1987).
The argument by Nordlinger (1970) that increases in military spending in 
countries with military regimes lead to a decline in the performance of other sectors of 
the economy may also be founded on debatable analysis. For if the issues were structured 
to inquire into how detrimental increases in military spending are to economic 
development, then the analysis would be one of opportunity cost directly related to that 
alternatives forgone. In which case, it would also be necessary to compare defense 
budgets with allocations in other sectors of the economy by evaluating available data. 
Unfortunately, Nordlinger did not provide this data in his analysis. Also he failed to 
address the possible spillover effects of increases in defense spending, where it is 
believed such effects are bound to stimulate growth in other sectors of the domestic 
economy. An example is the United States, which experienced tremendous economic 
growth during and immediately after World War II, in large part due to increased defense 
spending. The point needs be made though, that using the experience of the United States 
in this spill-over effects argument is one of incomparables, in that whilst the increase 
benefitted the domestic economy, as the recipient of that increased spending, the same 
cannot be said of the Third World countries, which are primarily importers of all defense 
and other manufactured products. Besides, economic spillover effects may not hold true 
for most of the nations in Africa in real economic terms, since private sector profits are 
not always the result of efficient operation or increased productivity, but rather represent 
money that private contractors make through inflated contracts, patronage and corruption. 
Hence, many of the richest people in the private sector in these countries make their
money, for the most part, through their public sector connection and influence (Ugorji, 
1995). Finally, it may well be that increases in military expenditure under military 
regimes do not preclude the ability of military governors to act as agents of economic 
modernization. However, it is hard to imagine how increases in military expenditure 
would not impact on the overall sectoral budgetary allocations, including economic 
development prioritization.
It would appear that the different approaches employed by these analysts could 
impose significant limitations on the validity of their findings. The studies of Fiet (1973) 
and Welch and Smith (1974) seem to suffer from such limitations. For example, although 
Feit’s model proved useful for explaining the performances of military regimes that make 
up the case studies in his book (Spain, Argentina, Pakistan, Burma and Egypt), it failed to 
prove an adequate model for explaining away military regime performance in tropical 
Africa. Meaning of course that some military regimes in the region (Liberia, Nigeria, 
Togo, Benin, Niger and Ghana) did not experience Fiet’s first stage, proceeding directly 
to some variation of the second stage. While yet other regimes remained at the second 
stage until either toppled or voluntarily returning to the barracks. Yet still other regimes 
have gone through the first and second stages without actually reaching the final, “mass- 
party” stage. However, Zaire, under Mobutu seems to have gone through all three stages 
(Willame, 1970, 149; Africa, March 1985). Within the West African sub-region, Ghana, 
Togo Mali, Benin and Nigeria (with a particularly curious variant) experimented with the 
formation of political parties by military leaders.
Finally it is worth noting that the duration of military or civilian rule has been too 
1 brief for a meaningful longitudinal study. For example Nordlinger’s (1970) study, which
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concluded that military rule was essentially conservative, is based on cross-national data 
for periods 1957-1962. A similar study by Robert Jackman (1976) over a longer period of 
time (1960-1970) came to a different conclusion. These varying results strongly suggest 
that statistical data from African countries, and especially those with military 
governments, should be applied with caution. Notwithstanding these limitations however, 
investigators who employ statistical analysis in evaluating regime performance in third 
world countries still perform a useful task. Not the least, the fact that their efforts serve 
the pertinent purpose of directing attention to some indicators for the evaluation of 
regime performance, in addition to forming the “building block” for future research focus 
and possibly making use of improved data.
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ENDNOTES
Africa News, August 22, 1983; West Africa, August, 1983.
The coup d’etat was characterized as a “palace coup” by reason of the fact that it 
was the overthrow by one of the original coup plotters, who was himself one of 
the leaders. It was an exercise that occurred within due to intrigues in the highest 
echelons of military leadership without the characteristic violence or bloodshed.
The Daily Times, January 16 & 17, 1966.
Chapter five (V), subsection 48 of the Interim National Government (ING) 
Decree 61 states, inter aha, that “the most senior minister shall hold the office of 
Head of the Interim National Government if the office of the Head of IGN 
becomes vacant by reason of death or resignation”.
Tempo, (Nigerian) June 17, 1999. General Babangida’s tenure was marked by the 
kind of senior officer attrition that became a standard for regimes after him. The 
inexplicability of General Abacha surviving these constant series of senior 
officer’s retirement is suspect.
CHAPTER THREE
THEORIES AND CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND RELEVANCE TO
NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION
Military intervention in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and especially 
Nigeria has been rationalized or justified on the predominant inability of the civilian 
(democratic) governments to effect meaningful economic development in these countries. 
The question thus has been: what is economic development? Is the term susceptible to 
different definitions and meaning, depending on whether it is a military or civilian 
government? Interestingly enough, some analysts and theorists have offered competing 
opinions on the issue (Blomtrom and Hettue, 1979; Streeten, 1984; Todaro, 1989; Meier 
and Stiglitz, 2001). Although there is consensus on the general state of economic under­
development within much of developing countries, particularly SSA, there is 
disagreement as to the possible causes and remedies. This chapter is an attempt to 
evaluate the different perspectives on development and the relevance of their contextual 
usage in understanding economic and market development under the military in Nigeria.
The meaning and/or definition of economic development are so nebulous and 
normatively relative that it does not quite lend itself to absolute categorization, not even 
in the traditional sense of the usage. However, the definition that gradually emerged from 
a strictly orthodox focus sought to embrace perspectives, which encompass new 
paradigms, especially as they relate to the Third World countries. This new perspective is 
especially significant since analysts believe that the orthodox focus or bearing was 
limited in scope and thrust, and thus did not broadly or comprehensively articulate a
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meaning or definition outside the context of established norms or usages (Meier and 
Stiglitz, 2001).
It would seem to suggest therefore, that the so-called new view or focus in the 
definition of development is not particularly new. Rather, it is the expansion and 
generalization of a hitherto peculiarly trite normative usage by providing it (definition of 
development) a kind of inclusive expansiveness, with perhaps greater emphasis to locale- 
specific socio-cultural, political and economic relevance. According to Paul Streeten 
(1984, 111, 114-115), although the shift in perception has been described as “recent”, 
some of these changes go back a considerable time. Indeed, hardly any of the features of 
the “old” perception were generally acceptable at any stage, and qualifications, criticisms 
and alternative perceptions were put forward almost as soon as “orthodox” perception 
had been formulated. In view of these changing perceptions in the term and usage, it is 
not surprising therefore that they have been interpreted to mean different things or have 
different emphasis for cultures and societies, depending on their value-judgement and 
national pre-occupation (Todaro, 1989; Thirlwall, 1994; Coleman and Nixon, 1986).
CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT: A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE
The word development has been variously defined by most theorists; each with a 
perspective as different as their peculiar focus and endeavour. The exercise is not made 
any easier when added the words “development” and “growth”. Indeed the two words 
have constantly been interchangeably used, that wittingly or unwittingly the intellectual 
assumption in some quarters has been made that they mean one and the same thing 
(Dudley Seers 1969). For example the traditional notion of growth implied that economic 
development would necessarily have occurred when an economy can generate and
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sustain an annual increase in its gross national product. However, economic prevalences, 
especially in the developing countries in the years immediately following the Second 
World War (WWII) prompted inquisitive inquiry on this traditional thinking. Following 
the end of WWII, the economic growth of some of the developing countries was rapid 
and showed impressive growth rates, while some actually exceeded expectations by 
sometimes outperforming “recommended” targets. Available data (World Bank Report 
1973; E. Wayne Nafziger, 1996; Andrew M. Kamarck, 1967) show that real growth rates 
for developing countries as a whole between 1870 and 1950 were less than one per cent 
per year, compared to about 3.4 per cent per year for periods between 1950 and 1975. 
The World Bank Report (1973) noted that this rate was significantly faster than that of 
developed countries in any comparable period before 1950. For example, the periods 
between 1960 and 1980 witnessed annual growth rates of 3.5 percent for countries like 
South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Brazil, Malaysia and Nigeria (Nafziger, 1996, 68). In 
the words of Andrew M. Kamarck:
“The years since World War II can be divided into two phases -  
1945-60 and the years since. Until 1960, Africa in general did very 
well economically. The indications are that economic growth in Africa 
during the period was at least as fast as in any other major underdeveloped 
region of the world, production and export grew rapidly; gross national 
product grew in the vicinity of 4-6 per cent per year in real terms. Only 
the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries showed a more rapid growth 
of exports...
...Some areas - like the Rhodesias, the Belgian Congo, Morocco, Gabon,
Kenya - grew at rates of 6-11 per cent per year, rates among the highest in 
the World ...Other African lands - Tunisia, Algeria, Ghana, Nigeria,
French West Africa, Liberia, Uganda, Tanganyika, South Africa-grew 
at rates of 4-6 per cent per year, not spectacular but more than satisfactory”
(1967,17).
Although some of these countries did out-perform “informed” predictions, while 
some actually met overall United Nations First Development Decade targets, what was 
inexplicable was the fact that the living conditions or standards of the majority of their
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citizenry did not improve at comparable rates of growth. In other words, the majority of 
their citizenry remained impoverished. Abject poverty, high unemployment, high 
illiteracy, gross inequality in income distribution remained. All of these in the face of 
impressive growth rates, created a palpable disconnect which could not explain “growth” 
without “development”. According to W.W. Rostow, (1960, 378) in a good many 
countries high overall real growth rates were accompanied by considerable mass poverty, 
unemployment and partial employment, and by other social ills.
The persistent presence and recurring feature of these negative indexes compelled 
a re-evaluation, because until then, there was an assumed inextricability between growth 
and development. It was assumed that one (growth) was the harbinger of the other 
(development). “...Growth and development tend to go together and to be mutually re­
enforcing. A growing economy tends to generate development, and a developed economy 
provides the wherewithal and incentive for further investment for growth” (Yusufu, T.M., 
1996, 30).
However, theorists (Seers, 1977, 5; Blomtrom and Hettue, 1979, 8-9; and Streeten 
1984, 111) contend that although early attempts at construing development theories were 
marked by the fact that the concept of development and growth were considered 
synonymous, there was a need to draw a distinction. According to Seers (1977, 5), 
development ought to embody improvements in the quality of life of the population by 
the provision of basic necessities such as shelter, food, employment, reduction of income 
inequality and self-reliance. Blomtrom and Hettue (1979) believe that development 
meant measured growth and associated changes, in addition to systematic changes of 
economic and political institutions in a growth-promoting direction. Essentially, they
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believe growth entails rising per capita output and all-inclusive improvement in a nation’s 
economic activities; with the resultant improvement in the standard of living, growing 
commercialization of production, gradual improvement of markets, shifts in the 
composition of output by sector of origin and a rise in savings and investment, as a 
percentage of gross national product (1979, 9). Streeten, who brings a refreshingly 
current perspective to the debate (in Michael Todaro, 1989, 62) contends that early 
thinking and policy making was dominated by economic growth as a principal 
performance criterion of development, and because of the redundancy of that original 
thinking, development must be redefined as an attack on the chief evils of the world 
today— malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and inequality. He also 
believes that measured in terms of aggregate growth rates, development has been a 
success. But measured in terms of jobs, justice and the elimination of poverty, it has been 
a failure or only a partial success. For Todaro (1989, 86), “economic development” has 
traditionally meant the capacity of a national economy, whose initial or prevailing 
economic condition has more or less been static to generate and sustain an annual 
increase in its gross national product at rates of perhaps 5 per cent or 7 per cent or more. 
That is to say, there is reasonable positive alteration in the general economic sphere as to 
evolve and engender improvements in the overall well being of the citizenry”. The 
conclusion that may be drawn from all of these is that of shifting emphasis on the 
meaning of economic development: one that emphasizes national economic activities that 
emerge from rural agricultural agrarianism to urbanization; when employment and 
production emphasis would have shifted from purely agricultural, agrarian activities to 
manufacturing and service industries (Rostow, 1960).
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The new emphasis, much as it redirected the collective focus and perhaps 
provided what appeared to be a much more acceptable functional definition, one which 
emphasized “the human elevation” in the meaning and process of economic development, 
especially for the Third World countries. However, it failed to recognize that 
“development” carries with it a different meaning for different people and cultures, 
depending on their national preoccupation, which in turn is rooted in their value systems.
Coleman, D. and Nixon, F. (1986) believe that not only are value judgements an 
inevitable part of deciding what concepts and relationships should be employed to answer 
questions such as “what causes development?” or “has development occurred in any 
specific instance?” but that value judgements are also necessary in how to present 
concepts empirically. Todaro, (1989, 11) believes that the normative subjectivity of both 
the usuage and meaning freely indulges regional and national value judgements and 
idiosyncracies, “tendencies which are subject to variations in different countries and 
cultures and at different times”. He also believes that many so-called general economic 
models are in fact based on a set of implicit assumptions about human behaviour and 
economic relationships that may have little or no connection with the realities of 
developing economies. For him, therefore, “development should be perceived as a multi­
dimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of entire economic 
and social system. In addition to improvements in incomes and output, it ought typically 
to involve radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures as well as 
in popular attitudes and, in many cases, even customs and beliefs” (Todaro, 1989, 62). 
Thirlwall (1994, 9-10), who asserts that a concept of development requires to embrace 
the major economic and social objectives and values for which a society strives, goes on
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to contend that poverty is more or less a national creation and/or location, an act of 
commission or omission in policy formulation and implementation, including factor 
allocation, on the part of the particular country to its resources. “...Countries are poor 
because they lack resources or the willingness to bring them into use” (1994, 4). Yet this 
does not begin to make the definition and/or meaning any less complicated, for as Lewis, 
Arthur W. (in W.W. Rostow, 1960, 397-398) explained:
“The most difficult problem...is to explain why people hold the beliefs 
they do. Economic growth depends on attitudes to work, to wealth, 
to thrift, to having children, to invention, to strangers, to adventure 
and so on, and all these attitudes flow from deep spring in the human 
mind. There have been attempts to explain why these attitudes vary 
from one community to another. One can look to differences in religion, 
but this is merely to restate the problem... The experienced sociologist 
knows that these questions are unanswerable, certainly in our present 
state of knowledge, and probably for all time...”
From the foregoing, the assumption is that perhaps “development” has a 
qualitative content to it that can only be defined with respect to its subjective values, even 
as these are a matter of belief (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). However, the other critical 
question, and for this there is little consensus is: what constitutes “development”? What
form should “development” take? What may be the prerequisites for such a process? And
what may account for lack thereof, especially for the Third World countries? And 
especially under a military government, could there possibly be a distinct institutional 
value system unique to the military? The lack of consensus in these regards further 
compounds the different and competing strands of thoughts or approaches being 
canvassed by economic theorists. There are four relevant strands, each persuasive and 
expansive, but nonetheless arguable and inconclusive.
According to Todaro (1989, 63-82) these may be classified as:
1- The Linear Stages of Growth Model
2- Theories and Patterns of Structural Changes
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3- The International Dependence Revolution; and
4- The Neo-classical, Free Market, Counter- Revolution
LINEAR STAGES OF GROWTH MODEL
The linear stages of growth model have, as one of its prominent proponents,
W.W. Rostow. In his work, “The Stages of Economic Growth”, he attempted to show 
that transition from under- development to development must follow a predictable pattern 
of stages through which all nations truly and meaningfully aspiring to develop must pass. 
Although, in his analysis he acknowledged the dynamism of economic, political, social 
and cultural inter-connectedness that may sometimes dictate a different sequential 
outcome, he nonetheless identified five main stages of development: 1- The Traditional 
Society Stage; 2 - The Precondition for Take-Off Stage; 3 - The Take-Off Stage; 4 - The 
Drive for Maturity Stage and 5 - The Age of Mass-Consumption.
According to Rostow (1960, 4-6), the under-developed countries are in large part, 
at the rudimentary, primitive stage or the precondition for take-off. A stage characterized 
by a high proportion of the workforce in agriculture (greater than 75 per cent) by some 
estimates), coupled with very little mobility or social change, great divisions of wealth 
and decentralized political power. These traditional societies, of which few, if any, are 
still existing today, in the typical model of his usage, would be inhibited from attaining 
self-sustaining growth if they failed to follow certain set processes.
The Precondition Stage, in his typical development evolution, comprises the 
transition stage. Its main features require, among other things, that the level of investment 
be raised up to 10 per cent or more of the national income to ensure sustainable growth 
(1960, 60). However, this stage, in some situations and given certain national
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circumstances, have taking a decidedly different form for some of the emerging Third 
World countries, who witnessed what might be characterized as “some external 
influence-imposition by more advanced countries”. The effects of which, it is believed, 
“shocked and stampeded” the traditional societies and initiated them into the World 
Markets and international participation, thus widening their scope internally and 
externally in the areas of commerce, manufacturing enterprise and levels of investment 
mobilization (1960, 6).
However, Rostow argues that for a majority of the Third World countries, this 
stage is handicapped (hobbled) because of the limited pace “within an economy and a 
conflicted society still mainly characterized by traditional low productivity methods, by 
old social structures and values, and regionally based political institutions that developed 
in conjunction with them” (Todaro, 1989, 88), including the unallayed suspicions of 
indigenous people regarding colonial power’s machinations, the seeming imposition of 
constructing a social overload capital and the introduction of industries from abroad 
(A.P. Thirlwall, 1994, 62).
If Rostow’s stages theory can be categorized by order of importance and 
criticality from the perspective of a Third World country this stage, Precondition, would 
be immensely critical for many a developing country. For many of these countries were, 
at this point in their nation-hood, either in the middle of colonialism or emerging from it 
(gaining independence). And given the exploitative structure of that regime (colonialism), 
indigenous people viewed with extreme suspicion any activity or exercise that bore any 
semblance to “external influence imposition by more advanced countries” (Thirlwall, 
1994, 63). For these countries, it looked a mimickery of the kind of external invasion
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(occupation), not unakin to colonialism and its exploitative consequences. It is not 
surprising therefore, that for most of these developing countries, this critical transitory 
period between the traditional (feudal) stage and the pre-condition, witnessed a crisis of 
both focus and supremacy (control); one in which the competing interests - “new types of 
enterprising men... in private economy, in government...” and the new political elite and 
the new military cadre - “ khaki - elite” held sway. The result is that for a country like 
Nigeria and some other countries with similar and constant military intervention 
experience, between the feudal stage (include colonial feudalism) and the take off stage, 
the military, another form of feudalism, which is perhaps a more pernicious specie, 
hijacked the development process, thus aborting the take off stage for what now seems 
like eternity, and elusive in realization. It would be precisely at the critical stage in their 
development process, if we accept Rostow’s stages hypothesis, that coups d’etat occurred 
in countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana, Egypt, Uganda, Togo, etc.
However, Rostow’s pre-condition stage tends to feature oil-producing Third 
World countries in a completely different category because of their “unusual sources”. In 
other words, their peculiar resource circumstances or endowments afforded them the 
opportunity of following a “stages” course of development that was not sequentially 
orthodox. He notes that “... but some countries have imported large quantities of foreign 
capital (from sale o f crude oil and other natural resources) for long periods, which 
undoubtedly contributed to creating the preconditions for take-off, without actually 
initiating take-off (Rostow, 1960, 39). Indeed Rostow believes that whatever the role of 
capital imports, the preconditions for take-off include an initial ability to mobilize
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domestic savings productively, as well as a structure which subsequently permits a high 
marginal rate of savings.
On the other hand, Rostow’s take-pff stage is, in a manner of speaking, a critical
irreversible turning point, when opposition and resistance to steady growth are finally
overcome. At this stage, progress and growth assume an institutional structure. Growth
becomes self-sustaining, especially following the establishment of “leading growth
factors” (1960, 7-9).1 It is also a period when the scale of productive economic activity
reaches a critical mass and produces changes which lead to a massive and progressive
structural transformation in economics and societies of which they are a part, better
viewed as changes in kind than merely in degree. According to some opinions, the most
critical components for the take-off stage are all encompassing:
A rise in the rate of productive investment say 5% or less to over 10% of 
national income (or net national product);
The development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors, with 
high rate of growth; and
The existence or quick emergence of a political, social and institutional 
framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modem sector 
and the potential external economic effects of take-off and gives to growth 
an on - going character (Meier, 1984, 91).
“Drive to Maturity” and “The Age of Mass Consumption” are respectively 
Rostow’s fourth and final stages. And although by classification, these are supposedly 
separate and distinct stages, my conjunctive treatment of both here make them no less so. 
My undifferentiated treatment of both stages in this section, though peculiar, is informed 
by their lack of perceptible substantial differences, especially from the perspective of a 
Third World country. Typically for most, if not all Third World countries, these concepts, 
Drive to Maturity and Mass Consumption, represent more or less an academic reference 
quotient that is as tentative as it is unreal. For most Third World countries, Drive to
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Maturity is a tentative prospect, while the Age of Mass Consumption appears neither 
feasible nor realizable. Drive to maturity presupposes a fully developed economic 
structure striving towards maturity, a feature not trully characteristic of any Third World 
country. According to Thirlwall (1994, 63), “...the developing countries have no 
likelihood of reaching this stage (mass consumption) in the foreseeable future”.
Notwithstanding, these stages have a common feature, namely economic growth 
as industrial and productivity technology accelerate to take on international significance, 
even as old industries level off. At these stages, the economy would have extended its 
range of modern technology into the more complex processes. In the final analysis, 
maturity is attained when a decidedly (original) industrial base begins to shift towards 
durable consumer goods and services, when new leading sectors replace old ones. In 
addition, maturity has features and implications that are not economic, but political. 
Maturity comes with a level of national attainment and confidence, a contagious sense of 
superior assertiveness, like those displayed by Germany under Bismarck and Russia 
under Stalin. According to Rostow (1960, 10), “Formally, we can define maturity as the 
stage in which an economy demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original 
industries which powered its take off and to absorb and to apply efficiently over a very
j
wide range of resources, if not the whole range, the most advanced fruits of (them) 
modern technology”.
Furthermore, it is at this stage of maturity that fundamental political choices have 
to be made by society on the use to which greater wealth should be put, since every 
nation will presumably reach the stage of high mass consumption, whatever the balance 
of choice at the stage of maturity (Thirlwall, 1996, 63). Essentially therefore, the stage of
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high mass consumption would have been attained when “the leading sectors of the 
economy shifts towards durable consumer goods and services: a phase from which 
Americans are beginning to emerge; whose not unequivocal joys Western Europe and 
Japan are beginning energetically to probe; and with which Soviet society is engaged in 
an uneasy flirtation” (Rostow, 1960, 10).
PERSPECTIVE ON ROSTOW’S LINEAR STAGES WITHIN A REGIONAL 
CONTEXT
Most analysts have picked issues with the general thrust of Rostow’s postulations 
(Kuzners, 1984; Cairncross, 1961). Besides, available data and results on the ground (in 
much of The Third World) seem to contradict his conclusions.
Firstly, Rostow, in postulating his stages theory and universalizing its application 
to all nations, (developed and developing countries), and finding within their disparate 
adherence and application the failure of most developing countries to attain economic 
development, ignores the socio-cultural, political and economic relativity of these 
countries; not to mention value-driven dynamics of prioritization in their development 
process. Indeed Kuzners is of the view that:
“stage-making approaches are misleading when they succumb to a linear 
conception of history and imply that all economies tend to pass through 
the same series of stages. Although a particular sequence may correspond 
broadly to historical experience of some economies, no single sequence fits 
the history of all countries. To maintain that every economy always follow 
the same course of development with a common past and the same future 
is to overschematize the complex forces of development, and to give the 
sequence of stages a generality that is unwarranted” (1984, 93).
Secondly, one of the factors Rostow referred to as an impediment to development, 
is the relatively low level of capital formation in some of the developing countries: their 
inability to save and invest. Though these countries may have lacked the requisite 
accumulative capacity, the active participation of the Bretton Wood Institutions and other
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multi-lateral agencies in the fiscal and economic life of these countries early in their 
independent life, persuades a different conclusion. The strong suggestion here is that, 
were capital formation the major obstacle (without significant other factors) to 
development, to the extent that capital formation did not have to be endogenous to 
qualify and did not by its very meaning preclude loans and foreign aids, that should have 
been overcome. This is because many of these countries received very substantial foreign 
assistance, including loans from developed countries and Aid Agencies. Indeed over the 
past 50 years, rich nations have extended over $1 trillion in aids and assistance to poor 
(developing) countries. For example, in the immediate pre-and post independent periods, 
the British and French governments made substantial grants to many of their African 
colonies. Also significant in this sphere is the impact of US finance in South Korea, 
Pakistan, and Taiwan, which became a classic case of aid-assisted take-off (Lloyd G. 
Reynold, 1977, 268- 269; The Economist, June 26, 1999, 23-25). Nigeria is also a case in 
point. When shortly after independence in 1960 the country inaugurated its first National 
Development Plan (1962 - 1968), the government positively counted on grants and loans 
of upwards of 50 per cent from external sources to execute its development plans 
(Yusufu, 1996, 381). As a matter of fact, for the periods 1970-1974 (Second National 
Development Plan), the country negotiated loans, credits and grants to the tune of over 
$4,311 million, excluding technical assistance (Olatunde Ojo, 1985, 145-147).
Indeed, across sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria’s experience is a replicated case of 
similar, if not equal, access and opportunity to foreign- assisted capital formation. 
Apparently, all of the countries in the sub-region benefitted. According to Ayittey (1992, 
281) “more than $300 billion in aids and various forms of credits and financial assistance
105
have been pumped into Africa since the 1960s.” That these countries, in the sub-region, 
with the possible exemption of South Africa, still failed miserably in their capital 
formation endeavours, inspite of, and hence unable to attain consistent levels of savings 
and investment, brings to focus another querry: Is the Third World countries’ (especially 
sub-Sahara Africa) lack of meaningful development a case of “relatively low capital
formation” or one of the dearth of skill and management a case of relatively low
human resource formation, compounded by a debilitating and inexplicably insensitive, 
inept and corrupt military leadership culture? Whatever the case, it is still premature to 
draw any conclusions at this point whether the latter is indeed the case. Suffice it to say 
that under Nigeria’s second National Development Plan, for example, the need for 
manpower in general, and foreign technical assistance in particular, reached crisis 
proportions. The country could itself supply only a minute fraction of 49,210 senior level 
personnel and 140,000 intermediates it required for the implementation of its 
programmes in the mid 1970s. This compelled the federal military government to initiate 
various crash technical assistance programmes in the areas of Applied Sciences, 
Engineering, and Technology etc, to train Nigerians in the United States of America, 
Japan, Western Europe and the former Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, in 1978 alone, 
Nigeria spent $9.2 million for about 1000 students under the program in the United States 
alone (Ojo, 1985,146).
Thirdly, the emergence of “one or more leading sectors” and the existence or 
emergence of “a political, social and institutional framework, which exploits the impulses 
to expand,” (Rostow quoted in Thirlwall, 1996, 63) may well be the critical components 
in the Take-Off stage. However, the apparent lack of general applicability of these
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components, even where these “factors” exists, by Rostow’s postulation, makes his 
conclusion arguable. For instance, he asserts that extensive railway construction before 
1914 in Argentina, India and China, though qualified as the emergence of “lending 
growth factor” (Rostow 1960, 52-58), but failed to precipitate take-off, because full 
traditional society had not been attained. Which raises the question: at what point is full 
traditional society attained? What are the yardsticks for measuring such full attainment? 
Better still, are there some other variables to transitional development, unrelated to and 
unpredicated upon his (Rostow) linear stages, which was not considered? There is reason 
to think so. There is also reason to suggest that the antecedental bearings of the majority 
of the Third World countries have more to do with their failure than the lack of “full 
attainment”.
For instance, if the construction of railways in these countries, an exercise that 
otherwise qualify as a “leading growth factor,” with impetus to generate “the impulse to 
expand”, by Rostow’s hypothesis, failed to precipitate, or if you will, initiate “take-off’ 
in these countries, it strongly suggests that his contention is of selective applicability or at 
best, limited relevance. It has failed therefore to address another related, and perhaps 
more crucial issue, namely that the more crucial requirement for “take-off”, especially for 
a colony, which many of these countries were, was not only the availability of “leading 
growth factors”, like the railways (since their development may not have been designed 
or intended as a growth engine, at least not deliberately positively), but also an 
understanding and appreciation of the original colonial intendment in the processing or 
provision of any “factor” at all in the colonies. The real question is whether this particular 
“factor” (railways) was deliberately intended to facilitate indigenous development? Or
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was it solely intended to facilitate or sustain colonial industrial development, by enabling 
the exportation of local primary (agricultural) products from the colonies, without 
necessarily precipitating development or increasing indigenous national savings and 
investment; but for its “trickle down” speculative possibilities?
The consensus amongst theorists (Kamarck 1967, 47-59; Richard Harris, 1975; 
Ismail-Sabri, 1980, 13-16; Ojo, 1985, 141-168; Ekekwe, 1985, 53-68; Anunobi, 1992, 
83-101) is that the provision of any kind of infrastructure, including the railways, in any 
of the colonies must be seen in the larger context of their enabling quotient: for the 
smooth exportation of raw materials to the metropolis (the colonial home country). 
Ismail-Sabri for one, believes that even though the “colonial powers did develop some 
sectors of the colonial economies and some aspects of their life”, they did so, solely to 
secure their own economic development interests. “Therefore, those sectors and aspects 
that received their concern and attracted their attention grew at tremendous pace in 
comparison with the other sectors and aspects, and became very linked to industries in 
the colonizing nations. The outcome has been distorted, extroverted and dependent 
societies” (1980, 14). According to him, Egypt built its first railway as early as the 1850s, 
because cotton had to be gathered from all over the country and carried to the port of 
Alexandria where it was shipped to Lancashire textile mills (1980, 14).
Finally, there is the general criticism of Rostow stages, especially by Kuznets 
(1965, 219), which seems to be representative of all the criticisms against (Rostow’s) 
hypothesis. First, there is the difficulty of empirically testing the theory, which Rostow 
makes no attempt to do. For one thing, there is a general lack of quantitative evidence for 
the assertions made, and for another his description of the characteristics of some of the
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stages are not sufficiently specific to define the relevant empirical evidence, even if data 
were available (Thirlwall, 1994, 64). For example, Kuznets (1965, 219) argues that with 
respect to the Take-Off stage, it is difficult to comprehend what “a political, social and 
institutional framework, which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modem sector”, 
means. He goes on: “it seems to me that Rostow... defines these social phenomena as a 
complex that produces the effect he wishes to explain and then treats this identification as 
if it were a meaningful identification” (1965, 219). Kuznet also questions the quantitative 
evidence that is available for testing Rostows hypothesis, especially the figures of 
investment and the incremental capital-output ratio during the take-off period in the 
countries studied. He opines: “unless I have completely misunderstood Professor 
Rostow’s definition of take-off, and its statistical characteristics, I can only conclude that 
the available evidence lends no support to his suggestion” (1965, 219). In addition, 
Kuznet maintains that when it comes to the take-off stage, the lack of common 
experience typifying countries in relation to investment etc. “casts serious doubt on the 
validity of the definition of the take-off, as a general stage of modern economic growth, 
distinct from what Professor Rostow calls the precondition, or transition stage preceding 
it and the self-sustaining growth stage following it” (1965, 227). Furthermore, it is the 
contention of another critic, Cairncross, A.K. (1961), who seems to re-echo Kuznets, 
when he wonders what relevance “stages” when the various stages overlap.
Finally in his development of stages theories, Rostow may have disregarded the 
input or significance of what was evolving as a unique regional phenomenon, even as he 
noted “.. .new types of enterprising men.. .in private economy, in government...” and the 
impact of participation. The military institution became an active part of the process and
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participation, with peculiar value systems that profoundly affected what could otherwise 
have been a “natural” stages sequence.
THEORIES AND PATTERNS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The structural change model is another in the development theories. But one that 
focuses on the mechanism by which underdeveloped Third World economies transform 
their domestic structures from heavy emphasis and dependency on the traditional 
subsistence agriculture to a more modem, more urbanized and more industrially diverse 
manufacturing and service economy. Professor Arthur Lewis 2, one of the leading 
authorities on the structural change approach proceeds from the assumption that an 
under-developed economy consist of two sectors, the so-called “two sector surplus 
labour” theoretical model, namely: a modern exchange sector, and an indigenous 
overpopulated subsistence sector. That is to say, within the subsistence sub-sector, there 
are unlimited supplies of labour, than the sub-sector needs or requires at the on-going 
subsistence wage rate; meaning that the marginal product of workers in the subsistence 
sector is equal to or below the subsistence or institutional wage level, so that a reduction 
in the number of workers would not lower the average (subsistence) product of labour 
and might even raise it (quoted in Thirlwall, 1994, 96-111).
In the context of a Third World country, it would mean that with rapid population 
growth and consequent surplus labour, whose only source of employment is agriculture 
(land), a point would be reached where a limited acreage, regardless of the amount of 
labour engaged, will produce the same amount of output, a feature akin to attaining 
optimum level and then reaching diminishing returns. At this point, labour from 
subsistence sector gets gradually transferred to the modern exchange sector. It is believed
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that the speed with which this expansion occurs is determined by the rate of industrial 
investment and capital accumulation in the modern sector. For this to occur, it is assumed 
that the level of wages in the urban industrial sector is constant and determined as a given 
premium over fixed average subsistence level of wages in the traditional agricultural 
sector. Lewis assumed that urban wages would have to be at least 30 percent higher than 
the average rural income to induce workers to migrate from their home areas (Todaro, 
1989, 69).
However, Todaro (1989, 69-72) believes that the primary focus of the model is 
both on the process of labour transfer and on the growth of output and employment in the 
modern sector. And that both labour transfer and modern sector employment growth are 
brought about by output expansion in that sector. He is also of the opinion that the Lewis 
model of an underdeveloped economy essentially consists of two sectors. “...(1) a 
traditional, overpopulated rural subsistence sector characterized by zero marginal labour 
productivity - a situation that permits Lewis to classify this labour as ‘surplus’, in the 
sense that it can be withdrawn from the agricultural sector without any loss of output - 
and (2) a high-productivity, modem urban industrial sector into which labour from the 
subsistence sector is gradually transferred...”(1989, 72)
In contrast to the Lewis model of structural change, patterns of development 
focuses on the sequential processes through which the economic, industrial and 
institutional structure of an under-developed economy is transformed over time, to permit 
new industries to replace traditional agriculture as the engine of economic growth 
(Todaro, 1989, 73). However, although increased savings and investment are thought to 
be necessary conditions for economic growth, according to this school of thought, that in
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and of itself, is not sufficient. Rather capital accumulation, both human and physical must 
complement a set of interrelated positive changes in the economic structure of a country 
for that to occur. These structural changes must involve virtually all economic elements, 
including the transformation of production, and changes in the composition of consumer 
demand, international trade and resource use, as well socio-economic factors, such as 
urbanization, growth and the distribution of a country’s population (Todaro, 1989, 74).
Like Lewis in the Structural Change Model, the Patterns of Development Model 
featured empirical analysts like Hollis Chenery who, with his colleagues, examined 
patterns of development for numerous Third World countries during post-war periods 
1950 to 1973. In their study of the transformation of the structure of production in 
selected developing countries, using time-series and cross-sectional analysis, Chenery 
and his colleagues concluded that as per capita incomes rise, there is a shift from 
agricultural production to industrial production. The major hypothesis of structural 
change model is that development is an identifiable process of growth and change whose 
main features are similar in all countries (Todaro, 1989, 77).
The model recognized however, that differences can arise among countries in the 
pace and exact pattern of development, depending on their particular set of factors and 
circumstances: resource endowment and size, its government policies and objectives, the 
availability of external capital and technology, and the international trade environment; 
provided that the “correct” mix of economic policies are in place to generate beneficial 
patterns of self-sustaining growth.
Todaro (1989, 78) concludes that:
“Empirical studies of the process of structural change lead to the conclusion 
that the pace and pattern of development can vary according to both domestic 
and international factors, many of which lie outside the control of an individual
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developing nation. Yet, despite this variation, structural-change economists 
argue that one can identify certain patterns occurring in almost all countries 
during the development process. And these...may be affected by the choice 
of development policies pursued by the LDC governments as well as the 
international trade and foreign assistance policies of developed nations”.
PERSPECTIVE ON THEORIES AND PATTERNS 
OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The structural model thesis as propounded by Professor Lewis makes some 
implicit assumptions, prominent among which are: 1. That the rate of labour transfer, 
from the agricultural sector, and the subsequent employment creation in the modem 
sector is proportional to the rate of capital accumulation; and 2. That the faster the rates 
of capital accumulation, the higher the growth rate of the modern sector, and the faster 
the rate of new job creation. The fact of the matter, however, is that the experiences of 
most developing countries are not consistent with his migration pattern analysis.
Migration patterns— rural to urban areas— in the majority of developing countries are 
not merely a function of “two sector surplus labour” theory, rather the result of social 
and other locally extenuating circumstances, including bad government policies. For most 
of these countries, available statistics show that migration is rather a precipitous and 
desperate reaction of the rural poor to unemployment and the development neglect by 
national economic planners. Consequently they migrate to seek employment in the urban 
areas. Writing on’ “Income, Expectations, Rural-Urban Migration and Employment in 
Africa”, Todaro (1971, 391-395) determined, among other things, that the more relevant 
reason for rural-urban migration is the combination and interaction of two variables, the 
urban-rural income differential and the probability of securing an urban job, which 
determine the rate and magnitude of rural-urban migration in tropical Africa.
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According to Nnoli (1980), rural-urban migration in Nigeria was partly caused by 
the desire of able-bodied rural dwellers to move into the cities in search of better 
economic opportunities. This was especially the case because virtually all economic 
development policy considerations were almost exclusively limited to the urban areas; 
and by the 1970s, rural living had gone beyond such indescribably horrible levels and 
rural migration verging on chaotic exodus, as to attract the attention of a hitherto 
unresponsive Federal Military Government. As a matter of fact, Dupe Olatunbosun, in 
his study of the plight of rural dwellers and their perennial neglect, estimates that 
Nigeria’s rural dwellers contribute more than 50 per cent of the current revenue of state 
governments and yet only about 20 per cent of the government total expenditure between 
1960 and 1974 found its way back among them (1975, 22). The state of neglect was so 
total and impacting as to attract government’s attention. As a matter of fact, the Guideline 
for the Fourth Development Plan (1981-1985) regarded it as critical, while strongly 
recommending a policy change to “a sustained effort to raise agricultural productivity and 
provide human needs such as hygienic water supply, health facilities, access roads, 
electricity and other amenities; noting also that rural migration can only be 
contained/checked by bringing health to the economic life of the rural areas. As Lewis 
himself will note in his “Reflections on Nigeria’s Economic Growth” (1967, 42), wage 
differentials, as opposed to sequential growth in the agricultural sector appears to be 
responsible for much of the migration to the urban areas, “...urban wages are typically at 
levels twice as high as the average farm incomes. Between 1950 and 1963, prices 
received by farmers through Marketing Boards in Southern Nigeria fell by 25 per cent
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while at the same time, the minimum wage scales of the Federal Government increased 
by 200 per cent”.
Furthermore, it is hard to hold that migrations were induced by “at least 30% 
higher than average rural income” (Todaro, 1989, 69). At least for Nigeria, the productive 
urban employment did not exist in any absorptive or significant quantity as to constitute 
an attractive incentive. On the contrary, the spectre was one of a growing large number of 
urban unemployed, who were otherwise engaged in such unorthodox endeavours like 
armed robbery, and other criminal activities. In his study, “Public Policy and Rural Urban 
Distribution of Income in Nigeria”, Willie Okowa (1985, 72-73) observed thus: 
“...unemployment was largely an urban phenomenon and rural-urban migration a major 
cause of the problem. In fact, a situation now exists in most developing countries in 
which surplus labour in the urban areas co-exist with shortages in the rural. It is estimated 
that under 50 per cent of Nigeria’s cultivable land is actually put to use”.
It is debatable whether the military governments’ policies positively or negatively 
impacted migration patterns, and if indeed such policies in any way help to support or 
debunk patterns of structural change hypothesis.
THE INTERNATIONAL-DEPENDENCE REVOLUTION (IDR)
This school of thought is particularly persuaded that the statistical averages that 
the structural-change economists calculate from a diverse range of rich and poor 
countries are not only of limited practical value in identifying the critical factors in a 
particular nation’s development processes but, more importantly, that they divert 
attention from the real factors in the global economy that maintain and perpetuate the 
poverty of Third World nations (Todaro, 1989, 78).
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The emergence of International Dependence Revolution (IDR) school of thought 
may be described as the cumulative despondency point for much of the Third World 
economic development theorists, grappling as it were, with issues of third world 
underdevelopment and hopeless dependency, and not finding within the varied and 
competing, if sometimes contradictory, available theories (thesis) a plausible explanation 
for what seems an intractable regional economic persistence. Within the IDR are three 
major theories (models): Neo-colonial Dependence Model (NDM); False Paradigm 
Model (FPM); and Dualistic Development Thesis (DDT).
NDM conjures up a pattern of dependency that historically, or perhaps colonially 
engineered an international capitalist system that was not created or intended to be 
equitable. According to this thinking, it is a system that decisively created over-bearing 
rich countries and haplessly dependent poor countries. Whether because rich nations are 
internationally exploitative or unintentionally neglectful, the co-existence of rich and 
poor nations in an international system dominated by such unequal power relationships 
between the center (the developed countries) and the periphery (the Third World) renders 
the attempt by poor nations to be self-reliant and independent in their development efforts 
difficult and sometimes even impossible (Todaro 1989, 79). The contention also is that 
these countries efforts at development are hampered by the collaborative dubiousity of a 
“perpetually indebted” elite within these countries.3 Directly and indirectly, they serve 
(are dominated by) and are rewarded by (dependent on) special international power 
groups, including multi-national corporations, national bilateral aid agencies and 
multilateral assistance organizations, like the World Bank or the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which are tied by allegiance and/or funding to the wealthy capitalist
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countries (Todaro, 1989, 79). Perhaps Paul Baran (in Gerald M. Meier, 1984, 139) gave
the most unflattering perspective to the dependency “rationale” when he said. “...What is 
decisive is that economic development in underdeveloped countries is profoundly 
inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist countries” and therefore in 
the latter’s interest to be deliberately exploitative.
Unlike the linear stages and structural changes theories, which stress internal 
constraints, such as insufficient savings and investment or lack of education and skills, 
the NDM contends that underdeveloped is externally induced. This view of under­
development is the thrust of the argument for many a proponent (Baran, 1975; Colin 
Leys, 1975; B. J. Cohen, 1973; Theotonio Dos Santos, 1969). Dan Santos aptly 
represented the collective view when he posited:
“Underdevelopment, far from constituting a state of backwardness prior to 
capitalism, is rather a consequence and a particular form of capitalist 
development known as dependent capitalism...dependence is a conditioning 
situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others. A relationship of inter-dependence 
between two or more economies and the worldtrading system becomes a 
dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion 
while others, being in a dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of 
the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative 
effects on their immediate development. In either case, the basic situation of 
dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited.
Dominant countries are endowed with technological, commercial, capital and 
socio-political predominance over dependent countries - the form of this 
predominance varying according to the particular historical moment - and can 
therefore exploit them, and extract part of the locally produced surplus.
Dependence, then, is based upon an international division of labour which 
allows industrial development to take place in some countries while restricting 
it in others, whose growth is conditioned by and subjected to the power centers 
of the world” (Dos Santo, 1969 quoted in Todaro, 1989, 79-80).
A similarly expressed papal sentiment is as elucidating, even if morally couched: 
“One must denounce the existence of economic, financial, and social mechanisms which 
although they are manipulated by people, often function almost automatically, thus 
accentuating the situation of wealth for some and poverty for the rest. These mechanisms,
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which are maneuvered directly or indirectly by the more developed countries, by their 
very functioning, favour the interests of the people manipulating them. But in the end 
they suffocate or condition the economies of the less developed countries” (Pope John 
Paul II, 1988 quoted in Todaro, 1989, 80). Creative dependency per excellence appears to 
be the recurring decimal, so to speak of NDM.
FPM, on the other hand, attributes Third World underdevelopment to faulty and 
inappropriate advice provided by seemingly well-meaning, but often uninformed, biased 
and ethnocentric international “expert” advisors from developed countries’ assistant 
agencies and multinational donor organizations. Some of these “experts” who, in most 
parts have not travelled to the countries of their “expert” experience, offer sophisticated 
concepts, elegant theoretical structures that relate little, if any, to the peculiar economic 
conditions or circumstance of these countries. This school of thought further contends 
that this blend of neo-classical economic beliefs and philosophy thinly veiled as panacea, 
lead to inappropriate or incorrect policy recommendations, further exacerbating the state 
of underdevelopment within these countries.
Furthermore, according to this argument, aiding in the implementation of this 
“faulty and inappropriate advice” is a disproportionate number of policy-makers in 
government and the academia in these Third World countries who are products of the 
developed countries’ institutions of higher learning and agencies (Glen Biglaiser, 1999, 
7-8). In a manner of speaking, they a little more than molded reproductions of their 
training and intellectual pseudo-assimilation, who essentially and rather uncritically 
regurgitate as it were, their western schooling and training, without relating policies to 
particular regional conditions or circumstances (Ross Hammond and Lisa McGowan
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1994, 78-82). The experiences of Nigeria, Mexico and Indonesia help illustrate the point 
of apparent uncritical formulation and implementation. The former Finance Minister of 
Nigeria, Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu, who was a former employee of the IMF, vehemently 
opposed and subsequently imposed upon the public debate that was originally initiated to 
evaluate national sensitivities and support on whether or not to accept proposed IMF loan 
conditionalities, including the structural adjustment program attached to it. The Minister 
demonstrated his preoccupation and sense of impatience with this legitimate debate in 
one of his many public comments, when he insisted that the question was not whether 
Nigeria should take the IMF loan and its accompanying conditionality, but whether it can 
afford not to do so (Nigerian Guardian, 1985, 1,3,5, & 8). This implied that the public 
debate was an exercise in futility. Another case in point was Mexico under President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who is currently living in self-imposed exile in Ireland, after 
the precipitous collapse of the peso, on the heals of his leaving the presidency. Ex­
president Salinas is a Harvard-trained economist who was said to have proceeded to 
implement, to the letter, the recommendations and/or conditionalities of the IMF, and 
their unrestrained free market gospel, only to watch the peso and the Mexican peso and 
economy plummet. The peso reached an all time low during the periods late 1996 and 
1997. (Wall Street Journal, November 18, 1996, February 19, 1997).
DDT, as the last of the three IDR theories, refers in the main, to the economic and 
social divisions in an economy or any economic system. In the words of Todaro (1989, 
81), “implicit in the structural change theories and explicit in the international 
dependence theories is the notion of a world of dual societies-of rich nations and poor 
nations, and in the developing countries, pockets of wealth within broad areas of
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poverty”. It is a world of dual societies, inhabited by poor and rich countries, and of poor 
individuals and rich ones within the same society. In his description, Debraj Ray (1998, 
353-354), believes that it is the necessary co-existence of the traditional and the modem, 
and with it a level of interpretational variability. “In a sentence, dualism is the co­
existence of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ where the words in quotes can have different 
shades of meaning. The traditional sector is often equated to the agricultural sector, 
which after all, produces the traditional output of all societies ...The modem sector is the 
industrial sector, which produces manufactured commodities”.
Although Thirlwall (1994, 128) and Ray (1998, 353-354) agree that “dualism” is 
susceptible to varying definitions and interpretations, Thirlwall nonetheless emphasized 
the differences in the degree of geographic development, as well as social customs and 
attitudes between an indigenous and “an imported” social system. In its peculiarity 
“dualism” is said to embrace four key elements:
1 Different sets of condition of which some are “superior” and others
“inferior”, co-existing in a given space;
2 The co-existence is not transitory but chronic;
3 The degree of “inferiority” or “superiority” have an inherent 
tendency to increase; and
4 Their relationships are inconsequential such that the existence of 
superior elements does little or nothing to pull the inferior element, 
let alone “trikle down” to it. In fact, it may actually serve to push it 
down to “develop its underdevelopment” (Todaro, 1989, 81).
In the final analysis “Dualism” is the raison d ’etre for the different and unequal 
economic development levels, whereby the developed industrial worlds’ “superior” 
condition and the Third World “inferior” condition co-exist. There appears to be a 
presumption of regularity or “naturalness” to this dualistic feature, as an expression of 
some sort of “natural phenomenon”, in the varying evolutionary time space of any
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country. The perception of settled “natural phenomenon” of dualism, the international co­
existence of rich and poor countries, which continues to show disparate and alarming 
gaps, should be cause to wonder whether there can ever be sufficient economic growth 
and development in the Third World countries to rectify this ever-widening gap. In other 
words, is there ever the possibility of a “catch-up”? Part of the exploratory evaluation 
here is to determine whether military governments and their policy thrust or 
preoccupation have made the process any easier or much more difficult.
PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL DEPENDENCY REVOLUTION
Whatever their ideological differences, it would appear that the advocates of 
NDM, FPM and DDT reject the exclusive emphasis on traditional western economic 
theories, designed to accelerate the growth of GNP, as the principle index of development 
(Todaro, 1989, 82). They question the validity of the Lewis-type, two-sector models of 
modernization and industrialization in the light of their questionable assumptions and 
recent Third World history. Just as they reject the claims made by Chenery and others 
that there exist well-defined empirical patterns of development that should be pursued by 
most countries on the periphery of the world economy. They place more emphasis on 
international power imbalances and on needed fundamental economic, political, and 
institutional reforms, both domestic and worldwide.
As is perhaps predictable, the Bretton Woods Institutions seem to represent, in 
their view all that is inequitable in international economic order. They argue that the 
institutions, 4 which were conceived, in the main, as institutional mechanisms for 
stabilizing the world’s financial uncertainties and assisting member-nations in their 
development endeavours have turned out, in prevailing dispensation, almost exclusively
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to be agencies for managing Third World financial woes and economic vicissitudes; and 
indeed pre-eminent “reservoirs” of international “expert economic advisers” for resolving 
their economic problems. How well the institutions have performed in their assigned (or 
assumed) responsibilities is the subject of endless public debate, as they are often accused 
of insensitivity, as well as ideological and anti-Third world development biases.5 Firstly, 
it is contended that the IMF in advising Third World countries, especially the military 
dictator governments (Sudan, Zaire, Ghana, Somalia, Liberia and Nigeria) on, say issues 
of structural adjustment, or perhaps balance of payment positions, have employed 
approaches that are purely a function of their preconceptions, beliefs and philosophy, 
founded largely on prevailing orthodoxy of neo-classical theory, “one that prefers 
capitalism to socialism; one that favours private investment over pubic investment, which 
extols the virtues of free trade and the operation of price mechanisms, and which 
encourages the free flow of private capital to and from developing countries by 
persuading them to remove controls over foreign exchange and imports and even making 
them a condition for (international) assistance, while the rich countries continue to 
impose restrictions against imports of goods from developing countries” (Thirlwall, 1994, 
403-405). Indeed a process of indiscriminate general prescription. As Helen B. Nankani 
(1990, 43-45) postulates, this one-size-fits-all kind of approach, no doubt compromises 
objectivity, as well as cast doubts as to the appropriateness of the some of the 
recommendations.
Finally, there is the contention as to whether the Bretton Wood institutions are in 
the business of monetary and economic development assistance for needy member 
countries or are they “the certified debt collector” for the developed world. Part of the
contention here is that during the 1980s for example, the IMF used debt negotiations as a 
guise to compel the Third World countries into implementing poorly-thought out, ill- 
suited, but particularly harrowing and economically debilitating, Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) in their economies, as a condition-precedent for availing them of the 
Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) facilities. Often times the SAP called for sweeping 
economic and social changes designed to channel virtually all of the country’s resources 
and productivity into debt-servicing or repayment arrangements, even though ostensibly, 
they were intended to enhance trans-national trade and investment competitiveness. Tony 
Clark (1996, 301) notes “in order to obtain the foreign exchange to service their massive 
debts, developing countries were compelled to become export-oriented economies.
Selling off natural resources and agricultural commodities on the global markets while 
rapidly increasing their dependency on the imports of goods and services”. Economic 
crisis in Russia and Brazil in late 1998 and early 1999 seem to underscore some of the 
criticisms against the IMF. 6 It would appear that there is an undertaking, albeit 
unspoken, on the part of the Institution to the effect that it (IMF) would enable, indeed 
precipitate, any nation’s debt enlargement, notwithstanding its original precarious status, 
provided that the new enablement is expended on servicing and possibly redeeming 
foreign investment and perhaps encourage inevitable capital flights. The question is 
whether this policy and process, seemingly so ideologically structured and implemented, 
have larger and far-reaching Third World development ramifications?
NEO-CLASSICAL COUNTER- REVOLUTION THEORY
The neo-classical counter - revolution theory of development was part of the 
emergence of a conservative, supply - side, free market proponents (ideologues) who
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came to dominate the political landscape in most of the industrial world between the late 
1970s and into the 1980s. It was the periods of Presidents Ronald Reagan/George Bush 
(USA); Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher/John Major (UK); Presidents Helmut 
Schmidt/Helmut Kohl (Germany); and Presidents Valery Giscard d’Estaing/Francois 
Mitterrand (France). The central argument of the neo-classical counter - revolution is that 
underdevelopment results from poor resource allocation due to incorrect pricing policies 
and too much state intervention by overly active Third World governments, the majority 
of whom are military governments in SSA. This position is also supported by some 
leading writers of the counter-revolution school, who argue that it is this unrestrained 
disposition at state intervention in economic activity that slows down the pace of 
economic growth thus adversely impacting development (Peter T. Bauer, 1984; Deepak 
Lai, 1985; Ian Little, 1982).
Contrary to the claims of the dependence theorists, the neo- classical counter­
revolution school argue that the Third World is under- developed not because of the 
predatory activities of the developed World and international agencies it controls, but 
rather because of the heavy hand of the state meddling, corruption, inefficiency and a 
general lack of economic incentives that permeate the economies of developing countries. 
What is needed, they contend, is not a reform of the international economic system or 
increase in foreign aid. But the evolution, within the Third World, a combination of 
policies, including restructuring of dualistic economies of developing economies and 
more effective planning, especially an attempt to make population explosion more in line 
with growth. Furthermore, they contend that promoting free markets and the laissez-faire 
economics within the context of permissive governments would allow the “magic of the
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market place” and the “invisible hand” of market prices to guide resource allocation and 
stimulate economic development” (Todaro, 1989, 83).
PERSPECTIVE ON NEO-CLASSICAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION
Like the dependency revolution of the 1970s, the neo-classical counter-revolution 
of the 1980s had its origin in an economics cum ideological view of the Third World and 
its problems. It is perhaps arguable whether privatization and market deregulation - the 
central theme in the neo-classical counter-revolution argument - is not a (neo-classical) 
praesertrim and an elegant theoretical concept, which ought to apply discreetly and 
selectively to national economies at different levels and stages of development and 
growth. It is also questionable whether implementing privatization and absolute market 
deregulation in the Third World is feasible without a fundamental restructuring of the 
economic base of what essentially is, at the moment, an economic system flustering 
between, what at worst could be described as the precondition stage, and at best, the take­
off stage (if we believe Rostow’s Linear stages). The critical issue is that at either of 
these stages, the social, economic, political and legal infrastructure that can support and 
sustain privatization strictly so-called, the focal theme of the counter- revolution school, 
are not even in place. The problem, according to Toadaro (1989, 84), is that many Third 
World economies are so different in structure and organization from their Western 
counterparts that the behavioural assumptions and policy precepts of traditional neo­
classical theory are sometimes questionable and often incorrect.
The other general assumption on privatization may not hold true for most Third 
World countries as well, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. It would appear that 
privatization is founded on, among other things, the premise that it would encourage
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citizens’ investment participation and private property ownership. Obviously, 
implementing divestiture for the benefit of the shareholders and stakeholders, which 
contemplates a meaningful indigenous equitable participation presupposes a solvent 
indigenous population with financial capacity to participate and invest. Unfortunately the 
state of individual financial well-being in most Third World countries, especially in sub- 
Saharan Africa, where years of profligate military governments have certainly guaranteed 
a failure of meaningful indigenous participation; in a sense not truly and reassuringly 
reflective of free and genuine public participation (Africa Economic Report, 1998; World 
Bank Report, 1998, World Bank Report 1999).
Furthermore, being at the very early stages of their development, Third World 
countries desperately need the critical role of and participation by government in their 
development process. But certainly not one of a corrupt military dictatorship much more 
preoccupied with mismanagement and military-related policy preferences. The growth 
and development of national economies might very well be dependent on markets. 
However, the role and participation of government would very much guarantee success, 
especially in establishing the enabling environment. The experiences of the United States 
of America and emerging Asia are very instructive (Stiglitz, 1996, 13-15; Alvin G. Wint, 
1998, 281-284). Indeed the nebulous and uncertain nature of unrestrained free trade is not 
lost to the United States that it effectively introduced restraining and qualifying 
legislation to regulate its impact on the domestic economy. For example Section 201 of 
the Trade Act 1974, the so-called “Escape Clause” allows US regulators to intervene 
when increased import causes “serious injury” to domestic industry. Also Section 731 of 
Title VII of The Tarriffs Act of 1930 allows the US to determine what it may absolutely
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discretionarily consider, “unfair” trade practices, like “dumping” and “subsidies” (Anant 
K. Sundaran and J. Stewart Black, 1995, 81-83).
Finally, it is argued to be misleading to canvass such ideals as “free market 
economy” and “price distortions in factor, product, and financial markets”, since it is 
doubtful whether there are any phenomenon strictly so-called.7 The point being made is 
that even in most developed countries like the US and UK, certain basic services are 
“determined” so fundamentally inalienable for the overall public good and national 
economic interest and viability that they are still subsidized by the government (The Wall 
Street Journal, March 11, 1999, A22; The Economist, April 24, 1999, 56; David C. 
Korten, 1996, 191). Indeed, according to Michael Porter (1990, 639-640) “...subsidized 
capital, subsidized research and development, subsidized raw materials, subsidized 
exports and direct grants are employed by nearly every nation...”
CONCLUSION: 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE MILITARY INSTITUTION IN NIGERIA
The nebulous and normative meaning of “development” in conceptual and 
theoretical usages within a larger definitional scope carries over to an institutionally 
localized context. In this case a region (Africa) and institution (the military). And even in 
an attempted definitional application of all the different meanings of development 
postulated by the different schools of thought— from Rostow’s (Linear) Stages, to 
Theories and Patterns of Structural Change, to the International Dependency Revolution, 
to Neo-Classical Counter Revolution — none has adequately or convincingly, not to 
mention uncontentiously, explained what is responsible for underdevelopment (for which 
there seems across the board consensus that they exists), and remedies for alleviation and
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possible eradication (for which there is vehement lack of consensus for approaches to 
relief).
These schools of thought who have attempted definitional meaning, scope and 
process, but failed to achieve consensus highlights the very presumptive disposition of all 
the theorerizing schools. This lack of consensus could be ascribed to a number of factors, 
prominent among which are, generalized application of inapplicable peculiar variables 
(Roslow and Lewis), ideological pollution of the process analysis (the International 
Dependency and Neo-Classical Counter-Revolution), as well as shifting focus, emphasis 
and interests. And perhaps more importantly is the failure to specifically identify and 
evaluate a very unique institution, one that has tremendously affected all facets of human 
development in SSA, including Nigeria.
As a matter of fact to unqualifyingly employ the peculiar experiences of the 
developed industrial world, who evolved at a different time and space, and definitely in 
completely different set of circumstances, in explaining development processes is to be 
overly simplistic in the evaluation of a phenomenon as complex, and intricate as the 
elements and processes of development. It is even more so when consideration is given to 
the fact that the exercise itself carries with it unquantifiable levels of political and socio­
cultural idiosyncrasies (T.W. Hutchinson, 1964, 64-86; Todaro, 1989; Thirlwall, 1994).
Indeed Kuzners (1984, 93) bemoans what he considers unwarranted 
generalization “...Although a particular sequence may correspond broadly to historical 
experiences of some economies, no single sequence fits the history of all countries. To 
maintain that every economy always follows the same course of development with a 
common past and the same future is to overschematize the complex forces of
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development...” And certainly not when their degrees of complexity and intensity are 
time and events related, given the fact that the poor countries stand in a different 
relationship to rich countries than was true when the developed countries were poor 
(Meier, 1984, 105).
To contend that development can be speeded up by the international system 
(according to Neo-Classical Counter-Revolution), and at the same time that under­
development is caused by it, (according to International Dependency Revolution) is to 
truely capture the contentious predispositions of the two ideologically-tainted 
development theories. Their near-absolute, mutually indignant sense of righteous 
articulation portrays the Third World in turns as victims and villains. The only point of 
agreement between the two schools of thought is that there is lack of development. But 
the reason(s) for such state of affairs continue to elicit extremely divergent opinions. The 
Dependency School believes that lack of development is mainly due to manipulative 
oppression, ethnocentric misadvise and dubious dualism. For the Neo-Classical School, 
the reasons are more rooted in lack of privatization, corruption, mismanagement and lack 
of sensitivity on the part of Third World policy markers.
Inspite of all of these, it is significant that there is consensus to the notion of 
dominant under-development, and perhaps particularly less important that there is 
disagreement for their cause. Although it would have helped to determine definitive 
common causes(s) with a view to finding helpful and universally workable remedial 
measures, since a situation can only be meaningfully remedied after a full appreciation of 
its root cause(s). But then the military factor is an indeterminate one. However, the 
cause(s) of under-development can hardly be attributable to any one particular cause, of
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the myriad postulations advocated by the different schools, within these competing thesis 
lie some elements of the causes of underdevelopment; some major, some minor, but all of 
which together constitute “the problem” to be focused on in the attempt to bring about 
development/change.
It is therefore important to address in the light of all of the above, not just 
accepted notions, as conceived and propagated by the developed world in the relativity of 
a usage peculiar to their condition and circumstances, but also the real impact or meaning 
of underdevelopment for the Third World, one that is expressed in the complete and total 
absence of well-being - economic, social and political. It is a notion expressed by Robert 
McNamara as absolute poverty: “a condition of life so characterized by malnutrition, 
illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality and low expectancy as to 
be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency”. (William H. Shaw and Vincent 
Barry, 1994, 124). When it therefore comes to the question of the meaning and or 
definition of development most relevant to a sub-region, particularly Nigeria, dominated 
in the last three decades by the military, it is perhaps as definitive to re-echo, Seers in his 
categorical inquisition: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening 
to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? And according to him, if all 
three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt, it has been a period of 
development for the country concerned. If in any case one or two of these central 
problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, he believes it would be 
strange to call the result “development”, even if per capita income doubled (1963, 3). It is 
hoped that my full subsequent evaluation of military performance in government will 
throw some light in this area. The significance of Seers postulation is mirrored in Todaro
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contention that: “There are a number of developing countries that experienced relatively 
high rates of growth of per capita income during the 1960s and 1970s but that showed 
little or no improvement or even an actual decline in employment, equality and real 
incomes of the bottom 40% of their populations. By the earlier 'growth' definition, these 
countries were 'developing'. By the more recent poverty, equality and employment 
criteria, they were not” (1989, 87-88).
Most Third World countries, including Nigeria fall into this category. According 
to the African Economic Report (1998,12), “... slightly more than 350 million people 
(more than half the population of SSA) continue to live in poverty. Malnutrition and 
hunger, disease, ill health and lack of shelter are widespread. A sizable number of adults 
Africans are not productively employed as such, they are unable to meet their basic 
needs...Access to social services, particularly education and health continues to be a 
reason for concern, while the employment situation remains precarious”. The Report goes 
further “... according to current estimates, close to 50 per cent of the population live in 
absolute poverty. This percentage is expected to increase at the beginning of the new 
millennium” (AER, 1998, 16). With reference to Nigeria, the social and economic 
situation is no less grim. For Nigerians are on average, poorer today than they were in 
1974 (the military have been in government for 21 years of the 24 years of the relevant 
period). Income in 1999 was US$345 per capita, less than a third its level at the height of 
the oil boom in 1980, and well below the average for developing countries. More than 
half the population lives in absolute poverty, life expectancy is only 52. And infant 
mortality rate as high as 84 per 1000 live births (IMF, 1999). As a matter of fact, as early 
as 1996 the United Nations Human Development Report ranked Nigeria 141 out of 174
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of the world’s poorest nations. At the inauguration of his cabinet ministers, the last 
military Head of State of Nigeria, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, had this to say by way 
of admonishing his would-be cabinet ministers “...every human welfare and development 
index measuring the well-being of our people show is on the decline...Currently, we are 
the world’s 13th poorest nation. Given our resource endowments this sorry state is a 
serious indictment” (The Economist, August 29th 1998, 45-46). For a country that has 
generated/received more than US$280 billion in oil revenue since early 1970s (about the 
period the military emerged and proceeded to last over 30 years of the country’s 39 years 
independent history) through 1999, with nothing to show for it either in poverty 
alleviation nor significant economic development, General Abubakar’s admonition was 
more than a classical understatement. His patent understatement belies a much more 
fundamental admission, namely that by whatever rudimentary measure, evaluation or 
definition, even by what appears to be a wayward military institutional standard, the 
country could have done better.
It follows that for a Third World country, including Nigeria, the priority should be 
one of moving from the current chronic state of underdevelopment, embodied in these 
mind-boggling poverty statistics, to one of alleviation, which seeks a level improvement 
in people’s living standards, and which according to Todaro “...must, therefore, be 
conceived as a multi-dimensional process involving major changes in social structures, 
popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic 
growth, the reduction in inequality, and the eradication of absolute poverty” (1989, 88).
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ENDNOTES
1. It would appear that Rostow used the phrase “leading growth factors” to mean the 
sector or sectors which are crucial to the development of the economy. These 
sectors have varied from country to country. From railways to textiles (UK), 
Timber (Sweden) and Grains (USA)
2. See The Economist, June 17, 2000 on Aid-tying. Even though some of these loans 
and assistance come encumbered. The fact of the matter is that these come with 
strings attached. Nonetheless, the general view of the matter is that even though 
they come with strings attached, these facilities and their cumulative effect is one 
of material and capital accumulation in the enablement of capital formation.
3. See Professor Lewis’ “Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour” 
quoted in Thirlwall (1994, 1996). See also W.W. Rostow, “Theorists of Economic 
Growth From David Hume to the Present: With a Perspective on the Next 
Century”, (1990, 392-399).
4. The group in most developing countries, which cover a broad spectrum (landlord,
entrepreneurs, military rulers, senior public servants and trade union leaders) 
enjoy high incomes, social status and political power. They also wittingly or 
unwittingly have vested interest in the perpetuation of the international capitalist 
system of inequality and conformity through which and by which they are 
rewarded.
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5. The sense, one might contend, is that although the usuages “world” and “member 
countries” give the impression of a representative world body, it is arguable 
whether in their original usuage and intendment these wordings contemplated 
today’s dominant “clients” of the institutions-The Third World. For many of these 
countries were either dependent colonies (of original member countries) or did 
not satisfy the protocol or meet the requirements for admission or membership. 
Although these countries have come to be the institutions’ primary and abiding 
current focus, it is doubtful whether their particular or futuristic needs were 
adequately taking into consideration at inception of the Bretton Wood institutions. 
See also Fredoline Anunobi (1992), “The Implications of Conditionalities: The 
IMF and Africa”, University Press of America, 149-168.
6. See The Wall Street Journal, June 4th, 1999, p. A 35. The Bank was advocating 
programs that have the effects of completely eliminating “safety nets”, inspite of 
rising absolute poverty in Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Africa. See also 
Business Week, October 19th, 1998, pp 38-39.The IMF is accused of extreme 
insensitivity in the implementation of its market reforms in the Third World.
See also Newsweek, May 25th, 1998, pp 44-48. The implementation of IMF- 
recommended increases raising the prices of gasoline by 71%, electricity by 50%, 
bus fares 66% and train fares by 100%. IMF had imposed these increases as part 
of a deal for a $40 billion international bailout for Indonesia. Needless to say, 
these led to riots and social upheavals that ultimately compelled the sacking of the
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Suharto government after almost 30 years in office.
7. See Thirlwall (1994, 403-406). See especially the works of Reichmann and 
Stillson (1978), on the effects of IMF Programmes in both developed and 
developing countries during the period 1963-1972. See also the studies by 
Donavan (1982) and Killick Associates (1984). See Also Edward Goldsmith, 
“Developing as Colonialism” in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds) 
(1996): The Case Against Global Economy and For a Turn Towards the 
Local”, Sierra Club Books, 253-266.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEYELOPMERNT UNDER COLONIAL AND 
FIRST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENTS IN NIGERIA. 
INTRODUCTION
Although the conceptualization of the usage “economic development” in the 
previous chapter greatly espoused the different competing opinions and theories as to the 
acceptable meaning and cause(s), one significant consensus emerged. That is to say, there 
is general agreement that development is about people and the creation of the kind of 
market and economic environment or infrastructure, albeit through different routes, that 
sustains a healthy standard of living; and which reasonably adequately provide the 
citizenry with human development basics like education, health, employment and other 
social welfare. This section attempts the contextual review of Nigeria in early colonial 
and post independent administration, by putting into proper perspective the historical 
sequences in the evolution of colonial, civilian and military regimes, and the thrust of 
development plans and policies formulated and implemented during the relevant period.
COUNTRY’S PERTINENT FEATURES
Nigeria, a former British colony, which gained independence on October 1, 1960,
lies on approximately 923, 768 square kilometers (approx. 356,669 sq. miles) in sub- 
Saharan West Africa. The country is bordered on the east by Cameroon and on the west 
by Republic of Benin. Republics of Niger and Chad form part its northern fringes. While 
its southern boundaries are a massive expanse of the Atlantic Ocean stretching from the 
Cameroonean border on the east to that of the Republic of Benin on the west. Indeed, the 
country stretches from the lower Sahelian region, about 14° North latitude, to the rainy
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and humid tropics, about 4° North of the equator. Its vegetation is a mixture of near desert 
and Savannah grasslands in the northern part to the light and thick tropical forests and 
mangrove swamps between the middle belt and further south.
The soils are a rich productive mix of both agricultural cultivable land and 
mineral deposits. Cotton, groundnut, rubber, timber, palm produce and cocoa are part of 
its cash crops. And these accounted for 38 per cent of GDP in 1993 (but over 80 per cent 
of the country’s export in the 1960s) Mineral oil accounts for more than 90 per cent of 
export earnings and up to 80 per cent of federal revenue. Large coal deposits as well as 
tin, lead, zinc ore and gold are available. Iron ore deposits feed the Niger Delta plant at 
Aladja and Ajaokuta.
Agriculture was the economic mainstay of the country. Export earnings averaged 
52.2per cent in the periods between 1958 and 1967 (Yusufu 1996, 92-101). Indeed for the 
country, agriculture produced both the food crops and cash crops, accounting for about 
70 per cent of GDP in 1966, and agricultural export generating 73 per cent of export 
earnings in 1968.
The country, Nigeria, is the product of British amalgamation of its northern and 
southern protectorates in 1914 to form what was then referred to as the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria. However, it was not until 1946 that the administration of the two 
territories were integrated under the Richardson constitution. The constitution created a 
federal structure, which allowed for an initial three regions. Although the country attained 
independence in 1960, it was not until 1963 did it adopt a Republican constition while 
still retaining membership of the Commonwealth (membership of independent countries 
of former British colonies/subjects).
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At the time of independence, the country was a three-region entity (Figure 4.1)
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made up of the North, East and West. A Mid-West region would be carved out of 
the original Western region in 1963 following a referendum, to make the component 
regions four. The Hausa-Fulani tribe of the north, the Yoruba tribe in the west and the 
Igbo tribe in the east predominated the regions. Scattered amidst these dominant tribal 
groups are over 247 ethnic minority groups unethnically located in the North, East, West 
and Mid-West. The former federal capital, Lagos, which played a dual role as both 
capital city and commercial nerve center of the country, has since retained the later role, 
following the official establishment of a new federal capital city in Abuja in 1991. The 
new capital site is believed to be more centrally located, at least geographically. Today
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the country is a thirty-six-state entity from an original twelve created in 1967.1 (Figure
4.2)
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Nigeria’s last official census in 1991 which put the population at 88.5 million was 
as contentions as it was said to be inaccurate. Indeed census figures in Nigeria have 
always been a questionable proposition. The census figures in 1964 were so contentious, 
that it led to their cancellation. Nigeria’s current estimated population figures, itself based 
on a dubious census exercise in 1963, is estimated at 96 million (1985), and 100.33 
million (1987). If these numbers are to be believed, Nigeria would be, numerically 
speaking, the largest in Africa and 5th in the World (FOS/AAS 1986). Officially, the
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population grew at a constant 2.5 per cent per annum over the period 1963-1985 
(FOS/AAS 1986). Using different projectional base figures, the World Bank projected 
the population to be 106.6 million in 1987 and growing at 3.1 per cent per annum. It is 
further projected that at current birth rates, the population would increase by 3.3 times in 
the next 28 years to 280 million by the year 2015 (WB, WDR 1989). The current estimate 
(2000) is 120 million (World Bank, 2000). The prospect of this projected population 
growth has made demographic issues within the context of social and economic 
development so urgent and critical. And yet the larger implicatory issues may never be 
realistically addressed in Nigeria, neither may the actual census figures be ascertained. 
Not as long as these figures are umblically tied to a very explosive, contentious and 
inherently divisive revenue allocation structure which makes individual state’s federal 
resource-entitlement dependent on their respective population figures.
The discovery of oil and subsequent boom in oil revenue fatefully coincided with 
a number of significant developments: military takeover, and burgeoning petroleum 
wealth (Rimmer, 1978). In a paradoxical, perhaps pathetic twist of fateful coincidences, 
the emergence of the military on to the political scene and the boom in oil revenue 
marked the turning point for good or bad, in the economic development life of Nigeria. It 
would appear that increased oil revenue did not only create the impetus for recurrent 
military intervention, it also created and essentially enabled the extremely corruptive 
environment and structure that have become the hallmark of the Nigerian military in 
government. Ironically the country seems blessed by geography and geology but cursed 
by leadership.
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THE PATERNALISTIC STATE: THE COLONIAL ECONOMIC LEGACY
According to some opinions, Britain’s overriding interest in its colonies, including 
Nigeria was, at least until and during the Second World War (WW11) to develop, harness 
and exploit indigenous resources for the benefit of the metropolis. Cotton, groundnuts, 
rubber, and palm oil, tin and columbine, were of direct interest to British industries, and 
constituted the main target of the colonial government in Nigeria (Yusufu, 1996, 53; 
Abdalla Ismail-Sabri, 1980, 14). Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 
therefore, and right through to its terminal stages in 1944, the Nigerian economy was 
essentially a source of military commodities and a limited market for British 
manufacturers (Yusufu, 1996; Sara Berry and Carl Liedholm, 1970).
Under colonial rule therefore, Nigeria developed an agrarian export economy, 
organized first by private trading companies and later by the (colonial) state. The diverse 
export outputs were geographically differentiated, even as there was centralized export 
terminal. The primary export commodities — Cocoa and Rubber (West), Palm Produce 
(East), Groundnuts, Cotton, Tin, and Columbine (North)— created their own regional 
economic and ethnic political impetus. The collateral impact was that the export earnings 
did provide an early and indispensable source of revenue for the Regional governments 
and the political elites, who led the country through independence. And these 
commodities remained a primary component of state resources through the mid-1960s 
and the emergence of oil (Tims Wouter, 1974, 174; Cliff Edogun, 1985, 89-112)
Significantly, colonial property laws (which may not be unconnected with the 
larger state of colonial power rivalry in the sub-region, especially between the French and 
the British) prevented the alienation of land by foreign residents^ even for the purposes of 
competitive investment activities. This state of affairs was thus different from the 
colonial agrarian economies of British settlers in the East African colonies (Douglas 
Rimmer, 1978, 145). Perhaps in contrast with agricultural development in many other 
Africa colonies, Nigerian exports were neither produced by European settlers on 
commercial firms nor coerced from the peasant population through taxation or mandate. 
Rather, and perhaps detrimental in the long run, in terms of the then prevalence of 
uncompetitive pricing Commodities Marking Board regimes, relative market 
inducements fostered the steadily increasing production of primary commodities by
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dispersed small-holder cultivators who were nonetheless paid a pre-determined 
commodity price, irrespective of prevailing international market rate (Gerald K. 
Helleiner, 1966; Erne N. Ekekwe, 1985, 53-70; Malcolm D. Bale, 1985). And given the 
bias in government expenditure, the policy of keeping producer prices low to generate 
government revenue was obviously a huge transfer from rural to urban groups. And apart 
from the distributional effect, the tax caused allocative losses, both among sectors and 
within the agricultural sector; with farmers feeling more inclined to switch to crops not 
controlled by the marketing boards. Even then, commercialization was not sufficiently 
robust and integrated as to bring with it any drastic transformation in agricultural 
production, neither did it meaningfully impact the living standard of the rural people.
The colonial governments’ efforts directed at ensuring law and order and 
maintaining colonial administration, also made possible the development of a modem 
economic structure, as well as the maintenance of a primary agricultural economy. It is 
noteworthy however, that the modern Nigerian economy developed mainly under private 
aegis. Manufacturing scarcely existed, limited as they were, to small soap factories and 
palm oil mills in the East, saw mills and rubber processing in the West, and abattoirs and 
cotton ginneries in the North (Robin Cohen, 1974, 43). The Collieries in Enugu, stone 
quarries at Aro and some wood industries in Lagos were government-owned, even 
though most manufacturing and mining concerns were privately operated (Tom Forrest, 
1987, 307).
Although it has been suggested that colonial powers developed some sectors of 
the economies of the colonies mainly for their own interests (Ismail-Sabri, 1980, 14), 
nonetheless the colonial administration in Nigeria established some rudimentary 
development and market infrastructure. Public utilities, including electricity generation 
and posts and telecommunications were developed, even if confined to a few urban areas. 
Railways and ports were developed and administered by colonial government 
departments, as were utilities. Apparently, government largely abstained from social 
welfare activities like education and health services, which were, essentially the province 
of missionary organizations (Aboyade, O., 1971, 30). The impact of this colonial policy 
may have set the stage for the lacadastical attitude of subsequent national governments in 
this area.
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This situation which changed dramatically after WW11, is perhaps attributable to 
the appointment, during the war, of an array of development officers charged with the 
sole responsibility of harnessing Nigeria’s economy to promote the British war efforts 
and to “assuage the conscience of some of the British people and parliamentarians who 
cared to know what was going on in the colonies...’’(Yusufu, 1996, 53-54). This would 
lead to a change in the economic objectives of the colonial administration. This changed 
disposition was giving added impetus with the assumption of government by the Labour 
Party in Britain. The new government set about fashioning a constitutional framework for 
self-rule, and establishing the essentials of economic and social infrastructure throughout 
the colony, by appropriating money (£200 million) “for the economic and social 
advancement” of the colonies. And at the request of the Colonial Office, the Nigerian 
Government formulated the country’s first ever development plan which had as a specific 
objective, the welfare of the citizens” (Yusufu, 1996; A.A. Okuboyejo, 1969, 3). It also 
sought to attract foreign investment (by formulating investment policies not inconsistent 
with its vested colonial interests), as well as some encouragement to local business 
activities. The level of rapid development occurring after 1946 is illustrative (See Table 
4.1)
This newly evolved colonial economic intervention and the emergent nationalist politics 
combined to create a predictable dynamism in the pattern and focus of the market and 
economic development. A number of these are significant in this regard, but particularly 
noteworthy are three: Firstly, the expansion of economic activities by the colonial regime, 
in tandem with the emergent nationalist elites created an early tendency toward a 
paternalistic state. Public intervention in diverse aspects of social and economic life was 
thus accepted and broadly encouraged. The nebulous stipulations and ideological 
consensus over the state’s economic and market development role permitted wide 
discretion for public intervention, and it would appear, the states’ impetus for action was 
stimulated by urgent and impatient demands for public amenities, protection, subsidy and 
patronage.
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NIGERIA: SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1913-1966 
TABLE 4.1
1913 1937 1946 1954 1966
Federal Government 
Expenditures (£mil!ion) 2.9 7.4 14.1 60.7 214.3
Exports (Emillion) 6.8 19.2 23.7 146.2 277.7
Imports (Emillion) 6.3 14.6 19.8 114.1 256.3
Electricity Generated 
(kwh ‘000)
15 96 179 1,208
Cement Generated 
(tons, ‘000)
6 51 96 368 1,137
Railway Freight 
(ton-miles, mn.)
253 408 429 909 1,215
School Enrollment (‘000)
Primary 36 239 619 1,673 2,912
Secondary 1 4 10 28 220
*1965
Source: Kilby, op. cit., p.9.
Second, the states’ revenue base in export agriculture and external trade permitted 
the government to avoid direct taxation of strategic urban constituencies, notably 
indigenous commercial and professional groups. Economic and political developments 
were in a sense “costless”, based largely upon rents from foreign sectors of the economy 
and accumulated reserve earnings from export (Rimmer, 1981, 31; Bevan, Collier and 
Gunning, 1999, 27). It could be argued that the colonial government and the early post­
independence regime were not classic rentier states, yet state revenue was insulated from 
transparent relations of extraction during the final years for colonial rule (Toyin Falola 
and Julius Ihonvbere, 1985, 95).
Thirdly, fiscal and development strategy developed within what might be referred 
to as a fractious and intensely competitive political context, creating an extremely
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competitive, yet focused and divisive struggle over states resources. The state became an 
increasingly vital arena for competition among sectional and communal interests, a 
source of private accumulation and political advantage. As the demands on the federal 
. government intensified, so did the responsibilities of state to expand; just as resources at 
its disposal burgeoned, culminating in the centrifugal demands, which weakened the 
state’s capacity for effective and authoritative action (Gavin Williams and Terisa Turner, 
1977, 135; Charles Lindblom, 1977, 120-123)
At the end of the day, colonial responsibilities devolved rather quickly to the 
emergent nationalist elites. The colonial civil service embarked upon an accelerated 
program of Nigerianization, just as indigenous political parties secured increasing 
representation in the national government, and party-based regional administrations 
gained control of pubic revenue. During the late 1950s, a largely indigenous leadership 
expanded public development efforts through the establishment of public enterprise, the 
promotion of state participation in private indigenous ventures, the provision of 
development finance and the creation of legal and fiscal incentives to external 
investmentl (Deborah Brautigam, 1996, 81-108; A. Akinsanya, 1983, 158; Philip 
Asiodu, 1977, 225; Adedotun O. Philips, 1977, 252-266).
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (THE TEN YEAR PLAN) AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Prior to 1945, the colonial government undertook no serious comprehensive
planning in Nigeria. Nigeria’s earliest attempts at national plans were the 1946-55 Ten- 
Year Plan of Development and Welfare (with plan revisions in 1951-55) and the 1955-60 
plan (later extended to 1962). Essentially, they were framed by the colonial 
administrators and known as “A Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria” 
and issued as Government’s Sessional Paper No.24 of 1945.
These were not ‘plans’ in the truest sense of the word. Indeed the so-called ten- 
year Plan consisted of proposals by the constituent departments of government for their 
respective expansion and these were collated to form the plan. Due to inexperience in 
such matters, it was not surprising that “the departmental schemes were not related to any 
overall coordinating of the projects in order to achieve consistency or coherence” 
(Okuboyejo, 1969, 30; Akin-Aina, 1984, 5, 11). Needless to say, the Plan, suffered
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gravely from lack of adequate scientific statistical background, as there was not as yet an 
Office of Statistic, even though the creation of one was indicated in the Plan.
The 1951 revision published as Sessional Paper No.6 o f 1951 emphasized the role 
of government activities and public institutions, including marketing boards, 
development corporations and loans programmes (Rimmer, 1981, 3). Although the 
revised Plan was said to have suffered the same weaknesses as the original plan, in that 
available data was insufficient, .. the ten-year plan together with its revised edition 
made possible the expansion of public health and education services and of some public 
facilities as roads, ports and water supplies. The private sector of the economy also 
participated in and benefited from the expansion, and the productive capacity of the 
economy rose to a higher level” (Okuboyejo, 1969, 4).
It would appear that further experimentation in development plan formulation 
would be predicated upon the Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank) team which visited Nigeria in 1954, and which visit 
coincided with the formal establishment of Nigeria as a federation, comprised of a federal 
government in Lagos and three semi-autonomous regions. The Plan which formed the 
basis for development policies for the Federal and, to an extent, Regional governments 
was intended to cover the five-year period, post 1955; and it consisted of five plans, one 
each for the three new federated Regions (North, East and West), one for the Cameroon 
(then still part of Nigeria), and the Federal Plan (Yusufu, 1996, 55).
The Bank Report embodied in the Economic Programmes of the Federation of 
Nigeria was published in Sessional Paper No. 2 o f 1956. The Report affirmed the need 
for assertive government intervention in the market and economic development process. 
In addition, it also recommended that revenues accumulated by the agricultural 
Marketing Boards, previously viewed as stabilization resources, be allotted to 
development purposes. The Report also recommended that diversified public 
Development Corporations be established to accumulate and invest these funds (IBRD, 
1955)
The regions essentially maintained separate civil service, budgets, courts, control 
over marketing boards, etc, and there were no efforts made at coordination, integration or 
alignment (Dudley, 1973, 52-53). The Plan as formulated, and given the political party
146
structure of the regions, was more duplication and competition than cooperation. 
According to Okuboyejo, (1969, 6). “They all fell short of standards of true perspective 
planning. No conscious attempts seems to have been made to accelerate economic 
growth by laying down national goals and objectives”
As Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show positive pictures, the Nigerian economy exhibited 
evidence of some commendable resilience and capacity for self-sustaining growth. 
However their translation to national development in terms of improved welfare for the 
average citizen is of debatable; given the not too necessarily obvious correlation between 
economic growth and citizens’ overall well being (Karla Hoff and Joseph Stiglitz, 2000, 
389-459).
SELECTED INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, NIGERIA 1944-1957 
TABLE 4.2
S/No. Item (Indicator) 1944 1949 1953 1957
1. Exports (Million £) 17.2 81.1 124.2 125.6
2. Imports (Million £) 157.7 58.2 108.3 151.6
3. Currency in Circulation 
(Million £)
13.5 31.8 51.4 57.3
4. Motor Spirit Consumption 
(Million gallons)
9.9 17.6 33.3 46.3
5. Railways goods traffic 
(Thousand net ton-miles)
513 653 827 1,294
6. Commercial Vehicles 
(New registration)
663 2,356 4,159 5,613
Source: United Nations: Information from Non-self-governing Territories, 
Nigeria, April, 1959 (Reproduced from T.M. Yusufu, An Introduction to 
Industrial Relations in Nigeria)
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It is noted that due to a buoyant world market for primary products, between 1 93 9  
and 19 5 7 , exports rose steadily from about £ 9 9 .9  million (pounds sterling) in 1 9 5 0  to 
£ 1 7 1  million (pounds sterling) in 1960. Imports also rose dramatically in the period 
1 9 4 4 -1 9 5 7 . In the pre-independence decade, 1 9 5 0 -1 9 6 0 , the export sector continued its 
upward trend, rising 7 1 .2  per cent. Imports, which for the first time showed a more 
significant rise than exports, grew by 2 3 6 .9  per cent (at 1957  constant prices) from £ 7 5 .1  
m illion  (pounds sterling) in 195 0  to £ 2 5 2  million (pounds sterling) in 1960 . In 19 5 4 , 
exports and imports were almost in balance at £ 1 3 1 .9  million (pounds sterling) and 
£ 1 3 1 .6  million respectively (Yusufu, 1996; Ekekwe, 1985 , 5 3 -7 0 ; S. Tomori and F.O. 
Fajana, 1 9 7 9 , 1 3 1 -1 4 6 ).
In time there appeared to be a widening gap between exports and imports with a 
rapidly increasing deficit balance against Nigeria. In 1955, the value of exports and 
imports were respectively £126.9 million and £163. 3 million, while in 1960, they were 
£171 million and £253 million. It shows that the adverse balance of trade position 
increased by 125.3 per cent from £36.4 million to £82 million. It must be pointed out 
however that some of the difference was made up by development grants from Britain 
(£23 million to support the Ten-Year Plan) and the rest from previously accumulated 
foreign reserve.
Also as Table 4.3 further indicates, consumer expenditure dropped by 2.4 per cent 
between 1950 and 1960; at a period when government expenditure rose by 126.5 per 
cent. To a large extent, this was attributable to constitutional changes of 1954, which 
gave rise to the creation of regional bureaucracies and the need for administrative 
infrastructure, which was also based on the recommendations of the World Bank, to 
strengthen government services and to enable the expansion of the real sector— industry 
and agriculture (IBRD, 1954). Although'this period was determined as one of rapid 
economic growth, in that there was a rise in Gross Fixed Investment by 123.2 per cent 
from £6.9 million in 1950 to £15.4 million in 1960, consumer expenditure fell by 2.4 per 
cent over a ten-year period, as against an estimated 30 per cent increase in population 
during the same period.
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LE 4.3
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1950-1960 AT 1957 PRICES
Increase 1950- 1960
s
/
N
Item/
Indicator
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Amt
(£ m )
Per
%
Avg
%pa
1 Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
(£m )
699.3 754.0 809.3 827.7 892.8 891.8 903.5 938.7 970.7 987.7 1023.7 329.7 47.1 4.7
2 Government 
Expenditures 
on Goods and 
Services (£m )
24.0 26.8 33.5 29.9 31.2 45.5 43.8 47.6 56.7 70.7 77.0 53.0 220.8 22.1
3 Gross fixed 
Investment 
(£m ) 48.4 59.7 75.0 79.9 92.9 102.6 108.0 113.0 122.3 136.7 158.0 109.6 226.4 22.6
4 Exports 99.9 93.6 111.7 114.8 131.9 126.9 138.5 129.1 144.0 163.0 171.0 71.1 71.2 7.1
5 Imports 75.1 82.6 108.3 114.1 131.6 163.3 180.9 175.6 182.0 212.0 252.0 177.9 236.9 23.7
6 Consumer 
Expenditure as 
percentage of 
GDP (%)
87.1 86.2 86.0 86.7 86.8 87.4 88.4 86.9 85.5 84.0 85.0 (-2.1) (-2.4) (-02)
7 Government 
Expenditure as 
percentage of 
GDP (%)
3.4 3.6 4.1 3.6 3.5 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.8 7.1 7.7 4.3 126.5 12.7
8 Gross Fixed 
Investment as 
percentage of 
GDP (%)
6.9 7.9 9.3 9.7 10.4 11.1 12.0 12.0 12.0 13.8 15.4 8.5 123.2 12.3
urce: Extracted from First National Development Plan, 1962-68, p.13
It would appear therefore, that the apparent positive effects of economic growth 
deriving from development efforts had not yet begun to trickle down significantly to the 
average person. The figures noted above suggest a significant decline in their purchasing 
power and level of average welfare. This statistics confirm evidence of rapid economic 
growth by conventional standards, but very little of national development in terms of
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improved welfare of the average or optimal citizen, whose per capita real income actually 
declined (Yusufu, 1996, 59).
THE FIRST NATIONAL PLAN (1962-1968)
Although Nigerian political leaders apparently made decisions about the general 
objectives and priorities for the first plan, its authors, who were foreign economists, had a 
decidedly distinct and significant role in its formulation. They recommended certain 
components and features to the plan they considered critical. For example, they favoured, 
among other alternatives, decentralized decision making by private units, disregard of 
major discrepancies between financial and social profitability, and high economic payoffs 
from directly productive investments (as opposed to indirect returns from social 
overheads). They discouraged taxes on the wealthy (out of a fear of dampening private 
investment incentives), and advocated a more conservative monetary and fiscal policy, 
emphasizing a relatively small plan, openness to foreign trade and investment, and 
reliance on overseas assistance. Foreign trade was at one-half of public sector 
investment.
Dr. Wolfgang Stolper headed the technical planning team and the National 
Economic Council with its Joint Planning Committee in the preparation of the plan at all 
stages (A.A. Ayida and H.M.A. Onitiri, 1971, 6). Although development planning of 
incomprehensible inconsistency and impractical implementability had gone on in Nigeria 
much earlier, the plan that subsequently emerged from this team would become the first 
post-independence Plan. The Plan’s statement of Goals and Objectives, inter alia, 
declares:
“Nigeria’s economy is a mixed one. The Governments have taken an active 
part not only in providing the social but also the basic economic services, 
such as electricity and ports. They also intend to participate in the operation 
of various industries, such as a steel plant and oil refinery. The attitude of the 
governments of the Federation, however, is entirely pragmatic and accepts the 
desirability of a mixed economy. At the same time, the Governments are convinced 
that no amount of Government activity can effectively replace efforts of a broadly 
based and progressive private sector (First NDP 1962-1968, 21)”.
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Among its other specific goals, the Plan stressed the importance of a target 
economic growth and productivity (4 per cent or more), apparently placing secondary 
emphasizes on economic independence and domestic distribution. It would appear 
therefore, that the broad thrust of the nation’s economic strategy was to launch Nigeria 
towards an economic “take-off’, to achieve “self-sustaining growth not later than by the 
end of the Third and Fourth National Plan” (First NDP, 1962-1968, 23). Obviously, the 
principle, if not the instrument, of distributive equity was affirmed as the Plan clearly 
stated an intention “to achieve a modernized economy consistent with the democratic, 
political and social aspirations of the people. This of course includes the achievement of 
a more equitable distribution of income both among people and among regions” (First 
NDP 1962-1968, 23).
The Plan’s main focus was its capital projects’ emphasis. Indeed, Edwin Dean 
(1972, 30) contends, “.. .The core of the Plan... was its projects”. According to him, the 
Niger Dams Projects, which greatly augmented the power system, was presented as a 
centerpiece of the development program (Dean, 1972, 20). Industrial projects included 
an expansion of cement production, the construction of an oil refinery and an iron and 
steel complex. Apart from these, the Plan outlined the expansion of social and economic 
services, including infrastructure and utilities initiatives to increase export crop 
production. It also included the establishment of farm settlements and plantations, and the 
expansion of technical services. All of which was hoped would increase employment 
opportunity for the citizenry.
Interestingly enough, the projected sources of finance for the Plan’s 
implementation reflected both the preeminence of state initiates in development, as well 
as the constraints on state resources. The public sector was to be responsible for two- 
thirds of Plan expenditures while the private sector, foreign and domestic, would provide 
the remaining third. It was also expected that nearly half the government’s capital 
projects would be financed by foreign loans and grants.
Apart from the fact that very little assistance came from foreign sources because 
of, among other things, aid-and-loan-tying (to specific projects), the Plan was not without 
other difficulties. Although the Plan was the product of Federal and Regional 
governments’ participation, its final appearance as a Federal plan and accompanied (or is
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it encumbered?) by three regional plans reflected the compromises inherent and 
potentially inconsistent in the Federal structure of government, especially the Nigerian 
model. According to A.A. Ayida, .. as long as the tripod theory of power in Nigeria 
subsisted, the unhealthy rivalry among the three major grouping made rational plan 
administration in Lagos impossible” (1987, 26). Understandably the Plan stressed a large 
measure of flexibility in implementation, especially as it was appreciated that information 
upon which the Plan was predicated was inadequate and patently unreliable. There was 
also palpable deficiency in administrative capacity, and the considerable autonomy, 
which the regions could be expected to exercise by default, if not by assent, in 
implementation (Ayida, 1987, 12, 26; Dean, 1972, 233; Stolper 1966, 40).
It has been suggested that economic rates of return provided the guiding criteria 
for assessing public sector investment programmes and development projects (Stolper, 
1966,25). However, consideration of social equity and long-term returns on social and 
economic overhead were explicitly subordinated to the principles of profitability and 
efficiency (Nafziger, 1983, 85); even as the insistence upon narrow economic criteria as a 
basis for state programmes was contradicted by the competitive requisites of the regional 
elites and the political class. The character of economic policy and the pattern of public 
sector activity were influenced less by the designs of planners, the dilemmas of 
administration or the problems of constitutional structure, than the imperatives of 
sharpening political rivalry (Rimmer, 1981, 44; Yusufu, 1996, 56-61). All in all, the 
predominant view expressed by Nobel economist W. Arthur Lewis is that the main 
weaknesses of the 1962-1968 plan were incomplete feasibility studies and inadequate 
evaluation of projects, accompanied by meager public participation, which was 
compounded by excessive political intervention in economic decisions. Moreover, he 
opined that insufficient attention was paid to small indigenous sector, even as the 
machinery for implementing development in public sector was unsatisfactory. The most 
important aspects of Nigeria’s 1962-1968 plan was “how the government proposes to 
raise the money and to recruit the personnel to carry out its objectives” (1982).
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PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AND NATIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE
It would appear that the political structure bequeathed by the colonial authority, 
and under which the development plan was to be implemented was already bedeviled by 
federal, regional and ethnic political rivalry. Unfortunately, economic policy, especially 
at the regional level, was influenced by the need to secure or enhance resources in the 
struggle for political competition and dominance. In his characterization of the 
relationship between politics and economics in Nigeria’s First Republic, Billy Dudley 
(1982, 63) had this to say:
“For the Nigerian political elite, politics involves not the conciliation of 
competing demands.. .but the extraction of resources which can be used 
to satisfy elite demands and to buy political support. The political relationship 
is essentially a relation between patrons and clients, and clients give their 
support in so far as the patron ‘delivers the goods’. The ability to extract 
and therefore to deliver, is of course directly related to the extent of control 
over the instrumentalities of government”.
The country’s political structure was one in which, especially following the Plan 
(1962-68) formulation, federal government controlled public service and fiscal resources, 
components that were becoming increasingly critical to the regions, in the light of the 
patron-client dynamics of the political culture (Robin Cohen, 1974, 6). Indeed by the Plan 
period, the Federal government accounted for over 60 per cent of the spending 
programme. Notwithstanding, by the late 1950s the Regional governments were running 
budget deficits while the Federal government, controlled by a hegemonous NPC (Hausa- 
Fulani-controlled Northern People’s Party) was running a surplus (Dudley, 1982, 56; 
Lloyd G. Reynolds, 1985, 212). Between 1961 and 1963, however, both the Federal and 
Regional government were running deficits (Tims, 1974, 224; Reynolds, 1985, 213-215), 
thus exacerbating desperation for access to increasingly scarce resources.
This dimension of access and its concomitant dividend was never lost to the 
northern political elite. Indeed, dominance of the Federation was a tremendous advantage 
and a source of constant friction in the regional competition for public services and other 
development resource allocations. That the Northern political elite will attain this 
superior position of regional largesse allocation is an ironic twist in the political 
dynamism of the country. For very early in the struggle for independence from Great
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Britain, the North was reluctant to join the independence struggle for early emancipation 
with the rest of the country since they were unprepared (educationally, infrastructually 
and institutionally) “to develop at the same pace with the South.” The following editorial 
in 1950 by one of the Northern Newspapers is instructive:
. .Southerners will take the places of Europeans in the North. What is there 
to stop them? They look and see it thus at the present time. There are 
Europeans but, undoubtedly, it is the Southerner who has the power in the North.
They have control of the railway stations; of the Post Offices; of Government 
Hospitals; of the canteens; the majority employed in the Kaduna Secretariat 
and in the Public Works Department are all Southerners; in all the different 
departments of government it is the Southerner who has the power...”
(Coleman, 1958, 362).
Providentially, the Northern elite was in a position to allocate federal resources, including 
the public services, during a period when increasing federal revenue, derived from 
petroleum production in the East, created huge federal retained revenue. The revenue 
allocation formulae for the federation even though it was based primarily on “derivation”, 
the manipulative application of the formulae based on other political considerations -  
need, power structure and a census-based population -  seems to call into question, at least 
from the perspective of some of the segments, its judicious and equitable sense of 
fairness. The sense within the regions was one of resentment and inequity. This 
perceived, albeit collective, sense of injustice and unfairness was vocally expressed by 
the Eastern Nigerian Regional Government ran thus:
“Take a look at what they (NPC) have done with the little power we 
surrendered to them to preserve a unity which does not exist:
Kainji Dam Project.. .about £150 million of our money when completed 
all in the North; Bomu Railway Extension.. .about £N75 million of our 
money when completed- all in the North; spending over £N50 million on 
the Northern (sic) Nigeria Army in the name of the Federal Republic; Military 
training and all ammunition factories and installations are based in the North, 
thereby using your money to train Northerners to fight Southerners; Building of 
a road to link the dam site and the Sokoto cement works.. .£N7 million when 
completed—all in the North; Total on all of these four projects about £N262 million.
Now they have refused to allow the building of an iron and steel industry in 
the East and paid experts to produce a distorted report” (Dudley, 1973, 69).
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It would appear from the foregoing that the East perceived a number of 
misgivings: 1. That burgeoning resources from its enclave were being appropriated (or ill 
appropriated) by the Northern (NPC) dominated Federal government which was 
essentially channeling these resources to the northern heartland; and 2. That this level of 
selective resource concentration had serious political and military implications. In his 
work, Dean (1972, 247) observes that the 1962-1968 Development Plan “implied a 
transfer of resources to the North”, and that the Northern Nigeria Development Plan’s 
large funding deficit required effective Federal subsidization of the Region’s 
development effort.
The sense of discontent felt by the East was perhaps no different, or perhaps 
worse in the Western Region, culminating in the notorious political events in Western 
Nigeria (Robin Luckham, 1971, 206-221, Cohen, 1974, 1-17; Dudley, 1973; Kenneth 
Post and Michael Vickers, 1973). Understandably, the attempt by the North to perpetuate 
political dominance and the inevitable struggle resulting from that with the other two 
regions (East and West) undermined the system’s capacity to implement economic 
policies, as well as the effective creation of sustainable market environment.
Notwithstanding the political colouration of the regions, a practical, even if 
inexplicit consensus was apparent among regional political leaders and influential 
business groups as to the broad features of Nigeria’s mixed economy. Government 
intervention was deemed necessary and appropriate in three distinctive areas: in the 
provision of major public services; the establishment of a viable and sustainable market 
environment; and in the establishment of strategic enterprises in areas where the 
indigenous private sector had little interest or capacity, and foreign involvement was 
politically unacceptable (Akinsanya, 1983, 156).
PLAN SCOPE AND PERFORMANCE 
The first five years following Nigeria’s independence may not have been as
peaceful and uneventful as they could have; controversies ranged from the hotly disputed
census figures of 1964, to the leadership crisis in the Western regional House of
Assembly. However, on the economic front, the country would made some modest gains,
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notwithstanding “the disparate, uncoordinated and inherently conflicting nature of 
development policies and strategies between the nascent Regions, on the one hand, and 
on the other, between them and the Federal Government of the time” (Yusufu, 1996, 59- 
60). Modest because the plan was encumbered by a number of factors, including shortage 
of skilled manpower, low level of technology and revenue shortages, especially when a 
high percentage, 50 per cent, of the country’s projected revenue source, for the execution 
of the Plan (1962-1968) was counted to come from external sources, in the form of grants 
and loans.
During the Plan period (1962-1968), highest priorities were accorded to 
agriculture, industry and technical training (First NDP, 1962-68, 1961, 6). The sectoral 
allocation of planned capital expenditure in the Plan broadly reflected these priorities. 
Thus the proportions of planned capital expenditure earmarked for primary production, 
and trade and industry in the Plan amounted to 13.6 per cent and 13.4 per cent 
respectively as against 5.7 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively in the 1955-62 
programme. Also, due to the priority accorded to technical training, there was an 
increase in the share of resources allocated to education from 7.3 per cent in 1955-1962 
to 10.3 per cent in 1962-1968.
It should be noted however, that the Federal Government neither established large 
numbers of public enterprises during the First Plan period nor did it engender a dramatic 
expansion of the public sector. Nonetheless, public enterprises were responsible for 63 
per cent of the planned Federal capital programme for 1962-1968 (NDP 1962-68, 1961, 
52-54).
The most important Federal ventures in infrastructure included the Niger Dam 
Authority, established in 1962 to implement the massive hydroelectric project at Kainji; 
the National Television Service, and the Nigerian External Communications (later 
renamed Nigeria Telecommunications Ltd.), both in 1962, the Niger Delta Development 
Board (1961), principally concerned with the development of primary production and
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agricultural research, and the Chad Basin Commission, a multi-lateral development 
institution established by Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon.
Three enterprises which were established on account of their importance and 
implication to national security, self-reliance and self-sufficiency were: Nigeria Defense 
Industries Corporation, Kaduna and Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company, 
Lagos (both established in 1964), and the Nigerian National Press Limited (established 
1961). Commercial and Manufacturing ventures included the Tourist Company of 
Nigeria (1962) and the Nigeria Paper Mills Ltd, Jebba (1969). Research and Training 
institutions included the Nigeria Council for Medical Research (1964) and the Nigeria 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (1966). In 1961, government inaugurated 
the National Provident Fund, a social insurance scheme.
It would appear that government participation in industry continued to expand 
throughout the decade. By 1967, public industrial investment comprised about 18 per 
cent of total industrial investment (World Bank, 1974, 244). It would also appear that 
Federal participation was concentrated in larger industrial ventures. It was also believed 
that by 1963, government investments equaled as much as 22 per cent of the equity in 
large-scale manufacturing (Forrest, 1982, 325). Although the Paper Mill in Jebba and the 
Petroleum refinery became operational in 1965, the iron and steel complex, for reasons of 
extraneous political considerations, never progressed beyond the planning stages. This 
was inspite of a political compromise that the project be split in two, one to be built in the 
East and the other in the North. Many of the other larger industrial projects were 
undertaken as joint ventures, including mining. However, apart from coal, the mining 
sector was dominated by foreign capital (Ogunpola Akin, 19, 311). What also seemed 
significant was that domestic value added in the new industries was low: their products, 
which had high import content, also meant that profits were freely repatriated. 
Understandably, firms with prior “protected” interest in the market accounted for the 
major part of the country’s import substituting industrialization (Kilby, P. 1969, 75-79; 
Dina, 1.0. 1971, 393). Overall, it would appear that government’s role, as an investor was 
modest at best. According to some opinions, government intervention in this sector was 
largely to accord incentives to private, predominantly foreign investors in the areas of 
allowing accelerated depreciation, import duty relief and tariffs; the main effect of which
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was not for protection reasons, but to create rents for revenue and balance of payments 
reasons (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 31-32).
If there was one area of significant contention,' if not disruptive regional 
competition, it was in the area of industrial policy formulation (and implementation). 
Sectional wrangling over a number of issues gravely affected the process: siting, staffing, 
managerial appointments contracts and patronage (Aboyade, 1968, 290-292). There was 
also this prestige attachment to industrial location and presence that saw the replication of 
textile and cement industries all across the regions, resulting in substantial duplication 
and excess capacity. According to S.O. Ugoh (1981, 163), a study in the mid-1960s 
concluded that at least three of the country’s five operating plants were economically 
unviable due to poor location and inappropriate size. The Sokoto Cement was perhaps an 
example of what appeared in some varying degrees a typical form and pattern. It was not 
only located in the home city of the Northern Region’s premier which was more than 136 
miles from the nearest rail line, no feasibility report on the project was ready until a year 
after an agreement was signed with the foreign partner (Dean, 1972, 58).
The government’s role in agriculture was also modest, in spite of the hitherto 
dominant role of agriculture as the country’s economic mainstay. For as Godwin 
Okurume would posit, Nigeria essentially was “an agricultural export economy. The 
entire economy revolved around agriculture, which was largely in the hands of peasant 
smallholders. They exchanged varying proportions of their produce for cash even though 
the main components of their activities were outside the money economy. The fact, 
however, that exports of agricultural produce determined the direction of the rest of the 
economy made Nigeria an agricultural economy” (in Yusufu, 1996, 232). Indeed, in 
1961 this sector accounted for 89 per cent of all exports and 66 per cent of total foreign 
exchange earnings, while employing over 70 per cent of the country’s labour force 
(Second NDP, 1970-1975 Chapter 12, 103). A number of factors account for this modest 
outcome.
For example in its first Plan (1962-1968) government claimed that agriculture was 
among its top most priorities. However during the first five years, only 7 per cent of total 
government spending (capital and recurrent) went to agriculture (J. C. Wells, 1970, 251- 
252). There was also a peculiarly regional thrust to that process. In the South (East and
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West) investment went largely to settlement schemes and government plantations, which 
turned out to be woeful and costly failures (S.A. Oni, 1972, 191-205; First NDP, 1962- 
1968, 290). In the North the emphasis was on irrigation projects, which might have been 
successful but for insufficient funding -only NG1.4 million was spent.
Furthermore, the use of improved seeds and fertilizers remained at very low 
levels, and the yields of major crops remained constant or even declined (Wells, 1970; 
Oluwasanmi, 1971; World Bank, 1974,239). Where there was growth at all, it had 
nothing to do with changes in production methods, but had everything to do with 
expansion of the area of cultivation and expending more time on the farm. However as 
prices declined, it became less attractive to farm and rural-urban migration became an 
attractive alternative (Helleiner, 1966; Aboyade, 1971; Nnoli, 1980).
What seems apparent is that government viewed the agricultural sector largely as 
a source of foreign exchange and government revenue, even as it had extreme difficulties 
evolving a consistent policy thrust. According to Ekekwe, the policy was as shortsighted 
as it was prospectively unrealistic and comprised of four significant components, each of 
which was circumstantially unattainable:
“(1) it emphasized cash crop production, (2) it depended for state 
revenue on surplus squeezed from peasants through the Marketing Boards,
(3) it accelerated die introduction of capitalist relations among the peasants, 
while later, (4) it sought to disintegrate completely the peasant mode of 
production and replace it with capitalist agricultural production” (1985, 59).
It is also noteworthy that government intervention in the agricultural sector was 
rather sparing, and when it did, its main instrument continued to be the use of Marketing 
Boards as vehicles for taxation, thus underlying the singular resource-generation focus. 
And for some inexplicable reasons, the Board was rather baselessly discriminatory in its 
tax categorization of cash crops and their relationship with some other food crops. For 
example, the marketing boards did not control rubber and food crops, but were 
monopolies for cocoa, cotton, ground- nuts, and palm produce. The Board set prices that 
were significantly lower than international market price for the produce. The resulting 
surpluses were channeled to the government. This implicit export taxation reduced
s
producer prices by 20 to 30 per cent (Malcolm B. Bale, 1985; H.D. Nelson et al, 1972, 
332-334; Helleiner, 1966;Yusufu, 1996). In view of the fact that government
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development expenditure showed a decidedly urban bias, the policy of keeping producers 
prices low to generate government revenue could be seem in its larger implicatory 
perspective—a huge transfer from rural to urban groups. According to Dupe 
Olatunbosun’s estimates (1975, 22), Nigerian rural dwellers contributed more than 50 per 
cent of the current revenues of state governments; yet only about 20 per cent of the 
government total expenditure, between 1960 and 1974 found it way back among these 
rural dwellers. Apart from the possible distributional effects, this tax also caused mis - 
allocative losses, both among other economic sectors and within the agricultural sector: 
farmers had incentive to switch to crops not controlled by the marketing boards. And 
although the export tax already existed before 1960, things got worse during 1960-1967 
(Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 31).
Indications are that government’s role in the provision of social services— 
education and health— were as modest as they were sectionally discretionary. 
Notwithstanding the widespread consensus among the development economists and 
indeed the Nigerian elite that investment in education and health is investment in human 
resources and thus a stimulating factor in economic growth, improvements in this area 
were relatively modest. According to Yusufu (1986, 2), “They saw education as an 
instrument to lift the nation out of its ‘primitive’ morass, to enlighten the masses for 
democratic participation in politics, and the nation for participation in international 
affairs. It was the beacon of light that led to the Promised Land”. Markedly different 
from other policy differences and focus between the regions, there was unanimity in the 
central place of education in the life of the people. “The Western and Eastern Regions 
embarked upon universal primary education; the Northern Region whose primary and 
secondary education had, by almost imperceptible tradition, invariably been free, 
instituted very generous overseas scholarship awards...Primary and secondary schools 
multiplied by the hundreds, and the Universities of Nigeria, Ife and Ahmadu Bello, were 
added by then to the University of Ibadam at the tertiary level” (Yusufu, 1996, 136).
Indeed, although the United Nations recommendation is that education should 
take at least 20 per cent of national budgets, the 10 per cent threshold maintained by the 
government, in view of all other contending priorities, was perhaps as consistent as it was 
relatively comparable. About NG 70 million (10 per cent of total budget) was allocated
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to education. Primary school enrollment stabilized in the south. In the North, however, 
enrollment increased rapidly, from 250,000 in 1959 to 410,000 in 1963 (Bevan, Collier,
& Gunning, 1999, 33).
Health, another area of general agreement on need for investment, in view of its human 
capital development significance, and impact on the overall economy received very 
modest allocation. Government’s allocation for health during the plan period amounted to 
only NG 17 million, and only about half of that was actually spent (P.O. Ahimie, 1971). 
Table 4.4 shows a distinctive expenditure pattern; and these budget choices may be better 
appreciated in Lewis characterization of health expenditure as the most productive of 
national allocations:
“Expenditure on health is productive in three ways: firstly, it increases the 
number of man-hours of work that can be performed; secondly, it improves 
the quality of work; and thirdly, by clearing otherwise uninhabited areas, 
it makes possible the use of natural resources which would not otherwise 
be utilized” (1968,110-111).
EVALUATION OF REGIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Although the regional governments (only three by 1963) expanded their economic 
activities through their respective Development Corporations, the general belief was that 
the regional parties physically executed those activities in the names of the various 
corporations. Significantly, the four regions reflected an unmitigated disaster in terms of 
financial mismanagement, and almost uniformly, party and political interference was a 
factor in their overall public conduct. Low productivity and ubiquitous political 
manipulation was a recurring decimal, so to speak, in the areas of agriculture, industry 
and welfare services.
It is also pertinent to mention here the pride of place agriculture had for all of the 
regions, (as with the federal government) as a primary source of revenue for the 
execution of their projects through their various Marketing Boards. “Thus, for the 
Western Region in 1962-1967 about 39.7 per cent of public investment money come 
from Regional Marketing Board. For the Northern and Eastern Regions the figures for 
the same period were about 42.3 per cent and 64.7 per cent respectively” (Ekekwe, 1985, 
60).
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Public Capital Expenditure Performance under the First National Development
Plan, 1962-68
TABLE 4.4
S/No. Sector Estimate (£m) Actual 
Expenditure (£m) Change %
1. Primary Product 91.760 52.523 -42.3
2. Trade and Industry 90.269 47.537 -47.3
3. Electricity 101.740 80.686 20.7
4. Transport 143.817 121.101 -15.8
5. Communications 30.000 11.042 63.2
6. Water 24.258 24.747 +2.0
7. Education 69.763 45.654 -34.6
8. Health 17.076 7.460 -56.3
9. Town and Country 
Planning
41.746 19.630 -53.0
10. Cooperative and Social 
Welfare
8.662 3.722 -57.0
11. Information 3.662 4.680 +27.7
12. Judicial 0.964 1.247 +29.4
13. General Administration 48.089 103.527 +115.3
14. Financial Obligations 3.900 12.883 +230.3
TOTAL 676.800 536.499 -20.7
Source: Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974, Table 3, p.13
The Western Region was perhaps the most innovative and could be ranked 
first in terms of development spending in the regions. Its flag institution, the Western 
Nigeria Development Corporation (WNDC), between 1949 and 1962, invested some 
£17.8 million, 72 per cent of which was purportedly allocated to productive enterprises 
(Teriba, 1966, 237). The Corporation held equity in about twenty commercial ventures, 
four of which were wholly owned. Loan commitments were nearly double equity 
holdings. Although the corporation extended substantial loans to companies like West 
Africa Portland Cement Company, the Nigeria Textile Mills Ltd and the Nigerian Plastic
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Company, among others, the fact that its largest loan recipients were two companies — 
Nigersol Construction Company and Nigerian Water Resources Ltd—owned by the 
Chairman of WNDC, Chief Albert Rewane, is very telling. It should however be noted 
that it (WNDC) also made large investments in cocoa, rubber, and palm plantations, as 
well as wholly-owned agricultural schemes; including smaller commitments to pioneer 
oil and rice mills. What was spectacular about these numerous activities was that by the 
early 1960s almost all of these investments had gone sour and were written off.
The investment activities of WNDC were marred by a combination of factors, all 
of which were distinctively impacting. They ranged from hastily prepared feasibility 
studies, to mismanagement, to corruption and indiscipline. For instance, the industrial 
ventures operated well below capacity, either because of excess installed capacity, (as in 
the case of the Pepsi-Cola plant) or that inputs were in short supply (as in the case of the 
Lafia Canning Factory, which operated between 3 per cent and 13 per cent capacity 
(Teriba, 1966, 253). In his assessment of the Corporation’s activities, Teriba had this to 
say:
“outside the minority investments in privately managed and therefore 
profit-oriented companies, the activities of Western Nigeria Development 
Corporation have, for the most part, been unguided by any meaningful or 
viable criteria of development.. .For the generality of WNDC wholly-owned 
and managed industrial projects as well as agricultural schemes, the criteria 
of potential profitability was either ignored, badly calculated or misapplied... 
cumulative losses were the outstanding feature of the Corporation’s agricultural 
and industrial...projects”( l966, 256-257).
The Region’s modus operandi was no different in the activities of the Western 
Nigeria Financial Corporation (WNFC). More than 70 per cent of the corporation’s 
investment, indeed £1.1 million was invested in one single, non-viable venture, a car 
sales firm. The transaction with the Arab Brothers Motor Ltd was one of imperceptible 
dubiousity. The idea of investing in a motor distributorship was suspect enough, but that 
the company immediately started losing money after it went public, leads inevitably to 
the conclusion that the Corporation’s bookkeepers inflated the firm’s performance prior 
to sale. The fact that the firm had been in business since 1933 is even more curious 
(Morton S. Baratz, 1964, 60-71). The Corporation’s other investments, apart from lacking
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any rational investment prudence, did not seem to benefit the region in terms of human 
development. These ventures included an insolvent boatyard; a bankrupt distributor of 
appliances, spare parts and building-materials, a hotel and a wholly- government 
patronized insurance company.
For the Eastern Region, their investment vehicle was the Eastern Nigeria 
Development Corporation (ENDC). By 1962, the ENDC had expended £10.7 million, 63 
per cent of which were investments in commercial schemes and equity in private firms. 
The Corporation’s investment interest included the Obudu Cattle Ranch, a pioneer palm 
oil mills, cocoa, oil palm, cashew and rubber plantations. There was also a brewery, 
Pepsi-Cola bottling plant, a glass factory and hotels. It also held equity in seven other 
companies. They included a rubber estate, the African Continental Bank, the Universal 
Insurance Company, two construction firms and two cement companies. These financial 
investments accounted for 44 per cent of the Corporations equity holdings, and the 
cement firms comprised a further 25%. Nearly 80 per cent of the Corporation 
outstanding loans went to community development, real estate and regional statutory 
corporations. The Development Finance Company, in which the Eastern Regional 
Government shared equity equally with the Commonwealth Development Corporation, 
invested in fifteen ventures by 1966. Among these were shares in Alcan Aluminium, 
Bewac batteries and several light manufacturing ventures (Pius Okigbo, 1981, 149).
Perhaps not particularly dissimilar or unexpected with the experience in the 
Western Region, only one of ENDC commercial ventures was profitable— an oil palm 
estate. By 1962, the cumulative losses on its commercial investments totaled £1.09 
million. Helleiner is of the view that perhaps a third of the Corporation’s capital was 
employed for projects and investments of questionable economic viability or allotted to 
ventures for which there was scant justification either for public capital or in terms of 
development benefits (1964, 122-123). Strikingly reminiscent of the Western Region’s 
experience, 37 per cent of the Corporation’s loan portfolio, about £1 million went to a 
real estate firm, African Real Estate and Investment Company Ltd. The company 
belonged to the chairman of ENDC. Curiously enough, the loan was not even reported in 
the Annual Reports of the Corporation (Helleiner, 1964, 117). These patterns and 
reasons for failure were no different from what was the case in the Western Region.
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According to Sayre Schatz (1977, 229), the default rate on the ENDC loans was 
extremely high: over 87 per cent of total loans were overdue in 1963.
On the face of it, the Northern Region’s investments ventures fared better. The 
Northern Nigeria Development Corporation (NNDC) in the early 1960s seemed to 
exhibit better financial judgment and prudence in its investment strategy (Helleiner,
1964, 241). By 1962, the NNDC had allotted loans and equity in twenty-eight private 
companies, fourteen of which were in manufacturing. Investments in nine textile firms 
accounted for half the Corporation’s manufacturing investment. A quarter of its funds 
were allotted to road transportation, and a relatively small amount to banking, including 
the Bank of the North, the Guinea Insurance Company and the investment company of 
Northern Development (Nig.) Ltd.
The appearance of judiciousness and prudence seems tenuous and unsustainable. 
Of the thirty-nine projects in its portfolio by 1966, only one of twelve wholly owned 
projects was deemed viable. And out of about twenty-seven commercial ventures, only 
six was deemed viable. It became apparent that the Regional government had financed 
these investments in the name of loans to the Corporations. Indeed the Regional 
government listed these allotments as plan expenditures, an amount equivalent to 13 per 
cent of total capital expenditure for the fiscal years 1964-1966. The failure of 
Corporation was attributed to be pervasive political intervention in the Corporation’s 
affairs, especially from the Minister of Economic Planning (Dean, 1972, 58).
It is believed that the regional loan programmes suffered similar fate of political 
intervention and a combination of mismanagement and inattention to other impacting 
economic factors. In his study of loans schemes, Sayre Schatz found that the primary 
constraint on the expansion of public capital was the dearth of viable projects available 
for funding. Despite indications of early fiscal restraint on the part of some regional 
development corporations, by the mid-1950s the regions were anxious to disburse money 
as quickly as possible (1977, 228). Economic justifications were discarded, and political 
connections because the decisive criterion for securing public credit. Loans were 
typically granted with minimal investigation and little security (Sayre Schatz, 1970, 
1964). The high default rate on regional loans were largely attributable to the 
politicization of the process that as casually made patronizing loans available to
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“connected” recipients without collaterals and, as equally, applied no pressure for their
repayment. The default rate for the North was about 53 per cent for the West 74 per cent 
and the East it was 87per cent (Schatz, 1970,101, 107).
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
According to some opinions, five significant developments during the period 
1960-66 set the direction for Nigeria’s economic future:
“First, macroeconomic discipline suffered from favourable initial conditions (the huge 
foreign exchange reserves) and from oil bonanza. Second, apart from the implicit 
taxation of export crops and the government’s role in raising wages, expanding 
employment, and granting tariff protection to industrial firms, there was little 
microeconomic intervention. Third, agriculture was apart from some ill-conceived 
projects neglected, whereas industrial investment, especially by foreign firms, was 
actively encouraged. Fourth, regional tensions, which were already strong at the end of 
the colonial period and which had made it difficult to find a constitutional arrangement 
for a new independent Nigeria grew. This occurred because the regions had unequal 
access to positions in the federal state and because the old political equilibrium was upset 
by disagreements within the Western Region and the intervention of the Federal 
government there. Fifth, the political process became discredited, having failed in the 
face of important issues such as the census controversy and the corruption associated 
with political parties” (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 33-34).
Overall, the performance of the Nigerian economy through the period 1962-1966 
showed relative growth and encouragement (See Table 4.5).
Gross Domestic Product, 1960/61 and 1966/67
TABLE 4.5
Millions of 
Pounds,
Nigerian 
1962/63 prices
Increase
ector 1960/61 1966/67 (Percent)
griculture, forestry, fishing
il
799.9 869.5
5.5 102.4 1,769
ther mining 10.3 13.4 30
anufacturing 57.0 113.4 99
blic utilities 4.2 10.1 140
onstruction 55.4 81.3 47
rade 154.7 200.9 30
ansport and communications 53.9 64.7 20
eneral government 39.9 51.1 28
ucation 32.1 55.1 72
ealth 6.3 12.5 98
ther services 25.3 41.4 64
otal GDP 
(factor cost) 1 ,244.5 1 ,615.8 30
Source: World Bank 1974, p.208.
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The economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.3 per cent, a level consistent with Plan 
projections. Manufacturing grew at annual rate of 10.5 per cent between 1961-1967. 
Though foreign investment in the economy continued at a steady rate, foreign aid 
receipts, a significant part of the Plan projections, were less than forecast (Tims, 197,
220; Philip Asiodu, 1971, 195; Tomori and Fajana, 1971, 138)
Agricultural export grew at an average annual rate of between 4-6 per cent 
between 1960-1967, even as declining world prices for most agricultural commodities 
yielded depreciation in the value of most exports (Tims, 1974, 213; Onitiri 1971, 239; 
Eicher and Johnson, 1970, 379). The agricultural proportion of the GDP continued to 
suffer from the effects of petroleum, government spending and other commerce. At the 
eve of civil war, agriculture accounted for over 55 per cent of the GDP, which showed an 
obvious reduction from a 70 per cent high in 1960. Notwithstanding, the sector still 
accounted for 53 and 49 per cent of GDP (excluding the contributions of the mining 
sector) in 1970-1971 and 1973-1974 respectively (Second NDP 1970-74, 103; Third 
NDP 1975-80, 63). Petroleum activities contributed about 2.6 per cent in 1960 and 4.8 
per cent in 1965/1966. By 1967, its contribution was about 30 per cent (Scott R. Pearson, 
1970, 34).
As Yusufu commented (1996, 59), “it may be concluded therefore that available 
statistics confirm evidence of rapid economic growth by conventional standards, but very 
little of national development in terms of improved welfare of the average or optimal 
citizen, whose per capita real income actually declined...” This goes to suggest that the 
broad measures of aggregate growth bespeak the underlying dilemmas of structural 
change in the domestic economy. Significant strides were no doubt made in the 
expansion of light import-substituting industry (albeit of discriminatory application), the 
development of domestic finance and the scale and diversity of indigenous 
entrepreneurship. However, the most significant advances were made in the areas of the 
private economy dominated by foreign investors, in petroleum, large-scale trade and 
manufacturing. Indigenous economic activity showed less dynamism and the Nigerian 
economy remained essentially reliant on primary production. The manufacturing 
proportion of the GDP increased modestly from 5.3 in 1959-1960 to 7.4 in 1967-1968. It
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should be noted however that output in the modem manufacturing sector increased more 
than twenty-fold between 1950-1964, at which time nearly 70 per cent of the equity in the 
largest enterprises were held by foreign investors (Teriba, Edozien and Kayode, 1981, 23; 
Kilby, 1969, 17, 20)
It has been suggested that public investment contributed to this growth as 
imported inputs in manufacturing went as high as 75 per cent (A.N. Hakam, 1977, 161). 
However, it would appear that the large proportion of imported components in 
manufacturing negatively affected savings on foreign exchange. Due to the fact that the 
current account balances worsened steadily between 1960 and 1967, capital and 
intermediate goods and agro- and allied- industries, all experienced slow growth during 
the period (Hakam, 1977, 161; Teriba, Edozien and Kayode, 1981, 83). State initiatives 
did little to change the dynamism in the agricultural sector. Production schemes failed to 
generate significant increases in output, while processing industries operated at a fraction 
of their capacity. It is also noteworthy that efforts to assist smallholder agriculture failed 
to effect changes in technique, just as it failed to enhance productivity. The novel 
resettlement schemes were no less a failure.
Available quantitative data suggest that, with few exceptions, the First Plan failed 
to substantially meet their targets. Under spending and under-fulfillment were 
particularly acute in the areas of agriculture, industry and communications. According to 
Yusufu, “in the areas touching directly upon the welfare of the citizens, under-fulfillment 
ranged from 34.6% in Education, to 63.3% in Communications. The planned primary 
production capital budget was under fulfilled by as much as 42.8 % and the health sector 
by 56.3%. With regard to water supply the Federal Government under-fulfilled its 
estimates by an incredible figure of 63.1% and in health by as much as 71.1%. Only the 
Northern Region over-fulfilled its target capital allocation for water by 31.8%. All other 
governments fell short of their budgeted allocation” (1996, 64; Second NDP, 13). 
However, the government’s efforts at certain national infrastructure were relatively 
successful. The notable success stories were: the Niger Dams project, the extensions of 
the external communications and the Bornu Extension for the Railway Corporation. The 
costs of these projects to the government was tremendous; and additional subventions 
notwithstanding, they operated at heavy loss to the government.
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The overall public sector capital formation was also well below Plan forecasts. 
Public sector Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 1967 was a sixth of Plan forecasts and 
the public sector never exceeded 40 percent throughout the period (Dean, 1972, 207). 
Public enterprise did not create substantial employment effects, for by the end of the Plan 
period, less than 5 per cent of total national employment in agriculture, industry, trade 
and construction was in the public sector. Activities in the public sector were very 
impacting on indigenous entrepreneurship by increasing opportunities and capital 
available to domestic business, even though government productive ventures yielded 
poor productive and financial returns. Government enterprises accounted for half of 
outstanding external debt by 1970, as well as a substantial portion of domestic debt 
(Second NDP, 275, 303).
The reason(s) for poor performance during the Plan period may be attributable to 
all manners of varied and interrelated circumstances. Even in their relatedness, a few lend 
themselves to distinctive discernibility. There are issues of planning, formulation and 
implementation. In the opinion of some analysts, these range from shortage of skilled 
manpower and prevailing low level of technology; administrative bottlenecks and the 
problem of inducing the numerous state governments to act in unison and agree on 
priorities (Ayida, 1977; Ojo, 1985, 145-146; Edozien, 1972, 274-299; Yusufu 1996, 63).
Although these have assumed a recurrent refrain through the various military 
regimes, there seems as yet to be no viable, consistent policy initiatives to seriously 
address the problem. Indeed the Federal and the regional governments evolved no 
rigorous, sustained standards of determining economic priorities and project viability. 
Most ventures were not only determined ad- hoc, they more often than not lacked 
feasibility studies that were realistically grounded. Ventures were undertaking more as a 
function of party patronage and the realizable quantum of kickbacks, with absolutely no 
regard to the quality or currency of the technology. The result was that extremely high 
and inflated projects were executed with outmoded and, often times incompatible 
machinery, resulting in waste and loss of development funds to private individuals 
(Kilby, 1969, 79).
Also inappropriate factor mixes which allowed for overstaffing, especially at the 
lower skill levels, and over or under installation of capacity affected productivity. As
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Teriba (1966, 248) would note, many agricultural ventures suffered from labour 
shortages due to poor siting or compensation policies. The plantation schemes have been 
noted for poor land management, resulting in the case of mechanized farms 
incompatibility between technical requisites and the pattern of the dispersed plots. It was 
also a common feature that many firms were highly liquid, leaving assets idle and 
susceptible to misappropriation, or heavily leveraged, leaving the company in financial 
straits at inception.
Another problem was managerial incompetence and unsuitability, which was 
compounded by over dependence on government funding. Both of which allowed for 
political interference in management and executive appointments (NPA Commission of 
Inquiry Report, 1968, 31). There was no discernible and effective line of communication 
and apportionment of responsibilities among members of Board of Director (usually 
political appointees) and the Chief Executives and indeed, there existed few procedural or 
practical limits on legislative and ministerial interference in the daily affairs of the 
enterprises (Sessional Paper No.7, 1964; NPA Commission of Inquiry, 1968, 6-7).
Lack of effective supervision by government of the multiple and, sometimes, 
simultaneously executed projects was an added problem. Dearth of skilled manpower 
compounded by partisan interventions created a palpable disconnect for the meaning and 
essence of state initiatives in economic and market development. According to Rimmer 
(1981, 48) “the ability to command resources at public disposal remained the highest 
political good in these early years of Nigerian independence ...precisely because 
development was understood to be the main business of government, it could not be 
insulated from politics. Questions of how to increase production were not perceived to 
be factually separate from questions of who was to benefit; the stakes were too high”.
The overall picture that emerges from the foregoing reflects a completely, dis­
enabling market creation environment. One that would persuade Gavin Williams and 
Terisa Turner, to comment: “There was a clear contradiction between the politics of 
commercial capitalism in Nigeria and the policies required for the development of 
capitalist production” (1978, 149-150). All of which is not to suggest that within these 
apparent inconsistencies there could not possibly have emerged a functional structure to 
serve the purpose for regional or even national definition of market and economic
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development. For development at core is a perspective, leadership-defined and directed 
phenomenon, with no universally acceptable uniform route of attainment. Neither are 
there any reliable measure(s) of (market or economic) development that are not 
abstractive and rather dependent on relatable variables, amidst peculiarly intense 
competition for attainment. This is especially the case in the diverse regional political 
and economic arrangement, compounded by military intervention, where well-being was 
less a national focus but more a regional preoccupation; and determined by resource 
accessibility to the competing regional elites. The question, which naturally arises, is 
whether some “good” could emerge form a rapidly evolving national process, which 
could be characterized as tentative processes of Nigerian market and economic 
development and perhaps the subsequent emergence of a durable institutional framework 
and rule, albeit imperfect. According to some opinions, corruption and patronage (the 
hallmark of the process in Nigeria) have historically accompanied the emergence of 
seemingly stable, autonomous {and perhaps, effective and productive— inclusions mine) 
business elites and effective administrative machinery (Bienen, 1971; Alexander 
Gerschenkron, 1962; James Scott, 1972).
Much as the political and public sector organization during the short-lived civilian 
regime (and Plan period) were characterized by corruption, mismanagement and 
instability, ostensibly prompting military intervention, what really was the true state of 
the entity called Nigeria? Was the military any more institutionally prepared for 
leadership than the civilian administration they displaced? At the inception of the civil 
war the military, like the rest of the society of which they were a constituent part, was 
fragmented and suicidally politicized, and they inherited an equally volatile, fragmented 
and dangerously politicized, even if more corrupt and inefficient public sector. Not to 
mention a hopelessly dependent and mismanaged economy. Apart from restoring the 
integrity of the nation-state, theirs would also require the capacity to articulate, formulate 
and implement a viable and enduring market and economic development framework, one 
that could be measured against the background of all available resource capacity of the 
country.
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CONCLUSION
To have the desired economic development outcome, planning ought to be 
national in orientation and emphasis, in order to achieve some kind of uniform 
realization. However, due to the federal character of Nigeria, and the very significant and 
near-autonomous participatory initiatives, many homegrown, of the various regions, with 
their particular thrusts and focuses, that could not be achieved. Indeed some of the 
exercises/processes were political patronage and diametrically at variance with economic 
development or federal emphasis on market enhancement at any given time. The result 
was that coherent and coordinated implementation was always difficult, if not impossible 
to attain. This state of affairs was no different even under the military administration. In 
any case, to the extent that development for the overall benefit of the citizenry could not 
be accomplished within federal or regional isolation or disparate implementation, the 
failure was gravely impacting. In addition, deliberate misapplication mismanagement and 
corruption may have compounded the dearth of data, and lack of implementation 
capacity. Notwithstanding, government’s selective participation in the process is still 
considered indispensable.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE MILITARY AND THE CREATION OF AN ENABLING MARKET
ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
It would appear that very early in the process, critical consensus emerged, even from 
military governments’ perspective, as to the appropriate role of government in the 
essential creation of an environment, sufficiently enabling, in the attainment of market 
and economic conditions, that could sustain acceptable levels human development 
(Gowon, 1974; Buhari, 1984; Babanginda, 1986; Abubakar, 1998). This chapter seeks to 
not only evaluate the underlying rationalization, but to determine the level of such 
attainment in Nigeria.
With the current state of economic situation in much of the Third World, the 
question of course is, what role, if any, should the state play in the overall market and 
economic development of the State? The role of the State in any country’s development 
is without question indispensable. One of the most pivotal roles of the state is the creation 
of an enabling economic and market environment, which ultimately, like a rising 
economic tide “lift all boats”. The state is said to occupy a central and unique position in 
marshalling capital, establishing institutions, regulating markets and fostering 
entrepreneurship (Thomas M. Callaghy, 1988; Paul Kennedy, 1988; Dietrich 
Rueschmeyer, and Peter Evans, 1985). In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of countries in 
the Third World achieved impressive records of economic growth and diversification, 
including the emergence of a vigorous self-sustaining industrial capacity. By the end of 
the 1970s, it was apparent that structural transformation and endogenous development
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were possible in diverse nations of the Third World, and there emerged a widespread 
recognition of the strategic role of state action in fostering capital accumulation and 
growth in the developing economies. The importance of the developmental role of the 
nation state in contemporary Third World can be evaluated from the experiences of the 
Newly Industrializing Economies (NIES). The so-called East Asian “Gang of Four” 
(Hong Kong, Singapore South Korea and Taiwan) experienced rapid expansion of export 
manufactures and the development of sophisticated capital goods industries. Countries 
like Brazil and Mexico, often counted among the NIE fold, combined export growth with 
import substitution strategies. India, which essentially evolved import - substitution 
industrialization, among other technology-based capabilities has, like the NIEs, shown 
relative success in deepening their productive structure to achieve greater integration 
within sectors, linkages between sectors, and domestic engines of growth and innovation. 
Needless to say, these diverse cases have reflected important commonalities, including 
the appearance of an independent industrial bourgeoisie; changes in the structure of 
production away from primary commodities and agriculture and toward manufacturing; 
advances in agricultural productivity and indigenous technological capacity; and the 
development of substantial backward linkages within the industrial sector.
The nation state’s participatory involvement in this process has been widely 
recognized in the cases of Brazil, Mexico and India, which have emphasized state 
planning, large public enterprise sectors, and close technocratic supervision of economic 
policies. The East Asia countries have reflected export-oriented strategies, greater 
reliance on market mechanisms, close ties with western trading partners and a more 
targeted and selectively focused nationalist development strategy (Amsden, 1989, 1993;
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Lall, 1995; World Bank, 1993). Even the case of Hong Kong, which is supposedly a 
laissez -faire economy, it is apparent that the regulatory presence of state, either in the 
form of guarantee of the rule of law, or what Alvin G. Wint (1998, 281) calls “functional 
interventions” or “selective interventions”, in providing an essential stabilizing 
framework for the achievement of growth, has been crucial. In Taiwan and South Korea, 
heavy government intervention and extremely discriminatory protectionism served to 
foster nascent indigenous business classes (Amsden, 1985, 78; Edward S. Mason, Mahn 
Je Kim. et al, 1980, 293; Shahid Yusuf and R. Kyle Peters, 1985, 9).
A comparison of these diverse experiences prompts consideration of the possible 
commonalities, which condition or predicate statist development strategies. The apparent 
success of these emerging economies reflect the emergence of a comparatively sustained 
and coherent strategy of economic development focusing on capital formation, the 
deepening of production, the diversification of output and the organization of social 
groups around production. The existence of a “project of accumulation”1 guiding state 
policy is a crucial feature of such strategies. Such a project which is said to be pursued by 
a relatively coherent and stable state elite, also embodies consensus around an ideology 
of development and is organized around certain strategic elements such as planning and 
critical public interventions (Bertil Walstedt, 1980; John Waterbury, 1983).
ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE AND FOCUS
OF THE STATE
During the late 1970 and 1980s, development theorists focused on the role of state 
in the development process. State-centric analysis emphasized the primacy of political 
factors in development, the potential autonomy of state actors in promoting domestic 
accumulation and structural change; and the crucial importance of a coherent and
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effective set of governing institutions and state elites (Skocpol, 1979; Evans, 
Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1979; Zaki Ergas, 1987). This theoretical trend also stressed 
the significance of institutional design, the content of government policy and the context 
of policy implementation. The dimensions of state building and the possibilities and 
constraints on “effective intervention” constituted central concerns for many analysts 
during the period (Rueschmeyer and Evans, 1985; Basu Prahland, 1994; Stiglitz, 1996; 
Wint, G. 1998).
This new emphasis superseded a number of earlier focuses in the study of 
development (Atul Kohli, 1986). State-centric theories represented a corrective to 
modernization approaches which focused on social and economic processes but tended to 
disregard or de-emphasize the autonomous role of political action and institutions (Cyril 
Black 1966; Rostow, 1960). State-centric analysis drew upon the tradition of political 
development, which was concerned with issues of state power, governance and institution 
building, but statist analyses amended significant gaps in the political development 
literature by focusing more clearly on economic issues and policy questions (Huntington, 
1968; Huntington and Almond, 1987). However, most theorists stressed the possibility of 
achieving genuine and sustainable indigenous development under state tutelage, and the 
potential efficacy of domestic actors in the pursuit and attainment of development 
(Evans, 1979; Amsden, 1989; Stephan Haggard, 1990).
By the 1960s and 1970s however, the relevant focus had become the role of the 
state in economic development as many of the hitherto colonized countries were attaining 
independence. The exit of the colonial governments and the need to maintain a semblance 
of government or administrative regularity compelled a tremendous expansion of the role
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of government in much of developing countries. State development strategies were 
implemented throughout the Third World during these periods. However, by the 
beginning of the 1980s, scholarly consideration of the role of state developed 
simultaneously with an emergent critique of state intervention in the economies of 
developing countries. There was both the recognition of the criticality and deficiencies of 
state tutelage and intervention (“Berg Report” World Bank, 1981; Stiglitz, 1996). Indeed 
Miles Kahler (1990) criticized state economic intervention in the developing world, as he 
called for divestiture, reform and a return to market forces. Apparently, events in 
developing countries and the sensibilities of the neo-classical counter-revolution school 
of thought in the developed countries prompted this whole criticality of the role and 
participation of the state. The collapse of many African economies, and the emergence of . 
a widespread debt and investment crisis throughout the Third World, led to a 
reassessment of state regulations, the scope of public expenditure and failings or 
inefficient state enterprises. The Reagan and Thatcher governments in the 1980s in the 
United and United Kingdom respectively expressed strong anti-statist proclivities through 
domestic privatization, as well as political influence on multi-lateral organization and bi­
lateral aid. Some theorists of like-mindedness no doubt supported this position (Peter T. 
Bauer, 1984; Deepak Lai, 1985; Ian Little, 1982). These initiatives exerted considerable 
pressure on donor organizations, aid recipients and highly indebted countries. Such 
leverage in the international arena inevitably compelled a wave of state-sector reforms 
and nominal privatization throughout the developing countries during the latter part of 
1980s and early parts of 1990s.
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Analyses of state developmental roles have encompassed a wide variety of 
strategic, institutional and policy features. Scholars and practitioners have variously 
stressed the critical role of the state organization in industrialization, the significance of 
developmental ideologies, the importance of trade and pricing issues, the consequences 
of rural-urban policy biases, and the strategic position of state-owned enterprises and 
government regulations. In recent years however, there has been a general proliferation of 
literature on the politics of economic decision-making, policy implementation, and the 
performance, reform and divestiture of public enterprise in many areas of the developing 
world (Nicholas Van De Walle, 1989, 601-615). Interestingly, recently literature on 
Africa has reflected a strong focus on agricultural issues and state intervention in rural 
development (Robert Bates, 1981; Carl K.Eicher and John M. Staatz, 1984; Naomi 
Chazan and Timothy M. Shaw, 1987; Bruce F. Johnston, 1986). Nonetheless, this new 
focus is not immune from the general weakness that impact African public sectors since 
agricultural development was also affected by general crisis in the sub-region. Indeed, 
since many public enterprises are involved in agricultural marketing, credit, inputs and 
rural infrastructure, the failure of public enterprise itself constitutes a significant cause of 
poor agricultural performance. Several existing studies provide a good picture of the 
operational causes and economic consequences of public enterprise failure in Africa, yet 
little attention has been devoted to the political roles of public enterprises and the 
political context of state sector reform.
PREREQUISITES FOR STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT 
The idea of a project of accumulation points to specific qualities of state structure, 
which facilitates development. According to Evans (1990) statist patterns of late
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development requires both autonomy and capacity. State elites must share an articulate 
developmental vision, and they must possess the cohesion and independence to sustain a 
set of policies in the face of diverse pressures or resistance from particular elements in 
domestic society and the international arena. It is also crucial that the state apparatus as a 
whole must be capable of undertaking the complex and protracted tasks of 
implementation: bureaucratic agencies must function with a modicum of efficiency and 
effectiveness; informational and regulatory functions must be well developed; state 
enterprises must fulfil minimal productive and service roles, and state implementers must 
be responsive to changing market conditions and policy directives. These “prerequisites” 
for state - led development serve to frame an analysis of the economic role of the Nigeria 
State. On the one hand, it is argued here that state elites (predominantly military 
leadership) in Nigeria have not clearly articulated or consistently pursued an autonomous 
project of accumulation. Besides, the state apparatus has lacked the coherence, 
institutional effectiveness and necessary linkages with civil society to realize such a 
project. While formulating a nominal policy of state capitalism, appearances have been at 
variance with capacities in the case of Nigeria.
State expansion in Nigeria was not guided by an articulate strategy of state 
capitalism; neither did any coherent program of state-led economic reform hugely inform 
its structure. Besides, the Nigerian state lacked the administrative and technical capacities 
necessary for implementing effective implementation of economic development 
initiatives (Yusuf, 1996; Ekekwe, 1985). The convergence of poor institutional capacity 
and low state autonomy yielded ineffectual and even ruinous policies. The pattern of state 
intervention in Nigeria has essentially impeded the types of social and economic changes
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implied by state capitalist goals as state institutions and public resources are diverted to a 
host of separate, conflicting, contradictory and even corrupted ends (Anunobi, 1992; 
Yusufu, 1996; Adebayo Olukoshi 1989).
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA: ORIGINS, 
SCOPE AND PERFORMANCE
As in most developing countries, public enterprises have played an indispensable 
role in the economies of African countries. Indeed Africa’s political and economic 
evolution has been driven largely by private trade and business activities; heavily 
influenced by the activities of colonial traders. The key facets of these economic 
activities have persisted to this day. Amongst them were the emphasis on natural resource 
exports, particularly minerals, plantation-based agriculture and associated commerce in 
imported consumer goods. The region also featured a close interaction between 
government and business, which led to the licensing of monopolies, the creation of trade 
restrictions, and the dominance of formal economic activity by large-scale foreign-owned 
firms. In addition, the colonial period saw heavy government regulation and control of 
many spheres of economic life. The state and nature of the relationship between countries 
in the sub-region and their ex-colonial masters very greatly influenced and affected the 
pace and structure of economic development. Although independent, these countries were 
still tied to the apron strings of their colonial masters in what became a patronizing 
colonial-based region of economic spheres (of influence) without meaningful sub­
regional economic integration and co-operation. A situation further compounded by the 
fierce and sometimes brutal competition among colonial powers (Britain and France) to 
retain absolute and unfettered monopolistic and sometimes neo-merchantilist control over 
trade and other economic activities in their respective sub-regional territories (R.K.A
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Gardiner, 1976, 92; Ekekwe, 1985, 58, The Washington Post, August 31, 1997, A26).
According to Gardiner (1976), African economic structure and activities were greatly 
influenced from the outside. He contends:
“A significant difference between Africa and other parts of the world is 
that the modernization of African economies was initiated by the colonialists.
In Asia, Japan secured to herself the initiative to adopt and adapt modem 
economic organizations and technical skills to the physical and sociological 
conditions of its country and people. In varying degrees, one notices the 
importance of this factor in conditions in China, India and most of South-East 
Asia. Latin Americans were able to throw off the colonial yoke much earlier, 
but some of the feudalistic aspects of the economies can be attributed to the 
fact that the states were colonized and settled by aliens. In the case of Africa, 
foreign dominance until recently - a little over ten years ago in a number of 
cases-deprived the inhabitants of the opportunity to exercise political and 
economic options which would have influenced the pattern of their economic 
and social development...”(1976, 90-91).
At independence therefore, African states generally inherited low levels of 
economic development, weak indigenous business classes and urgent popular demand for 
public services. Most governments embodied socialist and/or nationalist ideologies, and 
they were strongly influenced by the statist tendencies inherent in colonial rule. New 
regimes (civilian or military) seeking to consolidate power had compelling incentives to 
expand their legal prerogatives and their control over patronage. Such diverse motives 
fostered assertive government economic intervention and the rapid expansion of state 
sectors (John Nellis, 1986; Leroy Jones and Edward Mason, 17).
Economic statism throughout most of Africa reflected an inherent paradox, in that 
public tutelage was undertaken by states with poor resource bases, sparse expertise and 
weak administrative capabilities. Moreover, the political goals of state intervention 
typically contradicted the requisites of acceptable economic performance. The divergence 
between responsibility and capacity, and the political context of planning, management 
and control, led in most instances to poor performance within the public sector (Richard 
Sandrook (1985). The rather dependent significance of state institutions and resources, in
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turn, fostered economic stagnation and decline. This pattern has been evident in Nigeria. 
This route Nigeria has taking to development is distinguishable from most other sub- 
Saharan African states by reasons of the enormous, yet unstable windfall derived from oil 
wealth. The oil boom facilitated a rapid and massive increase in the size of the state 
sector. The sudden arrival of abundant resources also fostered a corresponding rise in 
illicit activities, heedless spending and capital flight. During the peak years of the boom 
period, easy access to foreign exchange and public revenue tended to veil the poor 
performance of state enterprise and, more generally, the distorted pattern of growth 
throughout the economy (Richard Joseph, 1978, 221-240; Anunobi, 1992, 134-147; 
Gamaliel Onosode, 1993, 61). When the waves of oil wealth receded, the structural 
weaknesses of the Nigeria economy were rapidly exposed, revealing structural crises and 
extensive failure throughout the public sector (Peter Olayiwola, 1987, 139).
Nigeria’s public enterprise sector is perhaps the largest in sub-Sahara Africa. As a 
matter of fact, since the colonial period, the public sector has assumed diverse and 
strategic developmental roles. During the 1970s, successive military governments, 
prompted by ambitious economic nationalist objectives and abundant public revenues, 
promoted an enormous expansion in the size and scope of the public enterprise sector. 
Public enterprises became the central instruments through which a nominal policy of state 
capitalism was articulated (the features of state capitalism and Nigeria’s divergence from 
successful state capitalist model are discussed later in this chapter).
The performance of Nigeria public enterprises has not been without enormous 
problems. The public sector has long been criticized for its inefficiency, politicization, 
corruption and poor output. These dilemmas have increased exponentially with the
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proliferation of both coups d’etat and government enterprises. By the end of the oil boom 
era, the nation possessed a huge, wasteful and unwieldy public sector, presided over by a 
corrupt and unaccountable military. The investment of billions of naira in public 
enterprises yielded few dividends and enormous burdens: basic utilities and infrastructure 
did not function properly; public sector efforts in industry produced extraordinary waste, 
growing deficits and scant production; and massive capital projects in agriculture offered 
no fillip to a stagnant rural sector. Public enterprises presented a growing liability to the 
government budget, and their faltering performance constituted a central factor in 
Nigeria’s economic decline during the 1980s.
Because of its operational antecedents, the failure of public enterprise in Nigeria 
has been apparent for more than thirty years. Several government-instituted commissions 
of inquiry have offered detailed and seemingly thorough analyzes of the problems within 
the pubic sector. However, these have not been followed by effective reform either within 
individual firms or across the sector as a whole. The onset of Nigeria’s economic crisis in 
early 1980s, in part prompted the military coup of General Mahammadu Buhari, which 
was thought to be “reformist”. However, the reforms the administration introduced 
produced a mixed bag of results; for no sooner had some of their policies been in place 
than the administration being supplanted by the seemingly more orthodox regime of 
General Ibrahim Babangida. The continuation of some of these policies has, by the end of 
the decade, beginning to gain momentum, even as issues of economic revitalization 
remained critical and unresolved. The question of course is how far-reaching were these 
measures. It would appear that the reversal in the nation’s economic fortunes was not 
forthrightly confronted, partly because of inadequate policies, but largely because of the
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guided expectation that the downward trend in the world oil market would be short-lived. 
By 1985, Nigeria faced a very serious economic crisis. GDP had fallen 15 per cent than it 
was at the beginning of the decade, and real per capita income and domestic consumption 
had dropped well below levels of the early, 1970s (World Bank, 1991; Egonmwan 1992; 
Ugorji, 1995; Nafziger, 1997; Naude, 1996).
The truth of the matter however, is that poor performance within the public sector 
is common throughout African (World Bank, 1994; Kevin M. Cleaver and Gotz A. 
Schreiber, 1994; Lionel Demery and Lyn Squire, 1996). Due to the fact that this situation 
appears endemic to a varying degree throughout the sub-region, the other question that is 
raised is whether they have any correlationship with the prevalence of military regimes 
within the sub-region. Perhaps related to this (by reason of the number of military 
regimes in Nigeria thus far) is the scale and persistence of public enterprise failure in 
Nigeria. Without exception, the public sector has presented a picture of unmitigated 
disaster and unrelieved failure spanning three decades. The arrival of abundant revenues 
and the presumptuous sense of superior skill and experience within the Nigerian civil 
service, highlight the shortcomings in the public enterprise performance. The record of 
Nigeria’s public sector vis-a-vis the creation of a market environment (reform) prompts a 
number of pertinent questions: 1) What factors have engendered the growth of the public 
enterprise sector? 2) Why have these enterprises performed poorly, so consistently? 3) 
Why has the public enterprise sector proved so impervious to reform?
The attempt to answer the questions raised necessarily reveal the failure of the 
creation of a market environment in Nigeria. For implicit in the pubic sector development 
process and explicit in the creation of a viable market environment is the notion that the
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successful implementation of the former would necessarily precipitate the development 
of the latter. What is evident however, is that norm of strategic distribution rather than 
norms of production and accumulation have driven state intervention in the Nigerian 
economy. The raison d'etre of the Nigerian state has been to construct legitimacy and 
preserve regime stability through the manipulation of the instrumental linkages between 
state and society. Moreover, the military and other domestic elites have relied upon state 
resources and authority as essential means of mobility and sustenance. The state has been 
the source of wealth and opportunity throughout the economy since the late colonial era, 
and the accumulation of resources within the state sector has focused contention over 
access to the state (Barbara Callaway, 1975, 117). Consequently, state enterprises have 
served as avenues for the distribution of public resources of the distribution of the public 
resources to diverse communal and particular interests. These imperatives stand in direct 
contradiction to effective public sector performance and the more general achievement of 
state-led accumulation and capacity creation.
STATE CAPITALISM AND NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT 
Perhaps as part of their colonial legacy and post independent economic 
attachment, Nigeria’s successive governments, civilian and military, have subscribed to a 
“mixed economy” model of state-led capitalist development. The nation’s development 
strategy and thrust, embodied in the various post - independence constitutions and 
national development plans 2 processes, have reflected a strong, even if in practical terms, 
nominal commitment to private sector development (Crawford Young, 1982, 220; M.E. 
Blunt, 1977, 77, 80). Which meant that the state has always encouraged private sector 
activity, and has attempted to foster a domestic business class within the permissible
185
constrains of an apparently uncoordinated process implementation. It is also the case that 
state elites have been ambivalent about the role of the private sector, especially the 
accommodable level of foreign participation in that exercise. As a matter of fact, 
Nigeria’s policy-makers are continually torn between, on the one hand, the need to satisfy 
the demands of the formal business sector and, on the other, the short-term requirements 
of a powerful elite that has grown increasingly accustomed to a steady flow of 
government contracts and project-related import opportunities. Also acting as a brake on 
reform and liberalization are the demands of older-generation proponents of state 
economic management. They still form an influential part of the economic nationalist 
lobby that is determined to resist any surrender of Nigerian national assets to foreign 
ownership and control (The Commonwealth African Investment Almanac, 1999, 3).
Nigeria would be said to have experienced three identifiable phases in 
development strategy since independence. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the 
governments economic role was said to be interventionist and tutelary, albeit limited, 
since it acted as “catalyst” for private sector development by creating physical 
institutional and financial environment for economic progress (C.O. Ogunbanjo, 1983, 
98-100; Rimmer 1981; Sayre Schatz, 1977, 3; Sara Berry and Carl Liedholm, 1970, 76- 
76; Gerald K. Helleiner, 1966). During the final years of British rule, the colonial 
government initiated efforts to establish a nationwide economic and social infrastructure, 
and to foster the emergence of a viable domestic private sector. This orientation did not 
change significantly after independence in 1960. The civilian administration of Prime 
Minister Tafawa Belewa (1960-66) did emphasise the development of physical
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infrastructure and the creation of an institutional framework for economic growth. It was 
also part of the government’s effort to attract foreign capital participation in the economy.
However, the military coup d’etat of January 1966 and the civil war by mid 1966 
completely changed the pattern and focus of Nigeria’s development. Although the war 
efforts showed remarkable self- reliance and prudent economic management, it would not 
be gain- saying to suggest that the increased revenue from crude oil at that crucial time 
was particularly helpful. At the end of the civil war, the government under General 
Yakubu Go won derived its policy guidance from a coterie of senior civil servants, who 
have become so powerful and influential that they were dubbed “super permanent 
secretaries” (Super Permsecs). They were said to have supervised the implementation of 
the set of state - directed, nationalist economic policies embodied in the Second National 
Development Plan (1970-74) (Peter Koehn, 1983, 4; John F. E. Ohiorhenuan, 1981, 78; 
Ayida and Onitiri, 1971).
The sudden influx of oil revenue in 1973 precipitated a shift in state strategy from 
one of the three Rs - Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation - to more 
ambitious aspirations for rapid capitalist development; essentially a de facto state 
capitalism was in process. In this new dispensation, central planning efforts and 
regulatory authority were greatly expanded: Public investments increased and diversified 
as the state moved directly into strategic productive activities. Indeed the state became a 
central source of growth, accumulation and entrepreneurship throughout the economy. 
This state - capitalist direction in development strategy coalesced and, if you will, 
accelerated during the military regimes of General Murtala Mohammed (1975-1976) and 
that of his successor General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979). It could be said however,
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that the shift in development strategy was more circumstantial than deliberate thus bereft 
of any fundamental/ideological and administration direction or grounding, which 
nonetheless did not lessen its impact.
By the early 1980s, there were indications that the state capitalist strategy was less 
than a success as the global oil market plummeted and the Nigerian economy went into 
rapid decline. The extravagance, corruption and mismanagement of the Second Republic 
under the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, led to its overthrow 
by the austere “corrective” military regime of generals Mohammadu Buhari and Tunde 
Idiagbon (Anunobi, 1992, 220). The Buhari-Idiagbon government effected a fundamental 
re-orientation in strategy, implementing a series of stopgap stabilization measures while 
avoiding issues of medium - to long - term adjustments. Essentially their immediate focus 
was to seek to end the debt crisis, curtail corruption (especially in the acquisition and use 
of foreign exchange), and put Nigeria on the road to self-reliant economic development.
In his budget speech in 1984, General Buhari emphasized that his government’s 
objectives were “to arrest the decline in the economy, to put the economy on a proper 
course of recovery and solvency, to chart a future course for economic stability and 
prosperity, and to achieve in the long run self-reliant economic development” (Onyema 
Ugochukwu, West Africa, May 14, 1989, 1009). By August 1985 when Major General 
Ibrahim Babangida toppled the Buhari government, he also effected a break with the era 
of expansive dirigism, and the emergence of an essentially neo-orthodox adjustment 
program (Thomas Callaghy, 1990; Peter Lewis, 1990; Anunobi, 1992).
It is perhaps important at this stage to seek to clarify the strategy of state 
capitalism in Nigeria’s development process, since the word “state capitalism” is a term
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often used but infrequently defined. The phenomenon has attracted greater attention from 
Marxist scholars, largely with respect to its implementation in Latin America (John 
Waterbury, 1983, 17-20; E.V.K. Fitz Gerald, 1983 and 1979, 34-38; Jeff Frieden, 1981, 
407-431; James Petras, 1977, 1-17). While applied to a divergent array of actual cases,3 
there is some definitional consensus over its nationalist and class character. The strategy 
appears as a particular response by certain ruling coalitions in developing countries to the 
problems of economic dependence and domestic class formation. While presenting a 
number of implementation problems in the Nigerian context, as discussed below, the 
applicability of the model to Nigeria’s experience seems appropriate.
State capitalism refers to a concerted, programmatic effort by state elites to reduce 
the power of foreign capital and to foster an integrated and dynamic national capitalist 
economy. The state assumes greater control of the economy and increases its 
participation in production, but does not seek to reorder relations of production or to 
constrain the prerogatives of indigenous private capital. The public enterprise sector, 
though expanded in scope and diversity, is run predominantly along capitalist lines, as 
profit - making ventures embodying hierarchical labour relations and managerial 
organization.
State capitalism represents a “new model of accumulation” in which the state 
supplants foreign capital and substitutes for a weak indigenous bourgeoisie in key sectors 
of growth (Fitz Gerald, 19-83, 67). The fundamental state capitalist goals are to limit or 
usurp the influence of foreign economic forces and to create a framework for national 
economic integration and endogenous growth. And of course, depending upon the 
ideological orientation of the regime and the tenor of the state relations with domestic
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business group, the strategy may also entail efforts to foster indigenous entrepreneurship 
(James Petras, 1977; Fitz Gerald, 1983, 37). In this instance, the state takes on a dual 
role: the public sector acts in lieu of an absent or incipient domestic bourgeoisie, while 
government intervention is also intended to engender a domestic capitalist class. These 
objectives are often in tension, as contradictions arise between the state’s role as 
substitute and pattern for indigenous capital.
The elite coalition initiating state capitalism typically unites nationalist military 
rulers, or leaders of a dominant or single party, with technocratic elements in the public 
sector, especially higher civil servants and public enterprise managers. Populist or 
socialist ideological programs often accompany the state capitalist endeavour, even 
though such rhetorical stances do not necessarily indicate a genuine commitment to 
income redistribution or to popular political or economic organization. Political tensions 
inevitably arise when the state finds it necessary - in the interests of growth and/or 
stability - to equivocate its resistance to foreign interests, and to curb the demands of 
labor in order to obtain better economic performance in the public and private sector 
(James Petras, 1977, 12-14). The state acquires the presumed advantages of control and 
profit, as well as the actual liabilities of social conflict, entailed by its position as 
capitalist.
State capitalism can be seen as a variant of the pattern of state - led development 
found throughout the Third World. A combination of ideological commitment, 
organizational form and a class relationship distinguish the strategy. The government’s 
role under state capitalism is not temporary and expedient, but entrenched and permanent. 
State actors build an extensive, interventionist economic bureaucracy to create large-scale
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industrialization and to manage the process of accumulation over a sustained period. The 
indigenous private sector is perceived as a weak and dependent class, requiring strong 
and enduring state tutelage. State capitalism, like in South Korea, can be contrasted with 
state-led strategies allowing for greater autonomy on the part of indigenous capital and a 
more equivocal role for state action (Shahid Yusuf and R. Kyle Peters, 1985; Stephan 
Haggard and Tun-Jen Cheng, 1987).
The failure of state capitalism in Nigeria may be attributable to three related 
circumstances: Nigeria has embodied problematic state autonomy and extremely low 
levels of capacity; the policy environment has been inimical to rational, systematic 
accumulation; and the corporate forms of political organization have not fostered the 
emergence of class forces essential to a capitalist social and economic order. Moreover, 
state strategies have played a direct role in perpetuating a social configuration at variance 
with the requisites of productive capitalism. The failure of Nigerian state institutions to 
become effectively integrated in the process implementation within the larger society is 
mirrored by the permeability of the state to societal (tribal and special interests) pressures 
and the capture of state institutions by diverse vested interests. The reminder of this 
chapter shall be devoted to the first two contextually pertinent issues.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONS IN NIGERIA
What appeared to be the Nigerian variant of state capitalism, though not peculiar 
to Nigeria in the sub-region, poorly articulated and badly implemented as it were, 
accorded a dual role to the state sector: as an agent of direct accumulation and growth in 
the strategic or dynamic areas of the economy, and as a source of patronage 
encouragement for the indigenous private sector (Sayre Schatz (1997). State enterprises
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and government regulation were intended to substitute for the vacuum in the indigenous 
private sector, and to promote the activities of domestic business. State policies had the 
objective of promoting both capital formation and class formation (Bratton, 1982). 
Consequently, public enterprises in Nigeria emerged as agents of state capital, and 
simultaneously as a central support for domestic private capital.
As instruments of state capital, public enterprises were ostensibly intended to 
increase state participation and possible control over the economy and to generate 
economic activity by the development of basic infrastructure, heavy industry and 
agricultural modernization. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector was nominally 
charged with economic self-sufficiency, if not outright profitability, so as to provide an 
adjunct to the central source of state finance; the rents from petroleum exports. Moreover, 
the development of the “commanding heights” was expected to generate a diversified and 
integrated industrial economy. Apart from creating the enabling environment for foreign 
investment and industry, the belief was that it would further broaden the revenue base for 
the state. Unfortunately, the illicit diversion of resources from a burgeoning state sector 
contributed to the development of a private property base among the ruling class: the 
military and other state elites.
The indigenous business class held an important role in this process. Although 
weak and fragmented, and regarded with considerable ambivalence by an interventionist 
state, local business interests nonetheless profited from state sponsored indigenization 
exercises, and they were intended to play a critical role in the economic growth generated 
by state investment in basic industries (Thomas Biersteker, 1987). Indeed Biersteker 
(1987) and Ugorji (1995) believe that the establishment of the Nigeria National
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Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was designed to give Nigeria control of the vital 
petroleum sector. Biersteker (1987) also contends that, as a result of the Nigeria 
Enterprises Promotion decree, the pubic sector began to play an increasingly dominant 
role in the economy. The result of course was that by the 1980s, there were 70 non­
commercial and 110 federal enterprise and parastatals in the nation (Robert Dibie, 2000, 
16).
Moreover, the private sector provided contractors, suppliers and distributors for 
state projects and businesses. Indeed extensive and generous subsidies were conferred to 
the private sector by public ventures in infrastructure, utilities, finance, industrial impute 
and economic services. Patronage, corruption and the abundant rent-seeking 
opportunities generated by the state economic intervention provided a bounteous 
environment for the accumulation of wealth within the private sector. State sector 
expansion, both formally and informally, provided copious resources to an incipient 
Nigerian business class, although it did little to engender productive accumulation among 
this stratum.
Organized private sector interests have not significantly challenged state sector 
expansion, and indigenous business elites have evinced an essential reliance on state 
protection, subsidies and transfers. The ineffectual character of Nigeria’s dirigiste 
strategy, while impeding growth and accumulation generally, has nonetheless included 
domestic business as clients and beneficiaries. Indeed, UgorjiE. (1995, 537-560), 
believes that in Nigeria private sector profits are not always the result of efficient 
operation and increased productivity, rather often represent money that private 
contractors make through inflated contracts, patronage and corruption. As a
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consequence, a broad domestic coalition, drawn from both the public and the private 
sectors, has acquired a fundamental state in state-led capitalist development. Adjustment 
and reform efforts must confront a wide range of resistance, both tacit and overt, within 
the state and the private sector.
The historical symbioses of state and indigenous capital have altered in recent 
years as a combination of events and circumstances have compelled change in the status 
quo ante. One was the insistence of the Bretton Woods institutions and other lending 
agencies on privatization as a precondition for loans and/or debt rescheduling or debt 
relief. The other was, and perhaps less of a compelling influence, influential circles 
within the private sector who were becoming increasingly critical of state economic 
intervention and the poor performance of the state sector. Private sector groups, and 
technocratic elements within the government advocated limitations and changes in the 
state’s economic role. The latter half of the 1980s witnessed the advent of direct, if 
tentative, contention between the government and the organized private sector over the 
scope and purpose of state economic activity. Much of this contention has focused on the 
formulation and implementation of privatization policy and attendant liberalization 
measures.
Sponsored by the World Bank and IMF, the introduction in 1986 of the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) was designed to create an appropriate policy environment 
that would promote growth and market conditions. As part of its process implementation, 
the program called for privatization and commercialization of various entities in the 
public sector. It was an exercise conceived as a process for reshaping and redefining the 
public sector, with a view to creating an enabling market environment. The truth of the
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matter is that between 1986 and 1994 reform efforts were unprecedented in their scope 
and diversity, even though they did not fundamentally reorder public-private sector 
relations, neither did they substantially modify the structure and performance of the state 
enterprise sector. The contentions have been that privatization became an increasingly 
state-led process. And that the private sector interest generally supported the state’s 
policy initiatives; but that business community did not offer encouragement for 
government action (Egonmwan, J. 1993; Uchendu, O., 1993; Edoho, F., 1997; Dibie, R. 
1999).
THE NIGERIAN STATE AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
Evaluating the developmental role of the Nigeria state, one cannot help but be 
absolutely flabbergasted by the gap between formal responsibilities and actual capacities. 
Successive (military) governments in Nigeria have managed increasing domestic 
resources, a dramatically growing economy and an expanding administrative grid. The 
scope of governmental authority, and the role assumed by the state, has also burgeoned. 
Yet the ability of the state to effectively manage its resources, to plan for long-term 
development or to ensure compliance with its directives, has progressively declined. As a 
matter of fact, state power has lagged behind the expansion of nominal authority. Indeed 
it is Richard Joseph’s (1983, 22) observation that the Nigeria state is simultaneously 
“overdeveloped” and “underdeveloped”, that is to say, expansive, yet weak. Also in his 
work on “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh”, Hamza Alavi 
(1972, 59-82) tried to elaborate on the notion of “overdeveloped” state as an extensive 
administrative/coercive apparatus divorced from, and disproportionate to, its social base.
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The dilemmas of state structure and capacity are rooted in the historical process of 
state formation in Nigeria. The Nigeria state was created under circumstances leaving 
little elite cohesion, few mature institutions and tenuous popular legitimacy (Richard 
Akinjide, Vanguard, July 9, 2000). The state apparatus has been plagued with 
fragmentation and instability. Communal divisions structure Nigeria politics, and diverse 
social cleavages suffuse state institutions. Experiences with civilian administrations 
(which have been few, two in fact) and military administrations (which have been many, 
seven in fact) have all failed to build non-tribal based political organizations, or to foster 
adherence to nationalistic identities and ideologies. Moreover, state elites have not 
effected durable consociational accommodation, or corporatist subordination of social 
groups (Richard Joseph, 1987).
Nigeria’s governing elites and institutions have reflected perduring dilemmas of 
factionalism, insecurity and comparative weakness. The state possesses minimal internal 
cohesion and a highly contingent authority over civil society; such authority may be said 
to have eroded in recent years during periods of political and economic crisis. Ruling 
strategies have placed emphasis on patronage and material inducement as a cohering 
element in the Nigerian polity, yielding a precarious basis of domination in the context of 
fiscal instability. The persistent generalized struggles over the control of state instruments 
and the disposition of public resources have been consequential for the pattern of 
economic policy, as well as the fortunes of state formation.
Four aspects of state performance and structure have been especially 
consequential for Nigerian economic development: first is the problematic nature of state 
autonomy in Nigeria; second, the instrumental character of state legitimacy and strategies
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of compliance; third, the deficiencies of administrative development and technocratic 
leadership; and fourth, the weakness of the state’s extractive and allocative mechanisms.
The Nigerian state has embodied the basic and enduring paradox of substantial 
autonomy and great permeability vis-a-vis societal interests. Although state elites have 
experienced wide discretion in formulating pubic policy, societal pressures and elite 
factionalism have constrained state prerogatives in pursuit of a sustained strategy of 
economic development. Relative state autonomy derives from a variety of factors: the 
independent fiscal bases of the state in external trade and foreign sector of the economy; 
the prerogative of military rule; the expanded administrative and economic roles of state 
institutions; and the weak bases of social cohesion and political organization among 
potential class strata. Unhindered by democratic organization or concerted pressures from 
below, Nigerian governments, especially the military, exhibit considerable latitude 
regarding the disposition of particular group interests.
At the same time, state elites and state organizations have been highly susceptible 
to multiple, immediate and particularistic demands on policy and resources (Richard 
Joseph, 1983, 21-28). State autonomy has been compromised by the tenuous nature of 
popular legitimacy and regime stability; the fractional character of military rule and the 
intense competition of civilian politics; the weak basis of state institutions for obtaining 
compliance; the interpenetration of “state” and “societal” interests; and the enduring 
identities of ethnicities and kinship within and between state personnel and the wider 
society.
The dilemma of state legitimacy in Nigeria constitutes a distinct, yet related 
problem of state efficacy. Lacking, as it were, a strong normative basis for compliance
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and cohesion, the Nigeria state has been heavily patrimonial, and clientalist relations with 
societal interests have provided the framework for political domination (C.S. Whitaker, 
1984; Thomas Callaghy, 1980; Zaki Ergas, 1987). The instrumental nature of the 
patrimonial governance has yielded an arbitrary and profligate use of resource. The 
decentralization of patrimonial rule weakens state cohesion. Moreover, instrumental 
inducements exist as both cause and effect: the persistence of patrimonialism serves as an 
impediment to the emergence of other forms of legitimacy (Otwin Marenin, 1987).
Administrative and managerial capabilities with the public sector have remained 
extremely weak. Nigeria has consistently lacked a substantial cadre of public sector 
technocrats to provide reliable, competent, politically neutral economic management, and 
an effective bureaucracy to execute policy directives. The Nigerian bureaucracy has been 
unable to provide routine, comprehensive or effective administration. The legal and 
regulatory machinery, and the key elements of the economic bureaucracy, has not 
effected stable and coordinated tutelage. The operations of the significant components of 
a functional government— customs, the Central Bank, the Judiciary, Licensing and other 
regulatory authorities, ministerial offices and pubic enterprises — are irregular, 
capricious and typically venal. These circumstances are especially consequential in the 
light of the vastly expanded jurisdiction of such agencies and institutions.
The rather arbitrary character of bureaucratic performance poses a fundamental 
constraint to state-led accumulation. These conditions, no doubt, impede the effective 
operations of state economic organizations, and they foster a milieu of conservatism and 
erasion among private economic actors. According to Richard Sandbrook (1985, 38) 
uncertainty and bureaucratic intrusion discourage savings, domestic investment,
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economic risks or long-term ventures. Economic actors seek to maximize liquidity, to 
expatriate their gains, and to avoid government regulation wherever possible. Indeed 
there is the constant struggle amongst the participating actors on whether to “voice,” 
“avoid”, “evade” or “exit” (Albert Hirschman, 1970;). And evasion or “exit” is an 
important part of the equation with the Nigerian entrepreneurs as they grapple with the 
dilemma of compliance with relevant laws and other regulatory provisions. The situation 
is further complicated by the fact that the state institutions lack both the capacity and 
authority to induce new orientation and compliance; and are also unable to intervene to 
correct distortions and gaps in the private sector.
Furthermore, the Nigerian state has reflected relatively weak extractive and 
allocative capabilities. The difficulty of retaining and channeling state resources has 
entailed major consequences for both state and private accumulation. The state manages 
the process of accumulation through direct capital formation, production, financial 
intermediation, investment and regulation. The rentier character of the Nigerian state has 
centralized the mechanisms of extraction and allocation, but the structural weaknesses in 
the state and the nature of state-society linkages have impaired the government’s ability 
to retain and channel the revenue under its control.
Nigeria has been described as a “high absorber” of petroleum revenues, relative to 
Middle Eastern States, which rapidly recycle their rents through capital export (Michael 
Watts, 1984; 403-410). This rather apt description of Nigeria reflects the fact that the 
country seems to completely channel oil revenues into government spending and the 
domestic private economy. It is also the contention that the Nigerian economy has 
reflected a shallow and grossly inefficient absorptive capacity, as evidenced in the poor
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returns on public expenditure, mounting public sector debt, declining domestic 
performance, low growth rates and the corrupt expatriation of billions (Schatrz, 1984, 47; 
Peter Olayiwola, 1987, 139). Resources have not been rationally or consistently allocated 
by the state, neither have they been channeled through productive or market structures 
capable of utilizing them efficiently.
Government capacities for aggregating and responding to societal interests, 
drafting and implementing fiscal programs, and indeed ensuring financial discipline have 
in fact been eroded by the multifarious claims on the state resources. Essentially, diverse 
interests consequently impacting on the actual extractive capacity of government are 
constantly draining the state and the economy. This structural conundrum is reflected in 
the government’s persistent failure to draft realistic plans, to enforce plan expenditures, 
supervise major capital projects, manage public sector expansion, and elicit desired 
policy responses from the private sector (Olatunde Ojo, 1985, 141-172; T.M. Yusufu 
1996, 381-388; S. Tomori and F.O. Fajana, 1979, 141-144).
THE STATE AND ECONOMIC POLICY
State weakness is also manifestly obvious in the policy environment. Nigerian 
governments have generally been incapable of framing and sustaining a coordinated 
package of economic policies to facilitate economic diversification and capital formation. 
This is a problem traceable to a variety of factors, including political instability, dearth of 
professional cadre, the low implementation capacities of state institutions and unstable 
fiscal conditions. (S. Tomori and F.O. Fajana, 1979). The advent of oil wealth provided a
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fiscal safety valve to state planners, essentially reducing incentives for effective policies 
of growth and diversification (E.O. Akeredolu-Ale, 1974, 71).
It is noteworthy that Nigerian governments have subscribed to a fairly consistent 
set of policy goals since independence (Yusufu, 1996; Adebayo Adedeji, 1971, 101). 
Indeed moving from the specific to the general, and approximately from earlier to later 
objectives, they are growth; import substitutions; redistribution, which is often stated in 
socio-economic terms, but substantially treated in geographic and communal terms; 
balance growth, both sectoral and geographic; and during the past twenty years, an 
increased emphasis on national sovereignty and control (Wolfgang Stolper, 1966, 52; 
Peter Kilby, 1969, 23-24; Henry Bienen, 1981, 140; Second National Development Plan, 
1970 - 74, 32-33; Third National Development Plan 1975-80, 29 - 30). Nationalism has 
been a potent ideological force in Nigeria, but socialism has existed as little more than 
rhetorical flourish (Blunt, 1977, 74). Socialist ideology and prescriptions have not held a 
significant place in federal policies, although populist programs have occasionally been 
pursued in particular regions or states (especially during military administrations because 
of the unitary, hierarchical structure of military governments). The continuity of broad 
objectives in Nigeria’s development strategy is contrasted by the erratic and contradictory 
nature of specific policies.
Nigeria economic policies have been marked by improvisation and inconsistency. 
This is partly attributable to the vagaries of state revenues and partly attributable to 
political factors (Schatz, 1981, 35-40; Ojo, 1985, 145-147). The recurrence of regime 
change and factional contention create a political environment prompting leaders to 
emphasize short time horizons, rapid and often symbolic gains in economic policy.
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Military leaders, while showing greater ability and resolve than civilian administrations at 
resisting special interests pressures, are nonetheless susceptible to diverse social and 
political pressures. Prior to the late 1980s, for example, Nigeria military regimes have 
been unable or unwilling to implement corporatist strategies or politically unpopular 
economic adjustment programs. Civilian rulers and bureaucrats have been guided by 
conditions of uncertainty; considerations of political expediency and anxieties over 
personal tenure typically override the long-term development objectives of state policy.
EVALUATING POLICY OUTCOMES
Processes and procedures, including planning documents, in Nigeria have become 
progressively more detailed and comprehensive, but they have only been loosely 
indicative of actual policies and expenditures (O. Akin-Aina, 1984). Political, 
administrative and fiscal instability have produced frequent and unanticipated shifts in 
Nigerian economic policy. These changes include abrupt alterations in planning and 
budgetary programs, unexpected revisions in public finances, arbitrary modifications and 
reforms of the legal and regulatory framework, and perennial changes in the institutional 
environment. Adjustment to fluctuating revenues has been slow, and state planners have 
not reacted promptly to poor performance or unintended outcomes (Olayiwola, 1987,
139; Watts, 1984, 408; Schatz, 1981, 36-37).
Economic policies have been internally inconsistent as well. The political 
coalition contending over state resources has supported economic policies reflecting a 
consumption bias (encourage trade over production) and urban bias (Willie Okowa, 1985, 
71-88). Over-valued exchange rates, restrictive and vacillating trade policies, and 
government expenditures on imports have fostered the provision of cheap goods to urban
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areas and economic elites, while aggravating intra-urban inequalities, rural- urban 
differentiation, and national dependence on external capital and goods (Bienen, 1981; 
Johnson O. Odufalu, 1981). These broad policy trends contravene both general planning 
goals such as balanced growth, and particular short-term objectives such as agricultural 
revitalization, inter-sectoral linkages or more equitable income distribution.
CONCLUSION
There is also a grave dilemma in economic policy discrepancy between policy 
objectives and implementation capacities. Nigerian governments have repeatedly 
embarked upon ambitious and far-reaching policies without possessing the institutional 
machinery for implementation (Schatz, 1977, 48 - 50; Ojo, 1985, 141-147). This has 
especially been so in the cases of indigenization, the proliferation of public enterprises 
and capital projects during the oil boom and more recently, privatization. Ambitious 
public sector expansion has partially been a product of confidence prompted by growing 
revenues, but the insecurities derived from state weakness have provided a more basic 
motivation for leaders to extend state prerogatives (Callaghy, 1987, 88; Stephen Krasner, 
1985, 11). The self-interest of state elites attempting to maximize their own resources and 
prerogatives has also been a major factor.
These vested-interest concerns, as well as an invertebrate distrust of market 
mechanisms in a dependent economy, have induced many administrations to emphasize 
physical controls on trade and foreign exchange over market instruments; fiscal over 
monetary controls, direct intervention rather than indirect regulation or price incentives 
(Michael Watts, 1984, 405; Robert Bates, 1981, 113-114). The drive for greater authority
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and control has paradoxically weakened the effectiveness of state policies and capacity 
for implementation.
Explaining public sector programs have been delegated to a state apparatus 
possessing inadequate executive capacity, and resources have been channeled through an 
economic infrastructure lacking the markets, institutions or physical plant to absorb them 
(Edwin Dean, 1972, 151-153; Schatz, 1977, 47-55). Fiscal instability has hampered the 
state’s capacity to see through expenditure programs in a consistent fashion. Precipitous 
increases in the demands on public institutions have frequently overwhelmed 
bureaucratic faculties, leading to haphazard and incomplete implementation of major 
programs 4 (Stephen A. Quick, 1980). The resultant dispersal of authority and resources 
further weakens state capacity to effect economic change.
Instability and incongruity in the policy environment compound the uncertainties 
of capricious administrative performance. These pervasive alterations in the economic 
landscape reinforce the aversion of private sector interests to substantial, enduring 
commitments to investment and production. The sense of insecurity faced by economic 
actors has encouraged, if not necessitated, behaviour detrimental to the process of 
accumulation and investment. Moreover, elements of state structure and elite 
composition have engendered patterns of public policy inimical to a productive 
transformation.
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ENDNOTES
1. See Peter B. Evans, (1990), “Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses:
A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State”, 
Department of Sociology, University of New Mexico, Working Paper No 11, 
1990. It should be noted that such “project” is also associated with countries 
other than NIEs, and that the existence of an identifiable productionist strategy 
does not guarantee the dramatic rates of growth and structural change that have 
occurred in more successful models. The examples of Egypt and Turkey help 
illustrate this point.
2. Following the independence constitution in 1960, Nigeria has had five other 
constitutions in 1963 (Republican); 1979 (General Obasanjo) 1991 (General 
Babanginda); 1998 (General Abacha); and 1999 (General Abdulsalami) It has also 
implemented various national development plans (NDP) First NDP (1962-1968); 
Second NDP (1970-74); Third NDP (1975-80); Fourth ND) (1981-85); and The 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) Years; Post- 1985.
3. There appears to be agreement that Peru (after 1968), Brazil (after 1964) and 
Mexico represent classic examples of the strategy. E.V.K. FitzGerald apparently 
regards South Korea as a model as well; See his article: “State Capitalism in Peru: 
A Model of Economic Development and its Limitations”, P 68. Waterbury, op. 
Cit., makes an argument for its applicability to Egypt (after 1957), even as he
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raises the issue of definitional precision. However, the term seems to have 
acquired expansive accommodatibity. Petras includes Libya, Algeria, Ethiopia 
and Venezuela in the state capitalist fold, a breadth of coverage, which seems 
somewhat indiscriminate. Sayre Schatz, in Nigeria Capitalism, makes passing 
mention of “state capitalist tendencies” in Nigeria development strategy during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. Richard Sandbrook observes, “In Africa, the 
typically large dimensions of the public sector suggest that the prevalent approach 
is best described as state capitalism” Sandbrook (1985), “The Politics of Africa’s 
Economic Stagnation”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 10 and 33.
4. In his “The Paradox of Popularity: ‘Ideological’ Program Implementation in 
Zambia”, Quick details how at the intersection of political urgency and 
bureaucratic weakness dilemmas for implementation are created.
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CHAPTER SIX
MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1966-1975
(UNDER GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON)
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the apparent, consecutive military government’s consensus on 
national economic and market development policy thrust, it is necessary to indulge an 
evaluative assessment of the different regimes in order to determine both consistency in 
the professed policy thrusts and goal attainment; and hopefully, to glimpse from these 
any commonalities. In the light of the above, it is not therefore unnatural to commence 
our examination with the Federal Military Government (FMG) of General Gowon 
(significant first in the line of successive military governments stretching about three 
decades).1 His government was one of peculiar origin and circumstances. It wa under his 
administration that the initial explosion in oil revenue and public expenditure ocurred. 
The social, political and economic ramifications of which essentially dictated what 
apparently became a recurring pattern in the development history of the country.
EMERGENCE OF THE GOWON ADMINISTRATION
By late 1965, Nigeria’s social and political system was at breaking points. Ethnic 
and regional conflicts, which had been growing over the years due to communal and 
distributive tensions, came to a head in the coup d’etat of January 15, 1966. Although 
unsuccessful, in the sense that it failed to install the coup leadership of Major Chukwuma 
Nzeogwu (the leader of the putsch), it still brought about a military change of 
government under the leadership of Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunakwe Aguiyi-
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Ironsi. The comments of the coup leader (Major Nzeogwu) in his maiden speech reflects 
the prevailing national sentiment at the time:
“Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high 
places who seek bribes and demand 10 percent; who seek to keep the 
country divided so that they can remain in office; the tribalists, the 
nepotists, who make the country look big for nothing, who have 
corrupted our society and put the Nigeria political calendar back 
by their words and deeds” (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 35).
The new military government which emerged may be characterized as a default 
regime, on account of its non-original coup initiation and participation, was headed by 
the most senior military officer, himself an Igbo. An occurrence which, although may 
have heightened ethnic tensions between the regions, did not in any way diminish the 
enduring perception that the sacked politicians were a bunch of corrupt, fraudulent and 
authoritarian leaders (Robin Luckham, 1971, 39-41). In May of 1966, General Ironsi’s 
government decreed the abolition of the regions and the promulgation of a decree 
establishing a unitary state and the unification of the country’s civil services, which was 
until then regionalized. In the meantime, his administration had established various 
tribunals of inquiry to look into questions of corruption within the public sector. 
According to some opinions, the circumstances of the coup, the way and manner it was 
executed, the composition of the original coup plotters, and the military leadership that 
inherited government, plus the abolition of the region, as a constituent federal structure 2 
raised fears of ethic and tribal domination by the Igbos, in an already extremely volatile 
political environment, edging toward inevitable catastrophy (Claude Ake, 1985, 10,14; 
Bevan, Collier, Gunning, 1999, 36). In retaliation of the perceived discriminatory killings 
during the coup attempt, and the seeming imposition of Igbo military leadership, many 
Igbos were killed in the North.
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The pervading level of ethnic mistrust would lead to the counter-coup d’etat of 
July 29, 1966 in which a group of northern soldiers assassinated General Aguiyi-Ironsi 
while on official visit to Western Nigeria (Rinehart 1982, 54). Also assassinated in that 
putsch was a host of other Igbo military officers, essentially dislodging the traditional 
structure and discipline within the army. The Chief of Staff (traditionally the second in 
command and the rightful successor to the leadership), who was Yoruba, Brigadier 
Sampson Ogundipe felt intimidated, marginalized and unable to restore order, he 
promptly left the country and allegedly resigned his commission. The Northern military 
officers, who spearheaded the coup, installed Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon as the new head of 
State on August 1,1966.
The Military Governor of Eastern.Nigeria, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu 
Ojukwu (as he then was) refused to recognize the authority and leadership of Lt. Col. 
Gowon (as he then was), giving the circumstances and “irregularities” of his ascension. 
This lingering leadership dispute was compounded by a subsequent massacre of Igbos in 
the North and which led to widespread call by the Igbos for secession of the East from 
the rest of the country. The East declared an independent Republic of Biafra on May 30, 
1967, citing as part of the reasons, the inability of the Federal government to protect the 
lives and properties of Easterners; and also of culpability in the genocide (Rinehart, 1982, 
56; Pedler, 1979, 223-225). The civil war, which ensured did not fully commence until 
July 1967. It lasted for thirty months, ending in January 1970.
In the circumstances, General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s military government was not only 
short-lived, it was also not significantly eventful both in political and economic policy 
initiatives.
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MANAGING THE WAR ECONOMY
Managing the war economy was significant both in its policy implications and the 
dynamisms of its prosecution. Its military, political, economic and international 
ramifications were huge. One of those critical implications was that the war called for a 
delicate revenue management prioritization, in view of resource flow limitations imposed 
by the enclave now called “Biafra”. In reaction, and preparatory to formal secession, the 
Eastern Region, when it refused to recognize the authority of the Federal government 
under Lt. Col. Gowon, took a number of steps. It promptly appropriated all locally 
derived revenues, attempted to employ the Regional Marketing Board for direct external 
trade, as well as seizing control of major public enterprises located in the Eastern region 
(S.K. Panter-Brick, 1970, 48-49). Because of their location (in the East and Mid-West), 
petroleum activities were curtailed through much of 1967 and 1968. Also affected were 
palm produce and food crops production and the region’s share of industrial output which 
accounted for as much as 25 per cent of the nation’s total output (Tims, 1974, 24). No 
less affected were aid and foreign investment, especially because of the availability of 
petroleum (a major foreign investment attraction) in the conflict zone.
For the Federal government, even more so for the “Biafran” enclave, the choices 
and challenges were as critical as they were inevitably inhibiting: curtailing domestic 
consumption and creating new sources of public revenue to augment shortfall from 
foreign sources, conserving scarce foreign exchange and augmenting or sustaining 
domestic production. According to some opinions, these goals were reasonably 
accomplished through a combination of policy initiatives: taxation, fiscal reform, control 
on foreign exchange, trade and investment (Fajana, 1979, 245).
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That the FMG did not recourse to external borrowing to finance the war 
demonstrated both increased domestic revenue generation and superb practical initiative. 
Indeed, an elaborate system of trade restrictions was substantially enforced, while 
licensing was augmented by blanket ban on luxury items. Domestic manufacturing 
compensated through the addition of second and third shifts, bringing capacity utilization 
close to 100 per cent in the Federal areas (Second NDP, 1970, 24). The foreign sector 
was squeezed through increases in company income tax, deferrals of profit repatriation, 
and greater exactions on the petroleum sector (Tims, 1974, 24).
It should be noted however that during the war, defense expenditure increased 
more than ten-fold, as public spending in other areas declined. Expenditures on defense, 
which accounted for only 11.3 per cent and 16.2 per cent of total current and capital 
expenditures in 1965, accounted for 50.5 per cent and 65.6 per cent, respectively, in 
1971. Conversely, current and capital expenditures for economic services declined from 
11.6 per cent and 55.8 per cent to 2.7 per cent and 19.7 per cent, respectively, over the 
same period (Nafziger, 1983, 127-137).
It could be said that at the end of the war in 1970, the economy was not, contrary 
to general expectation, bartered by the experience. If anything, it was a fairly resilient 
economy, with scarcely a 10 per cent increase in its external public debt (Tims, 1974). 
Although agriculture did not perform as impressively, by 1969 manufacturing production 
and foreign investment had shown great improvements.
Following the end of the war, the FMG under Gowon, either by accident or design 
created a coterie of senior civil servants who came to be known as super-permanent 
secretaries.3 According to some opinions, they wielded ultimate power when it came to
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issues of economic policy (Peter Koehn, 1983; Ayida, 1987, 252). The dominant role 
played by these “super permsecs” in the Ibadan Conference on Reconstruction and 
Development4 in formulating a post-war economic agenda for the country under the 
Gowon regime was as revealing as it was cautionary. Their influence was enormous both 
in its bearing on the formulation and implementation of Second National Development 
Plan and the policy thrust articulated for the country by this clique under the military 
administration of Gowon. According to Ayida in his keynote speech during one of those 
exercises:
“.. .it appears unnecessary for Nigeria to choose between private capitalism and 
public ownership of all means of production and exchange. What is missing in Nigeria 
today is an outward looking economic nationalism which alone will guarantee the 
general well-being of the people and generate in all sections of the country collective 
self-reliance and the will to develop. What is needed is an economic arrangement which 
will reward skill and enterprise in both public and private enterprise and inculcate in the 
people a development consciousness...” (Ayida and Onitiri, 1971, 8).
Whether or not this policy thrust, which obviously marked a departure from the 
civilian administration of Tafawa Balewa, was the most viable at the critical time is still 
debatable. However, it was significant for its structure formulation and process 
implementation, under a centralized hierarchical (unitary) military administration, 
weakened or non-existent competing regional structures or institutions and most 
importantly, a revenue allocation structure, which vested too much power and resources 
on the FMG. Because this new arrangement essentially centralized policy and economic 
management in the hands of the all-powerful “super permsecs”, there was the tendency 
on their part to effectively exclude the kind of participatory exercises, which enhances 
both the formulative and deliberative process of policy making. The result was policies
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that were very metropolitan in thrust and focus and could have used more “grassroots”
“rural” leadership input. Again Ayida puts in perspective the groupthink and mindset that
informed these super-permsec-engineered processes:
“Those who would like to involve the representatives of the people and members 
of the political class who are not in office, in the planning process, should 
recognize the limitations of representative institutions in the formulation and 
maintenance of the Plan objectives. It is the executive, made up of Ministers, 
planners, administrators and other public officials, who are in a position to 
determine and maintain the objectives and targets of development policy” (1971, 7).
As implementation outcomes during the period and subsequent plan periods 
show, these formulation and implementation process could not have been more 
misguided in their rudimentary ambience.
MARKET/ECONOMIC POLICY INITIATIVES UNDER THE SECOND 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Immediately following the end of the civil war in 1970, and the putative 
implementation of the three Rs (Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction), the 
Gowon administration, just about in the same breathe, announced a nine-point 
programme intended to prepare the country, and perhaps political participants “with a full 
sense of responsibility”, before returning the country to civil rule. The main thrusts of the 
programme are:
The reorganization of the armed forces;
The full implementation of the National Development Plan;
Eradication of corruption in the national life;
Resolution of the issue of the creation of more states;
The preparation and adoption of a new federal constitution;
The introduction of a new and equitable formulae for revenue allocation;
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Conducting a national and more accurate census;
Organization of “genuinely national” parties; and
The organization of elections and installing popularly elected governments in all the
states and at the center (Kirk -  Greene and Rimmer, 1981,4; Joseph O. Irukwu, 1983,
186).
In proper perspective this nine-point plan line of action was supposed to address 
all the immediately pressing and prospective problems of the country, and to put it on 
proper footing, and hopefully address the kinds of problems that bedeviled the erstwhile 
civilian administration. It also demonstrated the focal emphasis of the administration in 
realizing policy goals. It was hoped that by the target date of handing over to a 
democratically elected government, which was stated to be 1976, all of the items in the 
plan programme would have been realized. As it turned out, this promised date of return 
to civilian rule, like those of Generals Babangida and Abacha, would characteristically be 
unrealistic. In his independence broadcast to the nation in October 1, 1974, Gowon 
declared:
“Our own assessment of the situation as of now is that it will be utterly 
irresponsible to leave the nation in the lurch by a precipitate withdrawal 
which will certainly throw the nation back into confusion. Therefore, the 
Supreme Military Council, after careful deliberation and full consultation 
with the hierarchy of the armed forces and police have decided that the 
target date of 1976 is in the circumstances unrealistic and that it would 
indeed amount to a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to that target date”
(Kirk-Green and Rimmer, 1981, 7).
It appears obvious that the FMG had a consistently inconsistent projection and 
time frame to its planned programme and the time frame for completion. It would also 
seem that the FMG had also hoped that the Second Development Plan (2nd NDP) which 
got under way in October, 1970 would not only seek to reconstruct facilities damaged
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during the civil war, but that it would also redress some of the regional and party- 
affiliation based neglects of the pre-war era, in time for return to civil rule. The Plan 
clearly stated:
“What Nigeria lacked most in the past has been the national sense of 
purpose, particularly in economic matters. The Federal Government 
will therefore, occupy the commanding heights in the quest for 
purposeful national development and provide the leadership and honest 
administration necessary for the attainment of a national sense of purpose.
Government intervention in economic matters designed primarily to protect 
and promote the public interest, is, therefore, fully justified” (2nd NDP, 32).
Although the Plan’s focus was on growth and government’s active participation in
that process, the scope seems to be all encompassing and perhaps an acknowledgement of
deficiencies in functional supervision and control:
“Experience through history has shown that a Government cannot 
plan effectively what it does not control. The widespread frustration 
of planning in contemporary Africa has also demonstrated the futility 
of partial planning that is restricted to public sector programmes, 
especially when the typical African public sector is an inferior partner 
in a game dictated by the global strategy of modem international countries.
If Nigeria is, therefore to be really serious about planned development, 
its essential that she should play a dominant role in the public sector...
During the Plan period, Government will, therefore seek to regulate 
the use of those resources for the benefit of the community at large 
as well as to control the essential and growth-sensitive sectors of the 
country in the fields of commerce, industry, fuel and energy, construction, 
transport, finance and education” (2nd NDP, 33-34).
This Plan which provided what might be described as the first conscious military 
leadership definition or statement on self-reliance as a component and deliberate process 
of development, went on to insist that the country will accelerate its pace of development 
“through the use of her own resources instead of relying unduly on external Aid” (2nd 
NDP, 33). This seeming definitive and absolute expression in self-reliance finds 
contradictions both in the contextual expression in the Plan and what Callaghy 5 
characterized as “neo-mercantilism” — the use of a politically- regulated economy to 
engender elite consolidation and state power (Callaghy, 1984, 60; Olatunde Ojo, 1985,
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141; Mark Anikpo, 1985, 49-50). The Plan’s stated national objectives, inter alia, was the 
establishment of Nigeria as:
(a) a united, strong and self-reliant nation;
(b) a great and dynamic economy;
(c) a just and egalitarian society;
(d) a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and
(e) a free and democratic society (2nd NDP, 32).
In what obviously seems a deliberate effort at firing the imagination of the nation at all 
times, the Plan’s statement went further:
“.. .Nigeria is no longer a mere ‘geographical expression’. She has indeed 
emerged from the war as a united country... the defense and security of the 
state must be geared to the objective of national unity and the evolution of a 
well-integrated national community.. .In the context of modem power 
relations in the world and especially of the international threats facing the 
African peoples, Nigeria cannot be truly strong and united without a prosperous 
economic base. Material power exerts a disproportionate influence on international 
morality. Nigeria will, therefore, pursue relentlessly the task of development to 
make the national economy strong, dynamic and responsive to the challenge of world 
competition.. .the uncompromising objective of raising economic prosperity in Nigeria 
is the economic independence of the nation and the defeat of neo-colonialist forces in 
Africa” (2nd NDP, 31-31).
Evaluatively while the First Plan could be characterized as pragmatic economic 
orthodoxy, the Second Plan was more proactive, forward-looking and perhaps more 
nationalistic in outlook. Government was not merely going to play the “catalyst” role in 
economic and market development. Due to new impetus it would intervene directly 
intervene when and where necessary. It could be surmised that two significant factors 
made this new thrust feasible and realizable. One, was increased oil revenue which had 
greatly removed the hitherto resource constraints on government’s action; and two, the 
military governments’ action, unrestrained and unchallenged by a non-existent or weak 
opposition, which essentially allowed it to freely dictate its own policies and directions.
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Indeed by the end of the Plan period, government resources were abundant and the drive 
toward the transition to state capitalism was tremendous, with very significant 
consequences (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, 1981, 12-13; Legum, 1975, B750; 1977, B683). 
According to Yusufu “...it was a period of post-war reconstruction, and coincided with 
the emergence of the early fortunes of crude oil production and sale. It was the period 
when the Government gleefully announced that money was not Nigeria’s problem, but 
how to spend it” (1996).
In evaluating the development experience of the country during the preceding 
period, the Plan noted the predominance of private sector investment and capital 
formation in most essential areas of the economy. And although the 1962-1968 Plan had 
projected a public/private sector investment ratio of 2/1, actual proportions were closer to 
40/60. The Second Plan nonetheless envisioned a public/private sector investment ratio of 
55/45 (2nd NDP, 274-275). Foreign aid and investment would constitute about 20 per cent 
of public resources during the Plan period, which was indeed a significant reduction from 
50 per cent projected in the first plan, even though only 25 per cent was realized.
Procedurally State direct intervention was to be exercised through direct 
participation and through the indigenization of equity and management in the 
“commanding heights” of the economic sectors. As in the preceding Plan period, 
government played a dominant role in transport, communications and power. The 
government designated a minimum 55 per cent public share in iron and steel, 
petrochemicals, fertilizer and petroleum refining, and specified projects in each of these 
areas. In addition, a wide range of agro-industries, manufacturing ventures and services 
were to accommodate a 35 per cent public or private Nigerian share. The government
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reiterated its intention to employ industrial incentive legislation to induce further external 
investment.
The range and scale of new projects that were expanded included the 
sugar, palm processing, pulp and paper, fishing and canning, salt and passenger car 
assembly (2nd NDP, 148-150). While Federal activities targeted the development of 
intermediate and capital goods, the states (twelve in number during the relevant period), 
as numerous and seemingly uncoordinated as their projects and investments were, 
concentrated on consumer goods. Public industrial policy was to be directed toward 
insuring balanced growth among the constituent parts of the federation, as well as among 
different sectors. The distributive goals of state policy were elaborated through specific 
instruments and resources. The agricultural sector was dominated by smallholder 
production, and government’s share of total investment and output were limited. State- 
level programmes were prevalent in agriculture, health and education.
It is also interesting to note here that the FMG’s articulation of its new role of 
active intervention was also reflected in its sensibilities towards indigenous private and 
foreign capital:
“The view... that the interest acquired by the government should be handed
over to the indigenous businessmen if and when they have the capital and 
business know-how for operating these particular industries. This view flows 
from the narrow conception of the role of Government in national development 
which is not tenable in Nigerian circumstances.. .government as the most important 
single institution for ensuring the translation of growth into development through 
the provision of economic and social services, must have at its disposal resources 
sufficient for achieving these goals of society.. .Government investment activities 
will no longer be limited to public corporations and “dying industries” in which no 
private company can thrive, whilst leaving the virile, expansive and profitable 
industries to private enterprise” (2nd NDP, 289).
Even as government took steps towards promoting Nigerian enterprise, it was emphatic 
on its reassurance of foreign investment that “the government will not embark on
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indiscriminate nationalization”. And in any event, it reassured, appropriate compensation 
would be paid in instances of warranted nationalization. Notwithstanding, the FMG 
noted, “private investors will...continue to be welcome in Nigeria as partners in progress 
led by the public sector” (2nd NDP, 289; John M. Ostheimer, 1973, 151).
Although Scahtz, (1977, 29) is of the opinion that only about two-thirds of the 
nominal targets in the Second Plan were fulfilled by 1974, government was able to 
substantially establish a broad framework of state intervention through the indigenization 
of private equity, the augmentation of legal authority and the creation of new enterprises 
in strategic areas. Along the same lines of new refocus and engagement, development 
banking was expanded and strengthened. Federal and state-level industrial schemes 
proceeded through further planning and in some situations or early implementation 
stages, while a series of large-scale pilot projects were initiated in the agricultural sector. 
In the dynamisms of that dispensation, burgeoning petroleum revenue enabled the 
government to respond to distributive pressures through wage concessions and extension 
of services. It has been observed that government expenditures increased only gradually 
during the early 1970s, as state economic management failed to embody a more rigorous 
approach to planning or project implementation, resulting in public investments not able 
to significantly develop national productive capacities (D. Olu Ajakaiye, 1984, 383).
IMPACT OF OIL BOOM ON MARKET/ECONOMIC POLICY
According to some estimates, between 1972 and 1974, federal government oil 
revenue rose five fold, from N1.9 billion in 1973 to N5.4 billion a year later. Indeed the 
sector constituted 30 per cent of GDP, 80 per cent of government revenue and 95 per cent
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of export earnings (See Table 6.1) The oil boom imposed a series of choices on the 
Gowon’s and other subsequent administrations. The impact of the boom and its policy 
implications were mirrored in the government’s strategy to develop the productive 
capacity and “achieve self-sustaining growth in the shortest possible time” (3rd NDP, 30). 
First, the government had to decide whether to retain the income for its own expenditure 
or to pass it on to the private sector? Second, for the part it retained, it had to choose 
between consumption and saving. And finally, to the extent that it saved, it had a choice 
among assets (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999, 47; World Bank, 1985; Ojo, 1985, 
149). By 1973, federal capital expenditure had changed significantly. Defense and 
administration accounted for 36 per cent of spending. Transport fell from 30 to 24 per 
cent. The largest share was that of federal manufacturing investment from 12 to 27 per 
cent. And the most substantial decline, other than administration and defense, was capital 
expenditure on agriculture, from 7.8 to 4.4 per cent. It is also significant to note that in 
the middle of the Second Plan and “awash” with resources, government evolved a 
completely new focus. The expenditure program was increased and extended until 1975 
to enable the planning apparatus recast and reappraise the impending Third Plan, in the 
light of new resource availabilities.
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Table 6.1
NIGERIA: PETROLEUM STATISTICS, 1958-84
Year
Average Daily 
Production 
(thousand 
barrels)
Annual 
Petroleum 
Revenues 
N million)
As % 
of Export 
Revenues
As %
of Government 
Revenues
1958 5.1 1.8 0.7 —
1959 11.2 5.2 1.6 --
1960 17.4 8.4 2.5 --
1961 46.0 22.6 6.7 --
1962 67.5 33.4 10.5 --
1963 76.5 40.4 10.9 --
1964 120.2 64.0 15.2 --
1965 274.2 136.2 25.9 --
1966 417.6 184.0 33.1 11.1
1967 319.1 142.4 30.6 13.7
1968 141.3 77.7 18.9 7.8
1969 540.3 301.6 45.1 16.6
1970 1,083.1 509.6 58.1 25.9
1971 1,531.2 1,058.0 75.6 52.9
1972 1,815.7 1,176.2 87.2 41.5
1973 2,054.3 1,893.5 88.3 67.3
1974 2,255.0 5,365.7 95.1 80.8
1975 1,783.2 4,565.1 95.2 78.7
1976 2,066.8 6,321.7 95.8 78.5
1977 2,085.1 7,072.8 95.0 70.6
1978 1,897.0 5,401.6 92.9 67.2
1979 2,302.0 10.166.8 93.8 82.6
1980 2,058.0 13.632.3 96.1 83.6
1981 1,439.6 10,680.5 96.9 77.8
1982 1.287.0 8,601.6 98.6 75.3
1983 1,235.5 7,337.4 96.4 69.0
1984 1,388.0 8,840.6 97.2 73.7
Sources: NNPC Research and Intelligence Unit: World Bank
A few new changes were implemented. Revenue allocation formulae, which were
modified, also effected new emphasis for sharing resources among the states, and as part 
of implementing the recommendations of the 1970 Dina Commission, centralized the
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Federal Government’s fiscal authority. The hierarchical, rather centralized structure of 
military administration essentially eroded the independent revenue source for the states, 
as the Federal government commanded a monopoly on royalties on the offshore 
petroleum production. It also effectively impacted revenues from the marketing boards 
and agricultural exports (Pauline H. Baker, 1984, 14; Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, 1981, 
86).
Needless to say, the boom, in emboldening the FMG’s policy reach and 
ambiance, it also had some very significant macro-economic impact on other sectors of 
the economy. For example, petroleum export receipts greatly amplified disequilibrium in 
other sectors, by raising the exchange rate and making it more difficult for other exports 
to compete in the international market (Corden and J. Peter Neary, 1982; Purvis and 
Buiter, 1984; Sweder van Wijnbergen 1984). Most significantly impacted was 
agriculture, which ceased to be a leading sector of the economy, and was replaced by 
mining, which was now contributing a little over one-third of the GDP, over four-fifth of 
government revenue and about 90 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. 
Overall, the preeminence of oil created in the economy the so-called “Dutch Disease” 
phenomenon,6 by effectively transferring income from the traded sector, notably 
agricultural exporters and manufacturers, to non-traded sector—food producers and 
construction and service activities. This shift fosters an appreciation of real exchange 
rate, which in turn reduces competitiveness of non-petroleum exports, as well as 
increases the incentive for importation (Alan Gelb, 1986). It could be argued that the 
country’s experience with regard to the larger policy impact of oil boom reflected some 
of the most onerous pathologies common to large oil exporters, as well as the familiar
222
dilemmas of African development, especially those with capacity (Watts, 1984, 403-410; 
Pinto, 1987; Gelb, 1986;Meier and Steel, 1989)
The “Dutch Disease” phenomenon used to describe the series of economic 
consequences flowing from the Netherlands experience with natural gas windfall, 
characterized the experience of Nigeria. Notably, the sudden inflow of resources from oil 
prompted a precipitous increase in the size and activities of the public sector. Suddenly, 
deriving a disproportionately huge portion of its resources from external rents, the FMG 
directed its expenditure towards ambitious development programs, including the 
expansion of public enterprises and state subsidies. Indeed, Nigeria’s experience with 
changes in fiscal mechanisms, patterns of spending and economic growth were not 
peculiar, they merely reflected the experiences of a group of countries Watts have 
characterized as “high absorbers”, rather than capital exporters (1984, 405). In this 
category belonged countries like Indonesia, Iran, Trinidad and Venezuela. The general 
pattern was that these “oil boom” economies experience rapid, yet unstable growth as 
public and domestic investment become increasingly reliant upon single commodities. 
Growth of the non-oil GDP typically lags, as overvalued exchange rates and imports of 
food and consumer goods dampen incentives for productive investment. These structural 
distortions in the economy are often aggravated by large expenditures on unproductive or 
“prestige” projects, heavy external borrowing, inflation, extensive capital flight and 
diversion toward speculative activities and corruption (Bevan, Collier and Gunning,
1999; S. IbiAjayi, 2000).
It has been suggested that the growth of the oil sector equally impacted the 
agricultural segment by precipitating a decline in that sector (Gelb, 1981; Oyejide, 1987;
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WB/ASR, 1985, 1987) Before this development however, agriculture accounted in 1961 
for 89 per cent of all exports and 66 per cent of total foreign exchange earning. But all 
that changed between 1972 and 1974 when oil revenue rose fivefold to form more than 
80 per cent of total revenue. The neglect of this sector meant a fall in agricultural 
production, both for export market and domestic consumption. This situation was 
especially significant for the domestic food consumption and its implication for a rapidly 
increasing population. The high population growth rate, growing per capita real income 
(on account of high oil exports) and a rapid urbanization (due to rural-neglect-oil-boom- 
induced-urban migration patterns), all contributed to increased food demand. The 
shortfall in domestic production had to be augmented by importation (Olajide, 1983, 9- 
15). In the meantime, industrial sector contribution to the GDP actually declined during 
the same period, falling from 7 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent (See Table 6.2).
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Table 6.2
Sectoral Composition of the Gross Domestic Product (in Percentages)
Mining & Other Wholesale & Transportation 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Industries Retail Trade & Communication
I960 58 4.5 2 12 5
1961 61 5.0 2 11 5
1962 64 5.5 3 11 4
1963 57 5.5 2 12 5
1964 53 6.0 2 12 5
1965 50 6.0 5 12 5
1966 51 6.0 5 12 4
1967 52 7.0 4 12 4
1968 49 7.0 3 12 5
1969 44 7.0 8 12 4
1970 44 7.0 10 12 3
1971 42 6.0 15 11 2
1972 39 7.0 16 10 3
1973 28 4.5 18 20 4
1974 18 3.5 33 16 3
1975 19 5.0 22 20 3
1976 22 5.0 25 20 3
1977 22 5.0 24 21 3
1978 23 5.0 24 20 3
1979 21 5.0 28 21 3
1980 20 5.0 32 20 4
1981 19 5.0 27 22 4
1982 22 5.0 24 21 5
1983 22 4.3 22 22 4
Source: United Nations, National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of main Aggregates (New York: United Nations, 
1979-88).
Completely disregarding the apparent limitations inherent in its one-source 
revenue generating economy, the FMG reacted with massive spending increases, most of 
it investment expenditure. Public sector capital expenditure in 1970 was NG200.5 
million. It had gone up to NG4018 million in 1976. Non-capital expenditure grew from 
NG638 million in 1970 to NG1222 million. These expenditures increased the size and 
role of the public sector. It is also important to note that the annual federal government 
expenditure on administration in 1970 was NG0.46 billion (capital and recurrent), which
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by 1979 had increased to NG1.8 billion. The share of capital expenditure at the federal 
level rose from 24 per cent in 1973 to 52 percent in 1978, reflecting as it were, the FMG 
and civil service’s commitment to growth through huge capital formation (See table 6.3). 
Apparently, the government was less retrospective in its expenditure focus, since the 
widespread view was that as a result of oil money, “foreign exchange is unlikely to 
feature as a major problem” for the rest of the decade (Central Planning Office 1974, 8, 
quoted by Oyejide, 1991; Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1994, 58).
Table 6.3
Distribution of Government Expenditure, 1973 -  78 
(Percent)
Expenditure 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
General public services 20.2 - 15.9 12.8 13.5 11.7
Defense and public order 36.1 - 23.6 18.9 17.9 23.5
Education 5.4 - 15.5 21.0 9.6 4.5
Heal tli 2.6 - 2.2 2.7 2.2 2.5
Other social services 4.8 - 6.2 8.4 6.3 9.2
Economic services 20.0 - 24.2 32.4 45.8 32.3
Other 11.0 “ 12.4 3.8 4.8 16.4
76 0 - 53.8 48.2 57.5 47.9Current expenditure 
Capital expenditure
Total expenditure
24.0
1,165.0
46.2 51.8 42.5 52.1
(Millions of naira) 2,129.9 4,944, 95,4923 7,061.4 5,117.3
-Not available
Source: IMF various years (quoted in Bevan et al, p59)
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According to Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1999, 59), the contest for oil revenue 
was not simply one of public versus private expenditure, even though the existence of a 
large central government magnified the old problem of how to allocate revenues to the 
states. Nonetheless, the FMG succeeded in retaining an increased proportion (65 per cent) 
of public revenue. However, although transfers to the states fell from 42 per cent of 
revenue in 1970 to 23 per cent by 1978, in absolute terms the amount of revenue 
transferred to the states increased massively. Inspite of intensifying the contests among 
them (states) and their military administrators, for share of the distribution, it also 
enabled them to initiate some development programmes of their own. Yet a situation 
where the Federal government virtually became the sole source of development fund for 
the states, smacks of handicapping development initiatives at the “grassroots” state level. 
Indeed according to Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, (1981, table 15), by 1978/1979 less than 3 
per cent of state expenditures were met by state-raised revenue.
Another major area impacted was the manufacturing sector. Between 1966 and 
1968, total manufacturing output had declined by over 10 per cent. Indeed the number of 
manufacturing establishments declined from 776 in 1965 to 540 in 1968 and rising again 
to 704 in 1970 (National Accounts Statistics, 1978-1988; Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 
1968-1974). As part of its post-war economic development, the Gowon administration, 
evolved a series of industrial policies with some of the following objectives:
1. The promotion of even development and the fair distribution of industries 
in all parts of the country;
2. Ensuring a rapid expansion and diversification of the industrial sector of 
the economy;
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3. Promoting the establishment of industries which, cater for overseas market 
in order to earn foreign exchange; and
4. Raising the proportion of indigenous ownership of industrial investment 
(Okey Onyejekwe, 1981, 158).
Although the FMG had managed the re-activation of over 85 per cent of all the 
manufacturing industries damaged during the war, their overall output impact on the 
economy was minuscule, as industrial sector contribution to the GDP actually declined 
during this period, falling from 7 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent (Yusufu, 1996, 272). 
However, the growth rate within the sector was about 10 per cent, between 1970 and 
1975. Indeed the number of manufacturing enterprises rose from 704 to 1246 over the 
same period (Onyejekwe, 1981, 159; Legum, 1975, B750; Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 
1972-1976).
This development did little to stem the rising cost. The government’s ultimate 
imposition of price controls, which were very distortive and did not reflect the true prize 
of the commodities, had some inflationary after-effects, as well as precipitating a drain on 
the country’s foreign exchange reserves. According to Okowa (1985, 79) “...currency 
overvaluation implied a reduction in the domestic currency equivalent of the foreign sales 
receipts of the peasants. On the other hand, domestic importers are subsidized since they 
have to exchange for each unit of foreign currency a reduced amount of domestic 
currency. Even in the era of oil, the maintenance of over-valued currency implies a 
subsidization of importers from oil sales.”
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Table 6.4
IMPORTS OF MAJOR FOOD COMMODITIES 1970 -  84 (1000 MTONS)
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984
Milk 52.8 77.8 67.3 101.3 179 370 273 399
Sugar 90.5 121.4 74.4 164.4 593 712 741 490
Fish 6.6 20.8 14.7 85.5 160 218 218 210
3.1 6.3 11.6 6. 114 223 410 155Oil&Fats
444.6 13764. 41334.0 3520 3250Meat
267 317 454 408 1166 1176 1605 1498Wheat
2 6 5 50 761 400 651 700Rice
Q 2 2 2 97 168 345 100Maize y
Sources: FAO Trade Yearbook - Several years, Federal Office of Statistics: Nigeria Trade Summary, Several 
yearsWorld Bank: Country Report 1982/1985 
1983 FAO Data 
aFOS data in Kg.
The disproportionate emphasis on oil meant declining output in agriculture, 
especially the high value export crops sector. The loss of production and income due to 
taxation effect (implicit and explicit) translated to huge losses in the farmer’s real 
income. This had a grave direct impact on the welfare of the rural dwellers. And this is 
particularly significant since estimates suggest that about 65-70 per cent of the population 
still live in rural areas and over 75 per cent of the labour force is employed in agriculture 
(Yusufu, 1996, 125; Okowa, 1985, 82; Eleanor R. Fapohunda, 1979, 108). Besides, due 
to large-scale food imports, the huge rents from oil seem largely to have benefited urban 
dwellers, whose wage goods were subsidized by the over-valued naira and cheap food 
imports, thus depressing domestic food prices and consequently rural income (See Table 
6.4). The impact of this created a combination of winners and losers:
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-New urban wage earners, who acquired their jobs because of boom-enhanced 
government expenditure gained, because for most of the period urban wages 
(though falling) were higher than rural wages.
-Food producers gained because of rising relative price of food, combined with a 
fairly constant marginal physical product of labour.
-Existing urban wage earners lost because money wages did not keep up with 
rising food prices (which form about half the cost of living).
-Producers of tradable agricultural could have lost heavily because of the drastic 
decline in the relative price of non-oil tradable goods. Their losses were 
mitigated, however, by the ability of labour to exit into more remunerative 
activities, notably urban employment opportunities that were expanded 
throughout the South (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1991, 66).
OIL BOOM AND (PUBLIC) EXPENDITURE
One of the more obvious beneficiaries of the oil boom was the public sector 
labour force. The Public Service Review Commission, inaugurated in 1972 and headed 
by Jerome Udoji, undertook a comprehensive review of standard of service and
ncompensation in the civil service and state enterprises. The Commission recommended a 
phased increase of public sector salaries. However, in what Bevan Collier and Gunning 
(1999, 60) characterized as “bought off the public labour force in the previous week with 
the Udoji pay award, which nearly doubled public salaries”, the FMG disregarded the 
Commision’s recommendations and awarded a single blanket pay rise throughout the 
public sector, calculated retroactively tol974 (Rimmer, 1981, 60-61). Although this
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award augmented the relatively modest award of the Adebo Commission in 1970 and 
1971, it nonetheless fostered a precipitous rise in the public sector wage bill and fueled 
agitation for commensurate increases in the private sector, resulting in the extension to 
cover all formal sector wage earners. (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 199, 60). This 
remuneration windfall provided an additional spur to the growing inflationary trend.
It is important to also mention that the job grading and compensation policies 
outlined by the Udoji Commission were extended only to the major Federal public 
enterprises (parastatals). This measure, along with the reforms implemented after the Ani 
Commission Report, reflected a movement toward increased standardization of the public 
enterprise sector and its harmonization with the civil service. At the same time, the public 
enterprises obtained a nominal decentralization of control through the abolition of the 
Statutory Corporation Standing Tenders Boards. Indeed these institutions were generally 
believed to have been ineffectual at regulating management and were criticized for 
impeding the operations and development of public enterprises (M. Tokunboh, 1979, 38; 
Report, Presidential Commission on Parastatals, 1981, 16).
Another obvious beneficiary of the boom was Education. Indeed, 
expenditure on education was the nearest the FMG came to giving oil revenue back to the 
majority of Nigerian households. By expanding primary education and making it free, 
enrollment increased from 37 per cent in 1970 to 79 percent in 1978. Secondary school 
enrollment increased from 4 to 10 per cent within the same period. Priority was also 
given to higher education, as universities received much capital. Education’s share of 
recurrent expenditure increased from 2 to 17 per cent. According to some opinions,
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(Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999; Caldwell, J.C., 1982), that education was one of the
significant beneficiaries was no accident:
. .First it benefited primarily the politically strong but educationally
backward Northern states. Second, as an investment in Nigeria’s future, 
it suited the development aspirations of the army and the civil service.
Third, although it directly benefited children (a group without influence), 
the family structure in rural Nigeria is such that parents can expect to 
receive remittances from their employed offspring,.. .and because of 
disequilibrium wage premium that persisted during the 1970s, education 
enhanced entry to wage employment. Farm households’ heads could see 
the expansion of education as a welcome, state-financed diversification of 
economic activities away from agriculture. Fourth, education was a 
publicly provided activity and thus involved the federal and state 
bureaucracies not just in funding but also in administering a simple and 
easily expanded activity. Finally, education was probably the most promising 
investment for the Nigerian economy, which needed to invest the proceeds of 
a depleting natural resource in long term, sector-specific capital” (Bevan, Collier 
Gunning, 1999, 64-65).
Another group of beneficiaries was the new public sector (senior) employees and 
a corrupt elite (including the military elite). The military and the civil service, although 
jointly in power, deliberately took a declining share of federal capital expenditure from a 
high of 36 per cent in 1973 to a low of 15 per cent by 1980. Although the FMG gave high 
priority to rationalizing a military that had grown from 10,000 in 1966 to 250,000 in 
1970, with no substantial reduction, belying the expenditure cut was institutional 
corruption and mismanagement that did not transform the gains of reduction to the larger 
society and economy. Besides, public employment approximately tripled -  from 0.5 
million to 1.5 million -  between 1973 and 1981 (Yusufu, 1996; Bevan, Collier and 
Gunning, 1999). Due to the fact that by 1973 urban wages for the unskilled were 
considerably higher than earnings in agriculture, the young and mobile, who sought urban 
wage employment precipitated the expansion of public sector employment with an 
obliging FMG, notwithstanding its productivity (or is it unproductive?) potentials.
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The virtual neglect of the agricultural sector had resulted in rising food prices. In 
response, the FMG attempted to increase food supply without increasing the budget 
allocation to agriculture. It emphasized its importance in the Second National 
Development Plan (1970-75, Ch 12, 103) for the umpteenth time. Furthermore, it 
encouraged foreign companies to set up large farming operations. This it did by 
promulgating the Land Use Decree of 1978. Most significant, and rather inconsistently, 
the agricultural policy ran precisely counter to industrial policy where foreign capital was 
being displaced or strictly regulated.
THE INDIGENIZATION PROGRAMME— 1972 AND 1977
The other important impact of the oil boom was the impetus it created for the 
promulgation of the Indigenization Decree of 1972 and a subsequent amendment in 1977. 
Indeed, according to Claude Ake, (1985, 174-175) systemic thinking on indigenization 
emerged in the Second National Development Plan and started with the Nigerinization of 
personnel. The argument was that it would reduce the “earning leakage” which reduces 
the benefit of industrialization to Nigerian. It was also hoped that it would put an end to a 
situation in which high level Nigerian personnel educated and trained at great cost to the 
nation, are denied employment in their own country by foreign business establishments.
The second aspect was “indigenization and control”, culminating in the 
Indigenization Decrees, 1972 (and the subsequent amendment in 1977), which the FMG 
rationalized thus:
“.. .political independence without economic is but an empty shell... 
a truly independent nation can not allow its objectives and priorities 
to be distorted or frustrated by the manipulation of powerful foreign 
investors.. .the (FMG) will seek to acquire by law if necessary, 
equity participation in a number of strategic industries that will be 
specified from time to time. In order to ensure that the economic destiny
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of Nigeria is determined by Nigerians themselves, the Government will 
seek to widen and intensify its positive participation in industrial development.
This could be done where necessary, by joint participation with private 
enterprises (foreign and indigenous); and as occasions demand, through 
complete government control and exclusive public ownership of very 
strategic industries” (Ake, 1985, 175).
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (Decree No 4) of 1972, as the 
Indigenization Decree was popularly known, specified two schedules of companies 
affected. Schedule 1 listed 22 activities in which exclusive participation was reserved to 
Nigerian entrepreneurs. The industries affected included small-scale retail trade, 
broadcasting and newspaper publishing, road transport, and a variety of services and light 
manufacturing. Indeed many of these areas were already Nigerian-owed by 1972. 
Schedule 2 listed 33 activities and excluded foreign participation in enterprises below 
NG400, 000 in share capital and NG1 million in turnover. Enterprises above that limit 
were required to admit 40 per cent Nigerian participation. Schedule 2 enterprises 
included department stores, real estate, domestic air and road transport, large-scale 
commercial agriculture and most major manufacturing operations (Paul D. Collins, 1977, 
128-129). The Decree permitted majority foreign ownership of large-scale enterprise in 
manufacturing and agro-industries, although government indicated a clear and future 
intension to participate in these areas.
Notwithstanding the establishment of a supervisory and implementation body, 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, the Indigenization Decree showed obvious 
weaknesses as a mechanism for share transfers and meaningful indigenous participation 
and control. The practical and cultural impediments were legion, but some were more 
glaring. The Lebanese and Syrians businesses that owned many small establishments and 
whom, according to Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1999, 61-62), were the primary target 
of the decree, on account of indigenous resentment, were able to evade or circumvent the
234
practical provisions of the Decree. This, they did by hiring token managers who 
“fronted” as owners; and also by stacking the board of directors with conniving and paid 
indigenous collaborators (Ankie Hoogvelt, 1979, 56-68). Multinational enterprises were 
no less non-compliant, except that they preferred and very promptly perfected 
bureaucratic evasion, special dispensation and in some cases, outright bribery (Thomas J. 
Biersteker, 1987, 113-225). These impediments notwithstanding, the decree effected 
widespread transfer of assets into indigenous hands, even though the overall sense was 
that these assets were very narrowly held by a few and new emerging Nigerian elite, for 
whom it indeed was pure bonanza (Collins, 1977, 143; Bevan, Collier and Gunning,
1999, 62). Ironically, and in some culpable ways, this tantamounted to an exercise that 
obviated from the original intendment, which was hoped to be meaningful indigenous 
participation in economic/market activities that enhance citizens’ standard of living.
In view of the indigenization exercise and the need to attain and sustain a viable 
structure, other measures to develop the domestic capital market were effected. One of 
those was the transformation of the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) from its 1962 adhoc 
structure to a more permanent one in 1973; with responsibilities for, among other things, 
assessing companies and overseeing the valuation and timing of share issues. The Stock 
Exchange, on account of sudden influx of new listings and increase in trading activities, 
was expanded. Between 1972 and 1973, the value of transactions in the market increased 
three and half times. Another viable development was that the CIC was removed from the 
Central Bank hierarchy and reconstituted as an autonomous Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1979 with broad authority to regulate the capital market (Biersteker,
1987, 207).
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The failure of the 1972 decree to indigenize some industries considered some of 
the most important and largest (e.g. tobacco and textiles), and indeed most profitable in 
the country, lqd to widespread call to re-examine the exercise, and possibly expand and 
effect better implementation mechanisms. In 1975, the FMG inaugurated the Adeosun 
Commission to investigate the administration of the 1972 Indigenization Decree. The 
Commission’s recommendations, which included a major revision and strengthening of 
the programme, culminated in the promulgation of the second Indigenization Decree in 
1977. This second decree added 20 new industries to the list of Schedule 1 industries, 
which were to be completely Nigerian-owned. Under Schedule 2, 33 new industries were 
added to the list, and the mandatory sale of shares raised from 40 to 60 per cent. A third 
schedule was added to the new decree which listed all remaining industries and required 
that they make available 40 per cent of their equity to Nigerians (Biersteker, 1983, 190). 
There was another significant inclusion to the 1977 decree which was intended to limit 
the concentration of wealth in a few hands by ensuring that the benefits of indigenization 
are spread out to as many Nigerians as possible. The decree stipulated that in no case 
might one person have control of more than one enterprise affected by the Decree. Also 
schedule 2 and 3 enterprises were obliged to reserve 10 per cent of total equity shares or 
of the fraction of shares to be sold in affected enterprises, for their workers. No less than 
50 per cent of this 10 per cent is to be reserved for non-managerial staff. With the 
exemption of owner managers, the maximum interest that any Nigerian or association of 
Nigerians may acquire in any enterprise is limited to NG50, 000 or 5 per cent of equity; 
whichever is higher (Ake, 1985, 178-179).
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Although the various provisions of the first decree were to have been 
implemented by the end of 1974, only about a third of the business affected had 
completed the process of indigenizing their business by mid-1975 (Donald P. Whitaker, 
1982, 143). The second decree was similarly only partially effective. Apart from being 
widely seen by the private sector as a state initiative to increase its economic scope, it 
also met with greater resistance and impediments (Biersteker, 1987, 198).
However, the second decree provided a new channel for new state share 
acquisition, even though the total proportion of shares taken by the state was probably 
around 15 per cent of those on offer (Biersteker, 1987, 267). Although the decree 
facilitated some structural changes, and failed to significantly after the composition of 
ownership and control of business in Nigeria, it nonetheless illustrated the ambivalent 
relationship between state and private capital during the oil boom. According to some 
opinions:
“In effect, although the economy may be said to be largely indigenized, what has 
happened is that Nigerians have taken over rights to share in profits while control 
remained where it has always been -  in foreign hands, which if we must be realistic, 
cannot reasonably be expected to identify as intimately with national objectives as if 
the situation were otherwise. Clearly ‘control of commanding heights of the economy’, 
which the first Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree had as one of its main objectives 
is no where in sight. And General Obasanjo in his budget speech reflected the growing 
concern that indigenization may have missed the substance for the shadow, when he 
called on companies in the country to reflect the ownership structures in their policy­
making bodies” (Editorial, Business, Times, 5 June 1979).
CONCLUSION
The FMG under General Gowon did not only successfully prosecute the civil war, 
with little or no significant negative impact on the economy, it also had the good luck of 
huge resources generation through increased production in petroleum during the same
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period. Indeed, at the end of the war, the country scarcely had a 10 per cent increase in its 
external public debt (Tims, 1974).
The execution of the three Rs—Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction—involved huge public expenditure that was hoped would trickle down to 
the citizenry and transform what Rostow characterized as the Take-Off stage, thereby 
improving the standards of living, especially of those in the war-ravaged areas. However, 
the policy and the programmes’ formulation and implementation lacked grossly such 
“grassroots” rural leadership involvement and participation. They were thought to be the 
handiwork of obsessive “super permsecs” who were more pre-occupied with controlling 
the processes than they were with effective and relevant outcome (Ayida, 1971, 7). 
Needless to say, development planning should not be the exclusive preserve of the 
technocrats in the capital cities who hardly know how the rural people live. Besides, the 
process was as affected by dearth of reliable data as it was by qualified personnel.
Particularly affected in these regard was agriculture and rural development 
policies. Agriculture, which employed over 85 per cent of the rural population, was not 
only grossly neglected, inspite of governments’ repeated public professions to the 
contrary, it also gravely neglected rural infrastructural development, thus precipitating a 
huge rural-urban migration that led to high urban unemployment and sprawl and 
disruptive criminal activities (Fapohunda, 1979; Okowa, 1985; Yusufu, 1996; 3rd NDP 
1975-80).
The Second Plan seems too hugely ambitious in its scope. Few of the objectives 
articulated in the Plan were fully realized, if at all. However, one visible improvement 
was the road network, which was largely enhanced, even though the collateral effects of
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nthe “cement armada” had its drain effects on the economy. The “cement armanda” in
othe words of John Okwesa showed a disturbing lack of coordination and control, and 
indeed deliberately corrupt mismanagement by the military and the various government 
ministries. Full employment, self-sufficiency in food production and improved health 
care delivery system remained unrealizable, even though tentative progress was made.
The government’s activities with the Indiginization Decree, Udoji award and 
other public participation and improvement exercises were as poorly articulated as they 
were ineffectively and inefficiently implemented. Thus processes conceived as 
empowerment and enablement vehicles ended up effectively restricting the very 
objectives they were supposed to enhance. For example, the elites against whom some of 
these deliberate policies were formulated in an attempt at equitable redistribution 
exercise, ended up disproportionately benefiting due to the administration’s ill-thought 
out implementation mechanisms. Investment capabilities, enhanced standard of living 
through salary increases for the working masses ended up creating an inflationary 
economic environment since the increases were not marched by any level of increased 
goods and services’ production. The overwhelming majority of the citizenry may not 
have noticed or experienced any significant improvements in their living standards for 
duration of the administration (Yusufu, 1996).
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ENDNOTES
1. Interview in Abuja with former Quarter-Master General, Nigerian Army, on July 
17, 1999. He noted that although General Ironsi was the first military head of 
state, the circumstances of the first coup and the determination by a segment of 
the army from day one that he not succeed, made it nearly impossible for him to 
function. His impact on the army, his core constituency was minimal, and 
absolutely nonexistent within the larger society. According to him, true military 
government with full political and economic ramifications actually started with 
General Yakubu Go won.
2. One tribal group has made so much of the argument that the abolition of the 
Regions and the introduction of the unitary system by General Ironsi’s military 
government lend credence to the notion of virtual domination. That perception is 
of doubtful validity and may not be legitimately founded, in view of all the 
surrounding circumstances of the coup. It is important to note that military 
governments are by structure, a hierarchical, unitary frame with a top-down 
command structure. It follows therefore that whether or not promulgated, and as 
was evident in the subsequent military regimes, military regimes are by structure 
unitary systems. Command flows from the top-down. It could be said though, that 
the Ironsi’s government did not only lack sensitivity, it also lacked savvy in 
reading the volatile ethnic mood of 1966. For a perfectly appropriate and 
necessary military instrument of command and control, his government’s timing 
was pathetic. It could not have come at a worse time.
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3. The so-called “super permsecs” occupied key positions in the critical Ministries 
of Defense, Finance, Petroleum, Economic Development, Industry and Trade. 
These Secretaries, Philip Asiodu, Ahmed Joda, Alison Ayida, Ime Ebong and a 
few others, were said to be the technocratic power behind the Gowon government. 
It was also alleged that in “group-think” they essentially formulated, fashioned 
and implemented public and economic policies. That they would lose their power 
position following the overthrow of the Gowon regime lent credence to the 
allegation that they had become a technocratic clique who formulated and 
implemented their own development strategy and economic policy. See Thomas J. 
Biersteker (1987) “Multi-nationals, the State and Control of the Nigeria Economy, 
Princetion University Press. See A. A. Ayida and H.M.A. Onitiri 1971 (eds) 
Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria”, Ibadan: Oxford University Press. 
See especially the comments of Ayida on page 15. See also Second National 
Development Plan 1970-74, 31.
4. The Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research and the Federal Ministry 
of Economic Development jointly hosted this Conference. Much of the 
Conference proceedings are reported in A.A.Ayida and H.M.A. Onitiri (eds) 
Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria, Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 
1971.
5. Thomas Callaghy’s is of the views that “In the basic neo-mercantilist equation of 
African state formation, the key element in the search for sovereignty and
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unification is power, the basis of power is wealth, and the foundations of wealth 
are foreign exchange and economic development.. .’’African neomercantilist 
states attempt to maintain a partially open, partially closed approach to 
penetration by external economic groups. The ruling group can increase the state 
power and further its interests (and the two re-enforce each other), by encouraging 
regulated investment and the development of new enterprises by external groups. 
Mercantilism is opposed to laissez-faire or automous capitalism, but not to 
political capitalism. As in early modem Europe neomercantilism provided a 
favourable framework for the early development of politically regulated and 
controlled capitalism in Africa”.
6. An experience, following the discovery of gas in Holland that completely 
distorted the viability of the other sectors of the Dutch economy. The United 
Kingdom experienced the same problem as a result of oil exports, resulting in the 
worst trade deficit then on record (1989) and a decline in the manufacturing 
sector. Indonesia had a similar experience. See Corden and Neary, 1982;
Blackaby, 1978; Bond and Knobl, 1982; Forsyth and Kay, 1980 op cit.
7. The Commission’s Report and FMG views on it are published in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, Public Service Review Commission Main Report, Lagos; 
Federal Ministry of Information, 1974. And Federal Republic of Nigeria, The 
Public Service o f Nigeria: Government Views on the Report o f the Public Service 
Commission, Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1974.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1975-1979 
(UNDER GENERALS MURTALA MOHAMMED 
AND OLUSEGUN OBASANJO) 
INTRODUCTION
Governments and their policies are not a determinate quotient, in that they are not 
a closed process that completely and with a clean break, terminate with one regime and a 
new and unaffected process or phase automatically starts with a new one. Naturally 
therefore, the uncompleted/unconcluded policies or portions of them, of one regime, still 
in the process of implementation, may be inherited and carried over by a new one. 
Because the choice is one of discretionary exercise of executive authority on either to 
continue or jettison the inherited processes or policies, the argument may be sustained 
that the non-abandonment is, ipso facto, an adoption or ratification thereof. The effect of 
which makes the initiating regime and the adopting regime as equally praise-worthy or 
culpable, depending on the outcome. It is therefore against this background and 
understanding that an evaluation of the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime’s responsibility for 
implementing the Third National Development Plan (3rd NDP 1975-1980), inaugurated 
by General Gowon in March, 1975 just three months before being overthrown in July of 
1975 of the same year could be articulated. The responsibilities for implementation fell 
on Mohammed/Obansanjo regimes.
By 1975, General Yakubu Gowon’s government was becoming increasingly 
undermined by the combination of corruption and uncertainty about civil rule (which he 
had earlier deadlined for 1976) and the pernicious influence of a clique of self-serving 
“super permsecs” (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 60; Bienen, 1978, 47; Dudley,
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1982, 82). General Murtala Mohammed who succeeded Gowon, understandably, 
proceeded to carry out extensive purges against corruption in the civil service, especially 
the senior officials who had had a remarkably free hand at running the country since 1966 
(Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 167).
MARKET/ECONOMIC POLICY INITIATIVES UNDER THE THIRD PLAN
General Mohammed’s combination of populist reformism and economic 
nationalism galvanized the nation during the heady days of petroleum wealth (Gavin 
Williams and Terisa Turner, 1978). The new regime proceeded to implement a transition 
to civilian rule in 1979, as well as to execute the comparatively larger Third National 
Development Plan for the period 1975-1980. His administration would buy into the 
debatable but popular concept of “more states, better development” -the notion bringing 
development closer to the people by the creation of additional states (the administration 
created seven), to bring the total number of the states in the country to nineteen.
The Mohammed/Obasanjo government was engaged in the most extensive state 
intervention, aggressive economic nationalism and public sector development. This was 
due largely to their lack of reservation and perhaps total conviction of the role of state in 
market and economic development. The military governments of Mohammed and 
subsequently Obasanjo (Mohammed was killed in a failed coup attempt in February,
1976) presided over one of the most wide ranging and unrestrained period of public 
sector growth in Nigeria’s history.
The Federal Military Government, (FMG) under this new leadership dismantled 
the Gowon economic leadership, understandably blaming senior technocrats and military
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administrator for entrenching corruption and self-interest in the civil service. Many of the 
permanent secretaries under the previous regime were ousted, and more than 10,000 
others were dismissed, retired or forced to resign from service. Public enterprises were 
also purged, including the removal of 600 staff from the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA). 
Some of the state administrators were also summarily dismissed. In their place, military 
officers were appointed to manage some of the large public ventures, including General 
Mohammed Buhari (the leader of the yet to evolve 1983 coup). He was in charge of 
Nigerian National Petroluem Corporation (NNPC) (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, 1970, 12). 
This cleaning up of what had then become the augean stable of official corruption and 
mismanagement in government, although widely popular, was relatively insignificant in 
terms of the already debilitating level of corruption and mismanagement prevalent in the 
system. It is also ironic that this exercise at “house-cleaning” produced the most 
inexplicable, incomprehensible and unintended of consequences. It engendered a 
widespread sense of insecurity, demoralization and disarray throughout the bureaucracy. 
Indeed some have speculated that this level of sudden and rather abrupt mass termination 
of public employees may have been responsible for the subsequent increase in public 
service corruption, since it compounded the sense of insecurity and uncertainty of tenure 
within the bureaucracy (Ayida, 1987, 113-114).
The 3rd NDP, drawn up in the light of booming oil revenue, sought to use the 
revenue to create the infrastructure of self-sustaining growth, which included improved 
educational provision. The Plan also sought, apparently ostensibly, to reduce inequalities 
in living standards by means of public expenditure. This Plan was as ambitious as it was 
hoped to be transformational of the national economy. And compared with its two
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predecessors, this was more than twelve times as much as the investment covered by the 
Second Plan (Bailey, 1977, 158-159). The Plan set as its target a total capital expenditure 
of NG30 billion, which was subsequently raised to over NG43.4 billion, compared to 
British Pounds Sterling 2.2 billion and British Pounds Sterling 3.0 billion of the first and 
second plan respectively. As part of the strategy of concentration on, and fulfillment of, 
the defined objectives, as well as ensuring greater efficiency, the Plan set out a fairly 
comprehensive list of approved projects, highlighting the physical targets as well as 
associated financial allocations, a procedure which was “expected to be of immense help 
as an instrument of control” (3rd NDP, 1975,12). And because the FMG was gravely 
aware that past development efforts had largely by-passed the ordinary people, especially 
the rural poor, the Plan purports that “serious effort has been made to emphasize those 
sectors which directly affect the welfare of the ordinary citizen. These included housing, 
water supplies, health facilities, education, rural electrification and community 
development, “the expectation is that by the end of the plan period every Nigerian should 
experience a definite improvement in his overall welfare” (3rd NDP, 1975, 10; Okowa, 
1985, 83-86).
Although agriculture had the highest allocation in the plan, the largest percentage 
increase over previous plans was in the allocation to industry, which had been termed the 
most dynamic component of FMG expenditure, accounting by 1980, for 20 per cent of 
federal retained revenue (Bevan, Collier, Gunning, 1999, 61). For a plan whose avowed 
objective was the improvement of the welfare and standard of living of the average 
citizen, this was rather inconsistent for a sector (agriculture), which employs over 70 per 
cent of the population. For example, agriculture, which provides a rather high proportion
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of employment and food for the ordinary citizen, accounted in 1975-1976, for as much as 
27.3 per cent of GDP. But the total expenditure on agriculture with its allied sub-sectors, 
including irrigation, livestock, forestry and fishery, amounted under the plan to only 
NG2.1 billion or 7.1 per cent of the total capital expenditure of NG29.43 billion.
It has been suggested that apart from expenditures connected with the oil industry, 
the biggest single industrial project in the plan was the establishment of an iron and steel 
industry (Bailey, 1977, 159; Legume, 1976, B801-803). It would appear that another 
sector whose major functional characteristics were not particularly affected, even though 
government participation increased, was manufacturing. This sector continued to be 
dominated by light manufacturing enterprises (food processing, beverages, cigarettes and 
textiles). It would also appear that the import content of manufactured goods remained 
high. On average 34 per cent of raw materials used in this sector was imported (Jakande, 
1975, 274-276). However, government’s participation in this sector increased 
substantially during the period 1966-1979 in a variety of project: salt, oil, petrochemical 
and gas refineries, auto assembly plants cement, glass, beer, textile mills etc (Ostheimer 
1973, 149; Jakande, 1975, 276; Olorunsola, 1977, 35).
By reference to its expected results at current prices, the 3rd NDP performed 
relatively well. The GDP at current market prices grew by 89.6 per cent from NG21,
326.9 million in 1975-1976, to NG40, 426.3 million in 1979-80, given an average yearly 
growth rate of about 22 per cent. This obviously exceeded the projected plan growth rate 
of 9 per cent by over 144 per cent. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show sector growth rates at current 
prices and at constant prices respectively. The two tables show that while the projected
248
growth rate of 9 per cent was far outstripped at current prices, the actual growth rate at 
constant prices was below the postulated rate during the whole plan period.
Table 7.1
Growth of Domestic Product 1975/76 -1979/80 At Current Prices
S/No .Sector 1975-76 1976-77 1978-78 1978-79 1979-80
1 Agriculture and Allied 5,730.0 6,426.4 7,473.8 7,854.2 8,425.0
2. Mining and Quarrying 4,668.4 6,797.3 7,905.0 6,874.3 10,903.9
3. Manufacturing 1,170.4 1,464.3 1,555.0 2,212.9 2,746..5
4. Utilities 57.9 72.1 98.7 121.7 133.3
5. Building, Housing and 
Construction 2,685.9 3,616.5 6,771.7 6,282.7 7,585.2
6. Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 4,329.2 5,501.8 6,771.7 6,282.7 7,585.2
7. Transport and 
Communication 673.6 852.2 1,038.2 1,277.7 1,617.0
8.Producer of Government 
Services 1,352.9 1,429.3 226.8 1,968.0 2,236.3
9.0ther Services 658.6 733.4 859.6 980.1 1,219.7
10. TOTAL 21,326.9 26,956.3 31,992.0 31,120.0 40,436.3
ANNUAL GROWTH 
RATE% 14.9% 26.4% 18.7% -2.7% 29.9%
Source: Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85, Vol., Table 2.5, p. 17.
Indeed the actual rate of growth was negative (-1.3%) in the first year, and only 1.1 per 
cent in the fourth year. The highest rate of 8.8 per cent was attained in the terminal year. 
According to Yusufu (1996), this may be explained largely by the usual scramble in the 
last year of a plan for releases of funds ahead of performances, to sustain on-going 
projects, much of the releases being merely committed and not utilized until later. 
However, although the rate of growth fluctuated widely from year to year during the
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period in the light of Table 7.2, it averaged 5 per cent, which was indeed a far cry from 
the projected 9 per cent.
It would seem that the overall average growth rate of 5 per cent at 1975-78 factor 
cost, which was achieved by the 3rd Plan failed to reach its planned target, even as it did 
not positively impact the welfare and standard of living of the average citizen (Yusufu, 
1996, 74). Relative under-expenditure applied to various areas of citizen-oriented welfare 
projects, such as health (which accounted for only 2.0 per cent of the plan expenditure): 
Social Development, Youth and Sports (0.4 per cent). The share of agriculture (i.e. food 
crops) under the plan was 3.3 per cent; Forestry 0.3 per cent, Livestock 0.6 per cent and 
Fishery 0.1 per cent; Cooperatives and Supply 0.7 per cent, Water Supply 3 per cent, 
Housing 4.1 per cent and Community Development 0.6 per cent. Significantly, labour 
received 0 per cent. It is noteworthy that, at 1977-1978 factor- cost, agriculture with its 
allied sub-sectors recorded a negative average growth rate of 7.1 per cent. Utilities also 
recorded a negative growth rate of as much as 15.3 per cent during the plan period 1975/; 
76 - 1979/80. The aggregate growth rate of the GDP itself measured at 1975-78-factor 
cost decreased by 4.6 per cent (4 NDP, Vol. 1, Table 2.4, 16).
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TABLE 7.2
Gross Domestic Product 1975/76 -1979/80 
(At 1977-78 Factor Cost)
(Million)
S/No. Sector 1975-76 1976-77 1978-
78
1978-79 1979-80
1. Agriculture and Allied 7,465.9 7,206.9 7,473.8 7,271.8 7,430.1
2. Mining and Quarrying 6,275.1 7,694.7 7,905.0 7,446.9 8,83.9
3. Manufacturing 1,532.0 1,554.5 1,555.0 1,923.8 2,076.4
4. Utilities 77.8 79.9 98.7 105.8 100.8
5. Building, Housing and Construction 2,979.6 3,625.8 4,072.2 4,684.2 7,582.5
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade 5,718.9 633.6 6,771.7 6,896.9 7,093.0
7. Transport and Communication 963.0 1,007.1 1,039.2 1,033.0 1,129.2
8. Producer of Government 
Services
1,612.6 1,673.0 2,216.8 2,044.3 1,895.8
9. Other Services 739.2 770.7 .859.6 941.0 1,106.2
10. TOTAL 27,364.7 29,746.2 31,992.0 32,347.
7
35,196.4
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE % -1.3% 8.7% 7.5% 1.1% 8.8%
Source: Fourth National Development Plan, Table 2.2, p. 15.
The FMG professed emphasis on agriculture seems founded on the realization 
that during the period 1969-1974, the production of all food commodities rose
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approximately 2.5 per cent, and "barely sufficient to keep up with the increase in 
population" (3rd NDP, ch. 6, 67). Government was concerned with the level of under­
performance in this critical area where according to Yusufu "...the growth rate of overall 
food demand of 3.5 per cent per annum and the production growth rate of 1 per cent, 
about 2.6 million tons of grain equivalents were being imported annually. Assuming that 
the demand and production growth rates remain constant over the plan period 1981-85, a 
deficit of 5.5 million tons of grain equivalent would have resulted by 1985" (1996, 236- 
237).
The FMG over the years tried, by itself and through the state governments, to 
adopt and propagate various promotional activities to boost the agricultural sector. But 
perhaps the most impacting of its policies in this and other related areas was the 
promulgation of the Land Use Decree in 1978. The introduction of this Decree essentially 
redefined the land holding structure, and with it the agricultural ambiance of the country. 
These activities included the establishment of the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative 
Bank in 1973 and the federally sponsored Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) in 1976. 
Indeed, the fiscal year 1977/78 was declared "the year of Agriculture". The net effect of 
this level of investment and participation was minimal in terms of its impact on 
productivity, "other than create a small core of new breed farmers" (Godwin Okurume, 
120 cited in Yusufu, 1996, 237).
MARKET/ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EXPANSION
Between 1970 and 1980, Nigeria’s public enterprise sector would expand from 
250 firms to more than 800. Government’s dominant role in market/economic 
development and especially enterprise creation was significant during the period. The
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process evolution was particularly unique. Government created a significant number of 
new statutory corporations and wholly state-owned entities. Also Federal and State 
governments took equity in most large-scale productive and service ventures, often times, 
in conjunction with foreign capital. Furthermore, the share acquisition associated with 
nationalization efforts and indigenization brought a larger number of firms into the state 
sector. In the views of Bevan, Collier and Gunning, "Large-scale public expenditure on 
industry did not get under way until the first oil circle. Industrial expenditure included 
full public ownership...the purchase of equity stakes in private ventures...start-up grants 
to private firms, and operating subsidies" (1999,173).
Although a comprehensive industrial policy was lacking, successive governments 
emphasized its importance as a central focus for economic development. For example, 
the Fourth National Development Plan (4th NDP) emphasized that "the risk of 
industrializing the economy of Nigeria is a big challenge which has been accepted by 
successive governments of this country" (Vol. 1, 135; Paul Collins, 1983, 416-417). Also 
in the views of Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1999), the promotion of industry was a 
constant in Nigerian economic development policy, what changed however was the 
capacity to finance it and the distribution of industrial activity between the public and 
private sectors and between the regions (1999, 174). Earlier on, a broad set of industrial 
priorities were articulated in the Second and Third Plans, which included the 
diversification and deepening of the manufacturing sector, the promotion of balanced 
development and the even distribution of industries throughout the country. There was 
also increased industrial employment, indigenization, the further development of import 
substituting industries and the creation of export potential. Apparently, "in principle, this
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is essentially a political, much more than an economic objective" (Yusufu, 1996, 281), 
lacking as it were, in any underlying long-term perspective. However, planning and 
implementation proceeded largely on a project-by-project basis, and revenue fluctuations 
and administrative problems, compounded by corruption and mismanagement, which 
yielded uneven performance. Besides, " industrial planners revealed preferences (in the 
1975 development plan) for ’glamorous’industrial activities with a high-technology, real 
engineering, or high value added component, and they offered fiscal incentives to favour 
such activities over low-technology projects, light industry, and elementary industries 
such as textiles and foods stuffs. In part these preferences reflected a notion of what the 
pattern of activities in a developed economy should look like..."(Bevan, Collier and 
Gunning, 1999, 63).
The public sector share of manufacturing equity increased substantially during the 
first half of the decade, although there is evidence to suggest that the relative share of 
state equity may actually have receded after the second indigenization decree in the face 
of expansion from the indigenous private sector. Major investments were undertaken 
during the late 1970s, as the state press the campaign for heavy industry. By 1978,
Federal industrial expenditures totaled nearly NG2.3 billion (Forrest, 1987).
Some of the most ambitious elements in industrial planning were the large 
projects in heavy industry. For example, plan for an integrated iron and steel industry 
were revived and a new series of complexes were planned. The National Steel 
Development Authority established in 1971 had the responsibility to coordinate activities 
in this area. The political pressures attendant on the decision-making of site location did 
not only ignore the obvious and rudimentary critical elements dealing with proximity and
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availability of raw materials, it also disregarded the uncompetitive world price of the 
finished product. It was a project that defied market and economic development rationale 
or reason. In terms of opportunity cost, it is a monumental drain on scarce resources for 
other viable development activities.
According to Bevan, Collier and Gunning:
"The feasibility report on Ajaokuta is 21 volumes long and has never 
even been translated from Russian. Few Nigerian decision-makers are likely 
to have read it...If all planned steel projects had been completed, the 
total cost of the two mills would have been $10.8 billion (at NG4.2 = $1).
If the plants were then run to produce steel, the cost would be higher.
This is because the unit cost of steel in Nigeria greatly exceeds the 
world price...the cost per ton was $400 against $150 world price...
The plants cannot run efficiently below 30 to 40 per cent capacities, 
but it is doubtful if the market will permit more than 20 per cent capacity.
At 40 per cent capacity, the net present value of running the mills is
around -$3 Billion, so the total cost of steel mills is $13.8 billion" (1999, 62-63).
Completely disregarding these nonviable variables and the obvious economic 
impracticalities of the project, a blast furnace was planned for Ajaokuta and a Direct 
Reduction (DRI) plant sited in Aladja. Indeed Steel Rolling mills were planned for 
Katsina (North), Oshogbo (West) and Jos (Middle Belt). The intriguing thing about the 
site location was the heavy political content of the decision, for an otherwise purely 
economic project. Even then, the consideration excluded the East (another dominant 
component in the country’s traditional politics of heavy regional/ethnic relevance). 
Although the Ajaokuta project was originally contracted to the Soviet Union's 
Tiajpromexport firm, delays in completion caused pressure to be mounted, culminating in 
the engagement of West German and Japanese firms for a new and different design for 
Delta (Gbolahan Alli-Balogun, 1988, 631; Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 62). The 
alleged irregular disengagement of Tiajpromexport (with a military fiat), and the legal 
and contractual contentions of that exercise remained until 1998. The General Abacha’s 
administration resolved this contractual dispute in a corrupt and scandalous debt-buy-
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back transaction that became a subject of judicial inquiry under the Obasanjo civilian 
administration (The Guardian, March 31, 2000; This Day, March 22-27, 2001).
The increases in revenue derived from petroleum exports, which rose from 
NG219 billion in 1970 to NG10.6 billion in 1979, accelerated state participation interests 
in production activities, which also rose from an average of 35 per cent in 1971 to more 
than 60 per cent in 1979. In the face of this development, government sought to solicit 
unrestricted foreign development capital in the oil sector, which it believed would lead to 
the rapid expansion of the pattern and structure of this critical segment; especially by 
specifying the substantive content and conditions affecting down-stream activities 
(refining, marketing and distribution) in particular and oil exploration and production in 
general. Even then, Hutchful (1985, 113), believes that it was "less for purposes of 
control over the activities of the oil majors than for those of increasing the access of the 
state oil surplus".
OTHER POLICY INITIATIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION
The overall implementation focus was the establishment of the kinds of industries 
that generated gainful employment. To effect these imperatives, the FMG promulgated a 
number of decrees, requiring state equity participation in oil production and setting the 
equity limits of such participation between state and foreign companies. It would appear 
that the most far-reaching of these decrees is the Petroleum Decree of November 1969.1 
In continuation of this process expansion, new refineries were commissioned at Warri in 
1978, built by an Italian firm, Snamprogetti, an affiliate of Agip consortium; and another 
in Kaduna in 1980. These refineries were built to supplement the first refinery built in
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Alesa-Eleme, Port Harcourt in 1961, but which was owned and managed jointly by Shell- 
BP, even though the state subsequently acquired 60 per cent controlling interest.
The FMG also embarked on substantial new industrial activities, nearly all of 
them joint ventures. Some of those planned were fertilizer, pulp and paper, construction, 
sugar, salt and commercial fishing and processing. In 1973 the Federal Superphosphate 
Fertilizer Company, a wholly owned federal government venture, was established in 
Kaduna. It was to function as a manufacturer and distributor of fertilizer. A plant for the 
production of nitrogenous fertilizer, based on natural gas, was sited for Onne Rivers State 
complex to complement the activities of the proposed petrochemical compels. The 
technical partners to this project were the American firm of MW Kellogg.
A newsprint company was sited for Cross River State, whilst an integrated pulp 
and paper operation was earmarked for Iwopin, Ondo Sate. An expansion of the paper 
mill at Jebba was initiated. Furthermore, the Savannah Sugar, Sunti Sugar Company, 
National Salt Company and New Nigeria Salt Company were all established in the 1970s. 
These projects were delayed by a combination of problems, which included planning, 
managerial and financial difficulties (Ojo, 1985; 141-168). There was also the creation of 
the Road Construction Company of Nigeria and the Nigerian Engineering and 
Construction Company. Also created was the Seromwood Industries in Calabar, the 
Nigerian Yeast and Alcohol Manufacturing Company, the National Shrimp Company and 
the Nigeria National Fishing Company.
The efforts by government to engender domestic engineering capacity included 
the attempt to produce electrical equipments. By 1980, the government had finalized 
arrangements with the Indian state-owned firm, Hindustan Machine Tools to establish
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Nigerian Machine Tools Ltd., at Oshogbo. The FMG held an 85 per cent share in the 
enterprise, while the Indian firm was to provide the essential equipment, technical 
expertise and training. The Nigerian Transformers Ltd., in which the FMG held a 
majority share, was also established in 1979 to produce equipment for Nigerian Electric 
Power Authority (NEPA). The FMG’s preoccupation with retaining control of the 
"commanding heights of the economy" encouraged the important targeting of vehicle 
assembly as a critical sub-sector for import-substitution. Prior to 1970, the only assembly 
plant engaged in domestic production was the Federated Motor Industries, a Bedford 
truck assembly plant in Lagos.
Of the several new enterprises, participation was between the Federal, State and 
private capital, with the FMG acquiring 35 per cent of equity in majority of them. 
Consistent with the rationale underlying most of its equity participation, this key area of 
vehicle production was intended to provide a wide array of industrial linkages. 
Consequently two joint ventures, one with Peugeot, located in Kaduna, and the other with 
Volkswagen, located in Lagos, began passenger car production in 1975. Interestingly 
enough, both were assembly operations, with virtually all in-puts imported as Completely 
Knocked-Down (CKD) components. With a view to producing heavy-duty vehicles for 
domestic use, including the military's, other assembly ventures were contracted. These 
included the Anambra Motor Manufacturing Company (Anammco), in conjunction with 
Daimler-Benz, Steyr (Nigeria) Ltd. in Bauchi, and the National Truck Manufacturing 
Company in Kano, a joint venture with Fiat, and the British Leyland truck plant in 
Ibadan.
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Construction boom, which was precipitated by the oil boom, added fillip to the 
expansion process. By 1975, construction was responsible for over 68 per cent of gross 
capita formation. About the same time, cement production accounted for about a quarter 
of the demand (F.O.S., 1982, 10). It is noteworthy that the functional cement plants in 
Sokoto, Ukpilla, Nkalagu, Calabar and Lagos were unable to increase their output 
sufficiently to meet new demands. It was perhaps in recognition of these unmet demands 
that new cement factories under federal and state ownerships were planned for Yandev 
(Benue State), Shagamu (Ogun State) and Ashaka (Bauchi State).
At the height of the windfall the increased demand for cement was supplied 
through massive, if uncoordinated and unregulated importation by the different 
Ministries, especially Defense and Works and Housing. By 1975, bureaucratic 
bottlenecks, as well as corruption in the processes of clearing, created an enormous 
backlog in the harbor in Lagos.2 In what would subsequently be referred to as the "cement 
armada", over 400 ships waited for weeks to berth and discharge their cement cargo, thus 
choking the ports and the distribution network (Report Tribunal, 1976). It has been 
suggested that the consequent "cement racket" spurred concern for expanding domestic 
production, even as it marked the apex of corruption and commercial manipulation under 
the Go won regime (Diamond, 1984, 5).
The relative abundance of mineral reserves necessarily meant that mining was 
also an important area of state activity. However, the war had a decidedly impeding effect 
on mining activities. Not only did it slow down coal mining activities in the Eastern part 
of the country, other solid mineral mining activities were similarly affected during the 
late 1960s. At the end of the war, the Nigerian Mining Corporation (NMC) was
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established in 1972 to undertake mining activities in solid mineral, other than coal. The 
NMC took equity in various foreign-operated mining operations throughout the country, 
including iron, tin and limestone. It is important to put in proper perspective the need for 
the establishment of the NMC, in the light of the new significance of this sector. This 
sector’s share of the Gross Domestic Output was less than 1 per cent in 1950, but by 
1973/74 had a significant rise of about 18 per cent, thereby becoming the leading sector 
after agriculture (F.O.S., 1976). Indeed the NMC was supposed to regenerate and sustain 
mining production; and to increase the nation’s participation in a sector, which had 
traditionally been under foreign control and tutelage.
By 1974 however, much of the income accruing from investment in the mining 
industry went to depreciation payments and profits, which were repatriated, with negative 
domestic economic impact. However, the contention is that the mining industry's 
contribution to economic development and the industrialization of the country was not 
significant, relative to the high amount of capital invested in it. It neither contributed 
much to solving unemployment problems nor did it, at least before 1974, attract related 
industries (Roland Ekotome Ubogu, 1979, 64).
EVALUATING POLICY OUTCOME
It would appear that few of the ambitious targets for rapid industrialization were 
realized during the 1970s. Even less so was the hoped for increase on employment. 
According to Yusufu, "Throughout the history of conscious consideration of economic 
development in Nigeria, the industrial sector has been expected to create most of the 
increase of employment opportunities required to stem, and even solve, the 
unemployment problem" (1996, 267). Needless to say it was an unrealized expectation.
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Indeed, the indications are that of a noticeable decline in the level of employment in the
major sector of the manufacturing industry (See table 7.3).
Although substantial resources were committed to project development, the state 
industrial sectors yielded modest productive output. The light consumer industries and 
assembly ventures, almost all of which were set up in conjunction with foreign firms 
started operations. However, by the end of the oil boom era, most of the basic industrial 
schemes targeted in the Second and Third National Development Plans were unrealized, 
either because of bad planning, unfocused management or unrealistic schedule 
projections. For example one of the major government initiatives in trade was the 
establishment of the Nigerian National Supply Company in 1972, which was intended to 
help contain the burgeoning inflation, stemming from oil-induced consumption. The 
other was the nationalization of the distribution of essential commodities. Like most 
poorly conceived, ill-articulated and market-insensitive government programmes, these 
poverty-alleviation schemes, were prompted appropriated as a powerful mechanism of 
patronage and political instrument.
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Persons Employed in Selected Sectors, Manufacturing Industry
Table 7.3
S/N Item 1980 1982 1984 1988 1991 Increase(decrease)%
1980-91
Number Index Number Index Number Index Number Index Number Index
1. Food 57872 100 52296 90.4 35042 65.7 2999 5.2 2960 5.1 94.9
2. Beverages
and
Tobacco
32169 1 00 16682 51.9 23254 72.3 6225 19.4 6575 20.4 79.6
3. Textiles 88757 10 0 61583 69.4 57360 64.6 2437 2.7 2478 2.8 97.2
4. Wood 
and wood 
Products
53966 100 24490 45.4 14575 27.0 1322 2.4 1409 2.6 97.4
5. Leather
and
Leather
Products
7157 10 0 14108 197.1 7837 109.5 850 11.9 641 9.0 91.0
6. Rubber
and
Plastics
Products
44896 10 0 14659 32.7 16000 35.6 2867 6.4 3057 6.8 93.2
7. Electrical
Products
9752 10 0 10773 110.5 6685 68.6 169 1.7 227 2.3 97.7
Sources: (a) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1987, Table 75, p. 101 
Sources:(a) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1994, Table 117, p. 174
Prior to 1970, the Ministry of Mines and Power, and Petroleum Division of the 
Ministry of Finance determined central elements of petroleum policy, including prices, 
tax rates, royalties and the terms of participation for foreign producing firms. The 
increasing importance of petroleum to the national economy and its resultant increased 
capacity and revenue generation persuaded intervention on behalf of autonomous 
nationalist, as well as the creation of a state oil enterprise (Petter Nore 1980, 69-84; 
Malcolm Gillia, 1980, 248-249). The Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) 
established, as a statutory body in 1971, did not commence operations until 1973. Even 
then and although nominally delegated a policy role, it was to all intents and purposes, 
subordinate to the ministerial departments responsible for petroleum. The FMG policy
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towards the foreign producing companies was increasingly one of assertiveness during 
the 1970s, although less nationalistic than those of other OPEC (Organization of 
Petroleum Producing Countries) countries (Cliff Edo gun, 1985, 89; Turner, 1980, 207- 
210).
By 1977 the NNOC had expanded its activities, even as it was being merged with 
the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, to form what became Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC). The new corporation had broad authorities for the operations of the 
sector, as well as policy formulation. Overall, it administered public investment in the oil 
sector, collected revenues, implemented pricing and marketing policies, as well as 
monitoring the operations of producing companies. Inspite of this level of managerial 
participation, the corporation did not appreciably increase its technical capacities, neither 
did it engage directly in drilling or extraction (Turner, 1980, 210).
The Banking and Finance sector also saw an appreciable level of government 
activities. Banking and insurance were expanded during the Second Plan period, just as 
government’s intervention in the financial sector increased and diversified after 1975. 
Encouraged by the enhanced control afforded by nationalization and indigenization, the 
Federal and State governments expanded the assets and activities of development finance 
institutions, as well as state participation in insurance, housing, finance and savings.
Apparently, government objectives entailed a more vigorous role for public 
financial institutions. The central idea was to avert the kind of criticisms, which banks 
like Nigeria Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) had received during the late 1960s. It 
had been criticized for concentrating on joint ventures and foreign-dominated enterprises. 
It was also along this new line of more participatory involvement that proposals emerged
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for a new institution with a more decidedly broader national thrust and even greater 
indigenous-focused mandate (G.O. Nwankwo, 1980, 105). According to Okigbo, 
increased revenue made the establishment of new financial institutions possible (1981, 
139). A new bank, Nigerian Bank for Commerce and industry (NBCI), was established in 
1973 with an authorized capital of NG 50 million to provide equity capital and funds in 
the form of loans for Nigerians to invest in industry and commerce.
The NBCI, which was conceived as a principal instrument for financing the 
indigenous program, was also viewed as an important means of enlarging and 
streamlining the FMG’s development finance activities (W. Okiezie Uzoaga, 1981, 124). 
Even then, there were still some concerns that the assets of the Bank were very narrowly 
held by a few Nigerian elites (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999, 62), with decidedly 
grave economic and market development implications for the larger indigenous investor.
The Nigerian Building Society (NBS) established in 1956 was succeeded by the 
Federal Mortgage Bank, which was set up in 1977 with an initial capital of NG 150 
million. The Bank was established, in part, to complement the Federal Housing 
Corporation in the implementation of the FMG’s housing program (Okigbo, 1981, 236- 
237). It was also part of the Bank’s responsibilities to provide finance for housing 
construction and purchase. The Federal Savings Bank was established in 1974 as a 
successor to the Post Office Savings Bank established in 1923, and which operated as a 
branch of the Posts and Telecommunication Department until 1972. In 1978, the Nigerian 
Reinsurance Corporation, which was wholly owned by the Federal government, began 
operations with a mandated 20 per cent of the domestic reinsurance market. Again, this 
appears to be a huge industry-specific imposition that did not only create an unhealthy
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monopoly, but obviously impeded the competitive market development of that critical 
sub-sector in an emerging economy.
This level of direct government involvement and participation achieved some 
noticeable results. In its 1977 annual report, NIDB purports to have sanctioned projects to 
the value NG 74 million, of which NG 4.4 million was in equity participation and NG
69.9 million in direct loans. Of the twenty-seven projects sanctioned in 1977, Nigerians 
wholly owned twenty-four, and these accounted for over 91 per cent of the total value of 
sanction projects. The NBCI, on the other hand, helped Nigerians to purchase alien 
businesses affected by the Indigenization Decree. From May 1973, when it was 
established to December 1975, the Bank had total approved loans to the tune of NG 54 
million and made a total equity subscription of NG 4.8 million. And between April 1973, 
when it became effectively operative and March 31, 1977, the Nigerian Agricultural 
Bank had approved loans of a total of NG 265 million (Ake, 1985, 179-180). By 
comparison commercial banks seem to have played a more significant role, in that by 
1980, they held nearly 85 per cent of the total financial assets, while the development 
finance institutions held only 5 per cent (World Bank, 1983, 32). It is also significant that 
these federal institutions were not as dynamic in the development of manufacturing 
(Uzoaga, 1981, 226).
However, it should be noted that while direct government investment and capital 
mobilization were critical to economic growth during the petroleum boom, public sector 
financial enterprises played a subordinate role to private institutions, even as new state- 
level finance and investment activities created opportunities for local accumulation, by 
providing loans and equity to indigenous entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding, federal
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development finance institutions did not appreciably expand the capital base available to 
the private sector; neither did they effectively promote activities of domestic business.
State-level banks, insurance companies and development finance companies 
proliferated as new states were created and state incomes burgeoned. It has been noted 
that participation by the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CWDC) was largely 
replaced by State finance (Forrest, 1987). The Northern Nigeria Development 
Corporation (NNDC) succeeded the old northern Regional institution, albeit under a 
state-based military government structure, and indeed continuing under the joint 
ownership, of the ten northern states (created out of the defunct Northern Nigeria).
During the 1970s the NNDC, under joint ownership expanded its activities and created 
four holding companies, including the Northern Nigerian Investment Limited. In the East, 
the newly created East-Central State established the Central Investment Company 
Limited, to succeed the Development Finance Company, a joint venture of the erstwhile 
Eastern Region and the CWDC. In addition, new investment companies were established 
during the early 1970s, by Cross River, Kwara, Kano and Kaduna States (Okigbo, 1981, 
145-153).
In the Second Plan, the FMG acknowledged that the provision of agricultural 
credit would go a long way at stimulating increased food production, as well as 
enhancing the income of the rural population. According to Yusufu (1996, 247), even this 
initiative for change, which in part may have accounted for its sloppy implementation, 
came from outside, following a World Bank agriculture survey and recommendations.
The World Bank and the USAID recommended the development of agriculture credit 
facilities in the late 1960s, following which two feasibility studies were undertaking
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(Nwankwo, 1980, 112). As a result, the Agricultural Bank Ltd., (renamed Nigerian 
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank) was established in 1973, with an authorized capital 
of NG12 million to provide financing for entrepreneurs going into the agriculture sector. 
The Bank’s responsibilities were broadly defined to include assistance to all aspects of 
agriculture development and production. The Bank was intended to expand both sector 
and geographic spread of agricultural credit.
The need to develop smallholder credit was recognized, even as it was considered 
less realistic in direct implementation. The Bank therefore concentrated on funding state 
governments and public corporations, for onward lending to individual farmers, and 
allotted a substantial portion of its loans to state production schemes. In addition, it 
directed resources to large-and medium-scale private farming ventures and agro­
industries. Ironically with its style of operations, the Bank reinforced and perverted one 
of the most cardinal reasons for its establishment. That is to say that the Bank showed a 
general preference in agricultural policy towards large scale investments, which it 
administered through the state, rather than directly to the intended beneficiaries-small 
farmers (Uzoaga, 1981, 213). It thus reinforced and sustained “middlemanship” in all of 
its variabilities. Indeed the FMG’s significant activities in the agriculture were one of 
truly mixed results, mainly on account of inconsistency.
Overall government’s efforts in this critical area (agriculture) were disparate, 
ineffectual and poorly coordinated. Policy statements were markedly inconsistent with 
policy implementation. For example, although the original thrust of the policy was to aid 
smallholder agriculture, the components of a broad, effective strategy were absent due 
largely to inadequate investment coupled with inconsistent policies, resulting in fall in
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per capita production. The FMG sought to expand state intervention in the agricultural 
sector through large capital-intensive projects, and to increase Federal control over the 
administration of rural development. Unfortunate fiscal and institutional centralization 
led rapidly to the politicization of the process and projects, culminating in their 
appropriation as a source of rents and patronage (Yusufu, 1996, 247) and corruption and 
mismanagement of the process.
Besides poor management and corruption of the process, which effectively 
slowed implementation, the situation was not helped by the constant fluctuations in 
exchange rate. The exchange rate steadily appreciated, just as producer prices remained 
relatively low, due largely on account of the price and market in-sensitive activities of the 
marketing boards. A situation made worse by the inadequacies of both the market 
organization and support infrastructure. Consequently, despite large expenditures, 
agricultural export production diminished, even as rural-urban migration accelerated. The 
urban migration phenomenon and the resultant rising income fostered a shift in 
consumption toward imported staple food, especially rice and wheat. The end result was 
that food import escalated rapidly during the late 1970s, as Nigeria became the largest 
importer in Africa (Michael Watts, 1987; Bienen, 1985).
Due to their peculiar climatic conditions, the North always had an agricultural 
advantage, which was greatly encourage by the colonial authorities. Although extensive 
irrigation was encouraged, pilot project during thel940s and 1950s fared poorly 
(Richards Palmer-Jones, 1987, 149-157). Originally conceived under the auspices of the 
World Bank, feasibility studies undertaken in the 1960s by the FOA, USAID and CDC 
supported the creation of large-scale regional irrigation schemes, and subsequently
268
recommended the development of wheat cultivation in the North (Bjorn Beckman and 
Gumilla Andrae, 1987, 80-86). Under this scheme was established the Chad River Basin 
Development Authority (CRBDA), the Sokoto-Rima (SRBDA) and the Hadejia - 
Jama’are (HJBDA).
Although the RBDAs were initiated with a view to promoting the 
production of wheat, rice and other food crops, through the expansion of available land 
and the establishment of large state production programmes, it is doubtful that was 
achieved. The initial projects beginning in 1973-1974, which included the Chad Basin’s 
South Irrigation Project, the Bakolori Project and the Kano River Project were federally 
administered. Hence suffering the same fate as other FMG patronizing projects: 
corruption and mismanagement.
What seems inexplicable is why the programme was expanded during the 
later part of the decade, despite obvious ineffectiveness. Indeed irrigation claimed 39 per 
cent of the Federal capital budget for agriculture under the Third Plan (3rd NDP, 85), and 
by the early 1980s, expenditures on the RBDAs were in excess of NG2 billion (Beckman 
and Andrae, 1987, 114). Implementing these pilot programmes claimed huge capital 
outlays, as they entailed extensive construction and land preparation. Notwithstanding, 
material outcomes were slow, even as the projects yielded little output.
Agricultural Development Projects, (ADP) initiated in 1975-1976 were managed 
and co-funded by the World Bank, to deliver packages of inputs and to introduce 
improved techniques, as well as develop extensive services and infrastructure in the 
producing areas. By 1980, the number of ADPs increased to seven: Ayangba (Benue), 
Lafia (Plateau), Bida (Niger) and Ilorin (Kwara) all in the middle Belt region. The
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pressure for more geographic spread and inclusion resulted in the introduction of projects 
in Oyo North (Oyo), Ekiti Akoko (Ondo) and Egbado (Ogun) all in the West. What is 
particularly noteworthy and equally disappointing was that these ADPs in late 1970s and 
early 1980s functioned most significantly in the seemingly inconsequential, and contrary 
to their primary purpose, of supervisory and managerial role of massive importation and 
distribution of fertilizers. Indeed fertilizer imports, federally subsidized by as much as 90 
per cent, increased from 34,000 tons in 1970 to 513,000 tons in 1980 (Watts, 1987, 80). 
As a matter of fact the provision of fertilizer was not only a significant component of the 
FMG’s "Operation Feed The Nation" under General Obasanjo, it also formed a critical 
component of President Shehu Shagari's "Green Revolution". All of which turned out a 
futile symbolic exercise at implementing an ill conceived and poorly managed exercise at 
promoting food self-sufficiency through smallholder farmers.
The attempt by the FMG to reform the Marketing Boards, which had become an 
effective engine of regressive taxation to produce farmers seemed too little, too late. For 
example, a study of the Palm Produce Board found that when the official price was 
NG230 per ton, no farmer received more than NG180 and some were paid as little as 
NG135 (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999, 146; Yusufu 1996, 291). By 1967 Lewis 
expressed some concerns that agricultural exports which he considered the country's 
engine of growth, would stagnate due to the activities of the Marketing Boards "...clearly 
the governments have their hands on the throat of the goose which is laying the golden 
eggs" (1967, 20). Reforming the Marketing Boards’ regime was not until 1974. Even 
then, it was rather tentative, in that taxes amounting to 20 per cent of export proceeds 
were first halved by the FMG and subsequently abolished. The power to fix producer
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proceeds was also transferred from the Boards (which indeed were state’s Board) to the 
FMG. Producer prices would have doubled in 1973-1974 due to the reforms as well as 
rising world prices. In 1977 the state Boards were effectively abolished and the country 
centralized federal control. Besides, the country returned to a system of crop-specific 
boards and the addition of new crops (rubber and grains) to the four traditional crops of 
cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, and palm produce. It would appear that none of these 
innovations had the desired effect, either because the price increases were not sufficiently 
stimulating to revive export agriculture or that the national commodity Boards were no 
less corrupt and inefficient.
For the food crops however, government intervention had little effect on prices. 
Interventions were always sudden and rather inconsistent, and especially through trade 
policies, which it was hoped, would impact domestic prices. For example the tariff on 
rice was lowered from 67 to 20 per cent in April 1974, reduced to 10 per cent in April 
1975, raised to 20 per cent again in April, 1978, and reduced again to 10 per cent two 
months later. Overall, it would appear that government intervention in agricultural 
marketing was not just through its trade policy and the operations of the Boards; it also 
subsidized inputs including pesticides, improved seeds (50 per cent), and most notably 
fertilizer, which in 1982 accounted for one-third of all agricultural public expenditure.
The FMG’s attempt at establishing production companies for major food crops; 
coffee, tea, fish, poultry and livestock did not fair significantly well in contributing to 
national output. Indeed, the companies’ contributions to national output were 
embarrassingly negligible, either because of government's relatively small equity
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contribution (combined equity contribution in six companies, NG30 million) or the usual 
official corruption and mismanagement of the process.3
The Infrastructure Programmes, transport, power and housing, expanded during 
this period partly in response to such highly visible problems as endemic power cuts. 
Even then, it would appear that the programmes were constrained by the inability to 
construct and administer them rapidly rather than by a lack of finance. The suggestion 
that by mid-1970s, the Nigerian economy appeared to have encountered the proverbial 
bottleneck (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 64; Olatunde Ojo, 1985, 145-147) is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that many of the new infrastructure investment were 
channeled through existing but extremely corrupt, poorly run and ineffectual state 
enterprises, like the Nigerian Ports Authority, the Nigerian Railways, the Nigeria 
Airways, Posts and Telecommunications and the Nigerian External telecommunications, 
which became the conduit for implementation (3rd DP, 229; Ignatius I. Ukpong; 1979, 
68-69).
The Electricity Corporation of Nigerian (ECN) established in 1950 and the Niger 
Dams Authority created in 1962 were both merged to form the National Electric Power 
Authority (NEPA) in 1972. The new Authority, which was responsible for generation and 
transmission, supplied about 98 per cent (by 1974) of the electricity consumed in Nigeria. 
The Nigerian Electricity Supply Corporation and the African Timber and Plywood 
Company supplied the balance of 1-3 per cent. State governments were also authorized to 
generate and distribute electricity in their states, where NEPA was not available (Ukpong, 
1979, 78-79; Ernest J. Wilson, 1983). Increased industrial consumption, coupled with 
urban migration created high demand for electricity, even as NEPA was unable to expand
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its installed generating capacity, a situation that has continued to degenerate and have 
since reached crisis proportions and completely stalled market and economic 
development.
Infrastructure development consisted a major portion of government spending 
during the period. Transport, communications, power, housing and education comprised 
nearly half of the Third Plan. Although the responsibility for road development in Nigeria 
is shared between the Federal, State and local governments, the federal roads programme 
alone at NG4.35 billion, accounted for 13 per cent of the entire public capital programme 
(3rd NDP, 200). The programme, which called for the expansion and modernization of 
the two international airports in Lagos and Kano were not fully completed, neither was 
the proposal for the provision of airport facilities for each of the states of the federation 
fully implemented.
The realization that long distances, difficult terrain and climatic conditions pose 
special problems if the market and economy are to continue to develop led to the 
establishment of new enterprises in the transportation sector. By 1976, a road transport 
firm, the National Freight Company, was set up. The National Cargo Handling Company 
was set up in 1977. So also was the Central Water Transportation Company. While the 
former was to rationalize operations at the ports, the later (set up by the six central and 
eastern states) was to develop river transportation. The Nigerian Airports Authority 
created the following year (1978) was to administer the renovation and expansion of the 
nation’s airports. That these massive projects, including the extensive road construction, 
were undertaking by foreign private contractors attests to the dearth of expertise and
273
organizational capacity, both in planning and supervisory implementation to achieve 
desired results (3rd NDP, 403, Ojo, 1985, 146).
At the state level however, the proliferation of states and the concomitant increase 
in revenue disbursement created an up-surge in public enterprises and spending. For 
example, in 1970 the states owned about 200 enterprises, but by 1979-1980, they have 
increased to about 600. The suggestion is that one of the strong arguments for more state 
creation was to be able to bring government and development closer to the people. 
Whether that was realized or not is not the issue here, categorically they were not, the 
point is that throughout the 1970s, state’s revenues and the programmes of the Federal 
government exceeded development activities. However, state expenditures, in their 
expanded context, provided a central avenue for enhancing rural value and localizing the 
allocation and disbursement of petroleum rents, even as it created the tendency to greater 
insularity, inward-looking and self-centered economic interests (Yusufu, 1996, 40). The 
states, in large part, assumed the same roles as their erstwhile regional predecessors in 
providing capital and patronage for domestic business, in an extremely corrupt and 
mismanaged environment.
In their seemingly indiscriminate effort at promoting light and medium-size 
industries, including manufacturing ventures, banking, insurance and investment 
companies, the states were as indiscreet as their regional predecessors. Not only were 
some of the projects undertaking redundant, they lacked any rational economic 
justification. It would appear that, as with the erstwhile regions, dubious projects and 
investments were hastily conceived and implemented, just as payments were promptly 
delivered to contractors, who invariably failed to complete the contracted job.
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CONCLUSION
What is apparent from the foregoing is the scope and ambitiousness of the various 
projects undertaking by the FMG of Murtala/Obasanjo. Obviously conscious of the 
general underfulfilment in the previous Plans and the fact that they had not meaningfully 
impacted the ordinary citizen, the FMG under General Obasanjo (in the 3rd Plan) was 
emphatic that serious efforts have been made to emphasize those sectors that directly 
affect the welfare of the ordinary citizen. As such that at the end of the current Plan 
period, every Nigerian should experience a definite improvement in his/her overall 
welfare and standard of living, especially in the areas of housing, water supplies, health 
facilities, education, rural electrification and community development (3rd NDP, 1975- 
1980, ch. 1, 10). That these projects failed to realize their projected goals or attain 
substantial fulfillment seems to confirm an unsettling feature prevalent with the previous 
military administration that was overthrown. For in evaluating the success of the 
preceeding (3rd Plan), the 4th Plan noted that “although concrete and detailed data are not 
available, there are indications that the last decade has not seen any significant 
improvements in the distribution of our national income and wealth (4th NDP 1981-1985, 
ch. 4, 40). Economic development policies failed to meaningfully impact or trickle down 
to the citizenry whose standard of living they are supposed to improve. Inevitably 
therefore, by whatever standard or measure military “leadership” defines development, to 
the extent that the welfare of the average citizen is not positively impacted, it is failure. It 
should be noted that the unavailability of reliable data in policy formulation, and the 
dearth of skilled manpower have not made the process any easier. Besides, recurrent 
corruption and mismanagement have made the situation worse.
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Indeed, Nigeria is adjudged one of the most corrupt and unmanageable countries 
in SSA, inspite of military intervention, (or perhaps due it) which had as one of its main 
justifications the elimination of, repeat occurrences of mismanagement and corruption.. 
Interestedly enough, it would appear that during the relevant regime, the exercise at 
curbing this national state of affairs was primarily consigned to the state level. Numerous 
commissions of inquiry covering dozens of enterprises were commissioned in the mid- 
1970s for states like Bendel, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun and Rivers. As would 
be expected, these tribunals uncovered widespread mismanagement and corruption, 
political manipulation in inflated and uncompleted contract execution (Sibyl, E. Moses, 
1979, 191-217). Predictably, the Commissions of Inquiry documented a litany of facts, 
resulting in widespread "purges" within the state enterprises, as well as created the 
political ammunition for new military adventurists, in quest for takeover. Again as had 
become the tradition, few meaningly policy or institutional reforms were ever instituted 
from this state of disclosures, and the same abuses were repeated and often times 
exceeded throughout the boom era.
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ENDNOTES
1. See the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Annual Report 
on the Petroleum Industry, 1975-1976, 11-13. The Decree, inter alia, 1. 
Redefined petroleum to exlude gas; 2. Reduce the length of concession 
periods from ninety-nine years to twenty years; 3. Set out clearly the 
period and stages for surrender of acreage granted under concessions; 
4.Required that within ten years producing companies must Nigerianize 
their most senior positions up to 75 per cent and 100 per cent for other 
cadres; and 5. Set out procedures for acquisition of land for oil 
development and tranportation purposes and for payment of compensation 
to owners of such land.
2. Interview with John Okwesa, General Manager, 1973-1975, Nigerian 
Ports Authority, in Lagos, on July 2nd and 3rd, 1999.
3. The unpublished report of New Decade Consultants on Funding 
Programme for Government and State-Owned Companies. The Food 
Production Companies, Cabinet Office Lagos.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC:
1979-1983
(UNDER PRESIDENT SHEHU ALIYU SHAGARI) 
INTRODUCTION
Although his administration’s economic development policies failed to 
meaningfully impact the living standards of the citizenry, the administration nonetheless, 
implemented the government’s promised transition programme, culminating in the 1979 
constitution and the election of a new civilian government. The new civilian 
administration was modeled along the lines of the United State’s presidential and 
legislative structure. The only difference perhaps was the pointedly disruptive inclusion 
of “Federal Character” principle, which required a balanced representation from all areas 
of the country, not only for electoral competition but also for all federal appointments, 
employment and allocations in the public sector (Dudley, 1982, 162).
The basis and functional structure of the Second Republic was embodied in the 
1979 constitution which articulated among other things, a set of national economic 
objectives: 16 (1) The state shall, within the context of the ideal objectives for which 
provisions are made in this constitution:
(a) Control the national economy in such a manner as to secure the maximum 
welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality 
of status and opportunity; (b) without prejudice to its rights to operate or participate in 
areas of the economy other than the major sectors of the economy, manage and operate 
the major sectors of the economy; (c) without prejudice to the right of any person to 
participate in areas of the economy within the major sector of the economy, protect the
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right of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the major sectors of the 
economy (J.O. Akande, 1982, 16).
This inclusion seems designed to allow the government play a dominant role in 
national economic activities. According to some opinions, the import is unmistakable. 
“Major sectors of the economy” as defined “is sufficiently wide to enable the government 
to assume any degree of control over the economy of the nation... The public sector plays 
a large and leading role...’’(Akande, 1982, 17). It is perhaps in light of this emphasis on 
market and economic development that policy initiatives under President Shagari in the 
second republic were implemented. Policy initiatives under President Shagari may have 
been bereft of the dictatorial fia t that characterized military administrations, the party 
structure and political considerations nonetheless dictated a lot of policy changes and 
imperatives.
EMERGENCE OF THE SHAGARI GOVERNMENT
The political parties that emerged when the ban on political activities was lifted in 
September 1978 was, in large part, no different from the experience of the first republic, 
in that the patterns of distributive contentions were replicated (Richards A. Joseph, 1987, 
44), and parties’ alliances were more sectional and bereft of any competing ideological 
components (Bienen, 1981, 131). The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led by Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari, which subsequently won the 1979 presidential election was characterized 
as an artifact whose constitution was a carefully designed system of patronage. So 
pervasive was this atmosphere and sense of patronage that it has been suggested that “a 
more appropriate name for the party would have been the Party of National Patronage” 
(Forrest, 1986, 8). Notwithstanding, these compoundingly burdened circumstances, the
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second republic began under the notorious cloud of judicial interpretation of the sum of 
12 2/3 of 19 states.1 The Supreme Court’s resolution of that context in favour of the NPN 
was as controversial as the political disputes that led up to it (Toyin Falola and Julius 
Inhonvbere, 1985, 70). Rather ironically, the contentiousness of that exercise and the 
recriminations that followed the court’s decision was a disquieting reminder that political 
activities in the country was still a desperate enterprise and a zero-sun, “winner-take-all” 
game, in which the party in power, to all intents and purposes, managed and distributed 
national wealth as it pleased (Diamond, 1982, 662).
The distributive conflicts evident in the second republic were as complicated as 
they were diverse, especially in view of the creation of more states, which inevitably 
fostered more resource allocation competition and conflict. The situation, especially the 
political economy, was characterized by much more extensive state economic tutelage, 
which no doubt intensified the patrimonial orientation of the state elites, and made entree 
into that stratum much more important (Diamond 1988, 66). To all intents and purposes, 
it was a return to the prebendal politics, the personalistic and preferential appropriation of 
public office and resources, where public powers and state access essentially provided the 
basis of private accumulation. Indeed ethnically defined patron-client networks formed 
the basis of the prebendal system (Joseph, 1983, 59-65).
The new civilian administration did not initially alter the policy and economic 
strategy or focus it inherited from the preceding military administration. The predominant 
initiatives were essentially a carry-over. It would appear though, that the new 
administration’s activities were in large part a function of the government’s fiscal 
circumstances, especially the state of oil export. There also appeared to be little, if any,
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emphasis on national growth, as the new government lacked any detailed programmatic 
direction toward economic growth or adjustment, even as decision-making and policy 
implementation passed onto its executive political appointees. It was a shift that 
predictably set the tune of the new administration. According to Bevan, Collier and 
Gunning, “The return to democracy thus represented a massive shift of players away 
from the small coterie of permanent secretaries and generals, who had managed the first 
oil circle and who were devoted to national growth through public capital formation” 
(1999, 90).
MARKET/ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EXPANSION
It has been suggested that despite the discontinuity in policy formulation 
engendered by the return to democracy, the new civilian administration was conscious of 
the rapidly changing economic circumstances and felt disposed to evolve a development 
plan that acutely articulated and reflected these emerging realities. Whether or not it 
meaningfully effected that is another matter. More so as the Third Plan had turned less 
successful. For “although concrete and detailed data are not available, there are 
indications that the last decade has not seen significant improvements in the distribution 
of our national income and wealth” (Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-1985, 40). 
The 4th Plan, introduced in March 1981 therefore had as its policy objectives “the 
attainment of rapid economic growth and structural change with relative stability of 
prices”, as it sought “to ensure that the annual rate of increase in the general price level is 
kept below 10 per cent” (4th NDP, 1981-1985, 40). In the light of the reduced foreign 
exchange earnings due to oil glut in the world market, the plan acknowledged obvious 
limitations when it stated in part “revenue prospects though reasonably bright cannot be
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regarded as rosy” (4th NDP, 41), Even then the plan budgeted for the public sector 
programme, an expenditure of NG 70.5 billion; 24.2 per cent had to be covered by loans, 
partly internal and partly external. The private sector programme accounted for an 
additional NG11.5 billion (4th NDP, 387). However, these allocation patterns seem rather 
arbitrary since the breakdown and rationale appear to be obscure and unfounded (Yusufu, 
1996, 78).
For example, the public sector programme of NG70.5 billion was about 63 per 
cent higher than the revised Third Plan of NG43.3 billion. This huge increase is as 
curious as it is inexplicable. Indeed it defies reason, given that the Third Plan was largely 
under fulfilled. The plan was expected to induce an economic growth rate of 7.2 per cent 
annum for the GDP. A rapid growth in agricultural production was to be the first priority, 
followed by education and manpower development, the strengthening of economic 
infrastructures (power, water supply and telecommunications) and housing and health, in 
that order. (See Table 8.1 for the GDP sectorial growth rates proposed under the fourth 
plan).
Embodied in the Plan also was high priority to increasing industrial productivity 
(Legum, 1981, B583; Olayiwola, 1987, 127) by promising to encourage “the maximum 
growth of investment and output as to ensure a realization of the country’s industrial 
potential in the shortest possible time”. The projected growth rate 15 per cent for the 
manufacturing industry was anticipated for the plan period (Legum, 1982, B526-27).
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GDP Sectorial Growth Rates Proposed Under The Fourth 
Development Plan, 1981-1985
TABLE 8.1
S/No Sector
Planned 
Growth 
Rate per 
Annum
1. Agriculture 4
2. Livestock and Forestry Fisheries 4
3. Mining and Quarrying 2
4. Manufacturing 15
5. Utilities 15
6. Construction 5
7. Transportation 12
8. Communications 15
9. Wholesale and Retail Trade 10
10. Housing 8
11. Producers of Government Services 12
12. Other Services 10
13. Gross Domestic Product 7.2
Source: Fourth Development Plan, Chapter 5, Para 3, p.46.
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EVALUATING POLICY OUTCOME
It would appear that no systemic effort was made to implement the Fourth Plan 
neither were the projections realized (Onyejekwe, 1981, 161 Yusufu, 1996, 85). As 
indicated in Figure 8.2 there appears to be obvious short falls in plan projections and so 
was actually realized revenue during the plan period. The estimates for the Fourth Plan 
were based on projections of revenues derived from sales of crude oil in 1979 and 1980. 
These essentially envisioned a production rate of 2.19 million barrels per day at $36 per 
barrel (Bienen, 1985, 54). Both projections were off the mark and by August 1981, oil 
production fell to 650,000 barrels per day, as the world market experienced a glut. So was 
revenue from oil, which declined from $23.4 billion in 1980 to $10.0 billion in 1983.
TABLE 8.2
PLANNED AND ACTUAL FEDERAL REVENUES 
1980-1985 
(n MILLION)
Year Planned Actual Actual as%  Planned
1980 16,008.3 15,234.0 95.2
1981 17,837.6 12,180.1 68.3
1982 19,837.6 10,143.9 53.0
1983 19,638.1 10,811.4 55.1
1984 20,758.8 11,133.7 53.6
1985 22,455.8 14,606.1 65.0
Sources: Fourth National Development Plan; Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports
Unfortunately, the administration was culpably irresponsive to the rapidly 
changing economic environment. Aware of the short fall in government revenue and the 
failure to prioritize expenditures at the critical moment to reflect changing economic
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times may be attributable to four types of pressures for public expenditure under the NPN
administration:
“First there were direct expropriations made by elected officials 
in their own favour. Second, there was intense lobbying to break 
into the distributive network. Third, there was an incentive to 
generate public contracts not because of their output but also because 
of die opportunities for corruption. Finally, there was the continued 
desire for the national prestige projects that had characterized the 
military regime” (Bevan, Colder, and Gunning, 1999, 90).
Expenditures increased tremendously, especially as public expenditure was 
probably the most expedient opportunity for kickbacks on contracts and public 
employment. Agricultural expenditure grew, as more agricultural development projects 
were initiated and expanded. The highest priority was given to agriculture, which was 
allocated over 10 per cent of the total planned expenditure (Legum, 1982, B523-24). The 
launching of the administration’s signature agricultural promotion programme “The 
Green Revolution” sought to emphasize the “revitalization of the small landholders” as 
well as encourage the establishment of privately owned large-scale farms.
According to Claude Ake, of the NG 972 million earmarked for agricultural input 
in the Fourth Plan, NG470 was spent on the purchase of fertilizers, which was surprising 
in the face of current scandal about the purchase of fertilizers, which were never utilized. 
“There are mounds of fertilizers all over Nigeria decomposing in the rain” (1985, 30). 
Without question, the agricultural revolution of the administration, the “Green 
Revolution” was an unmitigated disaster, as food imports rose dramatically and the 
Nigerian National Supply Company (NNSC), established in the Third Plan to import and 
distribute essential goods was believed to have worsened the situation (Editorial National 
Concord, 25 November, 1983). Indeed the NNSC was not only seen as a failure, but was 
increasingly perceived as an extremely corrupt NPN institutional structure for delivering
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subsidized consumer staples to favoured constituencies, as well as lucrative 
distributorships for party supporters.
Public ventures were unjustifiably expanded, even as industrial allotments 
spiraled. The patronage system permitted and even encouraged project costs to 
quadruple, and new, costly and ambitious, albeit unnecessary, projects were introduced. 
The administration allocated over NG1.billion to the iron and steel project in its 1981 
capital budget, and at the same time appointed a cabinet minister to be solely responsible
f
for the new ministry (Tijjani and Williams, 1981, 258-265). Perhaps the corroboration 
that the momentum behind public expenditure was the opportunity it provided for 
kickbacks on contracts and public employment, than earnest exercise in public 
infrastructure development is demonstrated in, the contract for a major dam construction 
project that the last military government had awarded for (US) $120 million. It was 
promptly renegotiated by the new administration for $600 million, with the difference 
allegedly distributed among the parties to the contract. It has been suggested that the 
River Basin Development Authority Programme provided a clear instance of the priority 
of rents on contracts. For example, the Bakalori project incurred costs per irrigated 
hectare that were apparently 15 times greater than those in similar projects in Cote 
d’Ivoire (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999, 91). Industrial expansion, like any other 
policy issue remained an adhoc exercise of project financing and political competition 
over siting, contracts and capital. Only a refinery and three steel rolling mills were 
commissioned during this period, including the poorly thought out, hastily implemented, 
new federal capital territory development in Abuja inherited from the military.
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However, as petroleum revenue fell drastically by 1981, the pressures for public 
expenditure could not be accommodated without a budget deficit. Indeed by the second 
half of 1981, the budget had already run into massive deficit. Government indebtedness 
to the financial sector rose from NG2.3 billion in June 1981 to NG6.8 billion by February 
1982. And rather incomprehensibly, the 1982 budget estimates for current expenditure 
were double their 1981 level, in what the government had dubbed the “austerity” budget. 
The administration was unable to ensure adherence to budgetary goals (Yusufu, 1996, 78- 
88; Falola and Inhonvbere, 1985, 106). Obviously the choice the government made 
reflected not just the balance of interests within the government, but also the near vacuum 
in national policy formulation and the absence of centralized budgetary planning (Bevan, 
Collier, and Gunning, 1999, 92; Forrest; 1986, 14).
Although in his 1980 budget speech, president Shagari insisted that the mere fact 
that the country was currently experiencing rising crude oil prices should not be taken as 
a signal for the kind of import liberalization of 1975-77, his government’s trade policies 
and overall management of the foreign exchange reserves appeared inconsistent, 
unpredictable and even reckless. The government evolved a scandalous import-licensing 
scheme, coupled with a large-scale importation of rice and fertilizers (Forrest, 1986, 20). 
The financial recklessness of the administration guaranteed that by April 1982 a foreign 
exchange crisis had ensured and during that year the final IMF entitlement was drawn. 
According to Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, by the end of 1982 and aggravated by the 
Mexican debt, Nigeria had become quantity rationed (QR) in the world credit market. In 
just three years the public sector had so inflated expenditure that the country had passed
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through the phases of revenue surplus, reserve depletion, and foreign borrowing (1999,
92).
Faced with a decline in both federal and state revenues and rapidly degenerating 
foreign exchange crisis, the government chose to borrow abroad through syndicated loans 
for specific projects. External debt, which had been $2.7 billion in 1978, was $14.4 
billion by the end of 1983. Both the federal and state governments seem to have 
displayed the same degree of financial rascality and irresponsibility in the scramble for 
foreign loans. The states are said to be responsible for about $2 billion of this total 
national debt.
The biggest constraint at the federal level was foreign exchange and government 
responded by direct control of allocation by rationing. Import licenses were restricted, 
duties increased and import deposit scheme was introduced. When, understandably, these 
measures failed due largely to continued financial indiscipline and mismanagement and a 
lack of prioritization in an increasingly corrupt NPN government, the payments deficit 
was financed by what appeared the only means available: the involuntary accumulation 
of trade arrears, which increased during 1983 by $4.7 billion. Even when attempts were 
made at cuts in public expenditure, it was an indiscriminate 40 per cent across the board 
with no discernible focus or attempt at prioritization. The situation was compounded by 
the legislative and presidential elections due in August 1983. In January of that year, 
there was a large extension of import license, many of which were channeled through to 
presidential task forces, with some of the profits kicking back into party funds. Licenses 
were also distributed to the states and then sold by governors to the highest bidders. 
Without reference to the Licensing Committee (supposedly in charge of the process)
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licenses permitting NG682 million in imports were issued during 1983. According to 
some opinions, if these licenses are valued at the black market rate prevailing in 1983, the 
rents on them were worth more than NG 1 billion (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999,
93). However, the continuing budget deficit engendered was now financed mainly by 
inflation. Bank credit to the public sector grew 50 per cent in 1983 and inflation was 
more than 50 per cent. Between 1981 and 1983, GDP declined by 8.5 per cent and 
consumer prices rose at an annual average rate of over 20 per cent (Paul Hackett, 
1988,767), while unemployment remained a major problem (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985, 
85-145).
The administration also accorded high priority to increasing industrial 
productivity (Legum, 1981,B 583; Olayiwola, 1987, 127) by promising to encourage 
“the maximum growth of investment and output, so as to ensure a realization of the 
country’s industrial potential in the shortest possible time”. A projected growth rate of 15 
per cent for the manufacturing industry was anticipated for the plan period (Legum, 1982, 
B526-27)
Perhaps much more dis-enabling in President Shagari’s economic policy 
formulation and implementation was the ineffectual attempt at effective coordination. 
Economic decisions were dispersed over three ministries (Finance, Industries and 
Commerce), the Central Bank, Budget Bureau, and the Council of Economic 
Stabilization and Implementation Committee was established within the Office of the 
President. And given the infectious and larcenous patronage system of the NPN 
government (Forrest, 1986, 8), the committee was a little more than a talking shop, 
representing competing political and economic interests within the party. For example,
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the Committee’s Report avoided any discussion of the exchange rate, which according to 
some opinions, was a critical issue by 1983. Indeed, the suggestion is that the 
commission was never intended to provide a serious critique of government economic 
policy, but to give the impression that something was being done (Bevan, Collier, and 
Gunning, 1999, 93-94; Forrest, 1986, 15).
REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION
It would appear that the NPN party constitution that pretty much guaranteed a 
regional dispersal of power, failed to establish enforceable rules of democratic conduct 
within the party thus encouraging political brigandary and corruption, which effectively 
constrained the president from imposing discipline. For instance, as widespread and as 
mind-boggling as corruption and incompetence had become such obvious public 
knowledge by mid term, only two ministers were replaced in his cabinet reshuffle. And 
yet that reshuffle was billed as a serious attempt by the administration to sanitized and 
bring about competence, discipline and accountability to the administration. At the end of 
the day, public opinion characterized the exercise as laughable whitewash (Newswatch, 
February 15,1982).
However, in what appeared to be some attempts at selective reform, the 
administration made some efforts at public sector reform. One of such efforts was the 
Presidential Commission on parastatals. Gamaliel Onosode chaired the Commission. The 
Onosode Commission was responsible for conducting a comprehensive inquiring into the 
organization and operations of the nation’s public enterprise sector (Report of the 
Presidential Commission on Parastatals, 1981). Subsequent Commissions of several other 
consultants (Arthur Anderson; Coopers and Lybrand; Pai Associates; Paul Taiwo; and
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Milestone) was initiated, with a view to rationalizing funding programme for public 
enterprises, as well as examine the financial administration and operational problems of 
thirty-four of the nation’s leading State-owned Enterprises (SOEs).
The Onosode Commission was particularly critical of the need to rationalize the 
relations between government and parastatals, as well as the importance of developing 
management capabilities, with emphasis on the separation of many public enterprises 
from civil service salary and personnel structures (Report on Presidential Commission on 
Parastaral, 1981, 36-37). The commission was also favourably disposed to the issue of 
privatization, even though that was less of its particular emphasis or priority, in view of 
the obvious lack of onground support infrastructure to implement such exercise. On the 
part of the independent consultants, their views on the SOE’s fiscal prudence, 
independence and less reliance on the federal government subsidies were uniform. They 
proposed improving the capital bases of the major SOEs, liberalizing public sector 
ventures and improving accounting and monitoring system within government firms.
Apparently good intentions and the expediency of public display, or playing to the 
political gallery, if you will, made the difference between commissioning an exploratory 
Commission, including independent Consultants, and the implementation of their 
recommendations. As pointed out earlier, the President and his NPN party lacked both 
the forthrightness and discipline to implement any of the recommendations or reforms.
On the contrary, the public enterprise sector became politicized as the party leadership 
dispensed board appointments and dictated pricing, employment and investment policies. 
Management and accountability were seriously eroded. The continued level of patronage 
was so pervasive that by mid-term, the federal cabinet was enlarged to 45 ministers, to
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accommodate competing vested interests, with at least two members from each state, in 
what was characterized as the “National Party of Patronage” within a loose amalgam of 
baronies, each with its personal network (Forrest, 1986, 8; Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 
1999, 89).
It would appear that the proliferation of economic regulations and other 
regulatory strictures were deliberate, and were indeed designed to avail abundant 
opportunities for corruption and mismanagement. Civil servants exerted greater leverage 
over private transactions in rent extortion, even as businesses sought to evade or 
manipulate the new strictures. Obviously, the expropriation made by the political class 
effectively tantamount to a private and corrupt acquisition of public property on a 
massive and indiscriminate scale (Forrest, 1986, 4).
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC
According to some opinions, the central failure of the Shagari government, was 
not that it spent too much (although it did), but that the expenditures were so 
unproductive in the face of political chicanery, clannishness, nepotism and unmitigated 
bribery and corruption (Yusufu, 1996, 82; Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999, 74). The 
combination of these activities and participants could not have been more ominous. 
Politicians, civil servants, private businesspersons, foreign suppliers and contractors held 
unprecedented and unbarring sway in the plundering of the national economy. The 
situation was so pervasive and all embodying, Schartrz characterized the excesses of the 
civilian regime as “private capitalism” (1984, 45-47).
The NPN party constitution, apparently deliberately designed to perpetrate the 
system of patronage, also had its “contagion” effect on some of the other political parties.
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For example, although the Federal constitution provided that all public officers declare 
their assets on assumption of office the legislature refused and/or failed to pass the 
enabling bill. There were other indications of unbridled corrupt indulgences. At the first 
meeting of the parliament in 1979, after nearly thirteen years of uninterrupted military 
rule, the priority of members was to vote themselves large increases in salary and to 
unilaterally divert the newly completed public housing from the civil servants to their 
own use. In doing this they disregarded a housing provision made for them by the out­
going military administration. A similar pattern occurred in the states. For example, in 
Kwara state the governor made payment of NG100, 000 to each of the 42 legislatures and 
awarded himself NG 2 million. Also, soldiers arrested the governor of Kano state, Sani 
Barkin Zuwo after the overthrow of the Shagari government in 1983. Found in his 
official mansion, without credible explanations were “huge bundles” of banknotes 
belonging to the state government (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 90-91; Morris 
Szefted, 2000, 287-306).
The combination of a party constitution, which effectively guaranteed a regional 
dispersal of power but failed to establish enforceable rules of democratic conduct also 
encouraged regional baronies, who in turn looked to the national office as a means of 
financing their patronage requirements. Thus no one had sufficient power independent of 
patronage obligations to be able to pursue national objectives. This hopelessly dependent 
patronage structure, the rising costs of political competition and declining public 
resources, led to a degenerational economic situation and financial crisis. Popular 
expectation from a government, whose initial election in 1979 was of doubtful 
legitimacy, was compounded by unfulfilled campaign promises even as the
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administration displayed disturbing level of profligacy. All of these combined to 
exacerbate the frustrations of a population rapidly experiencing diminishing standards of 
living. The growing affluence of the political and business elite sharply contrasted with 
the dire living and economic conditions of the citizenry. There appeared to be this ever- 
evolving benefit to the “protected” class. This phenomenon was particularly significant 
because the mechanisms of patronage was always available, eve if in a new forms:
“Whereas during the oil boom the main mechanism of patronage had 
been public expenditure, during the slump this source declined and 
was replaced by rent from foreign exchange allocation. An indication 
of the growth in such rents and the implicit tariff rates generated by 
import restriction is given by the evolution of the paralleled market 
premium over official rate. At the start of 1981 the premium was only 
37 per cent during 1983, it surpassed 200 per cent, and by 1986 it was 
330 per cent” (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1996, 81).
CONCLUSION
While this level of corrupt patronage was going on, inflation increased, severe 
shortages in consumer goods (NNSC, the presidential rice and other essential 
commodities had been hijacked by political interest), bottlenecks in every facet of public 
service— urban transportation, protracted power outages, refuse heaps in urban centers— 
compounded the hardship and anxiety of an already impoverished, frustrated and yet 
dangerously excitable citizenry. This situation was not helped by the significant drop in 
oil revenue from about NG 9.9 billion in 1981 to less than NG8.5 in 1983. With the 
decline came an increasing dependence on food imports, as the production of food as 
well cash crops declined sharply. The resulting exodus of people away from rural farming 
communities into the cities heightened the agricultural crisis in food and cash crop 
production, as well as precipitating rapid urban squalor. By 1982 the national assembly 
had enacted the Economic Stabilization Act, ostensibly to reduce public expenditure
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profile of the state. However, the continued profligacy of the political elite drew 
opposition of public sector employees. It was a period of political chicanery, 
clannishness, nepotism and unmitigated bribery and corruption.
Even many of the manufacturing establishments, majority of whom have become 
hopelessly dependent on patronage allocation system, were forced to scale back or close 
down completely, following the shortfall in oil revenue and consequent shortfall in 
foreign exchange allocation. This was because the national manufacturing sector had over 
90 per cent of its activities in the light manufacturing sector, and which depended almost 
entirely on imported inputs for its sustenance. By 1983 over 100 of these establishments, 
who were primarily in light manufacturing industries— textiles beverages, cigarette, 
soaps and detergents (together accounting for over 60 per cent of the total manufacturing 
outfit)— were forced to close since nearly 70 per cent of their inputs were imported 
(Legum,, 1984, B529; West Africa, 13 October, 1983, 25-38; Hackett, 1988, 771). By 
1983, the total number of manufacturing establishment? has declined to a low of 2112 
from a high of 2342 in 1981 (Industrial Statistics Year Book 1985, 407). The overall 
situation was rapidly degrading. Even workers wages could no longer be guaranteed. By 
late 1981 seven states had defaulted on teacher’s wages, and contractors because of non­
payment of outstanding bills halted many projects.
By the turn of legislative and presidential elections in 1983, the rift between the 
contending political elites within their individual parties and across party lines have 
reached crisis proportions, especially as distributive patterns in the NPN government 
intolerably displayed a zero-sum proclivity. According to Diamond (1982, 656), an 
increasing alienation between the political class and popular constituencies was apparent.
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The extremely corrupt, and insufferably shortsighted, NPN government was over­
whelming adjudged to be unfit for a second term. When in the peculiar circumstances of 
the preparations for that election and the actual conduct of it, the NPN, under President 
Shagari not only won the presidential election, but an over-whelming majority of the 
legislative seats, in what party operatives dubbed a landslide, the second republic in 
Shagari’s second term was doomed even before it started.
By the time the 1983 presidential elections rolled by, all the indicators showed a 
worsening social and economic condition. The Shagari administration did not only lack 
focus, it trivialized the institution of governance and legitimized private acquisition of 
public property. Apart from the ineffectual and sometimes hugely inflated prices for 
projects’ completion (majority of which were inherited from the military administration 
of Obasanjo), the administration failed to evolve any effective or meaningful economic 
policy or poverty alleviation programme. According to Sir John Vereker, Nigeria’s 
problems in the area of poverty is really “poverty of resources and living standards as a 
result of poverty of leadership... in a country which earns $18 (USD) billions per year in 
oil revenue of which $15 (USD) billion a year goes into the budget, that 70% of its 
population live on less than $1 (USD) that is deeply shameful. Nigerians have become 
poorer.. .it is not because you haven’t got resources. It is because of dreadful governance” 
(This Day, June 30, 2001,Vol. 7, No.2260, 25).
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ENDNOTES
1. The Constitution had stipulated that the winning candidate in the presidential 
election shall have won 25 per cent of the vote cast in two-thirds of the nineteen 
states. Incidentally the number of states in the country at the relevant time was 
nineteen, a seeming mathematical uncertainty, in dividing such odd numbers. 
The NPN candidate met this criterion in only 12 states and so the constitutional 
ambiguity was whether the attainment of two-thirds of 25 per cent of the vote 
cast in thirteen states would suffice. The Supreme Court, which decided in 
favour of the NPN, understandably could not ground its decision on sound 
jurisprudence. Observers perceived the decision as unabashly partisan, thus 
eroding the court’s objectivity and the legitimacy of the new government. 
According to Tom Forrest, the perception of illegitimacy was self-fulfilling and 
in the attempt to secure its position, the party developed close links with the 
police and relied on them to help rig the subsequent elections (1986, 1986,12).
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CHAPTER NINE
MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1983-1985 
(GENERAL MOHAMMADU BUHARI)
INTRODUCTION
The NPN government under President Shehu Shagari was overthrown in a 
military coup led by Major-General Mohammadu Buhari. It would not be inappropriate 
to contend that the overthrow was induced by a convergence of interests and events. 
Notably on the eve of December 31, 1983, the Shagari administration was manifestly 
corrupt, had accumulated enormous debts, high rate of inflation and unemployment, 
deteriorating terms of trade and a low rate of economic growth. It was estimated that the 
country’s global debt at the time of the overthrow had reached $17 billion; trade deficit 
accounting for nearly $4.8 billion of this debt. Import imports had increased from an 
average of about $300 million a month in mid-1979 to $1.8 billion a month by 1983. It 
was also believed that the government’s manifest profligacy was responsible for this state 
of affairs, including the decline in personal living standards of the citizenry (Onaolapo 
Soleye, 1985; Wall Street Journal, 21 February 1984, 31; African Economic Digest, 
March 1984). Indeed by 1983 per capita private consumption in real terms was almost 15 
per cent below its 1981 level. (See table 9.1)
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Public and Private Consumption and Investment, 1981-86 (1981=100)
Tam** 0 1
Comsumption Investment
Year Private Public Private Public
1981 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1982 95.9 96.1 55.8 95.1
1983 86.7 95.0 37.9 65.6
1984 79.2 77.6 53.9 40.3
1985 86.1 78.9 30.6 44.8
1986 76.2 73.5 39.3 39.3
Source: Bevan, Collier and Gunning 1992
It is believed that in a normal democracy a government presiding over such 
unprecedented (at the time for Nigeria) economic uncertainty and fall in overall living 
standards of the citizenry was extremely unlikely to be re-elected. But somehow, the 
Shagari government was elected for a second time in electioneering circumstances that 
was believed to be massively rigged through a combination of institutional police 
assistance and the tribal-cum patronage nature of politics in the country. The result (or 
the proclaimed result) of the election, for the opposition and majority of the electorate, 
was disappointing. The evolving sentiments of the opposition and their supporters were 
frighteningly reminiscent of the events leading up to the first military coup of January 
1966: ominously pregnant with unpredictable, yet horrifying possibilities. It was in the
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circumstances of these unpredictabilities and economic uncertainties that the military 
took over, seemingly to the relief of the citizenry (Karl Maier, 2000).
MARKET/ECONOMIC POLICY INITIATIVES
General Buhari’s 20-month rule was characterized by a combination of abrasive 
political attitude and stringent economic policies. The Buhari administration inherited an 
economy that was practically at the verge of collapse. Unfortunately it had no, at least not 
in the immediate circumstances of the overthrow, discernible policy goals. “However this 
policy vacuum was disguised by an application of simple military “virtues”— discipline, 
hardship, and nationalism. The official policy stance of the Buhari government was a 
‘war against in- discipline’. Even though stringency was applied selectively” (Bevan, 
Collier, and Gunning, 1979, 94).
Notwithstanding, the Buhari administration sought to end the debt crisis, curtail 
corruption in all spheres of national life and to put Nigeria on what it had determined was 
the road to economic restoration and development. The administration’s crisis 
management strategy was implemented in a framework and socio-political environment, 
which brooked no political opposition at home. Apart from the detention of politicians of 
the Shagari era, the administration promulgated a series of decrees to curb the freedom of 
press (Decree No.4) preventive detention of opponents on security grounds (Decree No. 
2), and proscribed all demonstrations, processions and unauthorized meetings. It also 
proscribed all public discussions of Nigeria’s political future, and with it, the National 
Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Nigeria Medical Association as well as 
effecting the arrest and detention of its leaders.
The administration’s policy thrusts sought to conserve foreign exchange by 
restricting “unproductive” usage; improving agricultural productivity (which in the 1984
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and 1985 budgets received 21 per cent and 18 per cent respectively of the total capital 
expenditure); and emphasizing local sources of raw materials and technology (Legum 
1985, B561; Adebabayo Olukoshi and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, 1985, 96-97). This level 
of austerity measure, in its drastic application curtailed foreign exchange provision for 
students studying abroad. It also placed restrictions on imports, by subjecting them to 
import duty requirements (Legum 1984, B532). And because of the widespread 
smuggling in the local currency, the naira, and the resultant capital flight, the 
administration proceeded to change to a new currency in the hope of stemming the tide. It 
is doubtful this policy option succeeded, in view of the seemingly irreversible decline in 
the value of the naira vis-a-vis other currencies.
It would appear that at the end of the day, the administration offered only a 
patchwork of tightened administrative controls, budgetary austerity and “redemption” 
propaganda, especially when it seemed that it failed to attend to what appeared to be the 
most critical issue ailing the market/economic system. For example, the administration 
failed to reach agreement with the IMF, especially on a $2.4 billion programme to 
restructure the country’s debt, a process that had been initiated under the civilian 
administration of President Shehu Shagari (Effiong Essien, 1990, 70-72). The Buhari 
government refused to accept the conditionalities of the IMF package, which included a 
60 per cent devaluation of the naira, outright removal of the petroleum subsidies, and 
trade liberalization. The administration did not believe it to be in the national interest. In 
the views of General Buhari:
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. .if we devalue our exports would be cheap, imports would be dearer. If so, 
the effect on Nigeria is irrelevant because we hardly export anything other 
than oil which is priced in dollars and which is subject to currency fluctuations, 
so devaluation doesn’t make sense, because our industries hardly satisfy our 
needs up to 50 per cent...we are not exporting anything other than oil; finished 
goods are second, so that argument does not hold., if we make it expensive, our 
end product would be more expensive, and inflation will go up again, so the 
argument is against devaluation in Nigeria, and we hope the IMF will see it 
that way” (New Nigeria, 4th April 1984,16).
Needless to say, the IMF felt that FMG’s position was untenable in view of the 
country’s credit and balance of payments position. The situation reached crisis 
proportions when it became clear that debt-rescheduling agreements with the Paris and 
London Clubs were not even possible without the acquiescence and nominal approval of 
the IMF (Novicki, 1985, 4-9; Legum, 1985, B560). It is particularly noteworthy that 
inpsite of the absence of an agreement, the FMG on its volution and discretion, adopted a 
series of measure designed to qualify the country for debt repayment rescheduling, short 
of acquiescing to the IMF demands. In addition, it also evolved a retrenchment exercise 
that was intended to rationalize the public service, as well as weed the service of corrupt, 
unproductive (even though it is difficult to determine which public servant is productive 
in the prevalent dispensation) and undesirable elements. At the end of the day, over 
15,000 federal employees -  the largest in the country’s history -  had been disengaged. In 
addition, the government mandated across-the-board decreases in personnel in both the 
federal and state public services. According to some estimates, between the federal and 
state governments, close to one million public employees had been laid off by the end of 
September 1984 (The Guardian, 21, August, 1984, 12).
All of these measures taken by the adminitration failed to win over the IMF, who 
insisted on its primary conditions. Apparently it was with regard to the IMF’s insistence 
on massive devaluation and removal of subsidies, including fuel that the FMG drew a
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line in the sand, so to speak. According to Peter Asimota, “while the Nigeria government 
under Buhari pursued conservative monetary and fiscal policies which the IMF would 
approve of, it draws the fine at any massive devaluation, or direct interference by the IMF 
in domestic policy formulation or implementation” (1985, 9).
OTHER POLICY INITIATIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION
The FMG under General Buhari essentially continued to function within the 
framework of the Fourth National Development Plan, even as it identified particular areas 
of focus that it hoped would . .arrest the decline in the economy” and put it “on a proper 
course of recovery and solvency” (Onyema Ugochukwu, 1984, 1009).
The FMG felt particularly inclined to address the issues of foreign exchange, not
only because of its impact on the national economy, but also the level of abuse the switch
from rents on government contracts to rents on trade precipitated massive capital flight,
including all kinds of schemes from overseas medical bills to over-invoicing. Indeed, the
Exchange Control Decree No 7 was particular in its focus:
“The basic strategy underpinning these regulations is to 
reduce both imports and the demands for foreign exchange.
The regulations are three-pronged: (1) a lower ceiling on the total 
amount of exchange available to the public (that is the private sector);
(2) end-use regulation of the reduced allocation; and (3) restrictions 
on the private sector” (Olatunde Ojo and Peter Koehn, 1986).
Essentially, the provisions of this Decree were targeted at corrupt politicians, 
bureaucrats and their subverting contractor-business fellow conspirators. But the impact 
on the rest of the citizenry, especially its all-embodying 1 prohibitions was one of perhaps 
unintended consequences. In their extremity, they made everyday international 
transactions impossible, both for the ordinary citizen and international investment
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community. An extremely regulated foreign exchange regime is hardly conducive to the 
effective and dynamic functioning of any market economy.
The impact of this foreign exchange policy was as far-reaching, as it was 
impracticable. For instance, due to foreign exchange regulations, which placed even 
essential medications under specific license (hitherto, they have been under general open 
license), the country faced a critical shortage of supplies in all hospital, resulting in the 
national doctor’s strike of 1985. The FMG’s reacted by purportedly dismissing all of the 
doctors in public hospitals, dissolving their unions and imprisonment the strike leaders 
(West Africa, 4 March 1985, 437). The impact of the policy, especially on foreign 
exchange remittance regulation on Nigerian student’s abroad who could not be 
accommodated within the limited space of available number of universities in the country 
was the short and long term effect of manpower development in a country gravely in 
need of it (Ekekwe, 1985; Sunday Triumph, 14, October, 1984). It also affected the 
expatriate community who by now has their authorized remittances arbitrarily reduced 
from 50 per cent to 25%, without alternatives. It did not only discourage new 
investments, many of the investors and their expatriate employees resigned their 
appointments for reasons “not unconnected with the Federal Military Government’s 
reduction of their home remittance” (Sunday Triumph, 14th October, 1984). The other 
impact of this policy can only be appreciated within the context of the dearth of 
functional alternatives. In the circumstances of this arbitrariness in policy formulation 
and implementation, the unpredictability of the system was thought to be extremely 
frustrating. Its overall impact on foreign investment could not have been worse.
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The application of these new measures led to a reduction in imports to $11.7 
billion, a reduction of over 10 per cent. In 1985, the government imposed a $3.5 billion 
ceiling on imports (Daily Times, 2 March, 1984). The new ceiling, a 70 per cent 
reduction from 1984 led to chronic shortages. By some estimates, prices of household 
commodities such as cooking oil and soap soared by as much as 400 per cent (New 
Nigeria, 2 March, 1985).
The government’s introduction of price controls on a limited range of items was 
most helpful. Rather regressively, these controls were enforced on ex-factory, not at retail 
level. Consequently the data show that at the retail level, goods subject to ex-factory price 
controls experienced, if anything, more rapid price increases than unregulated goods, so 
the benefits of these controls accrued entirely to those able to make purchases at ex­
factory prices (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 95).
The policy implications on domestic production was as exacerbating. Many firms 
experienced shortage of raw materials and spare parts as a result of receiving only 10 to 
15 per cent of their requested imports requirements. After many months of idle waiting 
and bureaucratic arbitrariness some of these firms closed down, while others operated at 
extremely below capacity, between 15 and 25 per cent (New Nigeria, 2 March, 1985). 
This state of affairs could only be appreciated within the context of the foreign exchange 
the government was contending with at the relevant period and the fact that, according to 
the Manufacturer’s Association of Nigeria, over 60 per cent of all raw materials that local 
industry used in 1985 were imported. Even then, at no time did the sector contribute more 
than 7 per cent to GDP. Indeed it would appear that the sector’s contribution to GDP 
actually declined during the 1970s and 1980s (Table 9.2).
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SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (in Percentages) 
Table 9 .2
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Mining & Other 
Industries
Wholesale & 
Retail Trade
Transportation 
& Communication
1960 58 4.5 2 12 5
1961 61 5.0 2 11 5
1962 64 5.5 3 11 4
1963 57 5.5 2 12 5
1963 53 6.0 2 12 5
1964 50 6.0 2 12 5
1965 51 6.0 5 12 4
1967 52 7.0 4 12 4
1968 49 7.0 3 12 5
1969 44 7.0 8 12 4
1970 44 7.0 10 12 3
1971 42 6.0 15 11 2
1972 39 7.0 16 10 3
1973 28 4.5 18 20 4
1974 18 3.5 33 16 3
1975 19 5.0 22 20 3
1976 22 5.0 25 20 3
1977 23 5.0 24 21 3
1978 21 5.0 24 20 3
1979 20 5.0 28 21 4
1980 19 5.0 32 20 4
1982 22 5.0 24 21 5
1983 22 4.3 22 22 4
Source: United Nations, National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main Aggregates_ (New York: 
United Nations, 1979-88).
For example, output of all commercial vehicles declined from 30,000 units in 1981 to 10, 
000 in 1984 as most automobile assembly plants operated well below installed capacity. 
By some convoluted, yet understandable logic, at least in the circumstances of the 
relieving effect of huge alcohol consumption in depressive times, especially for a 
citizenry gravely impacted and depressed by economic hardship, the only industry that 
witnessed an increase in output was the brewing industry (Paul Hackett, 1988, 771).
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EVALUATING POLICY OUTCOMES
In addition to its serious attempt at foreign exchange regulation, the Buhari 
administration articulated econmic and market development perspective in other areas. 
For example, General Buhari announced in his 1984 budget speech (the only one 
believed to be wholly articulated by his government) that the FMG was seriously 
considering “a proposal to amend the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree to enable 
non-Nigerians to own up to 80 per cent of large farm projects” (Olyaiwola, 1987, 141). 
The policy shift was hoped to attract foreign private investment. It is doubtful whether 
this policy was ever implemented, given the limited span of that administration.
It is also noteworthy that because the administration effectively inherited the 
Fourth National Development Plan, it sought to implement the major components of the 
manufacturing policy under that plan, even as it abandoned some due to lack of resources 
flowing from the fall in crude oil sales. For example government expenditure was 
devoted to the manufacturing sector (steel development was allocated NG523 million). 
Obviously a 15 per cent reduction in total government expenditure from the previous year 
meant that the sector received much less in real terms than it did under the earlier 
administrations (for the current period, steel development was allocated NG 523 million) 
(Legum 1984, B532).
Whatever immediate effects the new regime’s measures had on the overall 
economy, especially on industries and which was then thought to be salutary, was short­
lived (See Table 9.3).
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SOME OF THE WORKERS RETRENCHED BY THE
STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
BETEWEEN 1 JANUARY AND 30 SEPTEMBER 1984
Table 9.3
State/Government Agency Number of Workers Sacked
Anambra State 4,177
Bauchi State 4,133
National Assembly 2,100
Kwara State 7,000
Federal Ministry of Finance 369
Niger State 2,144
Ogun State 900
Nigeria External Telecommunications 184
Sokoto State 2,545
Benue State 6,850
Bedel State 21,000
Nigeria Airports Authority 238
Federal Ministry of Works 255
Federal Ministry of Agriculture 220
Ondo State 1,176
Oyo State 3,000
Federal Ministry of Communications 1,029
Source: Bade Oninode, The IMF World Bank and African Debt: The Economic Impact (London: 
Zed Books, Ltd. 1989), p. 230
This figures were hardly sustainable at the point of full introduction of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) under the soon to be introduced General Babangida’s 
regime. This is because what these figures reflect are less improved productive capacity 
and more of increased transactions in real estate property owned by the majority of the 
firms, like UAC, Liver Brothers, etc.
However, the various foreign exchange measures seems to have had some 
salutary effects, in that it helped to cushion Nigeria’s debt crisis and slow the pace of 
economic desperation. At the beginning of 1984, the country’s overseas debt included 
approximately $10 billion in medium and long-term loans held by the government and 
about $7 billion in overdue short-term credits (plus interest) for goods and services 
already supplied. Uninsured obligation to overseas export business constituted about $5
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billion of the total foreign trade debt; the national governments (mainly OECD countries) 
of the creditor companies guaranteed the balance (Economist 3rd May, 1986, 6-7).
Inspite of the fact that the FMG did not secure additional facility from the IMF, it 
raised the country’s debt-service ratio by some 14 per cent from about 30 per cent in 
1984 to 44 percent in 1985 (Washington Post, 5th January, 1986). It also continued to 
make monthly payment of between $300-$400 billion on both the rescheduled bona-fide 
short-term obligations and its non-rescheduled medium and long-term debts to Western 
financial institutions (West Africa, 23rd April, 1984, 866). Indeed by the end of February 
1985, the country’s external liabilities had reduced to about $15.1 billion from $16.4 
billion in December 1984, including its non-scheduled medium and long-term debt to 
Western Financial institutions. Significantly, foreign reserves stood at $1385 million in 
February 1985, compared with $1265 million the previous December and less than $1000 
million at the time of the coup in December 1983 (West Africa, May 6th and 13th, 1985, 
908, 958).
CONCLUSION
Inspite of its obvious, albeit authoritarian, best endeavours, the Buhari 
administration fell victim to its own machinations. It attempted to secure its power by 
constructing the apparatus of a police state. Its revitalization and expansion of the 
dreaded secret police, National Security Organization (NSO) was very telling.2 The 
Organization became an instrument of terror, used to intimidate and scrutinize military 
officers as well as civilian opponents of the regime. The press was strictly and dreadfully 
regulated and many journalists were imprisoned. Strikes were banned, a wage freeze was 
imposed, while the trade union activities were suppressed. Unfortunately it seemed that
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the regime was blatantly partisan in the treatment of displaced politicians, with more 
leniency toward Northern politicians; a gesture which significance was not lost to 
Nigerians and regional politicians, especially since this was the first time a military 
government, and an otherwise non-partisan institution in the country’s history (hitherto) 
showed such partisan inclination (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 96).
These authoritarian measures intensified as the economic situation rapidly 
deteriorated. The prospect of the administration securing what appeared to be the IMF 
“life-line”, foreign loans and investments were not only beginning to decline, but to 
completely dry up. These economic conditions which seemed desperately ripe to seek 
and receive international aid and loans but which futilely was not forthcoming created an 
atmosphere clearly seen as an opportunity for change in political direction (Yusufu, 1996, 
90). According to Diamond, public disaffection and a deepening economic morass 
prompted elements within the military to oust Buhari and Idiagbon on August 27, 1985, 
(1988, 56-57). In the views of Olukoshi, the administration was doomed inspite of its 
nationalistic opposition to the IMF conditionalities. “The official nationalistic opposition 
to devaluation did not dovetail with the autonomous groundswell of domestic opposition 
to IMF policies, because of the alienation of groups such as workers, students, academics 
and professionals by the military regime, groups which, in turn, did not show any 
solidarity with the government” (1995, 144).
It may be argued that in its blinding patriotism, the administration became 
incurably nai've, as it substituted sound and responsive economic policy with patriotic 
sloganeering. The economic situation on the ground did not improve so as to give hope to 
the citizenry. At the height of what effectively became economic stagnation, foreign
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exchange rationing because the order of the day, even as plants were operating at below 
30 and 40 per cent capacity (New Nigeria, 2nd March, 1985, 4) This exacerbated 
widespread hoarding of “essential commodities”, including drugs and other medical 
supplies, culminating in price inflation. As industries closed or operated below capacity, 
unemployment became the order of the day.
Furthermore, the bureaucratic strictures attendant on the Import License regime did 
not only scare away foreign investment because of frustrating and obstructive processes, 
it made functioning for domestic business almost impossible, in addition to creating the 
most corrupt and debilitating atmosphere to operate any business. The end for the Buhari 
administration came suddenly and swiftly on August 27, 1985.
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ENDNOTES
1. Apart from the fact that the Decree was retroactive to October 1,1979 (perhaps to 
snag the politicians of the second republic who were notorious for the corruption 
and mismanagement), its indiscriminate application lacked common 
jurisprudentially sense. It also affected the most innocuous of transactional 
activities. For example, the Decree makes it an offense punishable by five years 
imprisonment and a fine in the same amount of foreign exchange involved for any 
person to make payment outside official means or place any sum to the credit of 
an individual outside Nigeria (either for subscription, educational purposes or 
otherwise). Indeed, many state gover ments cancelled scholarship awards to their 
students studying abroad and requested that come back home. It was also the case 
that apart from restrictions basic travel allowance, which was restricted to $130 
per traveller per year, there were also restrictions on medical care abroad. Only 
medical services positively verified as unavailable in Nigeria by competent 
authorities qualified for foreign exchange allocation for overseas travel.
2. Interview in Lagos with the Deputy Director of NSO on July 23, 1999 revealed 
That immediately following the Buhari coup, the Organization’s security vote did 
not only increase, but that they received expanded responsilities, which included 
round-the-clock monitoring of influential “trouble makers”. It is his opinion that 
the Organization’s indiscriminate and government-sanctioned harassment 
seriously affected foreign investment, as the perception was that Nigeria had 
become police state and unhealthy for investment.
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CHAPTER TEN
MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1985 -1993  
(GENERAL IBRAHIM BADAMOSIBABANGIDA) 
INTRODUCTION
The Buhari administration was overthrown in a bloodless coup on July 27, 1985 
in what had been speculated as internal hierarchical squabble amongst the initial military 
leadership that sacked the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari. General 
Ibrahim Babangida was the number three, hierarchically speaking, as the Chief of Army 
Staff in the Buhari administration he subsequently overthrew. Understandably therefore, 
his administration did not only lack the moral authority to stage a coup in the tradition of 
predecessor coups, by accusing the previous regime of corruption or mismanagement, 
without implicating its own members. Besides, it also lacked the credibility of “new” and 
“reformist” regime. To justify its emergence therefore, the regime cloaked itself in the 
benevolent dictatorship of participatory military administration of the 1966-1976 stripe.
The circumstances of General Babangida’s ascension to the military leadership, 
following the coup he mid-wived seemed to foretell both the styles of his government and 
the undiscernibility of his overall management ambience. Indeed, there seemed from the 
outset something very personalizing about the process that was devoid of military 
collegiate leadership of Generals Gowon and Obasanjo hue. His policy thrusts were as 
inspiringly hopeful as they were disastrously manipulative and misapplied. He set in 
place the Political Transition Programme (PTP) and the Economic Transition Programme 
(ETP), the former not effectively taken off until 1989, while the later took off in 1986. It 
is noteworthy that his government lasted for over 8 years and he implemented the most 
elaborate and far-reaching economic, social and political policy initiatives the country
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had seen in more than 36 years. That he was the first military head of state in the history 
of the country to designate himself President portended a telling curiosity of his person, 
personality and style of leadership.
His first attempt at legitimacy was the inauguration of the national debate, as to 
whether the country should or should not accept the IMF conditionalities as a 
precondition for economic relief and assistance. It is important to reiterate here that the 
Buhari administration had out-dghtly rejected the proposal as critics associated the IMF 
with everything that was wrong and debilitating with developing world’s economies and 
market development, including the citizens’ well being.
However, the need to reach some accommodation with the IMF in the face of 
worsening economic situation in the country became more urgent, especially with world 
market oil price falling to as low as US $10 per barrel. It is believed that reaching 
accommodation with IMF with a view to rescheduling the nation’s debts and renewing 
external flows, persuaded the Babangida administration to initiate negotiations with the 
Fund. Even then, the new administration was constrained by widespread public antipathy 
for accepting IMF conditionalities (Essien, 1990, 78).
MARKET/ECONOMIC POLICY INITIATIVES
There appears to be too many features in the administration’s thrusts very early in 
the processes that were sufficiently indicative of what turned out to be the many twists 
and turns of the Babangida years. It has been suggested that from the beginning, the 
administration manifested its inclination towards the IMF by the appointment of a former 
employee of the IMF, Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu, as the Finance Minister. It subsequently 
stacked the newly established “Committee on IMF Conditionalities and Loans” with
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appointees who favoured accepting the money (National Concord, September 20 and 21, 
1985, 6 and 1 respectively).
The orchestrated attempt at national debate to reach agreement on a deal with 
IMF was a grave manipulative disaster. While the debate was going on however, the 
government began discreet discussions/consultations with the World Bank on an 
adjustment package for the country (Olukoshi, 1995, 145). It is also interesting that the 
FMG waited for several weeks, amidst strong and persistent rumours, to announce 
whether or not it had accepted or rejected the recommendations of the committee on the 
IMF conditionalities. Apparently, the regime sought to avoid responsibility for an 
agreement it was eargerly disposed to making, while clearly seeing it as desirable. In the 
face of strong national opposition, the regime lost the public campaign, after nearly three 
months of orchestrated public debate. The regime also decided to declare a 15-month 
national economic emergency to begin from October 1, 1985. This involved wage and 
salary cuts between 2 and 20 per cent for public and private sector employees. Among 
other things, this policy move promptly invited Labour Union condemnation as being 
both arbitrary and unilateral, and for subjecting already hard-pressed workers to further 
hardship.
Having finally lost what was the final outcome of an earlier conceived two- 
process exercise at legitimacy, rejection in an unusual (for a military government) public 
dialogue, the administration moved on to its primary agenda. Apparently the rejection 
was a collective willingness and readiness by Nigerians to make sacrifices for the sake of 
national economic recovery, as long as the recovery package was designed by Nigerians 
and implemented at their own pace. The FMG seemingly obliged. It evolved the
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Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which it justified as an attempt to correct “the 
almost total dominance of national life by three foreign based elements that were proving 
to be counter-productive at one and the same time,” namely:
(a) an excessive dependence on imports, particularly consumer goods 
including food;
(b) almost total neglect of domestic production in all the five sectors of the 
economy, namely agriculture, industry, construction, commerce and 
transportation; and
(c) almost total dependence on earnings from oil exports alone for boosting 
government revenues as well as for accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves (Yusufu, 1996, 93).
As would become dubiously recurrent and rather typical of the regime, the 
government also invited the World Bank to draw up an adjustment programme that was 
subsequently submitted for IMF approval. This way the regime attempted to satisfy 
domestic public opinion whilst simultaneously sending signals to international financiers 
that it was ready to do business with them. It is believed that the IMF offered some loan 
as part of this programme, but was declined by the FMG, understandably, to maintain a 
consistent, even if misleading, front (Callaghy, 1990, 307; Bevan, Collier, and Collier, 
1999, 97).
The FMG through its 1986 budget lay the basis for the introduction of an 
IMF/World Bank-sanctioned adjustment programme dubbed Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), which it claimed was home-grown. Babangida had this to say in his 
January 1986 budget speech to the nation:
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. .in my silver jubilee address to you on 1st October 1985,1 declared 
a state of national economic emergency for a period of 15 months.
This action was dictated by the serious economic problems facing 
us—huge foreign and domestic debts, a rapidly declining per capita 
income, a high rate of unemployment, severe shortages of raw materials 
and spare parts for our industries, and a high rate of inflation. We Nigerians 
all agreed the solution to these serious social and economic problems must 
be found through our own efforts at own pace and our volition, consistent 
with our own voluntary national interest. We are determined more than ever 
before to harness our own home-grown efforts to solve our problems and set 
a new path for the future (Babangida: 1986).
The programme (SAP) was designed to rapidly and effectively transform the 
national economy over a period of 15 months and to end by June 1986. Part of the 
rationalization, according to the Ministry, “the present government reckoned that the IMF 
loan facility, apart from being so patently insulting to the nation, would only have 
promoted further wishful planning based on oil revenue that never met expectations in 
the end... so the government formulated and imposed on itself the ‘package of economic 
reforms, chiefly to lessen dependence on oil revenues and imports and at the same time 
satisfy domestic demand by raising production substantially in domestic agriculture and 
industry’, which constitute the two main ways in which, under SAP, it has been trying to 
bring about sustained economic growth as the only lasting solution to the ever rising cost 
of living” (Federal Ministry of Information, 1989, 10-11).
The key elements in the programme were the floating of the exchange rate, trade 
liberalization, and fiscal and monetary stringency. Upon floating, the exchange rate 
initially fell from NG1.27 per dollar to NG 4.60. According to some estimates, the 
devaluation changed relative prices rather than the price level, since the post devaluation 
inflation rate was one of the lowest in Nigeria’s history (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 
1999, 98).
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It also reduced the petroleum subsidy by 80 per cent and committed the 
government to the privatization and commercialization of public enterprises. For 
example, the Nigerian National Supply Company (NNSC), which the Buhari regime had 
refused to abolish, was disbanded and a package of incentives for exporters was 
announced. Non-statutory transfers to all economic and quasi-economic parastatals were 
reduced by 50 per cent (1995, 146). The Import Licensing system was terminated, 
domestic foreign exchange (domiciliary) accounts were legalized. To deal with the highly 
contentious and politically delicate issue of the appropriate exchange rate of the Naira, 
the government in September 1986 introduced a two-tier exchange system.
The first-tier foreign exchange market was used to temporarily handle debt 
servicing and official subscriptions/transfers to international organizations at the 
prevailing nominal exchange rate of the Naira to the Dollar. All other transactions were 
to be handled through the second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), where the 
Naira was allowed to appreciate or depreciate on the basis of bids submitted by the banks 
for the foreign exchange supplied to the market by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). It 
was hoped that through the gradual convergence of the administratively-determined first- 
tier exchange rate and market-based second-tier rate, the Naira would be realistically 
devalued. When the government abolished the first-tier market in January 1988, it gave 
as its reasons, the attainment of convergence. From that period, all official and private 
transactions were carried out on the Foreign Exchange Market (FEM). From an initial 
exchange rate of NG1.27 per dollar at inception of SFEM in 1986, the exchange rate of 
the naira to the dollar is NG 114.50 to $1; an effective devaluation of over 100 per cent 
(The Guardian, June 30, 2001).
318
If anything the reform programme yielded rapid progress with creditors, even as it 
more rapidly had the most deleterious effect on virtually all sectors of the national 
economy. Consensus was reached with the IMF in September 1986, upon which a 
standby agreement was put in place the following January. This consensus facilitated 
rescheduling accords with the Paris and London Clubs, including commitments for 
modest infusions of new money from the United States, Japan and the World Bank. Since 
April 1986, Nigeria has taken steps to restructure its debt. For commercial banks, 
(multilateral), a total of $4.7 billion was restructured in April 1986 and November 1987. 
In March 1989 $6.0 billion was restructured. A total of $13.3 billion in debt to official 
creditors was restructured between October 1986 and March 1989 (World Bank, 1990).
Overall, the regime adhered to ambivalent economic policy orthodoxy throughout 
the later years of 1980s. The exchange rate increasingly reflected uncertain market 
values, despite regular Central Bank intervention in the currency auction. Interest rates 
fluctuated widely, as inflation rose, especially following Circular No 21 issued by the 
Central Bank on July 31, 1987 abolishing all forms of controls on interest rates. The 
Bank also raised its minimum discount rate from 11 per cent to 15 percent. Indeed, 
interest rates shot up to about 18 per cent in the second half of 1987 and hovered around 
20 per cent for much of 1988. Fiscal cutbacks and deficit reductions were seriously 
pursued; even then a “reflectionary” budget was outlined in 1988 and compensatory 
measures were implemented in 1989, following public protests, of the hardships 
occasioned by these policies, including the spirited protests of the Manufacturing 
Association of Nigeria (MAN) and other business groups. Rising expenditures yielded an 
unprecedented budget deficit in 1990. The trade regime, which was dramatically
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liberalized still imposed bans on a variety of items, including textiles, malted barley 
maize, wheat, rice and hops. Exports of raw cocoa were also prohibited in an effort to 
promote domestic processing. Subsidies for petroleum products and fertilizer were 
further reduced but not eliminated.
It has been suggested that perhaps the most significant reform which the FMG 
introduced as part of its effort to sustain reform was the institutional restructure of two 
critical components of viable sustainability: the Central Bank and the Civil Service 
(Olukoshi, 1995, 155-156). In 1989, the Central Bank was removed from the jurisdiction 
and the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and placed in the office of the President. 
The Governor of the Bank now reported directly to the President rather than to the 
Minister of Finance (West Africa, May 17, 1989). This accountability change was 
followed by an internal restructure and the creation of the position of four new deputy 
governors assisting the Governor in matters of administration and research, domestic 
banking, external transactions, foreign exchange operations and currency operations. 
Ostensibly, these reforms were intended to strengthen the operational capacity and 
autonomy of the Bank. It is doubtful whether they significantly affected the government’s 
overall management and implementation of SAP. If anything, the CBN restructure which 
placed the apex bank under the thumb of the military president enabled and facilitated the 
mismanagement and corruption of the control system since the Presidency dealt directly 
with the Bank, without unduly attracting public scrutiny. Reports suggest a pathetic abuse 
of the process both under Generals Babangida and Abacha 1 (George Uriesi, 2000).
The civil service reform was another area the FMG sought to restructure, with a 
view to more effectively implement the SAP. Beginning with the establishment of a high-
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level study team in 1987, the reform of the civil service was completed in 1989. The 
exercise was also aimed at promoting accountability, professionalism and operations 
efficiency, as well as reduce bureaucratic red tape. Following the reform, Ministers as 
opposed to Permanent Secretaries, became the Chief Executive and Chief Accounting 
Officers for their respective ministries. Permanent secretaries were re-designated 
director-generals. This reform also culminated in the upgrading of the Budget Office into 
full ministerial department headed by a cabinet minister. As with the CBN reform, it is 
debatable whether these changes, which in the main seemed cosmetic, in any way 
positively impacted the underlying problems of the civil service and their operations.2
These structural changes, significant and more economically impacting than was 
originally represented provoked protests from interest groups. Indeed, the general 
situation was so exacerbating and intolerable that the former military head of State, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo in December 1987 admonished the FMG to evolve a less 
monstrous relief programme, calling for “adjustment with a human face” (The Guardian, 
December, 1987). For example, import-substituting manufacturing firms, many of whom 
could not survive trade liberalization at any exchange rate because they were operating at 
low or zero value added at world prices, responding by retrenching workers. Another 
group, the North had little to gain from the devaluation, since the remaining tradable 
crops were grown elsewhere, and the fact that it had lost power with the Babangida coup, 
with inherent capacity to influence policies. As for the civil service, it suffered relatively 
little, even though those in the public corporations were threatened by privatization. 
However, the private employees experienced massive layoffs. The Marketing Boards 
were also abolished, costing employees their jobs. According to some opinions, the
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changes of mid-1986 were by far the most substantial and abrupt shift in Nigeria’s 
economic policy since 1950 (Yusufu, 1996; Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999, 98).
In order to deal with the myriads of contending issues stemming from its policies, 
the regime adopted a combination of strategies, including selective accommodation of the 
opposition demands, repression and co-optation of opponents and the erection of its own 
clientele network. At the level of accommodation, the government effected a slow down 
in the implementation of its policies and even diluted their content, in order to contain the 
opposition. Apart from its deflationary budget of 1988, it introduced the mass transit, and 
the Directorate of Employment activities, like the Open Apprenticeship Schemes. Other 
concessions made by the government included the creation of the soft-loan, non-profit 
making Peoples’ Bank, essentially targeting the urban poor, the administrative pegging of 
interest rates, the unfreezing of wages and the lifting of the ban on recruitment into the 
civil service, the introduction of a new minimum wage and a lost of others. In addition, it 
resorted to the creation of its own clientelist networks. Contract content of public 
expenditure became a key component of the government clientelist network while the 
leaders of trade unions, professional associations, student’s organizations and influential 
academics were targeted for co-optation. This tactic was supplemented with the arrest 
and detention of some of the most vociferous critics of FMG policies (Olukoshi, 1995, 
154-154).
The regime’s predisposition at extra-budgetary spending as a mean of sustaining 
its support base was also evident following the coup attempt in April 1990. The 
administration felt it necessary to garner support from the military. It embarked on a large 
spending programme for the rehabilitation of the police and military barracks, including
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special grants for the welfare of officers. It also increased spending on new weapons, as 
well as on national security including the extremely controversial National Guard. Indeed 
by February 1992, $50 million was allocated by the regime to purchase 3,000 Peugeots 
for the private use of officer ranks of captains and majors in the Nigerian Army, even as 
officers of the Navy and Air force were similarly compensated.
OTHER POLICY INITIATIVES
According to Olu Falae, one time secretary to the FMG under General Babangida, 
the guiding philosophy of SAP, which was an extension of the policy thrust of the 1986 
federal budget, was economic reconstruction, social justice and self-reliance (1992, 222). 
The broad objectives was active fiscal balance and balance of payment viability by 
altering and restructuring production and consumption patterns of the economy; 
eliminating price distortions; reducing heavy dependence on crude oil exports and 
consumer goods imports; enhancing the non-export base and achieving sustainable 
growth. Other aims of the policy were to rationalize the role of the public sector and to 
accelerate the growth potential of the private sector (Central Bank of Nigeria Briefs, 
Series No 92/03, July 1992, 3).
Although by July 1987, the first tier and second tier foreign exchange markets 
have been merged in order to reinforce the market determinations of the exchange rate, 
the unified foreign exchange market placed a lot of demand pressures on available 
foreign exchange and thus led to a rapid depreciation in the value of the naira relative to 
other international currencies. The search for relief led to two other determinate policy 
initiatives. In 1989, bureaux de changes were licensed to allow and facilitate easy access
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to small users of foreign exchange market (Central Bank of Nigeria Briefs, Series No. 
92/08, July 1992, 4). Also on March 2, 1992, there was a complete deregulation of the 
foreign exchange market, purportedly to bridge the gap between the official market 
exchange rate and the paralleled market. It was believed that this initiative would curtail 
the activities of currency speculators and hoarders who were accused of creating 
instability in the foreign exchange market. At the time of this decision, the official market 
exchange rate was adjusted upward to $1 = NG 18 from NG10.55 (See Table 10.1)
EXCHANGE RATE OF THE NAIRA VIS-A-VIS 
THE INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES:
OCTOBER 28,1993
Table 10.1
CURRENCY
MARKET
CENTRAL
BANK
RATE
BUREAU
DE
CHANGE
PARALLEL
DOLLAR 21,99 42,50 42,50
POUNDS 35,58 64,00 64,00
DEUTCH 13,12 26,70 27,50
MARK
Source: The News Magazine, November 15,1993, p. 30
The figures represent a naira devaluation of over 400 per cent against the
dollar and the British pounds sterling (using the 1980 exchange rates of 54 kobo to $1 
and about NG2 to 1 pound sterling, as the index). As would be expected, this dramatic 
devaluation had serious implications for investment and industrial production in the 
country.
The other, perhaps as critical, policy element of SAP was the privatization 
and commercialization of state enterprises. The process commenced in 1988 with the 
setting up of the Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC), 
through Decree No. 25 of 1988.3 The committee was empowered to handle state
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divestment processes by issue and sale of shares in public enterprises. To effect this 
exercise, the various state enterprises were classified into four. First are those in which 
state equity interests are to be fully privatized (these include hotelling and agro-allied 
industries) — Durbar Hotels, Nigeria Hotels Limited, Nigeria Dairies Company, Nigerian 
Food Company Limited,, Nigerian Grains Company Limited. Second, were those in 
which state equity interest are to be partially privatized — oil companies, steel rolling 
mills, air and sea travels, fertilizer companies and banks. Third, were those to be partially 
commercialized — Nigerian Railways Corporation, National Elective Power Authority, 
the River Basin Development Authority and Federal Radio and Television Stations. 
Fourth were those to be fully commercialized — Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) Nigerian Coal 
Corporation, Nigerian Ports Authority and African Re-insurance Corporation.
The TCPC had offered for sale share equities in about 55 enterprises in 
which the government had interest by 1992. The proceeds from this divestment process 
was estimated at NG 3.3 billion by the end of 1992 (CBN, Annual Reports and 
Statements of Accounts, December 1992, 70). The commercialization exercise was still 
in progress as the TCPC was reported to have prepared reform packages for about 30 out 
of the 34 state enterprises affected by the exercise (CBN, December, 1992, 70).
The regime introduced other policy measures whose specific purpose was 
to deregulate the economy, stimulate investment and promote external trade. These 
entailed the deregulation of interest rates introduced in 1987; again to be reintroduced in 
1991. The maximum lending rate was fixed at 21 per cent while a minimum of 13.5 per 
cent was stipulated for savings deposits rates (CBN Briefs, Monetary Policy in Nigeria,
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Series No. 92/03, July 1992, 3). However, by 1992, the attempt at realistic competitive 
interest rate regime seemed a futile exercise, at which point there was a reversal to the 
regime of interest rate deregulation.
The regime also reduced the number of prohibited import items from 74 to 
16. In addition, private individuals and exporters were encouraged to repatriate their 
foreign exchange earnings by guaranteeing them unrestricted access to it through the 
operation of the domiciliary accounts. Furthermore, the administration abolished 
marketing boards in mid-1986, thereby encouraging private sector participation in the 
export trade of agricultural produce and opening up the possibilities of higher returns for 
farmers on the sale of agricultural produce. It also established Export Processing Zones 
(EPZ) as part of government’s efforts at boosting non-oil export production.
Government’s introduction of an industrial policy in 1989 sought to 
invalidate the Indigenisation Decree of 1972; especially by allowing foreign participation 
in all areas of the economy, including those previously reserved exclusively for Nigerians 
under the original decree. It also established the Industrial Development Coordinating 
Committee (IDCC) to facilitate the approval process for the establishment of industries in 
the country. The government also effected a reduction in the corporation tax structure 
from 45 per cent to 40 per cent.
EVALUATING SRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME (SAP) 
SAP was not only the administration’s brainchild, notwithstanding its 
obvious origins, it also became the compost of its economic and social policy formulation 
and implementation flagship. By 1993, Nigerians had endured approximately eight years 
of SAP programme, even though it was designed to have lasted for less than two years.
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The question that remains doubtfully unanswered, at officially, is whether SAP lasted this 
long because it was successful at helping restructure the economy or that it was such 
uncertain and indeterminate phenomenon that it took so long to ascertain where indeed it 
was headed. Apparently, SAP’s positive or negative impact on the overall economy, and 
indeed societal well-being, is of debatable validity or relevance since the argument in and 
of itself answers little, if anything. 4 However, some have argued that SAP was an 
unqualified disaster, that it created more economic hardship and uncertainties than it 
created relief (Yusufu, 1996, 108-109; Anunobi, 1992, 251).
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) BY SECTORS, 1981-1985 (AT 1984 CONSTANT FACTOR 
COST) (N MILLION)
Table 10.2
S/N Sector 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Amount
(Nm)
% Average
%
1 Agriculturelivestock,
forestry,
Fishing
24460.7 25082.3 25009.2 23799.5 27794.5 3333.6 13.6 3.4
2 Minning and Quarrying 10749.0 9634.4 9147.1 10155.2 10743.2 (-5.8) 0.5) (-0.1)
3 Manufacturing 6964.2 7806.7 5549.4 4926.2 5903.5 (-1060.7) (-15.2) (-3.8)
4 Utilities 
(Electricity 
and Water)
478.6 475.0 555.6 514.7 472.8 (-5.8) (-1.2) (1.5)
5 Building and Construction 3325.0 2652.0 2338.0 1609.0 1313.0 (-2112.0) (-6.1) (-3.3)
6 Transportationand
Communication
3929.0 3027.4 2411.6 2896.8 3405.7 (-523.3) (-13.3) (0.6)
7 Wholesale and Retail 
trade 
(distribution)
9155.9 9551.9 9318.3 8596.6 8936.6 (-219.3) 2.4) 0.25
8 Products
and
Government
Services
4790.0 4744.3 4949.5 4605.6 4837.5 47.5 1.0 (-0.8)
9 Finance
and
Insurance
2403.7 3037.2 2996.0 2389.8 2324.2 (-79.5) (-3.3) 3.8
10 Real Estate 
and 
Business 
Services
200.8 200.3 220.6 214.0 231.2 30.4 15.1 (-7.4)
11 Hotels and 
Restaurants
736.3 695.5 584.5 492.4 454.4 (-281.9) (-29.7) 1.1
12
Housing
(Dwellings) 1813.3 1832.0 1854.0 1874.0 1894.0 81.0 4.5 (-6.4)
13 Community Social and 
Personal 
Services
812.7 820.0 769.4 635.2 605.9 (-206.8) (-25.4) (-6.4)
14 GDP at 
Factor Cost
65605.7 6542.0 61444.0 63006.2 689116.1 3310.4 5.0 1.25
15 Growth Rate (index) 100 99.7 93.7 96.0 105.0 “ 5.0 1.25
Source: Compiled from F.O.S., National Accounts of Nigeria, 1981-1991, Table 4
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It has been suggested that the dismal performance of the economy during the 
fourth plan period, 1981-85 was the immediate reason for introducing SAP. The gross 
domestic product (GDP) statistics suggests some incremental improvement in the growth 
of the economy, following SAP. To determine the levels of performance of the GDP by 
sectors between the period 1981-1985 and the period since SAP, from 1986-1993, Tables 
10.2 and 10.3 indicate that, the GDP grew by 1.25 per cent per annum on the average 
during 1981-85, as against 3.7 per cent for the SAP period.
Moreover, while all the economic sectors (except Agriculture, Real Estate, 
Government Services, and Housing) recorded significant drops in growth rate from 1981 
-  85, all the sectors recorded positive growth rates per annum during SAP from 1986 -  
19993. In the few sectors where both periods recorded positive growth rates, those of the 
SAP era were apparently more impressive. Agriculture had an average yearly growth of 
3.4 per cent in 1981-85 as against 3.5 per cent during the SAP. Government services 
grew by a mere 0.25 per cent per annum during 1981-85 compared with 14.5 per cent 
over the SAP period. The growth in the Housing Sector was 1.1 per cent per annum in the 
earlier period as against 3.2 per cent under SAP
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) BY SECTORS, 1986-1993 (AT 1984 
CONSTANT FACTOR COST) (N MILLION)
Table 10.3
/N
Increase/Decrease (-) 
1986-1993
Sector 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Amount
(NM) %
Avg
%
p.a.
1 Agriculturelivestock,
forestry,
Fishing
30356.
5
29388.9 32273.2 33845.5 35277.2 366277.2 366277.2 37780.0 7424.3 24.5 3.5
2 Minning and Quarrying 10029.
2
9087.5 9828.4 11288.8 11911.1 12992.5 13343.6 13017.3 2988.11 29.8 4.2
3 Manufacturing 5673.9 6729.5 6840.2 7361.4 7904.0 7657.2 7657.2 7341.0 1667.1 29.4 4.2
4 Utilities 
(Electricity 
and Water)
367.3 389.1 415.3 450.5 500.6 524.6 555.9 580.3 213.0 58.0 8.3
5 Building and Construction 3009.4 3010.9 3041.4 3048.9 2989.5 3088.51 3352.4 3495.2 485.8 16.1 2.3
6 Transportationand
Communication
1311.0 1433.0 1579.0 1644.7 1726.9 1796.0 1866.0 1959.3 648.3 49.5 7.1
7 Wholesale and Retail 
trade 
(distribution)
9251.0 9381.1 10725.0 11154.0 11488.6 11856.3 12223.8 12590.5 3339.5 36.1 5.2
8 Products
and
Government
Services
5020.1 5314.5 6125.9 6673.8 7596.3 7912.5 8900.1 10120.9 5100.8 101.
6
14.5
9 Finance
and
Insurance
2806.4 3035.1 3719.7 5185.9 7884.6 8200.0 8524.0 8845.4 6039.0 215.
2
30.7
0 Real Estate 
and 
Business 
Services
245.2 248.1 250.6 254.3 259.0 269.4 271.0 281.5 36.3 14.8 2.1
1 Hotels and 
Restaurants
461.0 467.7 468.5 473.2 477.9 482.7 492.3 499.7 38.7 8.4 i . 2
2
Housing
(Dwellings)
1913.6 1933.8 1952.2 1981.4 2080.5 21263.7 2247.9 2342.1 428.5 22.4 3.2
3 Community Social and 
Personal 
Services
631.4 637.7 644.0 667.6 678.1 723.3 723.3 795.2 163.2 25.9 3.7
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14 GDP at 
Factor Cost
71076.
0
70740.6 77752.3 83495.0 90342.0 94663.2 97431.4 99649.2 28573.2 40.2 5.7
15 Growth Rate (index) 100 99.5 109.4 117.5 127.1 13.2 137.1 140.2 40.2 5.7
Source: (a) F.O.S., National Accounts of Nigeria, 1981-1991, Table 4 (in respect of 1986-1991) 
(b) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1994 Edition, Table234 (in respect of 
1992,1993).
As noted earlier, since SAP was fundamentally a process at restructuring 
the economy in order to increase the relevance of the perceived real sectors, particularly 
agriculture and industry (manufacturing etc), as against the dominance of the mineral 
(including oil) sector, the relative contributions of the different sectors to the GDP may 
be evaluated to determine levels of structural changes. Tables 10.4 and 10.5, which 
respectively represent pre-SAP period of 1981-1985 and SAP era, are quite revealing.
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Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sectors 
(1984 Constant Prices) 1981 -  1985
Tab e 10.4
S/N Sector 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Yearly
Average
(%)
1.
2.
Agriculture, Livestock, 
Forestry, Fishing
Mining and Quarrying
34.7
15.3
35.8
13.7
37.7
13.8
37.8
16.1
40.3
15.6
37.3
14.9
3. Manufacturing and 
Crafts
9.9 11.2 8.4 7.8 8.5 9.2
4. Utilities (Electricity, 
Water)
0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
5. ■ Building and 
Construction
4.7 3.8 3.5 3.0 1.9 3.4
6. Transport and 
Communications
6.4 5.1 4.7 5.6 5.0 5.4
7. Wholesale and Retail 
Trade Distribution)
13.0 13.6 14.0 13.6 13.0 13.4
8. Hotel and Restaurants 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9
9. Finance and Insurance 3.4 4.3 4.5 3.4 3.4 3.8
10 Real Estate and 
Business Services
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
11. Housing (Dwelling) 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.8
12. Community, Social and 
Personal Services
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1
13. Producers of 
Government Services
6.8 6.8 7.5 7.5 7.0 7.1
14. TOTAL GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: F.O.S. National Accounts of Nigeria, 1981-1991, Table 7. 
NB: Some of the numbers have rounded to 100
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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) BY 
SECTORS
(AT 1984 CONSTANT PRHCES), 1986-93
Table 10.5
S/N SECTOR 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 YEARLY
AVERAGE
(%)
1 Agriculture, 
livestock, forestry: 
fishing 42.7 41.5 41.5 40.6 39.1 38.8 38.3 37.9 40.0
2
Minning and 
Quarrying 14.1 12.8 12.7 13.5 13.2 13.7 13.7 13.1 8.2
3
Manufacturing and 
Crafts 8.0 8.4 8.7 8.2 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.9 8.2
4 Utilities (Electricity, 
Water 0.5 0.6 05 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
5 Building and 
Construction 1.8 2.0 20.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9
6 Transport and 
Communition 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.2 3.2
7 Wholesale and Retail 
Trade (Distribution) 13.0 13.9 13.8 13.4 12.7 12.7 12.5 12.6 13.1
8 Producers of 
Government Services 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.0 8.4 8.4 10.4 10.2 8.5
9 Finance and 
Insurance 4.0 4.3 4.8 6.2 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.9 6.8
10 Real Estate and 
Business services 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
11 Hotel and Restaurant 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
12 Housing (Dwelling) 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5
13 Community, Special 
and Personal 
Serviced
0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
14 Total GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: F.O.S. National Accounts of Nigeria, 1981-1991, Table 7.
The average yearly contribution of the Agriculture sector to the GDP over the 
earlier period was 37.3 per cent, whilst during the SAP period it had increased to 40 per 
cent. The mining and Quarrying sector (with crude oil pre-dominating) accounted on the 
average for 14.9 per cent of the GDP during 1981-85. This dropped to 13.3 per cent
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under SAP. Regarding these two sectors, therefore, it could be concluded that, at least to 
some extent, the objective of SAP have been realized.
The other important sectors of the economy show a much more ambiguous 
outcome. Manufacturing fell from an average of 9.2 per cent in the period 1981-1985 to 
8.2 per cent under SAP between 1986 and 1993. The building and construction sector’s 
average contribution to GDP fell significantly from 3.4 per cent to 1.9 per cent; utilities 
from an average of 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent. From the foregoing, it can be concluded 
that in terms of sectarian and overall GDP growth rates, the SAP period has apparently 
performed better than the pre-SAP period 1981-1985.
It would appear that SAP felt short, or at best recorded ambiguous results, 
in other critical areas. One of the main objectives of SAP was to achieve fiscal and 
monetary balance at both Federal and State levels by restraining expenditure and 
avoiding deficit financing. Looking at the Table 10.6 and 10.7, it appears balance was far 
from being realized. Table 10.6 shows that the Federal government deficit rose by more 
than 3,200 per cent at current prices, between 1985 and 1993. Since the real value of the 
Naira would have depreciated considerably over the period, this level of deficit is 
significant and gravely impacting. The deficit arose from 31.5 per cent in 1985 to 103.6 
per cent. It declined to 36.5 per cent in 1987, only to climb to nearly 138 per cent in 
1993.
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Summary of Federal Government Finances, 1985-1993
Table 10.6
Year
Revenue Retained Expenditure Surplus/Deficit ()
Amount
(Nm)
Index Amount
(Nm)
Index Amount
(Nm)
Index % of
Revenue
1985 9640.3 100 12680.0 100 (3039.7) 100 31.53
1986 7969.4 82.67 16233.7 127.95 (8254.3) 271.55 103.57
1987 16129.0 167.31 22018.7 173.65 (5889.1) 193.74 36.51
1988 15588.6 161.7 27749.5 218.84 (12160.9) 400.07 78.01
1989 25762.2 267.23 41028.3 323.57 (15266.1) 502.22 59.66
1990 39033.0 404.89 61149.1 482.25 (22116.1) 727.58 56.66
1991 31774.5 329.60 67529.7 532.56 (35755.2) 1176.27 112.53
1992 51742.2 536.73 107723.3 849.55 (55981.1) 1841.66 108.19
1993 73397.9 761.37 174524.4 1376.33 (101126.5) 3326.86 137.78
Sourcs: (a) F.O.S. Digest of Statistics, December 1987, Table 10.1.
(b) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1994 Edition, Table 252.
The level of deficit spending on the part of the states was no less 
significant, even if at a comparatively lower level. Over 75 per cent of the states showed 
a level of dependence on loans and other special grants that was economically unviable 
(CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, December 1992). The viability of 
projects on which such huge deficits were incurred calls also into question issues of 
public accountability. As far as the Babangida administration was concerned, the annual 
budgets might as well not have existed; as spontaneous donations to all manner of causes 
and institutions became recurring features of the administration’s modus operandi 
(Yusufu, 1996, 104-105).
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Summary of State Government Finances, 1985-1993
Table 10.7
Year
Revenue Retained Expenditure Surplus/Deficit ( )
Amount
(Nm)
Index Amount
(Nm)
Index Amount
(Nm)
Index % of 
Revenue
1985 4844.9 100 5057.1 100.0 (1012.2). . 100 20.9
1986 4661.8 96.2 5588.6 110.5 (926.8) 91.6 19.9
1987 8151.6 168.3 8263.5 163.4 (111.9) 11.1 1.4
1988 10360.1 213.8 10778.5 213.1 (418.7) 41.4 4.0
1989 11502.1 237.4 12974.7 256.6 (1472.6) 145.5 12.8
1990 16516.5 340.9 17743.2 350.9 (1226.7) 121.2 7.4
1991 24114.3 497.7 25215.6 298.6 (1101.3) 108.8 4.6
1992 31870.5 657.8 35586.0 703.7. (3715.5) 367.1 11.7
1993 35532.2 733.4 39546.6 782.0 (4014.4) 396.6 11.3
Sourcs: F.O.S. Digest of Statistics, December, 1989, Table 10. 5.
C.B.N. Annual Report and Statement of Account for the Year ended December 1992, 
Table 4. 5
F.O.S. Annual Abstract Statistics, 1994 Edition, Table 256
The World Bank 1991 Report on Nigeria noted “a breakdown in fiscal and 
monetary discipline in 1990...not only characterized by additional spending and 
monetary expansion, but also by a major surge in expenditures bypassing budgetary 
mechanisms for expenditure authorization and control...significant domestic currency 
spending appears to have occurred without any apparent budgetary authorizations” 
(Quoted in Holman, 1992, 14). Perhaps no where was this level of arbitrariness more 
reckless than in the following areas: massive increase in spending and in the purchase of 
new military equipment (estimated at between $250-$500 million) to sustain intervention 
in Liberia; increased spending on Ajaokuta steel plant (initial price $1.4 billion final price 
$4 billion); continuing commitment to a dubious $2.4 billion aluminum smelter; and the 
ill-conceived sponsoring of the 1990 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit, at a 
cost of $150 million (Keeling, 1991, 4). Earlier, a Project Review Committee appointed 
by the Buhari administration to evaluate government’s on-going projects to determine 
their economic viability and sustainability, headed by Gamaliel Onosode (which included 
the permanent secretaries of Finance and National Planning and the Governor of the
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Central Bank) had recommended that “all possible spending should be stopped” on such 
major projects as Iwopin Pulp and Paper, Savannah Sugar, Ajaokuta Steel, the 
Metallurgical Research and Training Institute in Jos and Onitsha, Itakpe Iron Ore Mining, 
and Petrochemical Phase 11. They also recommended future studies regarding the 
economic viability and desirability of these or new projects (World Bank Report No. 
13053-UNI, May 13, 1994). By 1992, all the projects blacklisted by the Onosede 
Commission were still receiving funding from the administration.
Indeed the administration was notorious for its unbridled recklessness in 
deficit spending, and mismanagement. Table 10.8 shows a graphic detail.
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT FINANCING AS PROPORTION OF GDP, 1986 -
1993
Government Deficit Total Government
(N million) Deficit as Proportion
of GDP
TABLE 10.8 _______
Year Total GDP 
(N million)
Federal State Total Per Cent 
(%)
Index
1986 71,076 8,254 927 9,181 12.9 100.0
1987 70,741 5,889 112 6,001 8.5 65.4
1988 77,752 12,616 419 12,480 16.0 135.9
1989 83,495 15,266 1,473 16,739 20.0 182.3
1990 90,342 22,116 1,227 23,343 25.8 254.3
1991 94,603 24,755 1,001 36,756 38.8 100.3
1992 88,530 55,981 3,712 59,693 67.4 1,145.2
Source: Complied from Tables 10.3,10.6 and 10.7 Supra
The index of total government deficit spending rose from 100 in 1986 to 1,145.2, 
within a space of seven years (that is, between 1986 and 1993). As a proportion of the 
nation’s GDP, total government deficit spending rose from 12.9 per cent in 1986 to 67.4 
per cent in 1992. During the next year, it shot up to a dizzying 117.4 per cent. It is almost 
inscrutable that the Federal and State government’s deficit expenditure alone exceeded 
the entire GDP by over 17 per cent.
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One of SAP’s most significant and enduring effects may have been on the civil 
society. All indicators, both at the micro-and macro levels, seem to indicate a deepening 
of the social crisis in several important respects. For instance, per capita income in 
Nigeria was put at $778 in 1985 (before the introduction of SAP). It plummeted to $175 
in 1988 and further down to $108 in 1989. Even then, the continuing depreciation in the 
value of the Naira meant that the average GDP per capita in terms of the dollar fell 
continuously from $1,583 in 1981 to a mere $38 in 1993 (Yusufu, 1996, 106-107).
According to some opinions, perhaps the greatest tragedy for the common 
or average citizen under the SAP lay in the inflationary cost of living and the concurrent 
precipitate fall in real incomes (Yusufu, 1996, 106; Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999; 
Central Bank Report, 1994). Table 10.9 indicates a correlation between population 
growth and its impact on the consistently depreciating value of the naira on per capital 
GDP.
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) OF NIGERIA (AT 1984 CONSTANT FACTOR COST)
MEASURED IN NAIRA AND 
UNITED STATES DOLLARS, PER CAPITA
Table 10.9
ear Rate of 
Exchange 
(N:$)
Total
Population
(‘000)
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita
Million
N US$ Million Naira (N) US Dollars ($)
Amount Index Amount Index Amount Index Amount Index
981 0.6052 68,477 65,605.7 95.2 108,403.3 140.0 958.0 105.5 1,583.0 155.5
982 0.6731 70,257 65,412.7 94.9 97,181.3 125.8 931.0 102.5 1,303.0 135.9
983 0.7506 72,084 61,440.0 89.2 81,854.5 106.0 852.0 93.8 1,136.0 111.6
984 0.7672 73.958 63,006.2 91.4 82,124.9 106.3 852.0 93.8 1,110.0 109.0
985 0.8924 75,881 68,916.1 100.4 77,225.6 100.0 908.0 100.0 1,018.0 100.0
986 1,7323 77,854 71,075.9 103.1 41,029.8 53.1 913.0 100.6 527.0 51.8
987 3,9691 79,878 70,740.6 102.6 17,822.8 23.1 886.0 97.6 223.0 21.9
988 4,5367 81,955 77,752.3 112.8 17,138.5 22.2 949.0 104.5 209.0 20.5
989 7,3651 84,086 84,495.0 12.6 11,472.3 14.9 1,005.0 110.7 136.0 12.8
990 8,0378 86,272 90,342.0 131.1 11,239.6 14.5 1,047.0 115.3 130.0 12.8
991 9,9132 88,515 94,663.2 137.4 9,549.2 12.4 1,069.0 117.7 108.0 10.6
992 19,7592 90,816 88,530.5 128.5 4,480.5 5.8 975.0 107.4 49.0 4.8
993 25.0 (b) 93,177 89,528.3 129.9 3,581.1 4.6 961.0 105.8 38.0 3.7
Source:
(1) C.B.N.: Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 1 Nos. 1&2, December 1990, Table D.3.1
(2) C.B.N: Statistical Report and Statement of Accounts, 1992.
(3) C.B.N.: Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 2 No.2, December 1991, Table D.4.2.
(4) Federal Republic of Nigeria: 1991 Populationn Census (Provional Results)
(5) F.O.S. National Accounts of Nigeria, 1981-1991
(6) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1994 Edition
and D. 4.2
NB: These amounts have be approximated to the nearest whole numbers
The total population of the country grew by 36.1 per cent from 68,477,00 in 1981 
to 93, 177,000 in 1993. In the same period the GDP increased by 36.5 per cent from 
approximately NG 65.6 billion to just a little over NG 89.5 billion. It would appear that 
per capita GDP was about constant for the period 1981-93. Consistent with Table 9.9, per
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capital GDP grew over a period of 12 years by only 10.5 per cent from NG 958 in 1981 
to NG 961 in 1993.
Also as Table 10.9 indicates, the per capita GDP rose by a mere 5.8 per cent 
between 1985 and 1993, obviously a level of poor performance. Again using 1985 as a 
base, it would appear that the index of annual consumer prices in the urban areas was 
830.15, and in rural areas 736.7 in 1993. A composite index for both urban and rural 
areas over the same period was 751.89. It follows that while the GDP per capita rose by 
less than 6 per cent, the cost of living in urban centers rose by as much as 730 per cent, 
whilst those of the rural areas by 651.9 per cent. According to some opinions, although 
these data would suggest some growth rates, the real effect on market and economic 
development, and particularly on the personal welfare of the average citizen has been 
incomprehensibly devastating (Adejumobi, 1995; Yusufu, 1995; Bevan, Collier and 
Gunning, 1999).
The particular effects of SAP (on the civil society can also be glimpsed from the 
1991 World Bank which ranked Nigeria as the 13th poorest nation in the World. Also the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its human deprivation index for 
1990 concluded that Nigeria is the worst human deprived nation, from a list of eleven 
Third World countries for which the survey was conducted (Adejumobi, 1995, 180).
Furthermore, the other significant components of economic development like 
education and health were seriously affected by SAP. The educational sector witnessed 
both a crisis of management and funding. Books were hardly available, even as physical 
infrastructure of schools deteriorated. Today, almost everything — textbooks, laboratory 
equipment, classrooms, and internet-based facilities — is in short supply (Barbara
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Giudice, 1999, A 51-A52). Even more undermining to economic and market 
development was the inability to recruit and retain qualified teachers, especially at the 
primary school levels. Apart from being the first victims of public mismanagement, on 
account of failure to receive their salaries for months on end, teachers were also 
castigated for falling standards. Indeed between 1986 and 1993, the educational system 
and structure in Nigeria came to a virtual standstill as it witnessed several industrial 
disputes and crisis in forms of strikes and school closings.
It is perhaps ironic that education would suffer such huge disruptions inspite of 
apparent increases in educational spending. What seems obvious is perhaps the fact that 
apart from the corruption and mismanagement in disbursement process, these increases 
did not take into account the rapidly depreciating value of the Naira. Table 10.9B clearly 
shows a growth of 193.2 per cent of total educational expenditure between 1985 and
1992.
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION IN NAIRA AND
U.S. DOLLARS -  1982 -  1993
Table 10.9B
Recurrent Capital Total (Naira) Total (Dollars)
Year Amount Index Amount Index
(Nm)
Amount Index
(Nm)
Amount Index
(Nm)
1982 511.8 73.4 412.4 326.8 924.2 112.2 1373.1 148.8
1983 588.8 84.5 367.2 291.0 956.2 116.1 1273.9 138.1
1984 657.9 94.4 87.6 69.4 745.5 90.5 971.7 105.3
1985 697.2 100.0 126.2 823.4 100.0 100.0 922.6 100.0
1986 483.8 69.4 391.4 310.1 875.2 106.3 505.2 54.8
1987 354.1 50.8 94.6 75.0 448.7 4.51 113.0 12.2
1988 1458.8 209.2 327.9 259.8 1786.7 217.0 393.8 42.7
1989 3011.8 432.2 387.2 306.8 3399.0 412.8 461.5 50.0
1990 2401.8 344.6 416.3 329.0 2819.1 324.4 350.7 38.0
1991 1256.3 180.2 297.0 235.3 1553.3 188.6 156.7 17.0
1992 1907.0 273.5 507.2 306.8 3414.2 293.2 122.2 13.2
1993 6034.6 865.5 995.1 788.5 7029.7 853.7 281.2 30.5
Sources: (a) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1987 and 1994 Editions
(b) C.B.N. Statistical Bulletin, Vol,. 2, No.2, December 1991.
Note: Naira: Dollar Exchange rate based on Table 10.9
However, expressed in dollars, it merely translates into a drastic decline of as 
much as 86.8 per cent over the same period. The index of total expenditure in dollars fell 
continuously from a high of 148.8 in 1982 to 100 in 1985, then to 12.2 in 1987. Rising to 
50 per cent in 1989, it fell again rather drastically to a low level of 13.2 in 1992. There 
seems to be a notable rise to 30.5 per cent in 1993.
Although the fall in real terms of government expenditure on education pre dated 
SAP, they seem to have been exacerbated under it. Rather ironically, the case of 
education is one of superficial growth with negative development (Yusufu, 1996; Bevan, 
Collier and Gunning, 1999; Giudice, 1999).
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The health sector did not fair any better. Although in the announcement heralding 
the 1984 military intervention, General Abacha, among other things, lamented the state of 
health care delivery system as “our hospitals have become consulting clinics...” (Daily 
Times, January 2, 1984). This situation was exacerbated under SAP. There was 
absolutely no improvement in the situation. If anything, it went from bad to worse. Not 
only were there inadequate personnel, essential medication and supplies were absolutely 
non-existent. Where and when available, pharmaceutical products were acutely 
adulterated.
In this environment of poor health management system, it is understandable that 
the structure lacked adequate database, especially as citizens found it worthless and futile 
reporting critical health-related problems to a helpless, and useless (for their purpose) 
health organization. However, looking at Table 10.9C the very few reported cases tell a 
grim story with respect to cholera, diarrhea, typhoid and pneumonia.
REPORTED CASES OF SELECED DISEASES 1987 AND 1991
Table 10.9C
Disease
Cases Reported Cases of Death No. of Deaths as % of 
Total Reported
1987 1991 1987 1991 1987 1991
1. Cholera 2,798 61,256 114 7,711 4.1 12.6
2. Diarrhoea 10,123 451,422 165 1,613 1.6 0.4
3. Typhoid 2,179 8,101 34 259 1.6 3.4
4. Pneumonia 89,228 135,480 534 855 0.6 0.6
Source: F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1994, Table 54-54
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The Table shows that reported cases of cholera rose by 1,892.3 per cent from 
2,798 in 1987 to 61,256 in 1991; diarrhea by 3,459.4 per cent from 10,123 to 451, 424; 
typhoid by 271.8 per cent from 2,179 to 8,101; and pneumonia by 51.8 per cent from 
89,228 1 135,480 over the same period, while infant mortality increased from a ratio of 
110 per 1000 in 1986 to 124 per 1000 in 1988 (African Guardian, 1988, 11). The lack of 
adequate health-care delivery system is compounded by the rapid spread of the AIDS 
virus. While below the levels of East and Southern African States AIDS, it is believed to 
be running at 10 per cent in the country (Peter Foster, 2000). Malnutrition is rampant. 
Life expectancy is 50; and the health care is increasingly becoming a luxury of the rich.
Although the 3rd and 4th National Development Plans both critically noted rising 
youth unemployment (3rd NDP, 1975 -  80, chapter 19; 4th NDP, 1981-85, chapter 22), 
SAP exacerbated the youth unemployment situation. By 1986, at the introduction SAP, 
the rank of unemployment had swelled. It was not only the primary school leavers who 
were without employment, secondary schools, as well as university graduates were now 
part of the statistics.
SAP called for economic rationalization, which essentially dictated mass 
retrenchment, wage freezes (stagnation), depreciation in real wages and the virtual 
elimination of the middle class. For example, the total registration of unemployed 
professionals, the bulk of the middle class, was estimated at 16,293 in 1988. By 1992, the 
figure was 32, 665, representing as it were, over 100 per cent increase in the number of 
unemployed professionals and executives during the period (Assisi Asobie, 1993, 184- 
185). It has been suggested that SAP as a policy was formulated with concealed violence 
against the working class and that even the paltry concessions obtained from the state
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after so many protests, representations and terminations were a little too small, a little too 
late to make any difference (Steve Amale, 1991, 123-136; Lasisi Osunde, 1992, 18)
SAP was a programme conceived in part to alleviate the living and economic 
conditions of the rural dwellers and the peasantry by empowering and enabling them.
One of the primary motives, it could be concluded was economic, namely to stimulate 
agricultural production and other non-oil products (especially exports). The attainment of 
this goal, the government rationalized, would entail the substantial improvement in the 
socio-economic environment of rural dwellers. Hence government embarked on a huge 
ambitious rural development projects. The fact that these projects were embarked upon at 
a critical economic rationalization period necessarily dictated economic justification for 
such huge outlay vis-a-vis its short and long term realizable social and economic benefits. 
Needless to say, government committed tremendous, and some have contended, 
unrealizable and economically non-justifiable resources through the establishment and 
lavish funding of sundry pet projects (Abdul Rauf Mustrpha, 1993; Newswatch, 1992). 
They included the Directorate for Foods, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI); The 
Better Life for Rural Women Programme (BLP); Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Corporation (OMPADEC); People’s Bank and Community Banks.
Perhaps the BLP programme has larger ramifications both for the underlying 
impetus for its initiation and the monumental failure of the outcome. The main focus of 
the progamme was on women. Based on the report of the UN Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FOA) on Nigeria in 1975, which indicated, “The rural women perform all 
the work in food processing, 60 per cent in marketing, 50 per cent livestock and animal
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production and more than 70 per cent in food farming” the CBN rationalized a 
programme whose primary focus would be women. It was intended to do the following: 
encourage and stimulate the rural women in particular and the rural populace in 
general towards improving their standard of living and their environment; 
inculcate the spirit of self-development in the rural women through the 
promotion of rural education, business and recreation; and 
creating greater awareness among the populace about the plight of women 
(CBN, Economic and Financial Review, Vol.28, No. 3, September, 1990)
Table 10.9D shows a graphic performance evaluation in relation to its target 
objectives. Obviously, it performed no better than the various other government 
programmes, in their corruption mismanagement, and inefficient supervision.
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Tablel0.9 D
Evaluation of the Performance of the Better Life Programme
As At July 1990
Achievement
S/N Type of Activity Target No./ Quantify % of Target
1,278.1 183.03 14.3
1. A. EXTENSION SERVICES 492.3 188.54 38.3
2. Seed Distribution (tonnes) 45.0 - -3. Seedlings (million) 36.0 5.0 13.94. Palm Produce (hectares) 700.0 2.0 0.35. Rice Miling (million kg) 104,310.0 9,974.23 9.66. Fish Pond
Fertilizers
1. B. LIVESTOCK 29.0 10.0 34.5
2. Goat 842.0 1.0 0.13. Piggy 600.0 1.0 0.24. Small Farming 700.0 1.0 0.1
Periwink Farming
C. DEVELOPMENT
SUPPORT
SERVICES 42.0 2.0 4.8
1. Model Farms/Village etc. 6.0 710.0 11,833.3
2 Land Clearing 394.700.0 2,154,392.0 11,833.3
3. Irrigation 8,809.0 28.0 0.5
4. Waiting Station 10,000.0 44.0 0.4
5. Solar Energy 1.0 1.0 100.0
6. Water Transportation 400.0 200.0 50.0
7. General 14.0 1.0 7.1
8. Others
D.MARKET SUPPORT
SERVICES
1. Trade by barber 500.0 2.0 0.4
2. Storage 3,363.0 1,791.0 53.3
3. Credit Granted - 233.0 -
Source: C.B.N. Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 28, No.3, September 1990 Tablet, p.53
The overwhelming conclusion is that these projects were a monumental failure, in 
that they did not only fail to improve the life of the peasantry and rural dwellers, they 
constantly led to over budgetary expenses; not to mention widespread allegations of 
corruption, embezzlements and fraud (Mustapha, 1993). In the words of Uriesi (2000),
“ the money disbursed to DFFRI and OMPADEC alone, if utilized would have 
transformed Nigeria from third world to first world status”. Perhaps an exaggerated 
assumption, but the point on resource outlay is noted. Available statistics 5 suggests that 
there has been a steady decline in the real income of the rural household while their 
expenditure on food, transportation, health care and other social services have been on 
the increase. The obvious indication is a fall in the welfare and standard of living of the 
rural dwellers as Table 10.E suggests.
TREND IN REAE RURAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME
TABLE 10.9 E
Year Nominal Income Rural Income 
Price Index
Real Income 
(N)
1984 7609,96 455,4 1691,05
1985 7772,72 482,3 1611,59
1986 9767,83 504,9 1934,61
1987 10034,01 558,8 1795,63
1988 12532,96 771,6 1626,87
1989 14861,21 1061,7 1400,68
Source: CBN/NISER National Study
Another area seriously affected is manufacturing. The effects on the sector may 
further demonstrate the impact of SAP. As Table 10.9F indicates, employment in that 
sector stood at 357,164 in 1982. In 1992, ten years later, the employment level had 
dwindled to a mere 20,153, a decline of approximately 94.4 per cent.
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PERSONS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY: 
SELECTED YEARS, 1980 -  91
TABLE 10.9 F
Year No. Employed Index
1980 453,632 100
1982 357,164 78.7
1984 344,609 76.0
1988 26,601 5.9
1991 27,130 6.0
Source: (a) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1987, Table 75, p. 101
(b) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1994, Table 117, p. 171
(c) F.O.S. Digest of Statistics, 1989, Table 3.1. p. 23
The Table indicates that the employment level in 1991 was barely 6 per cent of 
the 1980 level of 453,632. It is particularly interesting to note the decline in the levels of 
employment recorded in Table 10.9G, affecting the major sectors of manufacturing 
industry.
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Table 10.9G
PERSONS EMPLOYED IN SELECTED SECTORS, MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY, 1980- 91
1980_____________1982_________  1984 1988 19991
S/N Item Number Index Number Index Number Index Number Index Number Index Increase(Decrease)
%
1980-91
Food 57,872 100 52,296 90.4 35,042 65.7 2,999 5.2 2,960 5.1 (94.9)
Beverage
and
Tobacco
32,169
88,757
100
100
16,682
61,583
51.9
69.4
23,254
57,360
72.3
64.6
6,575
2,437
19.4
2.7
6,575
2,478
20.4
2.8
(79.6)
(97.2)
Textiles 53,966 100 24,490 45.4 14,575 27.0 1,322 2.4 1,409 2.6 (97.4)
Wood and
Wood
Products 7,157 100 14,108 197.1 7,837 109.5 850 11.9 641 9.0 (91.0)
Leather and
Leather
Products 44,896 100 14,659 32.7 16,000 35.6 2,867
6.4 3,057 6.8 (93.2)
Rubber and
Plastics
Products 9,752 100 10,773 110.5 6,685 68.6 169 1.7 227 2.3 (97.7)
Electrical
Products
Sources: (a) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1987, Table 75, p. 101
(b) F.O.S. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1994, Table 117, p. 174
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Curiously enough, of all the major sectors (seven) depicted in the Table, all but 
one, that is, the Beverage and Tobacco sector, recorded employment declines of over 90 
per cent. It is particularly significant that these declines relate to sectors, which with the 
exception of the electrical products sector derive most of their raw material from within 
the country. It would appear therefore that the SAP programme rather than solve some of 
the problems of unemployment, actually aggravated it. It is in the light of the above that 
one may agree with the reasoned conclusions of Ben Nwabueze:
“On the whole, the record (of military rule) is one of failure; 
it has failed to integrate the country into one; to improve the 
quality of life of the people and to modernize the society, to 
curb and eradicate corruption.. .if any thing, the military 
government, has compounded the country’s problems.. .now, 
what little quality is left in our lives is being sapped by the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (1989, 19-20).
POLITICAL (POLICY) INITIATIVES
To protect itself politically, the Babangida administration on assumption of office 
set up the Political Transition Programme (PTP), just as it was setting up the Economic 
Transition Programme (ETP). It announced a timetable for the return to civilian rule, and 
with it the promulgation of the transition to civil rule (Political Programme) Decree No.
19 which gave a comprehensive agenda for return of power to civilians on October 1, 
1990.6 Though the timetable was never adhered to, the process proper did not even 
commence until May 3, 1989, when the government lifted the ban on partisan politics and 
subsequently announced the promulgation of the 1989 Constitution.
The 1989 constitution was the culmination of a process that commenced on 
January 13, 1986, when the Babangida administration announced the setting up of a 17- 
man (indeed handpicked associates) Political Bureau to organize a nation-wide debate,
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the objective of which was . .a collective search for a new political order.. .a call for a 
country-wide debate in order to illuminate our path towards the search. It is neither a call 
for political party formation, nor the assertion of claims and pleas for leadership on 
behalf of the operations both of which have failed us as a nation. The call is to all 
Nigerians to search, identify and select options that can lead this country to better 
heights” (Babangida, 1986)..
Although the Bureau was a deliberative body “whose primary objective is to 
bequeath to posterity a new political order that can endure stresses as well as stand 
competitive demands in our national life.. .ensure that Nigerians collectively secure for 
themselves a more meaningful political future through open and free debate...” with 
apparently no holds bare on significant issues of state, the government still occasionally 
intervened to pre-empt the process of political debate. It thus very early in the process 
manifested its determination to intervene and interfere with the process to impose or 
protect its own vested interests. The administration did not only reject a substantial part 
of the Constituent Assembly’s recommendations (a body set up under Decree No. 24 of 
1988 and purportedly free to deliberate on any matter whatsoever), it also declared some 
“no-go areas”, as when Sharia became a hotly deliberated issue during the sitting.
This level of interference and constantly shifting dates for return to civilian rule 
became the administration’s hallmark in the process implementation. At the end of a 
mercilessly convoluted process, which inexcusably banned and unbanned “old breed” 
politicians, created unrealistically, and some would add, unrealizable registration 
requirements, including the first NG 50,000 non-refundable registration requirement for 
political parties. There was also the particularly arbitrary non-refundable NG500, 000 for
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presidential aspirants for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) candidates and NG400, 000 
for National Republican Convention (NRC) party candidates. Besides, the government by 
fiat., imposed two political parties, with unequal participation requirements (as in the 
imposition of registration fee requirements for the two parties). These parties were the 
SDP and the NRC, which were to be funded exclusively by the government. (Abubakar 
Momoh, 1995, 16-56; Anthony A. Akinola, 1990; Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, 
1991; Nuhu Yaqub, 1992).
Even then, for a process that was supposed to engender an enduring democratic 
system “.. .committed to an order that will check the excesses of government and the 
abuse of power by the political leadership” (Babangida, 1986), the government’s 
execution of the transition was a model exercise in executive lawlessness. For instance, 
the administration promulgated Decree 48 of 1991, which gave National Electoral 
Commission (NEC) powers to conduct elections irrespective of court orders to the 
contrary; and to disqualify candidates without disclosing to them the reasons for doing so. 
Nothing comes close to such breach of fundamental tenets of administrative law. Even 
when elections have been conducted, Decree 52 of 1992, Section 16 categorically 
prohibited any “court proceedings with respect to matters done or purported to be done 
by any agent of the Federal Government (including NEC) in the process of realizing the 
objectives of the transition programme”.
The so-called Option At, a procedure disingenuously contrived by NEC, in view 
of the antecedents of its origin, was ostensibly meant to secure a presidential primary 
selection process at the grassroots level; that is, the wards and local governments, state 
and national conventions (Chima Ubani and Emma O’Mano Edigbeji, 1993; Momoh,
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1995, 31). This contrived process produced two unlikely and yet obviously preferred 
presidential “government” candidates in the persons of Moshood Abiola (SDP) and 
Bashir Tofa (NRC), in circumstances so riddled with irregularities and corruption that at 
their respective conventions, and subsequent election exercises, it was alleged that over 
NG2.1 billion was spent by the presidential candidates; notwithstanding that the official 
cost of the election was underwritten by the FMG (Babangida, 1993; Momoh, 1995, 34).
The election was scheduled and held on June 12, 1993 and was observed by both 
local and international monitoring groups who described the entire exercise as “free and 
fair election”. Indeed NEC had proceeded to declare election results in 12 states and the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 27 states, before they were ordered to stop. In 
circumstances replete with the arbitrary lawlessness of the regime, General Babangida 
made a nation-wide broadcast on June 26, 1993, in which he cancelled the June 12, 
election, and purported to set a new date for new presidential elections in July 1993, with 
a completely new and fresh guidelines (Babangida, 1993, 18).
In all of these, Babangida purports to display a level of consultative process by 
which inputs from significant vested interests, including the military, are taking into 
consideration. In reality, it seems that General Babangida, from the outset, displayed all 
the lawlessness of a military dictatorship in the way and manner he dissolved, 
reconstituted, empanelled, disempanelled, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), 
Tribunals and Commissions, including the appointment and dismissal of cabinet 
Ministers. “IBB, for instance, had the highest turnover of ministers, he had 44 ministers, 
and 18 secretaries as constituted under the auspices of the Transitional Council. He 
dissolved the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) twice and reconstituted it. He
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created all sorts of panels, tribunals and boards and reconstituted them at 
will...’’(Momoh, 1995, 19).
Following the national sense of unease and imminent crisis engendered by the 
unsigned press release of June 23, 1993 annulling the election, General Babangida met 
three times with the two political parties between June 26 and July 12, in which he gave 
them the options of fresh elections or the constitution of Interim National Government 
(ING). Indeed it was not much of a choice because the parties were also warned that 
failure to accept new elections stated for August 14, 1993 would lead to a dissolution of 
the parties, including their elected officials. The two parties objected, and having been 
rejected by both his military constituency, and a stupendously bribed, but unconverted, 
Houses of the National Assembly, amidst demonstrations and palpable civil disorder, 
Babangida decided to foist his hand picked puppet Ernest Shonekan as the Chief of State 
and head of the ING. General Ibrahim Babangida offered to “step aside” 7 on August 26,
1993. However, contrary to the agreement that civilians from the two political parties will 
predominate in the ING, the Shonekan Government had no more than four members from 
the two political parties, out of a 32-man team. The rest were either handpicked or 
holdover technocrats or Babangida loyalists, who included General Sani Abacha, Defense 
Secretary; Joshua Dogonyaro, Chief of Army Staff; Uche Chukwumerije, Secretary for 
Information; and Clement Akpangbo, Attorney-General and Secretary of Justice. It is 
instructive that the contraption called the ING was itself terminated after three months, 
November 17, 1993, by no other than the Defense Secretary himself (General Sani 
Abacha).
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EVALUATING THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE POLITICAL 
TRANSITITON PROGRAMME (PTP)
The cost of the PTP has been variously put at between NG30 and NG 35 billion 
(Newswatch, December 15, 1993; African Concord, October 19,1993; The Nigerian 
Economist, December 22, 1993; Nigerian Tribune, June 14,1993). Looking at the 
transactional elaborateness of the processes of this political transition programme, these 
figures seem extremely conservative. The reality is much more staggering, as the 
following glossary would indicate.
The initial 13 political associations that were disbanded were said to have spent 
about NG 6 billion since they were required to have offices and followership in no less 
than two-thirds of all the states of the Federation, as well as registered members with 
their identifiable passport photographs. The Constituent Assembly and the Constitution 
Review Committee spent NG 320 million. Political party offices, in what was then 21 
states, cost the FMG NG 210 million, while state governments spent NG 600 million in 
building party offices in what was then 400 local government areas. And about NG 110 
million was used to establish the National Electoral Commission Secretarial in each of 
the nine newly created states.
According to Alhaji Aliyu Mohammed,8 the Secretary to the FMG, over NG 100 
million was spent on logistics and administrative take-off of both political parties, which 
cost did not include the building of secretariats for the parties at all levels. That cost was 
put at over NG 2 billion. The FMG’s other expenses on the party processes were equally 
extravagant, albeit less than NG 26 billion the political parties requested for their national 
conventions. The parties were given NG 17.7 million for these exercises. And by 
September 1990, they had received NG 559 million as take-off grants. Also by May 7,
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1992, the FMG gave both parties NG 100 million to organize national assembly and 
presidential primaries, even though the parties had requested NG 620 million.
Following the cancellation of the August 1992 presidential primaries and the 
dissolution of their elected executives, Caretaker Committees were appointed for the two 
political parties. The Committees were given another NG 363.8 million. To be able to 
organize and execute the June 12 presidential elections, staff salary and other over-head, 
the NEC received NG 2 billion. While furnishing their offices in 1991 cost NG 147 
million, NEC expended another NG 4 million in purchasing vehicles in the same year. 
General Babangida alleged that the two presidential candidates themselves spent over NG 
2.1 billion of their personal money for the campaigns, and election (Babangida, 1993).
Furthermore, on inauguration of the National Assembly in December 1992, the 
Assembly’s first order of business was the passing of a resolution that paid each member 
NG 5,000 daily to cover feeding and accommodation. Translation: it cost the country 
about NG 5 million daily for the up-keep of 684 National Legislatures, who were to all 
intents and purposes, inactive; or more appropriately jobless, in view of the stalled 
transition process. For the period July to December 1992, the National Legislator did not 
sit. Even them, the Senators received NG 20,000 each, while members of the House of 
Representatives received NG 16,000 each. By August 1993 it was estimated that the 
National Assembly had gulped NG 3.4 billion. Indeed between December 1992 and 
August 1993, the hotel bills, alone, of the National Legislators was a whopping NG 900 
million, while allowances for the same period amounted to over NG 40 million.
Although the FMG would admit that between January and June 1993, the height 
of the fateful transition programme, Nigeria had a budget deficit of over NG 46 billion, it
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is still to be accounted for. Although official estimates dubiously put the figure at NG10 
billion, how much of that was spent on purported transition-related programmes like 
MAMSER, National Census, etc. is not known. However, Figure 10.1 shows a select 
survey9 of government’s extra budgetary spending in 1992 alone. It is believed that these 
sums were expended on winning popular support for a political transition process that 
General Babangida intently undermined every step of the way. For a process (SAP), 
which was intended to judiciously apply dwindling public resources, so that the market 
and purely prudent economicimperatives determine economic and political options, the 
aborted PTP of the Babangida administration was a monumental waste of scarce national 
resources. In the light of the above, it is difficult not to conclude that the preoccupation of 
the FMG during this period in regard to resource allocation was with the political process 
that it completely ignored the economic and market development of the country in critical 
areas: employment, education and health.
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FIGURE 10.1
SOME EXTRA -  BUDGETARY SPENDINGS IN 1992 
TITLE N
(MILLIONS)
1. Federal Universities 575,00
2. Eumerical Cathedral Abuja 50,00
3. Awolowo Foundation 35,00
4. Zik hall Zungeru 40,00
5. Arewa House 35,00
6. Zik’s Wife Book Launch 15,00
7. Yakubu Go won Centre 30,00
8. Nigeria Medical Association 20,00
9. Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria 15,00
10. African Bar Association 10,00
11. Nigerian Bar Association 5,00
12. Abuja Central Mosque 50,00
13 Nigerian Union of Teachers Secretariat
Building Fund 30,00
14. Nigeria Union of Journalist Abuja Council 10,00
National Secretariat
15. Nigerian Labour Congress 30,00
Secretariat Building Fund
16. Organization of African Trade 5,00
Union and Unity (OATU)
17. Book Launch on IBB 0,10
18. Major General Bajowa (rtd)
Book Launch 50,00
19. Alhaji Isa Kaita Book Launch 2,00
20. 20 National Youth Service Corps Presidential Winner 0,50
21. University Lagos Endowment Fund 5,00
22. Obafemi awolowo University 30,00
23. Faculty of Journalism, University of Namibia 90,00
24. University of Nigeria, Nsukka 7,50
25. 1992 Olympic Medalists 5,00
26. Federation of Chess Club Secretariat Building Fund 3.00
TOTAL N1198.10
Source: Committee for Defense on Human Rights (CDHR) 1992
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THE BABANGIDA LEGACY
General Ibrahim Babangida regime was not only the longest serving peace 
time10 military government in Nigeria, his was the only one to attempt the articulation and 
implementation of one of the most ambitious, even if fundamentally flawed and 
contradictory, economic and political policy changes in the history of the country. “The 
changes of the mid-1986 were by far the most substantial and abrupt shift in Nigeria’s 
economic policy since 1950” (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 98). Unfortunately, the 
administration’s attempt to address the varied and complex issues that lie at the heart of 
Nigeria’s economic, political and social problems were undermined by a most incoherent 
and contradictory policy initiatives by the same administration that depended for its very 
existence and survival the clientelistic structure of the moribund and decadent political 
system in Nigeria. It is quite intriguing that the Babangida administration sought to 
deregulate and sanitize both the ETP and the PTP through the democratization process, 
yet its policies and programmes led increasingly to abuse and authoritarianism:
“... Inaugurating the season of ‘transition without change’,
Babangida represented three fundamental breaks with past military 
dictatorships in Nigeria. First, he undermined the collective collegiate 
leadership of the regime by the officer corp and instead instituted a personal style.
Second, he ‘legitimized’ grand and widespread corruption at the same time as he 
was squeezing the salaried classes through the Structural Adjustment Programme.
Corruption became an unstated, but all-embracing, foundation of state policy.
Third Babangida resisted the transfer of power to an elected government by engaging the 
populace, particularly the politicians, in an ‘endless’ and meaningless transition process, 
which he himself constantly subverted. For seven years, Babangida involved the 
country in a ‘political transition whose cost has been put at about NG 30 billion...”
(Abdul Raufu Mustapha, 1999).
After eight years of all kinds of economic and political experimentation, 
“the government proved to have been far more richer in abusive rhetoric and 
unproductive propaganda, than in economic wisdom” (Yusufu, 1996, 109). Indeed the
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believe is that General Babangida and his cohorts used the resources and information at 
their disposal to manipulate the transition programme in such a way that a justification 
was always found for extension, thus the transition progrmme was shifted four times, 
from October 1990, to January 1992, to January 1993 and August 27, 1993. With the 
same level of unbridled authoritarianism and insensitivity, the administration bequeathed 
to the country the politicization of religion, when it unilaterally and without national 
consensus caused the admission of a hitherto secular Nigeria (with significant Christian 
population) into the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1986. This singular reckless 
political decision did not only provide a spring-broad for the intensification of religious 
bigotry, it created the impetus for the declaration of Sharia laws in some Northern states 
in the current Third Republic. The results therefrom have been enormous. According to 
Aaron T. Gana (1995, 100)”...no other regime in Nigeria’s thirty-three years of political 
development has tinkered with the fragile compromise on the secular character of the 
Nigerian State as the Babangida administration did...” Religious disturbances and riots 
have become a recurring feature of the Nigerian landscape and have intensified since the 
inception of the civilian administration, thus making it difficult for the administration to 
attract much needed foreign investment.
The administration faired no better with its ETP. According to some opinions, 
SAP lacked the logic of a Plan and practical framework of realizable implementation 
during any plan period that the administration introduced what it called the Rolling 
Plans.11 The underlying rationale was that any project not completed in the relevant 
period was to be “rolled over” to the next plan period (Yusufu, 1996, 108-110). As was
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evident there happened to be so many uncompleted economic projects under SAP, given 
the lack of coordination and profligacy of the administration.
Perhaps Babangida’s most enduring bequest to Nigeria after eight years was a 
most pernicious and enduring legacy of institutional corruption and mismanagement, 
followed by reprehensible human rights abuses (Momoh, 1995, 312-343). According to 
General Buhari, “The regime that came to power in 1985 that ushered in the General 
Babangida destroyed all national institutions which in its own opinion, stood in its way. It 
tolerated, encouraged, entrenched and institutionalized corruption and glorified 
perpetrators .. .at the end of 1993, the military government had established an image of 
corrupt, unreliable and unaccountable lords of the manor...’’(Quoted in Mustapha, 1999, 
277-291). The administration was contagiously laizzesfaire with the perpetration and 
toleration of corruption that it essentially assumed its primary nature. It has been 
observed that during the Babangida regime, petroleum smuggling was largely the 
province of senior military officers and a few civilian associates, who arranged illegal 
lifting contracts for companies in which they had an interest, but more typically they 
simply chartered tankers and covertly filled them at terminals of the NNPC for shipment 
overseas (Peter Lewis, 1996, 90). Corruption in Nigeria is not about a few individuals 
who pilfer from the public purse, it is the system (The Economist, 1996, 48).
Babangida was particularly adept at co-optation, especially in the corruption of 
his most ardent and vociferous critics. In what General Obasanjo characterized as the 
“settlement syndrome” (Momoh, 1995, 46), he believed everybody had a price. It was 
also believed that Babangida had this “hidden agenda” in all policy decisions and 
implementation, such that the underlying premise was not always apparent on the face of
362
it. For example, when he excised the CBN from the Ministry of Finance, ostensibly to 
make it autonomous and more efficient; the CBN promptly came under the direct 
supervision of the Presidency (his office), thus unquestioningly facilitating the kinds of 
improper financial and other alleged irregular foreign exchange transactions the CBN is 
accused o f .12
According to some opinions, the administration’s level of financial recklessness 
and unaccountability is only matched by its absolutely corrupt overall disposition. For 
example, between July 1990 and May 1991, of the over $5.2 billion accruing to Nigeria 
as a result of the Gulf war, more than $3 billion could not be accounted for by the CBN. 
William Keeling of the London-based Financial Times concluded that “there may be 
governments in the continent as corrupt as Nigeria’s and there certainly are governments 
that are worse managed. But few, if any, compare with Nigeria in the scale of the 
problems that have to be confronted, the size of the export earnings open to 
misappropriation...” (1990, 7).
The administration’s level of extra-budgetary spending, induced as it were, by 
absolute corruption, was very alarming. The administration did not keep any verifiable 
account13 on the prosecution of the “peace keeping” exercise in Liberia under the 
auspices of ECOMOG. However, according to President Obasanjo, as at June 2000, 
Nigeria had spent over $8 billion its ECOMOG-related activities in the sub-region (The 
Guardian, September 28, 2000). These sums can only be appreciated in evaluation 
against the backdrop of the following statistics: country’s external debt estimated at over 
$32 billion; a population of over 120million with over 60 per cent living on less than $2 a 
day; the population with access to safe water is 4.2 per cent and debt owed per capita is
363
$241; and spending on health care has slipped backward to about 70 cents (US) per 
capita. Education, the only honest way out of poverty, is a disaster: schools are without 
books, teachers unpaid and universities on strike (again)” (The Economist, 1996, 48; 
World Bank, 1990)
The consensus verdict on the Babangida’s administration is that he did not only 
fail to engender the economic and political changes for the better that he claimed was 
reason for his take-over in a bloodless coup from a military leadership structure of which 
he was a critical component, he either by his acts of commission or omission bequeathed 
to the country the six-year political and economic disaster and terror that was General 
Abacha, following his cancellation of the June 12, 1993 election.
CONCLUSION
General Ibrahim Babangida was the sub-product of a primary one (the Buhari 
regime), whose professed pre-occupation was eradication of the extremely corrupt and 
inept political and economic institutions perpetrated by the civilian administration of 
President Shehu Shagari. The Buhari administration hardly had time to focus on the 
regime’s concept of national development, which emphasized financial prudence in the 
management of the nation’s scarce resources, paying down the national debt, reducing 
massive foreign exchange out-flows, rationalizing the civil service, including the 
elimination of ghost workers. But above all, eradicating indiscipline and absolute 
corruption within the larger society. The administration believed that a well structured 
and orderly society, in which resources are prudently managed and corruption completely 
eradicated, provides the foundation for the development potentials in critical areas like
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education, health and gainful employment (Buhari, 1985). Theirs was an aborted 
endeavour.
General Babangida came to power just about when petroleum prices were as low 
as $10 per barrel and the external creditors were insisting on IMF guarantees (David 
Ottaway, 1986). Past negotiations with IMF and reform attempts have failed for a number 
of reasons, primary among them being (1) the resistance and lack of cooperation by many 
Nigerians in top positions who for so many years and for so long have benefited 
personally from bad policies and mismanagement, and (2) the Babangida coup which 
promptly interrupted an apparently genuine reform process, barely 20 months in 
formulation and implementation.
General Babangida’s adoption and implementation of the IMF-style and 
sponsored structural adjustment programme may have been informed by his peculiar 
conceptualization of what form national economic and market development and moving 
the country forward should take. And yet there appear precious little antecedents in his 
background policy-wise to ground or support such conceptualization. Understandably 
therefore, some of the economic measures he adopted seemed rather subjectively 
intended to achieve economic recovery and self-reliant development. The thrust appeared 
to be an attempt to liberalize his way out of economic mess by cutting the money supply, 
pushng up interest rates, slashing public spending (at least initially) cutting health, 
welfare and educational programmes. He also implemented a wage freeze, restricted 
both, domestic and foreign credits, dismantled price controls, removed subsidies on 
Petroleum and Fertilizer, in addition to setting foreign exchange rates free, through an 
effective, even if arbitrarily implemented, SFEM (Anunobi, 1992, 224).
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The administration’s structural adjustment programme did not only lack the 
institutional and technological capabilities that could transform the structure of a 
development-targeted economy, including production and trade, it also failed to attend 
other critical conditions affecting the balance of payments position:
“on the export side, most African economies are still uncomfortably 
dependent on a very limited number of primary commodities—unprocessed 
agricultural and mineral products—vulnerable to the vicissitudes of externally 
determined prices and quantities demanded. On the import side, while their 
import capacity has dwindled, the dependence of African economies on imports 
remains high. First, agricultural production in Africa has not benefited 
from any major technological break-throughs (like the “green revolution”).
With rapid population growth, dependence on food imports has increased,'
rising to one-third of domestic food production in recent decades. Secondly,
largely as a result of the tied nature of foreign aid, the pattern of industrialization
has created an industrial and manufacturing sector with high import dependence
for both inputs and technology” (Howard Stein and Macnhiko Nissanke, 1999, 399-420).
The situation in Nigeria may well have reflected these general patterns. However, 
the availability of petroleum as a premium source of export earnings meant that the 
country was peculiarly and resourcefully placed. The SAP and PTP programmes under 
General Babangida failed for two primary reasons. For although his administration’s 
objectives were ostensibly to achieve political stability, economic recovery and self- 
reliant market development, he seems to have failed to appreciate “the inherent 
ambiguities of the term development, in which the processes of development and its 
consequences, positive and negative, are confounded with the intent to bring about 
development, usually through the practice of state” when “an intention to develop 
becomes a doctrine of development... attached to the agency of state to become an 
expression of state policy”. (Gavin Williams, 2000, 147). Unfortunately there seemed to 
be within the same administration these contending and mutually disruptive processes of 
creation and destruction. The administration effectively created state agencies and
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institutions seemingly for the primary purpose of undermining their effectiveness 
(Momoh, 1995, 16-56; Olukoshi, 1995, 138-162; Mustapha, 1999, 277-291; Robert 
Guest, 2000, 57-58). General Babangida was too preoccupied with inventing democratic 
options, even as he was too preoccupied constantly undermining the political process. He 
was ostensibly reforming the economy just as he was preoccupied institutionalizing 
corruption and mismanagement within an economic system that produced the harshest 
and most dehumanizing of human development regressions. The administration is yet to 
satisfactorily explain what happened to over $3 billion windfall when oil prices surged 
during the Gulf war (Chris McGreal, 1999, 16).
It would appear that General Babangida essentially conceptualized notions of 
“state craft” and “engineering a nation”, without anchoring them in the relevant context 
of national economic development. Obviously his essence was “...to chart anew course 
for a nation towards a new environment consciously and carefully designed in 
anticipation of a future (perhaps consciously disregarding the national economic well­
being of the present) that can be understood, mastered and managed. Engineering a 
nation is, in reality inventing the future.. .there exist a world of difference between 
engineering a nation and ruling it. I never wished to rule Nigeria and I never did. My goal 
was to engineer it...” (Moyibi Amoda, 2000). General Babangida’s professed 
engineering of Nigeria would ultimate bequeath to it, not a stable democratic process; not 
a viable economic/market system in which human development in all of its critical 
ramifications (health, education, employment and general welfare) hold sway, but 
another military government of perhaps indescribable brutality, corruption and 
mismanagement.
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ENDNOTES
1. Interview at Lagos with the Deputy Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria on July
11,1999. According to him it was a change that changed nothing especially in the 
operations of the Bank. For the military he contended that it was more an issue of 
direct access expediency than it had to do with structural reform. The bank was 
subjected to such unprecedented levels of official presidential imposition that 
there was a complete breakdown of procedures during the early and later years of 
Babangida’s tenure. Whereas for General Abacha, it was a pattern that evolved 
from his very early days, until his demise.
2. Interview at Abuja on June 28,1999 with the former Secretary to the Federal 
Government and the head of Service. He contends that if continuity and
accountability were the rationale, the changes were ill advised. According to him,
it was a fundamentally flawed process that replaced stability, continuity and
accountability, which career civil servants provided with ministerial political
appointees in a military regime. He also believes that given Babangida’s penchant
for constantly removing and replacing disfavoured Ministers, the new
introduction was most unhealthy for national policy, planning and
implementation.
3. See Federal Republic of Nigeria; decree No. 25 -  Privatization and 
Commercialization Decree 1988, Official Gazette, Vol. 75. No 42, 6th July,
1988, ppA673-A683.
4. Interview at Kaduna on June 29/30, 1999 with the former Minister for Economic 
Planning. He contends that although the administration’s official policy was SAP,
there was lack of structure in both articulation and implementation. According to
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him, the different ministries were functioning at such cross-purposes, and often 
times with the seeming acquiesance of the presidency that one could not but 
wonder whether it was not official, albeit unwritten, policy that the programmes 
not succeed.
5. See data on impact of SAP on the rural dwellers by CBN/NISER, National Study 
“The Impact of SAP on Nigerian Agriculture and Rural Life, Lagos, Page 
Publishers, 1991.
6. See Transition to Civil Rule: Laws and Materials on the Electoral Process, NEC, 
1990, Lagos: Nigeria.
7. In his address to the National Assembly on August 17, 1993 titled “Nigeria’s 
Democracy and Withdrawal Process” Babangida used the phrase, which instantly
caused a national curiosity as to its significance and import of the usage, especially
as it gave the impression of someone simply taking a temporary leave of absence.
8. Interview in Abuja on December 17, 1999 acknowledges that the estimates were 
deliberately conservative in view of public sensitivity and the other sources of
spending which fell under “security” vote and not eligible for public accounting
and records.
9. Committee for Defence of Human Rights, Annual Reports Lagos, 1992, Page 35.
10. The only other military dictator to serve near as long was General Yakubu Go won 
(1966-1975), who was however pre-occupied with the prosecution of the Nigerian
civil war (1967-1970).
11. In 1990-92, the Babangida announced what it termed “3-year Rolling Plan.” The
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Rolling Plans seem to have been designed to package all uncompleted government 
projects during the previous plan periods and bring them to completion during the 
relevant Plan year. The idea basically was that any Rolling Plan project not 
completed in the relevant period was to be “rolled over” to the next period.
12. Based on the account of interview with the former Minister of Finance, and Deputy 
Governor of Central Bank both of whom served in the administration. See endnotes
1 and 8 above.
13. See endnotes 1 and 8 above.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1993 -  1998 
(UNDER GENERAL SANI ABACHA)
INTRODUCTION
General Sani Abacha came to power on November 17, 1993 after sacking the 
political contraption that was the Interim National Government (ING) headed by Ernest 
Shonekan. Although he called his take-over “a child of necessity”, it would appear 1 that 
the ING was set up specifically to enable him take over government at some convenient 
stage in the life of the ING. It is particularly curious that the provisions of Chapter five 
(V) subsection 48 of the ING Decree 61, inter alia, states: “The most senior minister shall 
hold the office of Head of the Interim National Government if the office of the Head of 
the Interim National Government becomes vacant by reason of death or resignation”.
General Abacha who presented himself as the last guarantee of the country’s 
strained unity on assumption of power proceeded rather rapidly to consolidate his hold. 
Apart from co-opting politicians of all hues into his cabinet, including those he sacked 
from both appointed and elected office, he also effected a wholesale weeding out of the 
so-called “Babangida Boys” from the military establishment. This move was particularly 
popular in view of the fact that the military establishment Babangida left behind was 
highly politicized and absolutely corrupt. However, by the time Abacha died in rather 
mysterious circumstances on June 8, 1988, the country had been through his style of 
political and economic transition; not particularly different from the Babangida’s 
experience, except that his (Abacha) was more obviously nationally and internationally 
insensitive and ruthlessly brutal in implementation. “If Babangida was Machavelli’s low 
and cunning fox, Abacha was his mean spirited and iron-fisted lion, mindless of the
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rationality of the exercise of power. Unfortunately, both ‘Princes’ also had scant regard 
for the interests of their ‘subject’ and the principality” (Mustapha, 1999, 278-179).
MARKET/ECONOMIC POLICY INITIATIVES
According to some opinions, Abacha’s take-over marked a reversal of the policy 
of economic deregulation of the state; as there was a return to a regime of economic 
regulation with the state determining the exchange and interest rate, among others. His 
administration also declined to move the privatization process any furthe (Economist, 
January 25, 1987, 41; Adejumobi, 1985, 184). And although it is speculated that they 
were essentially designed to placate political and other vested interests in order to gamer 
support for the new regime, the evidence strongly suggests that the policy retention arose 
from a perceived need for substantial continuation of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) and Rolling Plan era of the Babangida regime. “In 1995, even with a 
new military government under General Sani Abacha, the precepts of SAP still 
dominated the government’s economic mentality, and its tenets and modalities still 
dictate the management of the national economy.. .’’(Yusufu, 1996, 95). Apart from the 
occasional intervention to stabilize the rate of foreign exchange with the official pegging 
of the rate of NG 22 to $1 for certain government transactions, while the prevailing 
market rate had been over NG80 to $1, the administration seems to lack creative or 
innovation political or economic initiative.
The existence of a dual rate adversely affected the real economic sectors -  
manufacturing, agriculture etc that was compelled to source foreign exchange in the 
parallel market sustained by policy-induced “round tripping”. The encouraged existence
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of the parallel market was sufficiently destabilizing, even though they were briefly 
outlawed in 1994.
The administration essentially reiterated past administrations emphasis on 
perceived critical economic policy imperatives. For example, in his 1995 budget address, 
General Abacha felt obliged to reiterate the important role of agriculture in the economy 
and strongly noted, “In the quest for economic recovery, agriculture must provide the 
lead”. He further noted Nigeria’s position as the world’s leading exporter of palm 
produce, in addition to being the second largest exporter of natural rubber. While noting 
that the country was hitherto self-sufficient in food and agro-allied raw materials, he 
pledged to return it to its former glory “a new approach to economic recovery through the 
revitalization of the non-oil sector must now be implemented with dispatch. Government 
will finance and provide an enabling environment for the revival of tree crops and tubers; 
encourage the increased production of cereals and legumes, livestock and fisheries...” 
According to him, NG 2.7 billion was earmarked to implement” the development of 
agriculture and solid minerals...without prejudice to additional funds to be spent in this 
area from the Special Trust Programme. As he indicated in his new directives to all State 
(military) Administrators and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture for States to realize 
their most suited agricultural products potentials, he believed that “.. .once more in this 
country, groundnut pyramids and cotton in some of the Northern States, cocoa and rubber 
in the Western State, palm oil and kernels in Eastern States...” will return the country to 
its historic base of natural wealth (Abacha, 1995,26-32). However, after two years of 
monetary and fiscal restraint, the administration’s spending, based on projected oil price 
of $17 a barrel, rose astronomically. Essentially, infrastructure spending doubled to
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nearly a fifth of the entire budget. Spending on Agriculture, Water Resources and Rural 
Development also doubled.
The Rolling Plans, introduced during the extremely uncertain and ineffectual 
economic plan periods of General Babangida’s administration and which had been 
described as no more than instruments to patch up the yawning cracks and gaps created in 
the economy by SAP, (Yusufu, 1996, 109), assumed a permanent, recurring feature of the 
new administration, since it apparently substituted for regular development plan periods.
It also inherited or rather adopted the Better Life for Rural Dwellers (BLP) programme 
from the Babangida administration. Except that it was now renamed Family Support 
Programme (FSP), even though it substantially reflected the main objectives of BLP, and 
essentially, like its predecessor programme, replicated functions already assigned to other 
agencies of government. This obvious conflict in programme implementation’s 
formulation and had the effect of the different agencies working at cross-purposes, 
duplicating efforts and resources. Needless to say, rural economic and social conditions 
did not fair any better. According to some estimates, the FSP gulped over NG10 billion 
of public fund at a time the government was retrenching civil servants (Tell, 3rd August, 
1998).
The government also set up the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) headed by a former 
military head of state, General Mohammadu Buhari. The PTF resources were derived 
from “excess tax” on petroleum. In a manner of speaking, the PTF was an alternative 
poverty alleviation programme set up by the government. Apart from its independent 
development generating initiatives and activities, it was also ostensibly meant to 
safeguard “deregulated” petroleum revenue from public servants (for fear of
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misappropriation). The Fund promptly became not only an alternative to the Ministries of 
Works and Housing, Health and Economic development, it also effectively became an 
alternative to treasury, with over $700 million to spend initially on road improvements, 
and the import of essential drugs. For all practical purposes, the Fund by-passed the two 
ministries concerned in the execution of its programmes. The operation of the Fund, like 
most government -  sponsored organizations was bedeviled by corruption and 
mismanagement. The Fund had an average of NG 52 billion every year to spend on 
Nigeria. At the end of the PTF’s reign, the country’s poverty and underdevelopment level 
remained unchanged. According to Dr. Haroum Adamu’s interim report, NG135 billion 
out of NG146 billion was squandered, possibly through over-invoicing, over supplies, 
supplying expired materials, wrong project priorities, settling perceived troubled spots, 
like the army and the police and blatant thievery (Anthony Maduagwu, 2000). The new 
administration of president Obasanjo compelled the Fund’s liquidation in 2000.
Another area of seeming major economic initiative was Vision 2010. This was 
originally conceived in November 1996, ostensibly to establish a dialogue on economic 
policy initiative between the public and private sectors. The initiative essentially 
envisaged an economic environment in which the economy is growing at an annual 
average rate of 10 per cent, with inflation contained at below 5 per cent. It also envisages 
a manufacturing sector accounting for about 24 per cent of GDP (compared with 11 per 
cent in 1998), with the share of oil declining to below 20 per cent (against 30 per cent 
currently), and crude oil’s share of total export falling from 97.4 per cent in 1995 to 62 
per cent in 2000. It also foresees per capita income rising from around $300 in 1998 to 
$16,000 by 2010. In its estimation that would ensure that “Nigeria would have returned to
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the rank of middle income countries”. Also included as a primary aim of the initiative is 
the “virtual full employment of all able -  bodied persons” with the high, if unrealistic 
hope, that “by the year 2000 Nigeria should be a corrupt-free society”
Although inflation had fallen from a high to 70 per cent in 1996 to well under 30 
per cent, and oil-bolstered GDP had gone up 3.25 per cent in 1996, the predicted increase 
of 5.5 per cent was never realized. Nonetheless, the balance of payments deficit had 
declined significantly to less than NG 800 million, whilst the external reserves had risen 
to about $4 billion.
The sharp decline in world prices in 1998, and the ensuring one-third fall in oil 
receipts (US $5 billion) aggravated the already precarious economic situation. By 1998, 
real GDP slowed to an estimated 2.3 per cent, while real national income declined 
substantially. Inflation rose from a low of 6 per cent in the 12 -  month period ended 
March 1998 to an estimated 15 per cent in December 1998. The balance of payments also 
weakened sharply, with the current account balance shifting from a surplus of $1.9 billion 
(9.1 per cent) in 1998 (IMF, 1999, 2). Also recurrent federal government expenditure 
increased by NG 48 billion, substantially more than budgeted. Total federal government 
capital expenditures, were NG 67 billion higher than in 1997. Expenditures of state and 
local governments (including special funds) were also higher by NG 45 billion.
The manufacturing sector’s overall capacity utilization, on average, showed a 
relative improvement during the first half of 1998. Although it stood at 27.83 per cent, in 
real terms this performance represents a marginal decline of 0.4 per cent. Besides, all 
industrial sub-sectors with the exception of four registered increased capacity utilization. 
The sub-sectors that witnessed a decline were: Pulp, Paper and Paper Products; Printing
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and Publishing (26. 65 per cent compared with 27.83 per cent in the corresponding period 
of 1998); Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (26.59 per cent as against 28.14), and Basic 
Metal, Iron and Steel and Fabricated Metal Products with 24.08 per cent contrast with 
27.08 in 1997. For Food, Beverages and Tobacco sub-sector the decline was from 32.47 
per cent to 31.65 per cent during the period under review. Non-Metallic Products with 
54.38 per cent recorded the highest performance (M.A.N., 1999).
Again, not unlike the administration before it, the Abacha administration ignored 
critical development areas: education, health and social welfare. With an annual 
population growth rate of about 2.8 per cent over the past decade, out-stripping the 
average annual GDP growth rate of about 1.6 per cent, less than75 cents of the federal 
budget was allocated to health, and only 50 per cent of children between the ages 5 and 
24 years were enrolled in schools.
Under General Abacha, Nigeria had very unhealthy relationships with the 
international community, especially the Bretton Wood institutions and bilateral donors 
because of human rights abuses and rather arbitrary economic policies. It has been 
suggested that debt rescheduling came to a virtual stand still; and so was any kind of 
foreign assistance or cooperation. The decline in oil revenue compounded a situation that 
caused the administration to resort to printing money to finance the government deficit 
(Moser, Rogers and Van Til, 1997, 39).
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POLITICAL INITIATIVES
It is doubtful whether General Abacha had any genuine disposition at evolving an 
authentic democratic transition. Like General Babangida, there was a very personalizing 
process with this administration that it may be inappropriate or inaccurate to refer to it as 
a FMG. A more appropriate usage could be the military government of Abacha. Although 
he promised to return the country to constitutional democratic rule at the earliest 
opportunity, he however predicated that on the outcome of the deliberations of a 
Constitutional Conference he subsequently set up. The conference, he promised would 
determine the length of his administration. When, taking his words on the face value, the 
Conference set a terminal date of January 1996, for his administration, he proceeded to 
surreptitiously undermine the Conference deliberations. Even then, the so-called 1995 
Constitution drawn up by the Conference was incessantly tampered with, and was not 
released to the public, thus ensuing yet another “transition process” which was supposed 
to lead to an elected constitutional government in October 1998. “The institutions that 
were to mid-wife this transition were the National Electoral Commission (NECON) and 
the Transition Implementation Committee (TIC). Both were loaded with unashamed 
Abacha apologists” (Mustapha, 1999, 279).
The party registration process that was supposed to usher in the democratization 
process was gravely rigged. Virtually all the viable political associations were denied 
registration. The five political parties eventually formed and registered under the 
transition were so unabashedly compromised that they were “described, as the leprous 
fingers of the same hand” (Mustapha, 1999). In April of 1998, all the five registered 
political parties nominated General Abacha as their sole presidential candidate for the
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election scheduled for August 1998. The relevant sections of the laws were to be changed 
to allow a serving military officer to run for office. As if these were not strange 
developments enough, the election was now to be a referendum; a straight “yes” or “no” 
on whether General Abacha should transit to a “civilian” president.
The citizenry was so thoroughly and completely disenchanted that in the April 
1998 election to the National Assembly, only about 10 per cent of the electorate bothered 
to vote. The determination to succeed himself had become so resolute and desperate that 
General Abacha summoned religious leaders of all faiths to Abuja in May 1998 for 
supplication; on behalf of himself and his mindless quest. He also sponsored endless 
promotional activities. “Abacha sponsored an endless chain of groups to sing his praises. 
The most notorious of these hundreds or so groups was “Youths Earnestly Asking for 
Abacha” (YEAA), who organized the infamous Two Million Man March in March, 1998 
to ‘persuade’ Abacha to run for President. NG 500 million of public funds and countless 
public facilities, including two NNPC helicopters, was put at their disposal. This was a 
desperate attempt to create a semblance of popular support for his enterprise. In what 
appears a bare-faced attempt to bribe his ambition through an economically “sapped” and 
deprieved citizenry, ‘Abacha model’ television sets ‘Abacha soap’ ‘Abacha rice’, and 
‘Abacha jewellery’ were imported and distributed throughout the country. It became 
obligatory for government officials and those hoping to transact business with any arm of 
government to wear Abacha badges on their cloths and have stickers on their cars” 
(Mustapha, 1999, 279). By the time General Abacha died of an apparent heart attack, 
albeit mysterious circumstances, on June 8, 1998, there was this collective sense of
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national relief; indeed by accounts a breathe of fresh air to a brutalized, traumatized and 
economically deprieved citizenry.
EVALUATING POLICY OUTRCOMES
Although General Abacha described his takeovers as a “child of necessity”, what 
appeared obvious, in time, was his administration’s lack of focus and responsive 
initiatives in the management of the economy. His administration did not only halt the 
privatization process and evolved a very personalized and suffocatingly rigid policy, 
mindlessly routed in corruption and mismanagement. His administration attempt at the 
Failed Bank Tribunal was believed to be a witch-hunt at eliminating wealthy, potential 
opponents (Economist, June 8, 1996, 46, 48). Even then, General Abacha turned out to be 
one of the most corrupt Leaders Nigeria had.
Like General Babangida before him, General Abacha resorted to the 
personalization of power, and what was characterized as “imperial presidency”. But 
unlike, General Babangida, his circle of pilfering corrupt fellow travelers was not as 
wide. Personal contacts with General Abacha were limited to a few trusted allies; and his 
was a very patrimonial structure devoid of proper bureaucratic channels. It has been 
suggested that General Abacha’s eldest son, Mohammed Abacha requisitioned $100 
million from the CBN; even as it was revealed after his death that he himself had stolen 
about $2 billion of public funds between 1993-1998. Over $817 million and NG 8 billion 
have been recovered from the family. Other Cabinet Ministers have been implicated in 
the large scale looting of government confers, like Minister of Finance, Anthony Ani 
(Mustapha, 1999; Newswatch, 2000;Vanguard, 2000).
380
As was also the situation in General Babangida regime, the level of corruption 
and mismanagement perpetrated by General Abacha and his associates effectively 
misappropriated resources in all critical areas of development. By the time of his death, 
Nigeria was a country in limbo, politically and economically.
CONCLUSION
From the point of view of increased oil revenue in the later that year, of NG 0.46 
trillion in 1998 and NG 0.95 trillion in 1999 (CBN Report, 2000), overall economic 
development initiatives did little, if at all, to impact the life of the citizenry. The 
administration that emphasized the resuscitation of the non-oil sector ended up 
showcasing some of its worse performances. For example as percentage of total exports, 
the non-oil exports dropped steadily from 4.53 per cent in 1998 to 1.64 in 1999.
In 1998, real GDP growth slowed to an estimated 2.3 per cent and real national income 
decreased substantially owing to the fall in oil prices earlier in the year. Inflation rose 
from a low of 6 per cent in the twelve- month period ended in March 1998 to an 
estimated 15 per cent in December 1998. The balance of payments also weakened 
sharply, with the current account balance shifting from a surplus of $1.9 billion (4.9 per 
cent of GDP) in 1997 to a deficit of an estimated $3.1 billion (9.1 per cent of GDP) in 
1998(World Bank, 2000). These statistics are significant against the background that 
during this period, government serviced only part of its external debt, having by 1994 
imposed an embargo on contracting new debt (CBN, 2000). At the of the day, the 
country’s economic and social development remains deplorable, with per capita income 
at only $240 in 1997 (World Bank, 2000).
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GENERAL ABDULSALAMI ABUBAKAR
(1998 -1999)
INTRODUCTION
General Abacha’s death in rather mysterious circumstances and Moshood 
Abiola’s curiously coincidental demise shortly thereafter put paid to whatever festering 
controversy that might be lingering on account of the aborted the June 12, 1993 election 
debacle. These developments made the work of General Abdulsalami Abubakar who 
succeeded Abacha easier, in that he was able to evolve a transition programme, which he 
proceeded to implement rather expeditiously. There are divergences of opinions as to 
why he rapidly evolved a transition to civil rule progrmme. Some believe it has to do 
with a very restive population that was determined to resist any continuation of the 
military charade in the name of transition (Mustapha, 1999, 281). Others contend that the 
military got out of power not because of their regard or sensitivity to democratic values, 
but because of the dreadful state of the economy (Chris Mcgreal, 1999). For whatever 
reason, what is clear was that the political, social and economic situation in the country, 
including relations with the international community, was at the point of near 
irredeemable collapse; and that the country desperately needed new directions, which was 
obvious the military was in no position to provide; not even after their long successive 
tenure.
It is important to mention here that General Abubakar was in power for less than 
one year, June 8, 1998 to May 29, 1999. In the circumstances, it could be said that he 
was, literally speaking, a “holding” rather transitionary, military Head of State, whose 
most significant accomplishment had more to do with promptly effecting the transition
programme and less with any identifiable economic development programme; except for 
the overall economic impact of both the transition programme and the massive corruption 
and mismanagement that attended his administration’s disengagement activities. “Even 
the most recent military ruler, General Abdulsalami Abubakar -  widely praised for 
holding elections and handing power to President Obasanjo -  oversaw what turned out to 
be massive plundering of the central bank before leaving office. In recent months about 
pounds 2 billion -  more than an entire year’s debt payment - has evaporated from the 
treasury. Much of it disappeared into the pockets of military officers” (McGreal, 1999).
EARLY POLICY INITIATIVE
General Abubakar, on assumption of office, announced a transition programme in 
July 1998. Following which he disbanded the National Electoral Commission (NECON). 
T he Commission had become completely discredited on account of its conspiratory and 
conniving engagement with the Abacha regime. The entire so-called local and state 
government elections, as well as the national assembly’s elections held under the Abacha 
transition were annulled; to popular acclaim. The administration announced a new 
timetable, terminating on 29th May 1999, instead of the October 1, 1998 date originally 
set by General Abacha.
The administration’s pronouncements on the economic sphere were less realistic 
and even far less realizable. In what was dubbed “Budget of Realism”, though 
subsequently, even if brief, implementation showed a level of prodigality that was 
extremely disquieting, but not uncommon with the country’s previous military leadership 
shenanigans. General Abubakar noted “.. .but we have with great realism, taken into 
serious consideration the hard facts of our peculiar situation and come up with tough
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decisions on necessary policy actions that would launch our country into genuine 
economic greatness...” (Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1999).
According to him, the 1999-2001 National Rolling Plan (NRP) will continue to 
draw inspiration from what he described as the broad goals of and objectives of the 
Vision 2010, namely:
(a) Diversification of the productive base of the economy through enhanced capacity 
utilization in industry, increase agricultural productivity, and accelerated 
development of the gas and solid mineral sectors;
(b) Promotion of sustainable economic growth through achievement of macro-economic, 
exchange rate and fiscal stability as well as product monetary policies;
(c) Rising income levels and reduction of the level of unemployment through enhanced 
economic growth and vigorous implementation of poverty alleviation programmes;
(d) Facilitating private sector-led growth through the creation of appropriate enabling 
environment, institutions, and policies as well as legal and regulatory framework. 
However, the focus and policy thrust of the 1999 budget was one of emphasizing
objectives, strategies and priorities, namely:
-Achieving at the minimum, a three per cent overall growth rate of GDP;
-Establishing institutional, legal and regulatory framework as well as policy reforms 
necessary for economic growth and diversification;
-Maintaining appropriate fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies with a view to 
achieving overall macro-economic stability;
-Eliminating the dual exchange rate regime;
-Continuing the policy of privatization of state-owned enterprises;
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-Sustaining the single-digit inflation rate achieved for most of 1998 fiscal year; 
-Enhancing efforts on capacity building and utilization;
-Sustaining prudent internal and external debt management systems;
-Reducing the level of unemployment;
-Expanding the existing revenue base by exploring new sources of income;
-Improving the internal security system to create a safe environment; and 
-Developing and rehabilitating physical infrastructure to facilitate investment and 
economic activity (Abubakar, 1999).
Another significant components of the budget speech was the restoration of the 
autonomy of the CBN, as well as lifting the embargo on external loans, particularly with 
respect to concessionaire and project-tied loans and credits. The administration also 
replaced the pre-shipment inspection requirement with a destination requirement. It is 
believed that this would, to enable the easy and free flow of goods through the ports as 
well as encourage foreign investment participation.
The administration also promulgated the Public Enterprises (Privatization and 
Commercialization) Decree, 1999, which came into effect on 31st December 1998.
For a government that had less than five months to hand over power to an elected 
civilian government, these policy outlines and projections are not only ambitions, they 
seem patently unrealistic.
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CONCLUSION
It would appear that General Abubakar’s most enduring legacy was one of 
highlighting the larger ramifications of the micro -  and macro economic short Falls of the 
Abacha administration, especially its failed and seemingly unachievable economic 
development projections; and to rapidly set in progress a process that finally culminated 
in the civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo.
His economic development policy thrust for the very short life of his 
administration can only be grasped against the background of his budget speech and the 
reality at his administration’s terminal date. In his Budget of realism, he noted that “The 
overall fiscal deficit for the Federal Government in 1999 is projected at NG 34.1 billion, 
representing 1.05 per cent of project GDP. This deficit is arrived at after taking into 
account considerable anticipated transfers, including draw-down from our external 
reveres...’’(Abubakar, 1999). However, in what has been comically described as “injury­
time looting”, billions of pounds have disappeared from the country’s reserves. The last- 
minute level of looting by the administration is mind-boggling. Between January and 
April 1999, the administration ran up a budget deficit of NG 100 billion, a figure far more 
than the entire deficit for 1995. Between of the inverse correlationship between public 
looting and foreign exchange rate in Nigeria, during the administration’s short tenure, the 
Naira depreciated by 11 per cent and inflation over 12 per cent (Mustrapha, 1999, 
Vanguard, 1999; Newswatch, 1999).
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ENDNOTES
1. See Abdul Raufu Mustapha’s “The Nigerian Transition: Third Time Lucky or 
More of the Same” in Review o f African Political Economy, June, 1999; 
Abubakar Momoh’s “The Political Economy of Transition to Civil Rule”, in 
The Political Economy of Nigeria under Military Rule: 1984-1993, for a 
detailed analysis of the processes antecedents and the role played by General 
Abacha in the military regimes that span the periods 1983- 1993.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSION: MILITARY GOVERNMENTS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
This chapter attempts to draw together the findings of the last six chapters (with 
relevant reference to the Shagari administration) as they relate to individual regime’s 
performance.
Between 1966 and 1999, the military institution in Nigeria, through coups and 
counter-coups, assumed responsibilities for determining, formulating and implementing, 
social, political and economic development policies, except for a cumulative ten-year 
period between 1960-1966 and 1979-1983. This period may appropriately be described as 
civilian interregnums. What informed the policy choices or decisions of the military 
governments, and whether those resulted in economic development and improvement in 
the overall well-being of the citizenry, have been the subject of this study. The attempt in 
this chapter is to determine whether those policies were more directly informed by any 
particular preferences: defense, agriculture, education, health, employment or social 
welfare. And if they were, were they grounded in any realistic leadership-articulated 
conceptual relevance, to be consistent and realizable? Indeed, were they realized?
It should be noted that from the point in January 1966 that the military took over 
power in Nigeria all the critical issues associated with economic development were 
present namely: agriculture, education, health, employment and social welfare. It is also 
important to mention here that in the interval, new dimensions and scope have been 
added to measuring economic development that further enlarges the analysis and resource 
requirements, namely . .how to measure economic development as a whole once it is 
understood that growth is only one aspect of the development of societies and that there
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are other equally important dimensions such as political democracy and human rights, 
health, education, the environment, and equal access to opportunities” (Philippe Aghion, 
2000, 54).
National Development Plans and budgetary processes essentially formed the 
premises of military governments’ policy options and implementation. And the 
experience in Nigeria, where national budgets were prepared by soldiers or through their 
directives and by civil servants and technocrats who were obliged to satisfy their 
employer’s (the military) preferences, is very instructive. The policy preferences 
obviously seem to be one that invested less in human resources development. The 
budgets showed clear sectoral preferences to issues like defence, general administration 
and internal security. Table 12.1 reveals that between 1975 and 1994, budget estimates by 
government on health and education were much lower than budget estimates on defence, 
general administration and internal security (an undisguised reference to the military 
governments’ concern and preoccupation with possible coup attempts). It was also the 
case that defense and associated spending were rarely affected by austerity budgets, not 
even in the years 1987 and 1994 when the Babangida's, and subsequently Abacha’s 
military administrations were subjecting the citizenry to the most harrowing and 
dehumanizing Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (M.M. Afolabi, 1999;
Olayiwola, 1987). Although some have argued that the increase in defense spending went 
to finance improvements in pay and conditions (Omari, 1972, 164; Bayham, 1988, 229) 
and that the trickle-down effect of this expenditure created evident growth for the rest of 
the economy; especially for a country like Nigeria with a sizable military, which
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increased from 10,000 in 1966 to 250,000 in 1970. The evidence on the ground does not
support this contention.
ACTUAL EXPENDITURE OF NIGERIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM 1975 TO
1994 
(N MILLION)
Table 12.1
Year Health Education Defence Internal
Security
General
Administration
1975 82.8 850.0 N/A 1803.2 N/A
1976 140.3 1051.2 N/A 1805.6 N/A
1977 123.8 504.1 N/A 2053.8 NA/
1978 155.3 826.6 N/A 2249.4 N/A
1979 77.5 667.1 N/A 1769.0 N/A
1980 360.0 1238.5 N/A 3205 N/A
1981 416.0 930.0 N/A 3713.9 N/A
1982 269.0 924.2 N/A 2910.6 198.7*
1983 254.5 956.0 N/A 3114.2 N/A*
1984 121.6 745.5 N/A 2820.8 119.2*
1985 223.4 823.4 N/A 2950.8 147.0*
1986 312.2 875.2 803.2 439.9 1697.4
1987 124.2 448.7 2155.0 1190.8 4516.7
1988 578.2 1786.7 1720.1 1200.9 4655.4
1989 796.8 3399,3 2291.3 1082.4 5586.3
1990 823.2 2819.1 2285.2 1653.6 5521.3
1991 771.3 1553.3 2711.7 1869.9 5708.2
1992 1634.0 2414.2 4821.8 3874.6 5276.8
1993 2567.6 6331.5 6381.6 3850.4 16215.8
1994 2843.1 9434.7 6607.7 5559.6 17152.6
* No record of current expenditure 
N/A = Not available
1 Provisional -  Available capital expenditure is provisional 
Source: Federal republic of Nigeria official gazettes
This sectoral preference practice cuts across all the military regimes, so much so 
that one of the regimes that was perceived as the most “progressive” in the human 
development area (The military administration of Generals Mohammed/Obansanjo), the 
emphasis or focus did not change. For example, in the year 1977 when NG 123.8 million 
was spent on health and NG 504.1 million, on education, the sum of NG 2053.8 million 
was spent on internal security. Also in 1987 when only NG 124.2 million was spent on
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health, and NG 448.7 million was expended on education, NG 4516.7 million was spent 
on general administration, and NG2155 million spent on defence, while NG 1190.8 
million was spent on internal security.
Furthermore, Table 12.2 indicates that education, and health expenditures 
represented on average, between 1 and 5 per cent of total federal government expenditure 
between 1990 and 1994. According to these estimates, in the years 1990, only 5.3 per 
cent of the annual federal budget was spent on education. This decreased to 4.1 per cent 
in 1991. This again increased to 6.3 per cent and 7.3 per cent in 1992 and 1993 
respectively (typically without any consistent and discernible rationale).
SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS OF NIGERIA: PERCENTAGE OF 
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ALLOCATION IN NATIONAL
BUDGET
Table 12.2
Sub-Sectors 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(i) Federal Government 
Budget Allocation to 
Education (N million) 2,121,2 1557.5 2404.6 7999.4 10283.8
(ii) Percentage of Annual 
Federal Budget 5.3 4.1 6.3 7.3 14.9
Health
(i) Federal Government 
Budget allocation to 
Health N (million)
904.9 1091.8 1051.1 2652.2 3042.4
(ii) Percent of annual 
Federal Budget
2.5 1.4 2.0 1.5 4.4
Source: Derived from Statistics of Ministries of Education, Health, Office of Statistics and CBN
Estimates
(Various years)
The Table also reveals how dismal the situation was with health. The percentage 
of annual federal budget spent on health ranged from 1.4 per cent to 4.4 per cent between
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1990 and 1994. According to Gunatilleke, G (1995,4), the World Health Organization 
(WHO) recommendation for developing countries should be at 5 per cent of total national 
budgets. If it is noted that these are minimum recommendations, and does not even rise 
up to acceptable national-need requirements levels, depending on other variables that 
could impact human development, the enormity of Table 12.3 would be better 
appreciated.
Table 12.3 shows a comparative study of per capita expedition on health in some 
African countries between 1975 and 1985. Nigeria’s data figures show one of the most 
deplorable, if not worst, regressive per capita expenditure on health. Saadet Deger 
commented in his “Economic Development and the Military” that indicators on socio­
economic development shows that “...Nigeria, in spite of earning five times the income 
of the average Tanzania, seems to have a higher possibility of being illiterate, a larger 
probability of dying at birth, a lower life expectancy and a lesser chance of drinking safe 
water. Again increased militarisation is maybe, having a deleterious effect on the quality 
of life” (1986, 231-238).
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES ON HEALTH IN SOME AFRICAN
COUNTRIES
1975-1985
Table 12.3
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Botswana 19.00 20.91 25.10 23.04 19.13 27.06 34.13 29.72
Cameroon 10.96 11.09 10.82 11.56 10.94 12.36 9.88 13.52
Egypt 11.60 11.97 12.95 13.42 12.42 12.42 10.53 8.64
Ghana 9.03 8.56 6.91 6.77 4.63 3.96 3.81 3.32
Kenya 10.43 10.02 10.05 11.88 12.09 13.42 14.07 13.41
Liberia 12.33 14.31 14.52 18.38 15.33 10.91 17.06 17.10
Marritins 26.06 33.11 37.46 40.54 40.95 29.96 30.46 32.74
Nigeria 3.45 3.90 3.71 2.72 3.67 3.79 1.85 2.19
Swaziland 10.43 19.92 20.95 21.85 19.70 21.81 20.81 28.94
Togo 12.37 12.36 12.13 12.66 11.54 10.78 10.03 10.70 (
Zimbabwe 16.17 16.65 15.68 16.96 16.07 16.99 20.64 23.22
Source: Gallagher (1988: 7)
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The first military intervention in Nigeria fatefully coincided with first oil boom. It 
is rather comically interesting that intervention in the first place was hoped would remedy 
mismanagement and corruption of the First Republic civilian administration. And it must 
be added, was also the primary rationale for sacking the Second Republic. The new 
military leadership touted its determination of using the country’s resources, especially 
the oil boom, to enhance national economic self-sufficiency in food and cash crop 
production, manufacturing capacity, education, health, transportation and social welfare.
Although the First Plan estimated NG 1.351 billion, out of which 67.8 per cent 
was reserved for the economic sector, 24.4 per cent to social services and 7.2 per cent to 
administrative services (Tomori and Fajana, 1979); even if sufficiently constrained by 50 
per cent foreign aid expectation, the plan lacked appropriate focus and implementation 
prioritization. At what Rostow would characterize as “rudimentary” stage, the emphasis 
ought to have been agriculture, which employed over 75 per cent of the country’s labour 
force, sustained its food production capacity, as well as being a primary foreign exchange 
earner. Rather the emphasis was on building infrastructure such as road, bridges, 
electricity, railway etc. (Edwin Dean, 1972); some of which did not qualify as priority, in 
of the country’s overall competing development needs and alternatives. Some of these 
showed noticeable sectoral growth even as they did not diminish the critical need for 
selectivity. Examples abound, like the road building during the period, which experienced 
heavy growth. The total road network increase from 66.074 kilometers in 1960 to 95,374 
kilometers in 1972, an increase of 44 per cent (Second Progress -  Report (Lagos: Central 
Planning Office 1974). The combined lengths of roads and bridges under construction 
increased from 4,800 kilometers to 14, 500 kilometers (Economic and Statistical Review,
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1979, XIX). However, lack of subsequent sustainable maintenance capacity due to 
premature level attainment has since precipitated a rapid deterioration of those 
infrastructures.
Predictably this misplaced policy thrusts in the First Plan appears to have set the 
stage for subsequent other Plans formulated and executed by successive military regimes. 
It would appear that an economy which translated, for all intents and purposes, into an 
increased centralization of administration and decision-making (by reason of the 
hierarchical top-to-bottom military culture), and which conferred enormous powers of 
patronage and influence on a select few with a large capacity for corruption and 
mismanagement, lacked the inherent capacity to be responsive and need-oriented. There 
are reasons to think not. For it has been suggested that even the socio-economic 
achievements that were apparently recorded in the 1970s were not commensurate with 
the magnitude of resources deployed. And that beneath the apparent dynamism that 
seems to characterize the period, was an unsettling shallowness connected with the 
fundamental structural weaknesses of the national economy (Democracy in Nigeria,
2000, 91).
For example, agriculture, which was hitherto, the mainstay of the economy was, 
starting from the First Plan, neglected. And pitifully where there was little evident 
productivity, the marketing boards were used as instruments of regressive taxation; which 
reduced producer prices by between 20 to 30 per cent, and thus acted as disincentive to 
the farmers (Nelson et al, 1972, 332-334; Helleiner, 1966). The neglect, which 
heightened with rising increase in oil production, accelerated the decline in food and cash 
crop production, leading to an increased dependence on food imports. The neglect, which
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had implicatory impact on rural farmers, precipitated rural-urban migration, reinforcing 
both the crisis in agricultural production and urban sprawl.
The national manufacturing sector did not fair particular well either, though on 
the face of it, appeared vibrant. Over 90 per cent of their activities were concentrated in 
the light-manufacturing sector, which depended almost completely on imported inputs for 
sustenance. Indeed the domestic value added in the new industry was low: their products 
had high import content and profits could be freely repatriated. Firms with prior interest 
in the market (raising critical questions of new value to the economy) accounted for 
major part of Nigeria’s import-substituting industrialization (Kilby, 1969,75-79, Dina, 
1971, 393). Besides, the subsequent massive and repeated devaluation of the naira, 
which was complemented with the liberalization of prices, interest rates and trade, as well 
as efforts to trim public expenditures and recover costs, had the effect of further 
decimating the national manufacturing capacity. This general state of affairs was 
compounded by the failure of some of the strategic intermediate and capital goods 
investments made by the state under successive military governments to get off to proper 
start due to poor conception and implementation, not to mention outright corruption.
, . Unfortunately, the transformation of the basis of accumulation from agriculture 
to oil also translated into an increased national economic vulnerability to external shocks 
in the context of an almost complete dependence on one commodity for national 
economic development. And successive military governments did precious little to 
diversify this structural disequilibrium. Ultimately the collapse of the world oil market 
led rapidly to the accumulation of over $30 billion in debts by the end of the 1990s as the 
government embarked on domestic and international borrowing in order to sustain the
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level of economic activities in the country. The repayment structure of this huge debt 
became an unsustainable debt burden, which effectively eroded what was left of the 
social gains of post-independence period in all departments, and diminished the capacity 
of the state to deliver public goods. It has been suggested that if the oil boom years 
witnessed the graduation of Nigeria into the ranks of the middle income countries of the 
world, the decades of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed its relegation back into the ranks of 
the low income countries; and by 1990s had become one of the poorest, with per capira 
income falling below $300, with over 80 per cent living below poverty line from a low of 
41 per cent between 1992 and 1998 (Democracy in Nigeria, 2000, 93-99).
The Land Use Decree, introduced during the Third Plan period, by the Obasanjo 
administration, was ostensibly for a number of beneficial reasons. For example, it was 
believed that the Decree would ease the land acquisition process thus increasing 
agricultural production and other productive uses; and especially to “attract foreign 
entrepreneurs and foreign capital into agricultural production” (Ake, 1985, 17). The 
exercise was a monumental failure. Conceptually it lacked practical application in its 
failure to reckon with the complicated land tenure system in the country. Other features 
of the failure are evident. For example, manufacturing firms without expertise in farming 
suddenly found themselves scrambling for land for farming, even when they lacked the 
expertise. Because the Decree vested all public land in the state governors, companies 
wishing to acquire land had to queue up in the governors’ offices nationwide. It has been 
suggested that the Decree simply gave the bureaucracy new powers of land allocation, 
which it used to favour public servants and private business (Koehn and Aliyu, 1982).
The result was official corruption involving governors, commissioners, permanent
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secretaries and other public officials. The larger consequence was the complete 
disinheritance of the majority of rural dwellers and farmers, for whom land provided both 
nominal asset and a practical means of livelihood, thus affecting their standard of living.
It is perhaps in the light of the above that the opinion of Ake, as to the real reason for the 
Decree might be viewed. ".. .But its latent function, far more significant than its manifest 
functions, was to increase enormously the power resources and access to surplus of those 
who have executive control of the machinery of state. It gave them power to appropriate 
any house or land, to allocate it to any person or to any use they pleased, for any length of 
time they pleased” (1985, 17).
Government other major policy initiative was the Indigenization Decree. It 
believed that through participation, Nigerians would be encouraged to acquire the 
entrepreneurial know-how, which will enable the development of a better habit of saving 
and thrift, all of which are considered essential for the economic independence of the 
country (African Research Bulletin, March, 1980, 2015). The scheme was essentially 
conceptualized as a vehicle to localize ownership and participation, through equity 
transfer to individuals and also direct government participation. In addition the Decree 
sought to limit the sectors of the economy in which foreign companies could operate 
without success. The aim ostensibly was to push foreign capital into higher technology 
areas, thereby creating opportunities for Nigerians in other areas (Vision 2010, 1997). 
Unfortunately, indigenization failed as an effective instrument for transfering meaningful 
domestic participation and ownership, especially as government did not provide any 
effective mechanisms for indigenous majority participation. Ironically therefore, rather 
than produce economic independence, the scheme may have been an impediment, to the
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extent that it fostered the exaggeerated view or believe that economic independence can 
be achieved by the simple act of Nigerians acquiring ownership and management of 
private foreign companies operating in Nigeria, without the requisite management know­
how.
With the possible exception of the civilian administration of the first Republic, 
which initiated and proceeded to implement a substantial part of the First National 
Development Plan, with some commendable results (noted in Chapter 4), the other 
civilian administration, (of the Second Republic), although notoriously noted for its 
profligacy, and corrupt mismanagement, was not privileged to initiate substantial original 
development plans which it executed to completion. And although its level of relative 
performance is noted in chapter seven, virtually all of its projects were inherited from the 
military administration of Generals Mohammed/Obansanjo. In the light of the above, its 
pereformance evaluation here is one of unavoidable relativism, and would not therefore 
suffice for comparative purposes.
And although the Babangida administration conceptualized (albeit with the 
assistance of the International Monetary Fund) and proceeded to implement SAP, which 
was meant to radically transform the national economy and stem the decline in the 
country’s fortune by restoring it to the part of growth, the exercise inevitably fed into the 
existing dynamics of decline, thus compounding the national economic crisis. This 
resulted in massive devaluation of the naira, liberalization of trade, prices and interest 
rates, and without the benefit of support and the sustaining infrastructure, had the net 
effect of decimating the capacity of system sustainability. The citizenry was left
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hopelessly and helplessly vulnerable from a scheme whose underlying rationale was the 
ultimate improvement in their standard of living.
The general assessment is that SAP was a monumental failure. Its underlying 
premise of deregulation and “free market forces”, ill-conceived and poorly -  
implemented, as they were, meant that gross under valuation of the national currency, 
high interest rates and galloping inflation completely diminished citizens’ capacity for 
survival. By 1993, the effects of SAP were legion; the Finance Minister in the erstwhile 
Interim National Government (ING) commented that:
“We cannot hide under the guise of deregulation to watch helplessly 
as our economy gets bastardized. We should also realize that 
deregulation is not synonymous with abdication of the time-honoured 
responsibilities of the government to ensure the direction of the 
economy along desired lines” (Olashore, 1993,15,19).
What is obvious from the fore-going is that notwithstanding the very significant 
circumstances that led to changes in regime (from one military government to the other); 
and notwithstanding further the apparent shifts in policy emphasis and spending priorities 
(and these were obvious in the Go won (civil war) and Babangida (SAP) administrations), 
there appears to be no significant difference in socio-economic development focus or 
outcome. Thus supporting hypothesis (H3) that based on outputs and outcomes, relative to 
overall national revenue generation (especially given near-equal revenue generation 
capacity) socio-economy development is not more likely under any one particular 
military administration. It cannot therefore be said that at any time during the life of any 
of the military regimes, the citizenry have had a better standard of living comparatively. 
Again, given equal revenue generation capacity, the underlying questions are not only 
one of huge resource flow, but also the prudent management of it for the improvement of 
societal well being.
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Apparently the development plans of successive military governments in Nigeria 
did not only lack depth, they were pathetically short on national outlook and orientation, 
and this was in spite of the quasi-unitary structure of these military regimes. Apart from 
dearth of relevant data and requisite statistics, which impact development planning, there 
were also uncoordinated and unreconciled (especially with the states) individual 
government programmes and objectives.
Even though some of the regimes were obviously worse than others, none 
performed spectacularly better than the other. Except to add that the mindlessly 
corrupting ambience of one regime (Babangida’s) may have had some very deleterious 
socio-economic consequences, and thus set the stage for another extremely corrupt and 
brutal military administration—General Abacha— so much so that it distorts reliable 
comparisions, especially the endless availability of all seemingly “unaccountable” 
revenue sources. One who served in very important position under one of the military 
governments, had this to say:
“Nigeria needs to embrace strategic planning and strict discipline 
in Government and industry as a way of life. Strategic planning requires 
a very detailed and continuing scanning of the environment and strict 
compliance with the plan. This requires a culture of self-discipline which 
we must make a way of life in this country. When we as a nation 
develop these attributes we surely will recognize the danger sign 
well in advance and take appropriate corrective action”
(Quoted in Yusufu, 1996, 388).
Based on available evidence, including quantitative results in chapters six through 
eleven, there is reason to conclude that no one military regime had the superior ability to 
articulate and fully implement any economic development concept it formulated, let 
alone attain any of their stated development objectives. The results showed that 
productivity in the government professed critical areas (agriculture, industry, education,
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health and employment) were rarely attained (Yusufu, 1996, 81-86). If anything, they 
showed a downward regressive pattern with each successive regime from 1966 and 
culminating in 1999.
From the foregoing, it can only be concluded that the huge resources expended by 
successive military regimes to attain development and economic self-reliance is of 
questionable realization. And that whatever socio-economic achievements recorded at all 
are not commensurate with the magnitude of the resources deployed. Supporting data 
suggests that military governments in Nigeria changed little by way of better living 
conditions for the citizenry; if anything, they made them worse. This thus validates the 
opinion of Ruth First (1970, 22) that military coup is “a method of change that changes 
little” Obviously the overall poor quality of well being in Nigeria in all critical areas is as 
a result of changes in military governments that promised everything but changed 
nothing, other than exacerbate the social, political and economic conditions. Table 12.4 
shows selected social indicators of standard of living, educational and health. These 
statistics are grim, especially haven regard to the fact that in 1960 Nigeria (without the oil 
boom) was ranked among the 40 richest countries in the world would in 1999 rank one of 
the poorest (Tell Magazine, May 11, 1998, 18; World Bank, 2000).
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Selected Social Indicators
Table 12.4
S/NO 1992-94
Yearly Ave 1994-96 1996
A: Standards of Living Indices Yearly Ave (1997)
1. Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 2.. ..32
2.29 3.72
2. Real GDP Per Capita (N) 1058.2
1044.5 1046.1
3. Real GDP Per Capital - 0.50
Growth Rate (%) -0.54 0.56(0.92)
4. Current Prices GDP Per 7571.0
capita (N) 18664.89 26874.26
5. Exchange Rate (N $1.00) 24.946
62.347 69.8449
(77.54)
6. Current Prices GDP Per 303.50
Capita ($) 299.37 384.77
(320.44)
7. Inflation Rate (% change 52.9
GPI) 53.0 29.3
(15.00)
8. Real Per Capita Private
Consumption (N) 784.98 776.60
745.68 (801.03)
9. Real Per Capita Private
Consumption Interperiod 2.16
Growth N/A
-5.01 1 (3.15)
10. Current Prices Per Capita
Private 6045.07 20834.26
15682.25 (20555.53)
11. Current Price Per Capita
Private Consumption ($) 242.33 298.29
251.53 (265.10)
B. EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS
12. Adult Literacy Rate 54.7
56.3 57
13. Teacher -  Pupil Radio 1.44
(Primary) 1.53 1.48
14. Teacher -  Pupil Radio 1.25
(Secondary) (1990-94) 1.36 1.37
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15. % of annual Fed Govt.
Allocation of Education 9.5 
(%)
12.9 10.8
C. HEALTH INDICATORS
16. Life Expectancy at Birth 52 
(Years)
52.3 53
17. Population Per Physicians 3762 
(No)
3718 3744
18. Population Per Nursing 620 
Staff (No)
613 617
19. Population Per Housing 1237 
Bed (No)
1446 1555
20. Children Immunization 51.5 
(overall fully Immunized %)
30.4 49.1
21. % of Population with 66 
access to Health Services (%) (1985-93)
67
(1993) N.A
22. Population (Million) 94.125 99.528 102.318
(105.214)
23. Population Growth Rate (%) 2.83 2.83 2.83 (2.83)
Source:
(1) CBN Annual Report and Statement of Account, 1996
(2) Nigerian Economic Society (NES): Selected papers for the 1997 Annual Conference on 
Poverty Alleviation Nigeria.
(3) World Bank: World Development Report 19993,1996 and 1997.
*Figures for 1997 are indicated in brackets as N.A.—Not Available.
These states of affairs may be explained away as being due to a number of
environmental peculiarities. However, the choice here is to group the most critical under
two broad headings: Internal Institutional Constraints and International Constraints.
INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON 
REGIME PERFORMANCE
Understandably the successive military regimes in Nigeria did not transplant from 
a different planet or zone to suddenly begin to function in Nigeria. Essentially they are a 
product of what has been characterized as “low political culture” (Finer, 1975, 4-6) and
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of increasing “political decay” (Huntington, 1968, 1-92). So are gravely lacking in the 
functional support structures and institutions any government, military or civilian, needed 
desperately to succeed. Although the role of the bureaucrat underwent some (cosmetics) 
changes following any military intervention, they continued to exercise significant, if not 
dominant, influence over policy matters. They were singularly and heavily relied upon 
for advice and implementation of public policies (B.B. Schaffer, 1969, 1999; James 
O’Connell, 1980, 62).
Indeed, the active and perhaps near-indispensable involvements of the bureaucrats 
have been variously described as “military-bureaucratic diarchy”, “administocracy”, etc 
(Basil Oshionebo, 1995, 239-240). And unlike other structures or organizations 
connected with the deposed regimes, which were either disengaged or made redundant, 
the Nigerian bureaucrat tended to emerge from the “revolutionary dust” unscathed and 
often times, more powerful.
Understandably, military revolutionaries are not particularly schooled in the act of 
government, neither are some of then (regimes) very clear or certain on what to do or 
policies to implement, upon assuming control of government (Anton Bebler, 1973, 38; 
Baynham 1988, 220). The reliance on the bureaucrats seems to be total. Oshionebo notes 
that:
“.. .Senior civil servants were in the limelight because the military 
administration, on assumption of office, did not have clear-cut, 
articulated and coordinated programes which it was committed to 
implement. It therefore relied heavily on the professional skills 
of the civil service for the initiation and formulation of policies.
In order words, from the position of a prompter in the wings 
of a stage, the civil servant was feared to have become the 
lead actor in the center stage” (1995, 240).
Following the 1966 coup, there evolved in Nigeria a feature characterized as 
“military democracy” and the reign of “super permanent secretaries”. It was a level of
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active policy participation that Shehu Shagari, then a federal Commissioner for Finance 
under General Gowon (he emerged as the second republic civilian President) had this to 
say:
"In a military regime actually, the policies are formulated by the civil 
servants themselves, not by the military, not by the commissioners.
It is the civil servants themselves who formulate policies and execute 
those policies. That is the position in a military regime.. .under military rule, 
when a commissioner and his permanent secretary were in disharmony, 
it was the commissioner who was removed" (quoted in Adamolekun, 1986,118).
It follows that the military reliance on the bureaucracy created new dimensions 
and complications for an institution (civil service) that was over-routinized, over­
specialized and inflexibly hierarchical. Essentially the civil service embodied features 
that were not amenable to individual regime’s new policy initiatives and creativity; it was 
continuity without changes or innovation. In the circumstances, it was impossible to 
differentiate one regime from the other, at least in their policy retention and continuity. 
The “Federal character” of the country’s civil service structure, compounded this state of 
affairs, since it mandated regional (ethnic) representation, without discriminatory 
technocratic preferences. The bureaucrat essentially saw himself/herself as fulfilling 
chiefly partisan functions in all spheres of their activities. The disposition was the same, 
regardless of whether it was implementing political goals, articulating, regulating or 
implementing other policies. It also meant that pressures from the different states, 
reflecting the federal character, to include far too many projects in the development plans 
than available implementation resources and capacity can carry.
Understandably the consequences would include policies that are not national in 
focus and orientation. And since in Nigeria, government is the dominant economic actor, 
the civil servants have come to exert a great influence on the direction of economic 
activities and development (S.N. Eisenstadt, 1968, 286-293). Indeed it was obvious that if
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the economic recovery and adjustment programmes (under SAP) were to succeed the 
government needed to reappraise the bureaucratic institutional framework within which 
they were to be implemented, especially by streamlining the policy-making and 
implementing processes and to inculcate in the civil service a sense of purpose and 
urgency. The World Bank Annual Report, 1988 in noting their critical role had this to
“To keep the adjustment process going, there is a need for institutional 
development, that not only fosters effective macro-economic management, 
but also builds an internal capacity for policy analysis and implementation” 
(World Bank, 1988, 88).
The role of the civil service was most articulated by The Political Bureau, set up 
by General Babangida, as part of his radical transformation of Nigeria’s political and 
economic landscape:
“It is clear that the civil service occupies a very strategic position in the social, 
economic and political development of this country. It is the most central of 
the institutions of government, which in our recommendation, should be the 
prime mover of the social and economic development of this country. The 
role of the civil service will become even more crucial in the achievement of the 
goals and aspirations of the new philiosophy of government outlined in this Report.
Indeed, the implementation of the recommendations of this report,
as with similar reports will depend very much on the
civil service” (Alex Gboyega and Yaya Abubakar, 1986, 8).
For an institution in which so much is reposed by way of functional and 
implementation responsibility, it is important to note some peculiar features of the 
institution:
1. High incidences of corruption;
2. Lack of qualified personnel;
3. Limited functional specialization;
4. Over-centralization, poor coordination, lack of autonomy or initiative; and
5. Inadequate communications and overlapping between different levels, 
departments and ministries.
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These sources of weakness have remained untackled by successive military governments. 
According to Chijioke Dike, the civil service continues to be criticized for “poor 
organization, planlessness and over staffing, indiscipline, red-tape and secrecy, 
insensitivity, rigidity and over-centralization, conservatism and lack of imagination, 
apathy, incompetence and lousiness, corruption and favoritism, rudeness and high 
handedness laziness, truancy and malingering” (quoted in Alex Gboyega, 1995, 260). 
That there are persistent problems of national development underimplementation in 
Nigeria is hardly surprising (O’Connell, 1980, 55-71; Adedeji, 1980, 72-77). According 
to Adamolekun, “the verdict is inescapable that the senior administrators share part of the 
blame for the mismanagement of the national economy between 1979 and 1983” (quoted 
in Gboyega, 1995, 261).
As was noted in chapter four, communication among the different regions on the 
one hand and the different ministerial departments on the other, made it difficult for 
uniform policy objectives to be constructively formulated and implemented. Indeed 
Gordon Idang (1980, 34-52) believes that a major deficiency in Nigeria’s economy 
development planning was the inadequate provision for communication and coordination 
among relevant department and agencies.
The problem of bureaucratic corruption is one of pernicious persistence. The 
degree was degenerational with successive military regimes. It extends from high-ranking 
civil servants who embezzle millions of dollars in state funds, to those at the lower levels 
who extort bribe or “tip” for the simplest of their official responsibilities. That the Gowon 
administration was becoming increasingly undermined by corruption was chiefly the 
unbridled conduct of some of his very powerful senior servants (Turner, 1978, 174). It
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has also been suggested that an attempt by Gowon and one of his permanent secretaries 
to suppress a document prepared by technocrats at the Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
and highlighting gross mismanagement was the direct antecedent to an internal army 
coup (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 60).
The situation had become exasperatingly chronic and sufficiently debilitating that 
the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime adopted what may be characterized as shock therapy to 
deal with the problem; a measure, which in 1975 featured the mass retrenchment and 
dismissal of corrupt civil servants. That some have argued that this singular bold act of 
redeeming a critical public institution had the unintended effect of making the civil 
service insecure and precipitating more avaricious form of unbridled corruption (Ayida 
1979, 226), attests to the convoluted process of rationalization and condonement. That 
policy makers failed to continue to nip the continuing and persistent evolving civil 
service corruption in the bud, meant that by the time General Babangida assumed power 
in 1985 and when he “stepped aside” in August 1993, corruption had become second 
nature not only in the civil service but the larger society where it was now baptized and 
legitimized as “settlement”.
Apart from bureaucratic corruption, perhaps the other most singular constraint on 
regime performance in Nigeria was the level of military leadership corruption that 
permitted the introduction of new lexicon “lootocracy”, “kleptocracy” “kletomania”— in 
describing the mindless looting and conversion of public fund and property. It is also 
important to observe that these acts of corruption were extended to friends, relatives and 
clients who received appointments, contracts and other illegitimate favours.
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With the possible exception of the Mohmmed/Obasanjo and Buhari military 
regimes that were believed not to be leadership-corrupt (although corruption was still 
prevalent within the larger society during their tenure), all the other military leaders, 
especially from General Babangida, showed a level of mindless corruption that it was 
strange and extremely strange not to be corrupt in the system. It has also been suggested 
that General Gowon may not have been corrupt personally, but that he lacked leadership 
capacity to control his subordinates, including his notorious and all-powereful “super 
permanent secretaries”.
It was perhaps during General Babangida’s regime that corruption in the country 
was elevated to a fine art. It has been suggested that never in his eight years plus, of 
leadership, did he even admonish at least publicly of curbing corruption (Gana, 1995, 
100; Mustapha, 1999, 277-291). From General Babangida through Generals Abacha and 
Abubakar, the story is one of mind-burgling unbelievability.
“.. .the years of economic crisis and structural adjustment produced 
an outcome in which centralized power was increasingly personalized 
in the office of the president and within that framework, corruption at the 
highest levels of government not only was able to bloom but, in fact, 
assumed the status of primary objective and directive principle of 
state policy” (Democracy in Nigeria, 2000, 94).
Over $2 billion of public funds have been recovered from the family of General 
Abacha since his death. General Abubakar is alleged to have massively looted the public 
treasury at the eve of his hand-over to the current civilian president on 29th May 1999 
(Vanguard July 27, 2001).
It is not difficult to see the negative impact of corruption in the economic 
development of any country. Not the least in one in which there is wholesale corruption 
of the system and process, and in which gross mismanagement is only viewed as a better
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evil than outright corruption. The country’s problems were not limited to looting of 
public treasury by leadership and administrators; they also involved extravagant life 
styles by them at public’s expense. In addition to corruption these rapidly depleted the 
national treasury and resource capacity making it impossible to attain any sustainable 
economy development parity.
As resources were brazenly diverted to serve private and partisan sectional ends, 
the national infrastructure, ranging from the educational and health institutions to road 
and rail network, the entire power and energy sector, were allowed to go into decay with 
far-reaching consequences for both the economy and society.
Related to the high incidences of corruption, and perhaps the underlying, even if 
unjustifiable rationale for it, is the usually brief duration of the military regimes. “Coups 
beget coups”. This is especially the case in a highly politicized military institution like in 
Nigeria (Huntington, 1964, 194), where it appears intervention is political in nature. And 
as the experience in the country will show with so many coups and counter-coups, “the 
army acts for army reasons; a military coup needs the participation of a professional army 
or core-officers, but it needs not be precipitated, or even planned, by the military for 
military reasons” (Ruth First, 1970).
Because of the uncertainty in the duration of their tenure, policies seem poorly 
thought-out; and when they seem well thought-out, are hardly fully implemented by their 
originators. The adhoc nature of the process and the persistent sense of job/position 
insecurity do not only encourage precipitous corrupt activities, it also rapidly indulges the 
concentration of rather scarce resources in the desperate attempt to secure the office and
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position. The very disproportionate allocations in the budget (see Table 12,1, 12,2, and 
12.3) attest to this misallocation.
Another institutional constraint of military rule in Nigeria has to do with the 
destruction of fledging democracies. Democracy is an art, and democratic institutions are 
learning classrooms for the perfection of the process. The impatience of the military to 
promptly intevence to sack a sitting democratically elected government, at the slightest of 
missteps has only created a grave underdevelopment in an area that is patently crucial in 
the development of any country; especially given its participatory and inclusive 
imperatives. Military rule in Nigeria has gravely contributed to the decline in the political 
skills of future civilian leadership. The country’s first Republic was sacked after only six 
years and the second only after four years. For a country forty years old (following 
independence), a total of 10 years is hardly enough learning time. This fact perhaps 
explains the rancorous and almost immature performance of political actors in the 
country’s current third republic.
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON REGIME 
PERFORMANCE
In addition to internal institutional factors, regime performance may also be
affected by external and/or international constraints. The significance of this factor must 
be appreciated against the backdrop of a rapidly globalising market economy; where the 
market liberalizing activities of multilateral organizations like World Trade Organization 
(WTO) have encouraged an international investment environment that have 
simultaneously created equally attractive and equally rewarding investment-friendly, 
low-risk alternative countries, like those in South East Asia.
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Military governments, often times evolve, at least initially, by supplanting a 
constitutional democracy, like in the case of Nigeria. And because military usurpation is 
not a process adjudged legal and constitutionally acceptable, foreign governments and 
multinational corporations and investors are particularly weary of dealing with an 
institution they consider wayward and lacking in its regard for constitutional due process. 
Organizations are concerned about continuity and predictability, components that are not 
expected or even guaranteed in a continuing military government. Besides, in the current 
world dominant democratic dispensation, where America and the democratic West hold 
sway, military governments in large parts, are looked upon as pariah states (Nigerian 
under General Abacha, for example). The result is that economic aids that flow freely 
from these donor countries are suspended, oftentimes for the life of the military regimes. 
The impact of this kind of action on the ability of the country to promote and implement 
stated national development policies and plans could be enormous. The effects on a 
country like Nigeria can be immeasurable; especially because in its case successive 
development plans have relied on foreign sources for substantial portions of planned 
capital expenditure (Idang, 1980, 42).
It is also interesting to note the role of the Bretton Wood institutions. For apart 
from its institutional role under the Bretton Wood protocol, the World Bank and the IMF 
have essentially assumed another, and perhaps more critical role, that of “validator” 
institutions; in that, they determine and project for good or bad the economic and 
financial profile of any developing country, of which Nigeria is one. And their 
determination carries a lot of weight, if not the ultimate criteria for determining national 
credit or loan worthiness or eligibility. For example, the demise of the Buhari
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government is attributable mainly to the regime’s inability to reach consensus with the 
IMF, as a first step to negotiating debt rescheduling with the London and Paris clubs. It is 
also believed that in the desperation to gain the institution’s approval and credit 
worthiness ranking, the Babangida administration evolved and implemented a most 
devastating and poorly thought-through structural adjustment programme; the net effect 
of which was to consign Nigeria to the ranks of poorest African nations, with over 80 per 
cent of its citizens living below poverty line, by the end of the 1990s.
The world market economy is another international constraint, which might affect 
regime performance in Nigeria. Most countries in Africa, including Nigeria, depend on 
earnings from exports of raw materials (cocoa, coffee, groundnut etc) including metals 
and oil, for revenue to fund their budgetary expenditures and development plans. 
Unfortunately, these commodities are highly susceptible to the vagaries of the 
international market place. For example, during President Shagari’s administration, the 
slump in the world oil price for crude affected gravely government income and 
expenditure. According to Beven, Collier and Gunning (1999, 73), most of the fall in 
income was borne by the public sector, as public consumption was protected by reducing 
the pubic savings rate from 32 to 6 per cent.
The excessive dependence by successive military regimes on revenue from oil 
exports, to finance their economic and development programmes proved detrimental to 
the nation’s economic development. Although during the General Buhari administration 
(1984-1985) the slump situation improved modestly, General Babangida’s administration 
was immediately faced with a crash so severe in its full year in office, 1986, real income
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fell by more than 20 per cent —  an unprecedented decline, even by the harsh standards 
of the preceding years (Bevan, Collier and Gunning, 1999, 72).
Although there is consensus that international factors have a major impact on the 
ability of African state, including Nigeria, to develop (Andreski, 1969; Rodney 1974; 
Amin 1976), there are reasons to conclude that the military leadership in Nigeria has not 
helped the economic development situation by the policy options they adopted. Apart 
from a failure to diversify the economy and make it less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
primary product world market, successive regimes in Nigeria have lacked the leadership 
capacity to implement policies that are sensitive to changing economic conditions. The 
result is that in Nigeria, government is compelled to utilize deficit financing by 
borrowing heavily internally and externally (Olayiwola, 1987, 139).
The failure of successive military regimes to pay more than the lip-service to the 
development of agriculture, among others, which would have diversified the production 
and export base of the economy, as well as improve the attractiveness of life in the rural 
areas, have created a situation where the country is unable to feed its over 120 million 
citizens. The result is the dissipation of scarce resources that otherwise should go to other 
areas of national development, to import food.
CONCLUSION
Although overall it would appear that successive military regimes in Nigeria have 
been equally inefficient and ineffective in their efforts to realize specific socio-economic 
objectives, some have been more so than others. A closer look at the different military 
regimes with respect to intrinsically desirable economic and political objectives, would 
reveal some glaring differences between the regimes; especially levels of corruption and
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mismanagement. According to African Confidential, some $3-4 billion were reportedly 
siphoned off oil deals by the ruling elites and their business partners in less than four 
years between 1993 and 1997 (24 October, 1997). In comparison the country’s total 
government revenue from oil was $12 billion in 1997 (Guardian, Lagos, 19 February, 
1998). And among other financial arrangements, more than $2 billion allocated to the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for refinery repairs in the period 1993- 
1995 cannot be accounted for, even as the refinery remain unrepaired. The last four 
successive regimes -  Buhari, Babangida, Abacha and Abubakar -  have been spectacular. 
The Buhari regime may have exhibited a level of arbitrariness and lack of creativity in 
the issues of institutional political development as it indiscriminately locked up all 
manner of perceived opposition: politicians, trade unionists, students and professionals, 
that dared criticize or adversely comment on its policies. It also locked up politicians it 
believed were corrupt without giving them the benefit of a trial. The administration’s 
human rights abuse and drastic curtailment of press freedom was notorious. It 
promulgated in quick successions, Decree No 4, to curb press freedom; Decree No 2, for 
the preventive detention of opponents on security grounds. It went further to proscribe all 
demonstrations, processions, and unauthorized meetings.
The Babangida and Abacha regimes may be described as a seamful continuation 
of the same process, albeit with different leaderships. They both essentially evolved the 
same style of political and economic transition processes: transition without change. It 
has been suggested that the country’s experiences with both administrations were not 
particularly different; except that one (Babangida) showed obvious sophistication in his 
display of reprehensible conducts. It would appear that he possessed what phychogists
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would refer to as “split personality”, with as much capacity to do evil as he was to do 
good and an eternal craven to be “liked”. Those characteristics were on display at every 
turn in his eight years, plus in office. Abacha, on the other hand, was cruder and much 
more brutal. According to Mustapha, “if Babangida was Machavelli’s low and cunning 
fox, Abacha was his mean-spirited and iron-fisted lion, mindless of the rationality of the 
exercise of power. Unfortunately, both ‘Princes’ also had scant regard for the interest of 
their ‘subject’ the “principality” (1999, 278-179). It is also yet to be fully determined 
which was more corrupt (Babangida’s or Abacha’s administration), as they both 
exhibited a level of corruption that was unknown in the history of he country. The 
Abubakar’s regime, overall impact on economic policy is negligible, except when 
calculated the mismanagement and corruption that attended his transition programme and 
short stay in power (This Day, Lagos, 20 July, 2001); and the fact that he successfully 
implemented a transition programme that had been more than 16 years in the making.
The Gowon and Mohammed/Obasnjo regimes operated within what have been 
described as benevolent military dictatorship, with a high degree of meaningful public 
participation; in that they did not, by military governments’ standards, indulge the kinds 
of excessive abuses of processes and institutions, including unabashed corruption that 
attended especially the last three military administrations -  Babangida, Abacha and 
Abubakar. Indeed it is believed that the military governments’ collective efforts at 
seriously initiating and fully implementing infrastructural development projects were 
only earnestly attempted under the regimes of Gowon and Mohammed/Obasanjo. 
Whether they attained their overall goals or targets are another matter; and one that need 
be evaluated relative to resource availability, management and other variables.
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Regime performance in Nigeria has been even more dismal in the sphere of 
political development. Upon assuming power, the Nigeria military rulers, as a standard 
modus operandi, sack virtually all the political institutions in place, as well as restrict the 
free flow of the political processes and force politicians into long periods of hibernation, 
as it were, depriving them of the opportunity to acquire much needed political skills.
Thus perpetuating, in the words of Maniruzzaman, the chains of political 
underdevelopment (1987, 12). In Nigeria, that process of political institutional 
underdevelopment and restricted participation, started early, following the coup of 
January 15, 1966, barely six years after political independence from Britain.
If development be defined in part, as a process that encompasses improvements in 
essential activities of engineering society, the lack of avenues to develop and improve on 
political skills would necessarily lead to the underdevelopment of the larger society and 
its critical institutions; especially as political skills also entails human development 
management skills. The military’s failure in this regard has serious development 
consequences. And as was observed by Maniruzzaman (1987, 7), periods of military rule 
is usually a total waste, as far as the development of political skills are concerned.
Perhaps as important to regime performance in Nigeria is the issue of human 
rights violations. As Robert Jackman (1986, 228), notes “military regimes, on average are 
more repressive than non-military ones”. Unfortunately this is a case of an institutional 
mentality that fails to take cognizance of changing roles, from that of a military trained in 
the maximum application of force in the protection and preservation of the nation state, in 
the event of national security threats and a (military) administration or government, with 
a new role, whose primary responsibility is the management and execution of state affairs
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for the social welfare of its citizenry. Apparently, the military regimes’ in Nigeria lack 
this transformational capacity, such that when confronted with a problem that could 
otherwise be resolved by dialogue, promptly resorts to its specialization -  maximum use 
of force. In the words of Claude Welch, “Devised to use force in the most efficient 
manner, armies have a natural proclivity to turn to violence rather than palaver, to 
repression rather than compromise” (1971, 226).
Human development is a function of ‘leadership’ regard for human potentials.
And mechanisms and processes engineered and perpetrated by leadership disregard for 
these go to demonstrate lack of (leadership) capacity. And in any case, human rights 
abuses go further than the total disregard of human dignity. It is the process of complete 
denigration of human value and worth that goes to the very essence of human and 
societal development. It is not surprising therefore that a system that can denigrate human 
value and worth with ease would lack the capacity to appreciate those essential 
components of human development -  education, health and social welfare. Which may 
really account for the conducts of the last three military administrations, immediately 
preceding the fall of the second republic -  Buhari, Babangida and Abacha. They freely 
and indiscriminately closed institutions of higher learning, sacked lecturers, and 
physicians; and freely banned unions and organizations that as much as disagreed or 
criticized their policies.
It would not be inappropriate at this point to venture that at the end of the day, 
what seems most important is whether any (or all) of the military regimes in Nigeria has 
brought about any positive economic development changes in the country. For example, 
did the regime perform better than its predecessor, by revering negative socio-economic
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trends, such as political abuse and corruption, reduce inflation, unemployment, the 
national debt or increasing agricultural and industrial productivity? The basic finding of 
this study is that no single military regime in Nigeria exhibited a consistent ability to 
achieve its stated objectives, and none appeared to possess the unique capacity for 
dealing effectively with the dominant issues of national development and overall societal 
well-being.
However, as earlier noted in chapter one, available data on Nigeria lack the 
reliability needed to permit the establishment of cause-and-effect relationships with great 
confidence. Consequently, the outcome of contemporary empirical research under­
takings that employ these data, including this effort, should be interpreted with particular 
caution.
Although this effort was basically intended to evaluate military regimes and 
economic development in Nigeria, in the course of this exercise however, the enabling 
analysis consistently turned on the unique role and activities of state bureaucrats. Apart 
from being a holdover from sacked civilian regimes and some times, toppled military 
regimes, the civil servant seems to be a permanent feature in both policy formulation and 
implementation of successive military administrations. How their role and activities 
impact policy and goal realization is an area that requires serious study. This line of 
inquiring is particularly relevant because, although successive military regimes have 
come to government espousing their own brand of economic development philosophies, 
they have nonetheless turned to the same corrupt, conservative, red-tapped, secretive, 
insensitivity and rigidly over-centralized bureaucratic institution (Alex Gboyega, 1995) 
for implementation. And according to Adamolekun, the verdict is one of culpability
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(1986, 170). Would a change in the channels of policy formulation and implementation 
been different and more effective of each successive regime imported wholesale, its own 
policy teams? This is an area that needs further exploratory study. And whether the lack 
of performance is due to the military’s lack of superior ability or the inadequacies of the 
support institutional infrastructure they are compelled to work with or within needs 
evaluation.
At the core of any economic policy initiative or agenda are four overriding 
development challenges; what Stiglitz notes need attention: improvements in income 
distribution, environment, health and education. (Quoted by Kaushik Basu, 2000, 64). 
The available data on Nigeria suggest that the military not only underdeveloped the 
country, in light of available resources, they also created a vicious circle that has 
perpetuated the conditions of economic, social and political underdevelopment that was 
indeed the original impetus or justification for intervention.
In the light of the above, it would appear that the challenge for the Third Republic 
administration is how to grapple with the myriad of problems created by more than 29 
years of military underdevelopment, although ironically the president under the current 
civilian dispensation was himself one of the military rulers whose performance in 
government is the subject of this research. That the current civilian administration chose 
poverty alleviation as an immediate short-term policy priority only attests to the level, 
which the citizenry has collectively sunk. Poverty in the country meets the classical 
definition given by the World Bank in its 1980 World Development Report: “.. .absolute 
poverty—a condition of life so characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy and disease as to 
be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency” (World Bank, 1980, 32). The
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administration has budgeted NG10 billion for the creation of some 200,000 new jobs 
during the course of 2000 financial year. Revisiting the public sector pay structure with a 
view to raising the overall remuneration package for all categories of employees is hoped 
to enhance their purchasing power.
After many years of corruption, mismanagement, and IMF/World Bank- 
sponsored structural adjustment programme, with its emphasis on exchange-rate 
depreciation and demand management that completely impoverished the citizenry, a new 
long-term economic policy direction needs be articulated. One that would not only 
enthrone prudence and probity in the management of public affairs, especially finance, 
but evolve the maximum deployment and application of policy instruments that improve 
education, health, growth performance, generate jobs, improve wage sector incomes, 
revive industry and agriculture, improve infrastrucrural facilities (in transportation, power 
and energy and tele communications). Perhaps as important would be the efforts to 
generate non-oil revenues, including the enhancement and professionalization of the tax 
revenue generation capacity in the country.
These can only be achieved by articulating a clear and comphrensive framework 
for economic development policy design and implementation. Policies that are ad hoc 
and short-term have a way of discouraging investment, especially foreign investments. 
Government would have ensured a level of predictability and consistency in its policy 
articulation and implementation. Indeed the current civilian administration is exhibiting 
disturbing levels of inconsistency and unpredictability in its policy formulation and 
implementation, especially in the areas of privatization, public sector wage review and 
general goods import policy (The Guardian, August 14, 2001).
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In conclusion and perhaps in some not too straight forward a logic or contention, 
the best insurance policy the country’s third republic has against future military 
intervention is to formulate implement socio-economic policies that are both human- 
development relevant and actually improve the standard of living of the citizenry. 
Another is the evolution of the culture of political tolerance and accommodation that is 
devoid of mindless corruption. The challenge of this administration and any future 
civilian administration is that they have to succeed in the articulation and implementation 
of policies that improve the standard of living of the citizenry in all of its critical 
components to keep from military intervention.
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